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Abstract
This thesis examines the local development officials’ implementation in Tamil Nadu of a rural 
poverty alleviation policy--the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP)--using resource exchange 
theory. Resource exchange has not been used previously in the context of local administration. I argue, 
however, that it offers a good explanation of the local administrator’s allocation of policy resources 
because it sees this allocation in terms of his political and socio-economic environment. The official’s 
environment in the community development block gives rise to many, sometimes conflicting, demands 
for the resources under his control (thus severely his time). He exchanges policy resources with the 
resource rich to satisfy as many of these demands as possible, and to gain valuable resources in return, 
such as help in implementing other policies. By exchanging resources the administrator more easily 
satisfies demands for resource allocations from politicians (who have some control over administrative 
transfers and promotions), and from senior administrators who want program targets achieved. 
Importantly, he also minimises the time he needs to spend with each policy.
I argue that the current, "management-style" development policy and administration literature, 
which also reflects the attitudes of many senior administrators in India, is both ahistorical and 
acontextual. Its authors fail to explain the local official’s implementation of rural development policy, 
largely because they view him as acting either "pathologically" or "irrationally," rather than as responding 
as best he can to the most important demands arising from his environment.
In terms of IRDP, which seeks to raise people’s incomes above the "poverty line" through 
subsidised loans for "productive assets," the block officials have of necessity ignored most of its time- 
consuming rules of implementation. They have met IRDP’s targets by trading a large percentage of its 
resources to "loan brokers" who choose the program beneficiaries and complete program minutiae for the 
officials in exchange for other administratively-controlled resources. These brokers, many of whom have 
profited handsomely from IRDP, are little concerned with the poor beneficiaries’ welfare, and the latter 
have seldom benefited from taking ERDP loans.
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1Chapter 1
Administering Poverty Alleviation: 
’’Resource Exchange’’ Versus ’’Policy Failure"
The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate 
inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of 
people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations.
Directive Principle of State Policy 
Constitution of India 
Article 38, Clause 2
1.1. Introduction
Mrs. Gandhi’s much-publicised election slogan in 1971, "Garibi Hatao/," heralded the first major 
political attention to poverty alleviation in India. Rhetorically, poverty alleviation policies are now the 
centrepiece of the Government of India’s Five Year Plans, but in the community development blocks of 
the country poverty alleviation has received much less attention from local administrators. In this study I 
focus on the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) in two community 
development blocks of Tamil Nadu.1 I use IRDP as a tool to examine the local development 
administrator’s (especially the Block Development Officer’s) responses to his political and socio­
economic environment and argue that they lead to a tremendous divergence between rhetoric and reality 
in poverty alleviation policy implementation in India.
India’s development administration has been little studied at the block level, although the latter is at 
the centre of the Indian state’s rural development activities. The exceptions are Mook (1974) and 
Heginbotham (1975) writing on Tamil Nadu, along with some articles in Farmer (1977) arising from the 
"Cambridge Project" (based partly in Tamil Nadu’s North Arcot District). Some examples of district 
level political and administrative studies are Kothari and Roy (1969), Miller (1972), Rosenthal (1977) and 
Bjorkman (1979). The local level studies above were conducted at a time when development 
administration in Tamil Nadu and other states was primarily responsible for agricultural extension work. 
With the introduction of the World Bank-sponsored "Training and Visit" system for agricultural extension 
in Tamil Nadu in 1982, the development administration there lost its jurisdiction over agricultural 
extension (which had been its main responsibility) and became primarily responsible for poverty 
alleviation policies. There have not yet been, however, any major studies undertaken of the "new look" 
block administration. This new focus has meant in effect that senior administrators have made major 
changes to the local officials’ responsibilities-from agriculture to poverty alleviation-without trying to 
change their existing relations with rural elites.
1This is the development administration’s smallest administrative unit-comprised of anywhere from fifteen to fifty panchayat 
villages and a population in a range of about 65,000 to 150,000 in Tamil Nadu—to which funds for development policy 
implementation are disbursed. The funding available at the block has increased dramatically in recent years; twenty years ago the 
funding available in the block, with agriculture, was seven or eight lakhs, it is now at least 50 to 60 lakhs, and upto a crore (a lakh is 
100,000 and a crore is ten million) in some blocks.
My primary argument is that the block administrator implements policy by exchanging policy 
resources (including money, subsidised credit, building contracts) largely with those who have resources 
of value to him,* 2 and as will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the implementation of IRDP is not 
an exception to this. The political and socio-economic system of which the administrators are a part in 
the block makes policy resource exchange the best possible strategy for them to adopt both in terms of 
achieving policy targets and enhancing their career security. Through exchanging policy resources they 
are able to meet a number of policies’ targets quickly; by exchanging policy resources selectively the 
local administrators have the best chance of satisfying the largest number of demands on them, especially 
from important political people. The poor, with few resources of use to the administrators, are left out of 
most resource exchanges and are thus prevented from benefiting even from the policies (like IRDP) of 
which they are the "target group." Consequently, the state has not intervened effectively to alleviate 
poverty through its policies like IRDP and the National Rural Employment Program (NREP).
When policy resources are made available for the block administration to distribute, the demand for 
these comes essentially from three sources—administrators more senior to the Block Development 
Officer, locally influential people, and political people whose influence spreads beyond the boundaries of 
the block, such as the Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), the Block Chairman, and political 
party bureaucrats. I discuss the block official’s "environment of demands" in two parts. In Chapter Two, 
I look at it in the context of the development administration’s structure, and argue that while the local 
official is at the bottom of a rigid hierarchy, he is still able to respond independently to the demands 
which arise from his immediate environment In Chapter Three I explore the block official’s immediate 
political and socio-economic environment in the block, and identify the main demands (and from whom), 
which arise from it
The "survival-oriented" local administrator must accurately assess which of these demands should 
be given priority, and when. If he is fortunate he will be able to satisfy a number of demands with a single 
resource allocation. More often than not, however, he will have to respond to the demands separately, 
and he will be left with the difficult task of deciding how to satisfy as many of the individual demands as 
possible. Not surprisingly, the local administrator tries to meet the demands first of those who will cause 
him the most trouble if he ignores them (often the MLA and his major supporters in the block). In the 
local administrator’s attempts to meet these demands lies the explanation of how development policy is 
implemented in the block.
IRDP,3 with NREP, has formed the core of the Government of India’s rural poverty alleviation 
efforts since 1980, and will continue to do so at least until 1990 (the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan). 
IRDP is a program of greater complexity and with more ambitious goals in terms of rural development 
and poverty alleviation than NREP, and makes many demands of the local administrator’s time and 
ingenuity. NREP is a "food for work" program designed to relieve unemployment in the rural areas 
largely through the construction of "durable community assets." The beneficiaries under this program 
receive a few days’ additional employment in the year, and as such NREP is not designed to have 
continuing effects on its projects’ employees (unless they are constructing something like houses for 
themselves).
^’Resources," "resource exchange" (resource exchange and resource trading are used interchangeably) and "resource traders" are 
explained later in this chapter. A note on gender-while senior officials in Lidia are either male or female, the local officials are
seldom female. Hence, my use of masculine pronouns in reference to local administrators.
3A large number of evaluation studies have been conducted on IRDP. I discuss some of them in Chapter Five.
3In contrast to NREP, IRDP is meant to have a lasting impact on people’s economic lives. By 
providing beneficiaries with productive, income-producing assets like milch animals through subsidised 
loans, IRDP should make it possible for the beneficiaries to have a continuing source of extra income. 
Moreover, the purpose of IRDP is to bring program beneficiaries’ incomes "above the poverty line once 
and for all." IRDP, then, is a program which, theoretically, has the potential to have a continuing and 
lasting effect on its beneficiaries while NREP does not. Of greatest analytical interest is the way in which 
the local administrators have taken the senior administrators’ "creation" in the form of IRDP’s complex 
rules and guidelines and modified them so as to suit the political and socio-economic environment of the 
block. After setting out the block administrator’s environment in Chapters Two and Three, I examine this 
issue in Chapter Four.
The Integrated Rural Development Program’s title suggests that this policy promotes "integrated 
rural development," ie., that it encourages diversified economic development while promoting greater 
equity in the state’s rural areas. Government documents, however, always refer to IRDP as a poverty 
alleviation program (see for example, Sixth Plan, 1980: 171). Moreover, IRDP’s "success" is measured 
by senior Indian administrators in terms of the number of poor beneficiaries it "raises above the poverty 
line,"4 5but in more immediate terms the local officials’ implementation of it is judged largely by their 
achievement of the program’s "physical and financial targets." This equating of policy implementation to 
target achievement in India has given block administrators a significant amount of latitude in choosing 
how to achieve those targets. In Chapter Five I analyse the impact of the program at village-level as a 
result of resource exchange. I also include a discussion of the varied political and socio-economic 
interests of the administrator’s trading partners to highlight the important effect they have on the policy’s 
impact.
While there is a comprehensive theoretical discussion of resources and resource exchange in 
Chapter Six, I provide a brief explanation of those terms here. Loosely, "resources" may be used to 
further political, economic, or social interests.' For the purposes of policy resource exchange, the most 
important resources include: money and credit, supporters, control over jobs and contracts, land,
"contacts," education, and information.6 In a majority of cases, the pattern of control of resources in the 
rural areas arises from ownership of enough productive land to allow its owner to branch into non- 
agricuitural pursuits.
I see development or poverty alleviation policy (with distributive, as opposed to redistributive, 
content) as the resources it makes available to the development administration generally, but most 
importantly to the local (block) officials who must allocate these resources to a particular section of the
4The definition of "poverty line” is controversial in India. Some people believe that the poverty line should be equivalent to the 
costs of providing a daily minimum average food intake of 2400 calories (with 44 grams of protein), while others have argued that it 
must be based on the costs of having all the items required for a minimum level of living (particularly food, clothing, and shelter). 
A Planning Commission "expert committee" deemed in 1962 that based on 1960-61 prices the rural poverty line was Rs 15 per 
capita per month (the urban poverty line was set at Rs 20). As Kurien (1977: 118) says, however, "[t]he basis of this calculation is 
not clear but it has become a sort of magic number in writings on poverty in the country." Guhan (1986: 8) states that the 
calorie-intake poverty line is Rs 78.50 per capita per month, while the minimum needs line is Rs 101.80 (both in 1983-84 prices). 
As of 1985-86, the Planning Commission has set a rural household (consisting of five members) poverty line of Rs 6400. In the 
Sixth Plan (1981:51) the poverty line used was that devised by a Planning Commission committee in 1977 and was equal to "the 
mid-point of the monthly per capita expenditure class having a daily calorie intake of 2400 per person in rural areas," (or, Rs 3500).
5F.G. Bailey (1969) makes use of the concept "resources," but largely in relation to "political action." He discusses leaders, for 
example, and how they use resources in political competition and especially in building up their faction or party.
^om e policy and regime analysts like Ilchman and Uphoff (1969), and Roihchild and Curry (1978) have also used "resources," 
but in the context of policy making. They equate policy to an infusion of resources from the "regime" to the political-economic 
system. These authors are primarily interested in the level of resources as that relates to constraints on the policy maker’s (the 
"statesman" according to Ilchman and Uphoff) choice of policy, and his concerns about "regime legitimacy."
4"public" (the "target group"). Under conditions of resource scarcity, there is usually intense compedtion 
for existing resources, and each new policy may be seen as another round in the competition. The 
advantages of this approach are that it takes into account the dynamics of implementation (policy resource 
allocation), it focuses on the interactions between state and people at the local level (where resources 
actually change hands), and by focusing on implementation it emphasises what the state actually is 
accomplishing in the area of poverty alleviation policy, rather than what it says it will do (Mrs. Gandhi’s 
Garibi Haiao is a case in point), or what it claims it is doing (IRDP’s reducing poverty-see Chapter 
Four).7
I do not use the words "trade" or "exchange"8 to imply that these processes generally proceed as in 
the economist’s market. Rather, I locate policy resource exchange in a "bazaar" which implies that its 
transactors take more than economic considerations into account when deciding how and with whom they 
will exchange resources. Moreover, the transactors may even, on occasion, value the exchange itself 
above the resources exchanged. Because we are in a bazaar rather than a formal economic venue, the 
exchanges may be carried out in cash, kind or future considerations (or combinations thereof). 
Bargaining over the transactions may take place as well. (I discuss the "policy bazaar" in Chapter Six.) 
Ilchman and Uphoff (1969: 92-114) have, by contrast, discussed "political exchange" in political, 
economic and social "markets." Their "trading partners" are the "regime" as personified by the statesman, 
and "sectors," (which include parts of the state itself, different classes, and religious groups, in short, 
everything which is not the statesman), but they do not look at grassroots transactions.
Concrete examples of administrative resource exchange include the following: 1.) Intra-
administrative resource exchange. An illustration of this lies in the Block Development Officers’ 
"hosting" (ie., providing meals and other amenities) senior administrators on their visits to the block. The 
junior expects, although is not guaranteed of getting, favours such as a good conduct report from the 
senior administrator in return for the hosting (especially if repeated visits are involved) (see Chapter 
Two). 2.) Local official-local influential. In terms of IRDP, the BDO may ask one of the block’s 
building contractors to take charge of a number of IRDP loans and form a village milk society comprised 
of IRDP beneficiaries. The contractor completes some of the time-consuming administrative tasks which 
the block officials should do, and in return he is entitled to resource sharing with officials on IRDP 
purchase committees, no interference from block officials in the operation of his milk society, and 
improved chances of gaining block contracts. 3.) Local official-MLA. The local official disburses an 
appropriate percentage of contracts to the MLA’s supporters and arranges some well-attended publicity 
functions for the MLA. In return he may expect some help, if needed, with effecting a desired transfer.
7 Analysing policy in terms of resources also makes the expenditure budgeted for the policy an important consideration, as a 
leader’s proclaimed commitment to a policy is secondary to the amount of money eventually committed to it in the budget. 
Sussman (1982: 55 and 74) points out that in the First Five Year Plan, 100 crores (only 4.8% of the Plan total) was allotted for 
community development, and that by the end of the Plan only 46 crores had been spent. Rhetorically, however, community 
development was one of the Government of India’s top priorities. "Rural development” has also not received more than 5% of Plan 
outlays to date.
8For an introduction to sociological treatments o f "exchange" see Homans (1958 and 1961) and Blau (1964a). Their works have 
inspired many further discussions of social exchange--see Chapter Six. Blau (1955 : 99-116) discussed "exchange” (especially 
exchange of advice) within a bureaucratic setting and later (1964a: especially 88-114) in a broader, societal context. Blau (1964a: 
4-5) described exchange
as a social process of central significance in social life, which is derived from simpler processes and from which more complex processes 
are in turn derived . . .  Not all human behaviour is guided by considerations of exchange, though much of it is, more than we usually think.
Two conditions must be met for behaviour to lead to social exchange. It must be oriented toward ends that can only be achieved through 
interaction with other persons, and it must seek to adapt means to further the achievement of these ends.
5"Environment" is a somewhat hazy concept.9 I use "environment” to emphasise that the local 
administrator’s world does not begin and end with the administrative structure he works in, although it 
certainly includes it. The local official’s environment may be portrayed as an "environment of 
demands"--the relations between political and socio-economic actors in that environment in turn give rise 
to demands on the administrator. I use the term "political and socio-economic" to indicate that the actors 
outside of the administration who have bearing on the local administrator’s actions are not just those who 
hold political power, and that their interests in the resources the administrator controls are not necessarily 
political, but may be socio-economic as well.
In keeping with my use of the term "environment," I employ here, with apologies to Darwin, an 
"evolution-selection" metaphor to describe the local administrator.10 Rather than assuming, as is done in 
some of the "management" development literature, that the local administrator is "pathological," I assume 
on the contrary that he is well- or even best-adapted for his environment. George Honadle (1982: 176), 
for example, approvingly discusses R. T. Daland’s (1981) work entitled Exploring Brazilian 
Bureaucracy: Performance and Pathology. Honadle (p. 176) observes, "Researchers . . . will find the 
many solid illustrations of pathological behaviour within bureaucratic settings to be of value."* 11 I argue 
that if the official does not adapt to suit his environment he reduces his chances of survival, and over a 
number of "generations," the poorly adapted administrator ("genotype") will be selected against. The 
implications for analysis of using an evolution metaphor are thus: first, if the administrator is a small part 
of a large environment, the likelihood of his (even with the state’s resources under his control) effectively 
changing it are equally small and second, when something is well-adapted to its environment, inducing 
successful changes to it will be difficult, and if the "new" type is not well-enough adapted, it will either 
die out immediately or be selected against in future generations. Consequently, rather than a "change 
agent," the local bureaucrat is more a "status quo agent."
Local administrators have often been depicted as keepers of scarce resources. (See Thoden Van 
Velzen (1977: 225) who, borrowing from Easton (1965), calls the administrators resource "gatekeepers.") 
This view of administrative "keepers" does not do enough to capture the administrator as part of a 
dynamic process of resource allocation in which he also tries to gain resources under the control of those 
in his immediate environment Furthermore, the "gatekeeper" approach does not take into account the 
varying value of the policy resources under the administrator’s control-some of them are in such low 
demand by rural people that they represent a liability to the administrator charged with disbursing them, 
(unless he is an expert at fraudulendy allocating policy resources), because they are equivalent to unmet 
policy targets and consequent censure from superiors. In using resource exchange, one is forced to look at 
the local official as an integral part of his environment, and to determine who his main trading partners 
are, and why. I use this analysis-of resource traders-to show in the conclusion how the poor might gain 
a larger proportion of the state’s development policy resources.
To summarise, it has long been established that dominant castes and classes have captured the 
benefits of policies aimed at the rural areas. In this study I explore the mechanisms of that "capture" 
through focusing on the policy resource exchange activities of the implementing administrator in a given
9"Environment" is a concept favoured by a number of organisation theorists, although largely in relation to the organisation as an 
entity rather than the individuals within it (Kaufman, 1985).
10Kaufman (1985) uses an evolution metaphor to discuss administrative organisations.
11 "Organisational pathologies" are not solely the concern of development management specialists; see Hogwood and Peters’ 
(1985) work. The Pathology of Public Policy, which devotes a chapter to "pathology" in bureaucracy.
6political and socio-economic environment. I show that in some instances economically dominant people 
do not so much "capture" the benefits; rather they are asked to take them by the block development 
administrator doing his best to meet as many demands on him as possible. The concepts of resources and 
resource exchange are not new, but they have been little used, especially resource exchange, to analyse 
the local administrator’s implementation of development policy.12 I see block development 
administrators as exchanging policy resources whenever possible, and each policy they implement in 
terms of the quantum and type of resources it makes available in the rural areas. Among the rural public, I 
identify the main traders (who exchange resources with administrators), and explain the effects of their 
exchange activities on the implementation and impact of the Integrated Rural Development Program in 
two blocks of Tiruchirappalli District.
1.2. Problems with 'Failure’ and *Prescriptiony
The development "management" literature, a branch of the now-enormous development literature, 
offers explanations for the implementation of development policies which omit some important 
explanatory variables, largely because its authors adopt a "success-failure" view of policy (and projects), 
and have generally allowed prescription (for administrative reforms)13 to dominate analysis (especially of 
the local administrator’s environment).14 These management authors have seldom drawn on the wealth 
of organisation theory available (including March and Simon, 1958; Kaufman, 1960; Blau and Scott, 
1962; Etzioni, 1964; Downs, 1966;), taking their cues instead from the early concerns with "structural 
deficiencies" in developing country administration. Although analytical modifications have been 
introduced, much of the management-oriented development literature resembles "the Classical approach 
[to formal organisations] with its concerns for formal organizational structure" (Etzioni, 1964; 25). The 
Classical approach is characterised by concerns with accountability, efficiency, centralisation versus 
decentralisation, expertise, and the like. Etzioni’s complaint (p. 25) that "some continue to apply it as if it 
had never been criticized," is still valid for many management and development management studies. The 
views expressed in this literature are influential, as there is a close relation between the arguments and 
prescriptions expressed in it and those of senior, policy making administrators in India and elsewhere in 
the Third World.15
While it is easy to criticise the development management literature, it has made important 
contributions to our understanding of the development process. Crucially, it has brought administration- 
relegated in the past to the periphery of development issues-to the forefront of attention by development 
analysts from a broad range of disciplines. It is no longer possible to escape from the fact that all 
development projects and policies, irrespective of how technical their applications, are in some way 
administered. This literature has created an acute awareness of organisational problems, of which there
12David K. Leonard (1977) makes explicit use of exchange theory to discuss local agricultural extension agents in Kenya.
13The prescriptive trend in the development policy literature arises partly from development agencies such as the United Nations, 
the World Bank, and academics. It dates back at least to 1950 and the focus on "technical assistance" for "development" (see 
Schaffer, 1969: 182-83). The United Nations was one of the first bodies to put these concerns into practice, with its Technical 
Assistance Program in 1951 (Braibanti, 1966: 139). I am not opposed to prescription per se, but it must arise from a solid foundation 
of data and analysis.
14There is also a large literature on the technical/scientific aspects of development, especially agricultural development, which I 
do not attempt to critique here.
15Senior administrators themselves are contributors to this literature, and draw many ideas from it. This was made obvious to me 
in early 1985 when I saw a fullpage ad in the Indian Express (Madras) which depicted Robert Chambers’ (1983: 112) "deprivation 
trap." The ad stated that in Tamil Nadu the government is actively working to help the poor out o f the trap. The ad was occasioned 
by a Regional Secretaries’ Conference cm Rural Development.
7are undeniably many, and which also undeniably have an important effect on policy implementation. 
However, an administrator’s actions are determined by much more than his place, for example, in a 
devolved hierarchy. Hence, my use of resource exchange as a hoped-for corrective to what I see as the 
narrowly-focused institutional concerns of the development administration literature.
The "mainstream1’ development policy and administration literature, now over thirty years old,16 
has come to be over-represented, perhaps, by management analysts, (especially with the demise of Riggs’ 
Comparative Administration Group). Because management analysts tend to avoid discussion of the socio­
economic and political environments of implementing administrators, they have prescribed reforms which 
are based on acontextual analyses of the structural-institutional problems of Third World 
administration.17 The prescriptions are often based on the underlying notion that the local officials, as 
opposed to senior officials and foreign experts, are inexpert and corrupt, (senior administrators in India 
call local officials "irrational" when they do not implement IRDP and other policies according to "the 
rules.") This may, on occasion, be true, but surprisingly little of the literature has been devoted to major 
studies of local administration despite the emphasis that this is where the majority of problems lie. 
(Leonard’s (1977) work is an important exception to this pattern. Moreover, he is one of the few 
development administration authors to turn to organisational theory to provide a framework for his 
study.)
The literature has over the years created a heightened awareness of many of the difficulties a 
"development manager" in the Third World must face, although more blame than sympathy for "policy 
failures" (including divergences from policy design) has been laid at the feet of implemented. Senior, 
policy making administrators are viewed approvingly, while the implemented are seen in the literature 
(and, conveniently, by senior administrators) as inhibiting the senior administrators’ best efforts (not the 
least because those "best efforts" incorporate development agency suggestions). But even the "best- 
designed" project or policy is unlikely to have the impact advertised by its designers. Attempts have been 
made in the management literature to explain why policy or project implementation has so often "failed" 
but these attempts have usually drawn on "organisational constraints" to explain what has gone wrong, 
rather than to search more closely for the relations between officials and public, and between policy and 
public desires, which would add an important dimension to their analyses.18 Van Sant and Crawford 
(1985: 27) conclude, for example, that "In development practice, many strategies fail because the 
planning process does not fully consider implementation requirements." By contrast, Honadle et al. 
(1985: 34) in another article in the same volume begin by observing that "overly formalistic analyses take 
the place of understanding local circumstances."
The development management literature fits within the broader development literature, and has 
changed with the trends in that literature which I briefly review here. Bernard Schaffer (1969: 202) wrote 
that the development policy and administration literature has comprised "a series of somewhat panicky 
searches for panaceas." In the 1950s "community development" was a popular approach to the problems
16Fred Riggs was one of the earliest proponents of "development administration studies." His (1956: 70-80) article on 
development administration, saw it as the "neglected factor" in economic development. Considering the avalanche of development 
administration studies which followed, his article had the desired effect
J7This is not to argue, however, that management analysis must always be equated with superficial analysis. Some people, 
notably Chambers (1974) and Moris (1981), have successfully put management (and project) analysis into a framework of learning 
first about (and from) the "environment," including local people’s methods of administration and farming, and their socio-economic 
relations with one another.
18See Moris (1981) for a contextual, multi-disciplinary study of rural development management in Africa, and for his extensive 
bibliography.
8of rural development (particularly in India which had a fairly successful community development pilot 
project in Etawah District, Uttar Pradesh) (see Mayer et al., 1958 and Sussman, 1982), although World 
Bank lending, for example, continued to focus on major projects such as dams and steel mills. In the 
1960s the emphasis in the wider literature on development shifted to "high technology" inputs for 
agricultural production in the form of Green Revolution strategies, and with the realisation in the 1970s 
that "trickle-down" and "redistribution" efforts were unsuccessful, emphasis again shifted, this time to a 
quest for "basic needs" and a "direct attack on poverty" through the provision of "an integrated package of 
goods and services to poor farmers" (Baum, 1982: 4; see also Chenery et al., 1974; Ayres, 1983: 92-111). 
IRDP is pan of India’s "direct attack on poverty."
By the late 1970s, the "linear” development policy analysts19 were arguing that rural publics had 
been wrongly seen as passive objects of centrally-designed development policies (a position I would 
agree with), much to the detriment of policy implementation, and advocated "community participation" 
instead (Korten, 1981: 202-213). Community participation entails the reorganisation of local 
administrative offices to encourage the participation of the "development policy beneficiaries" in all 
"stages" of the policies which affect them (see especially Korten, 1980 and Rondinelli, 1982). The task of 
convincing local administrators to consult a broad cross-section of the rural population when they 
generally deal (often in financial terms) with those who are wealthy and influential in the countryside 
would be, except in limited contexts, unfeasible. It is simply not in the administrator’s interests to 
"participate" with the "community." It is time-consuming and unlikely to result in his accrual of the type 
of resources he can gain through limited relations with rural influentials. Moreover, even the "sincere" 
administrator may feel that investing much time in an unorganised, difficult to mobilise, rural poor, is a 
waste of energy (Bryant and White, 1982: 183). In the last few years, there has been increasing attention 
paid to "voluntary action groups" which are non-govemmental organisations that ideally aid the poor to 
organise for their own development efforts. The academic interest in voluntary action groups reflects a 
distrust of local administration in particular to "get the job done." Again, the search is on for panaceas. 
(On "VAGs" see Eldridge, 1984 and Kothari, 1984.)
It would be inaccurate to tag the entire development policy and administration literature, even its 
significant management component, as "acontextual." Fred Riggs, for example, was an early proponent 
of "contextual" studies of development administration. He wrote (1956: 80) that there are "complex 
interrelationships between cultural values and administrative and economic problems." Riggs (1964) 
ascribed too much importance to traditional (cultural) forces at work on the administrator, but he 
shrewdly observed that local bureaucrats espouse a set of behavioural norms on one hand (which conform 
to their superiors’ expectations), while eschewing it on the other. My interviews with local administrators 
and villagers support this argument. The officials spoke in terms of "helping the poor," while villagers 
told us the officials were only interested in meeting program targets and collecting bribes.
More recently, Merilee Grindle’s (1980) edited volume, Politics and Policy Implementation in the 
Third World, also represents a move away from the "acontextual." Its cover announces its discussion of 
"the broader questions of how both the content and the context of public policy affects its
19Schaffer and Clay (1984: 3) refer to the "mainstream” model of policy analysis which incorporates a "linear" view of policy. 
The mutual reinforcement of approaches between development agencies and "mainstream" academics manifests itself in the World 
Bank’s "project cycle" which is equivalent to the linear policy approach (Baum, 1982). The "cycle" has six stages, beginning with 
project identification and ending in evaluation with steps such as appraisal and implementation in between. The Bank’s author 
(1982: 5) states that "each project passes through a cycle that, with some variations, is common to all." He does not acknowledge 
that the local political and socio-economic context of the project can be such a dominant force as to scuttle the neatly planned 
project cycle.
9implementation." However, a number of the management literature’s contextual studies, and most of the 
Grindle book articles are not exceptions, do not follow through the implications of their observations 
because of their underlying assumptions about policy and administration. Their main assumption is that 
political and/or administrative policy makers do, indeed, design policy to achieve some "greater good" for 
the people. (For a counterpoint to this, see Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke (1984), who argue that 
policies to promote subsidised rural credit are nearsighted, and more likely to aid the rich than the poor. 
Honadle et al. (1985: 38) also suggest there are numerous "examples of initiatives that left the 
beneficiaries worse off than before the project started.") Moreover, some of these authors’ research 
methods give them little choice but to believe what senior administrators tell them, as they seldom stray 
outside of the capital cities and if they do, it is for a short time and in the company of the senior 
administrators (Moris, 1981: 7). (Chambers and Moris are exceptions, as is Grindle; Chambers (1983) 
complains about "development tourists.") R. L. Rothstein (1976: 701) provides an example of someone 
who has not followed through the implications of his observations. He argues that
the political systems of many lesser developed countries . . .  are split by sharp conflicts over very scarce 
resources between groups that mistrust each other and share only the desire to control the state for their 
own benefit. There is little consensus, there are insufficient resources to satisfy all groups, and the losers 
fear (with much justification) that they will be permanently denied access to the political arena and to their 
fair share of benefits.
He concludes, however, (1976: 705) that
. .  .they [the elite] mus t . . .  seek to legitimize their rule not only by competence but also by receiving the 
loyalty and support of the masses. They can do this only by convincing the masses that the government is 
actively seeking the public good, and by evincing some reciprocity in their own behaviour-by attacking 
corruption, by refusing to govern for the benefit of special interests, and by living in a style that is neither 
luxurious nor decadent.
Prescriptions for administrative reform generally imply that structural changes are needed in the 
local administrative offices, and often amount to suggestions for major behavioural changes in these 
offices. Because local administrators seldom "implement" policies as they are designed, management 
analysts conclude either that the officials themselves are inefficient and corrupt, or that there are major 
organisational constraints to efficiency (Bryant and White, 1982, take the latter position; Daland, 1981, 
the former).20 The prescriptive administrative studies, including a recent Government of India report 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1985a), generally begin with the premise that the local administrator must be 
changed, whether it is to change his responsibilities (encourage him to be a planner in addition to an 
implementer, as is done in India), or his relations with the public (including changing his attitudes toward 
the public, and with whom he primarily interacts.) If India’s development administration is any 
indication of changes possible in an administrative department, even a "simple" reform like increasing 
staff levels (staffing changes are often favoured by development managers--see Morss et al., 1985 for a 
discussion) in the block is difficult to put into practice, especially if the government’s spending priorities 
lie elsewhere.21
20Van Sant and Crawford (1985: 12) squarely blame organisational constraints for project failure: "On paper, IRDP II [a project 
in Jamaica] commanded the resources necessary to achieve its objectives; in reality, however, the project was seriously handicapped 
by its bureaucratic environment."
21 The contrast in staffing between the revenue and development administrations at the local level in Tamil Nadu is striking, and 
provides a good example of the state’s differing spending priorities. The revenue administration, after changes introduced in the 
1980s, has virtually one official per (revenue) village, while the development administration has at best, one official per three or 
four (panchayat) villages (which may be the same size as revenue villages). Ironically, the revenue administration has far more 
officials in charge of collecting much less money than the development administration is supposed to spend. For the financial year 
1983-84, for example, the land revenue demand for Tiruchi District was Rs 2.06 crores while in the same year the district’s IRDP 
spending target, representing less than a quarter of the "development” budget, was Rs 2.46 crores. (These data are from Tiruchi 
Collectorate mimeos.)
10
Corruption22 is seen as one of the (if not the) major bureaucratic pathologies standing in the way of 
"successful" implementation, although some authors23 ignore it (it is politically imperative for a 
development agency analyst not to mention evidences of corruption in the host country) and others have 
commended the use of "speed money" to "oil" the wheels of the bureaucratic machinery.24 Most 
treatments of corruption in the literature (Wade (1982a) is an exception), however, do not recognise that it 
is a reflection of the type of resource scarce environment in which the administrators work, and that much 
corruption is systemic; in India it exists at many levels in the bureaucracy, and it involves others outside 
of the bureaucracy as well (Narasimhan, 1987: 9). The latter point is important, for it is extremely 
difficult to tackle the problem of corruption by only focusing on administrators.25 If only part of a system 
is changed, and even effecting this transformation is problematic, the change is unlikely to have a desired, 
or lasting, effect. As is to be expected, senior administrators often accuse their juniors of corruption while 
maintaining their own innocence.26
Administrative prescriptions have a tendency to rely on the "pathological" to overcome identified 
bureaucratic pathologies. In other words, the administrators who have been accused of exhibiting self- 
serving behaviour and a lack of sympathy for, or understanding of, "rural publics," are expected to give 
up whatever advantages they have been able to accumulate. As David Hirschmann (1981:473) argued:
. . .  in urging the bureaucrat to raise the status of field officers, to emphasize rural development, to flatten 
hierarchical arrangements, and to bring the masses into the decision-making process, it is asking him to 
alter his internal administrative conduct, to initiate innovations which in terms of manpower, organization, 
and finance are difficult and above all, to do this at the risk of his own privilege, security, and interests.
It may, however, be fruitless to suggest that politicians or military personnel should enforce bureaucratic
reforms. Unfortunately they too, have made large gains through systemic corruption, and in a number of
developing countries protect the system they profit by through violence. In India politicians have control
over administrators’ transfers and promotions (and other punishments and rewards) and they wield this
power in order to extract payments and services from the, in this situation, vulnerable administrators (see
Bhambhri, 1982:28-34 and Wade, 1985).
Many development management authors have been concerned primarily with rectifying those 
features of administrative offices, especially "rigid, over-centralised hierarchies," which detract from their 
"optimal efficiency" in implementing policy (including Riggs, 1964; Gant, 1966). These "scientific 
management" concerns have been expressed partly through the view that administrative offices should be 
decentralised, devolved, or deconcentrated,27 to make them more efficient agents not only of policy 
implementation, but of local planning as well (UNCRD 1981 and 1982; Conyers, 1983). Advocates of
22Corruption is a form of resource exchange which also includes resource sharing, but as I will argue, by no means all of resource 
exchange is "corrupt."
^See Rondinelli, 1982; UNCRD, 1981 and 1982.
^For some works on corruption see Scott, 1972; Leys, 1965; Nye, 1967; and Tilman, 1968. Misra (1986: 275) contends that 
overall, "speed money" has the reverse effect, that is, it slows down rather speeds up bureaucratic action because even where 
decisions are taken quickly, this knowledge is kept from the "applicant,” and he is forced to pay to "speed" a decision which has 
already been taken.
^It is commonly suggested, for example, that corrupt administrators should be paid higher wages to stop their corruption. This 
suggestion is at least 150 years old in terms of the Indian Subcontinent. In 1837, a judge, F.J. Shores wrote " . . .  it is only on known 
and selected men receiving high pay on permanent appointments that we can rely for acting uprightly in matters for which a close 
superintendance is impossible" (quoted in Rosselli, 1971: 151).
2ßNeedless to say corrupt behaviour is difficult to uncover with a great deal of accuracy, as informants in the political and 
administrative worlds are unwilling to discuss it.
27See Conyers (1983) for definitions. Simply, these terms all refer to reducing administrative hierarchies and bestowing more 
decision-making, planning, and financial powers to "middle" and ’low" level officials.
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decentralisation and other administrative reforms which emphasise giving more discretionary powers of 
both implementation and planning to local bureaucrats assume, perhaps, both too great a capability on the 
part of the lower level official, and too great a willingness of the senior administrator to pan with some of 
his/her effective powers. Van Sant and Crawford (1985: 4), however, caution us against accepting 
governmental decentralisation rhetoric: "Since decentralized authority is rarely accompanied by real local 
control over resources, decentralized projects can be used to augment a centrally directed bureaucratic 
presence at the grassroots."
An obvious problem, however, in devolving greater powers to the local administrator is that if this 
does lead to him having greater control over resources, it makes him even more the target, whether a 
willing or unwilling one, of attempts to influence his distribution of resources. As soon as MLAs and 
locally influential people realise that their nearest source of state policy resources has even greater 
resources at his disposal they are likely to step up their efforts to secure them for their own benefit. An 
important impression I carried from the block development offices was that the most crucial change 
which had occurred in the blocks as a result of the shift from agricultural extension to poverty alleviation 
related to the large infusion of money for contract programs (partly in the guise of NREP and RLEGP). 
This money has made the block office much more a centre of political attention than it was in the past 
Policy
While "linear" policy analysts have paid some attention to problems with policy design, policy 
makers have seldom been criticised, at least partly because of their co-operative relationship with 
development agencies (see Cleaves, 1980 as an example of this). The politics behind various policy 
decisions have not been explored, and policy goals have generally been taken at their face value (Ilchman 
and Uphoff, 1969).28 As mentioned, there has been too great a tendency to assume an inherent "good" in 
statesmen’s policy goals, and in the policies’ or projects’ beneficent effects should they be implemented 
as intended. Even if policy makers are well-intentioned, however, they may be unable to design effective 
rural development policy simply because they are so far-removed from their own, especially poor, rural 
populations (see Chambers, 1983). Additionally, senior policy makers design policies without taking into 
account the "politics" that are likely to occur during the allocation of a policy’s resources, but then 
complain later about "political interference" in the policy’s implementation. They ignore or dismiss the 
local administrator’s political and socio-economic environment despite its impact on his allocation of 
policy resources.
Policy has often been equated with governmental "output," but this is like equating policy with 
government pronouncements. Kohli (1983: 649-71) in an article on "regime types" and land reforms in 
India adopts this position. While I would agree with his basic view (1987: 36) that regime types can be 
"associated with patterns of development," it must be kept in mind that government pronouncements are 
not what policy does. Instead, I see greater utility in Griffin’s (1979: 176) much-quoted warning that
Rather than assume that governments attempt to maximise social or national welfare but fail to do so, it 
might be more suitable to assume that governments have quite different objectives and generally succeed in 
achieving them. Rather than criticising governments for failing to attain what they did not set out to attain, 
or offering advice on how to attain a non-goal, it would be more instructive if more time were devoted to 
analysing what governments actually do and why.
For the purposes of this study, however, I take IRDP’s form as "given," and do not speculate at length on 
the central government’s possible ulterior motives in devising such a policy. Moreover, even if policy
28In senior political and administrative circles in India rural electrification has long been touted as a "minimum need” which will 
aid in the fight against rural poverty. When one goes to an electrified village in Tamil Nadu, however, one soon sees that those who 
are gaining the most from electricity are those with enough land to warrant the purchase of an electric pump. Electricity, then, 
boosts agricultural production of those who are already at the top end of the rural income scale. It is implausible that New Deihi’s 
policy makers did not realise that the benefits o f electricity would go more to the rich than to the poor.
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pronouncements were an accurate reflection of state intentions, there is seldom a close relation between 
policy pronouncements at the "top" and the actual implementation of policy at the "bottom."
The "mainstream" approach to policy focuses on the "stages" of a single policy and unduly 
emphasises the separation of implementation from policy making (examples are Scott, 1969; Smith, 
1973; Rothchild and Curry, 1978; Grindle, 1980). An example of the difficulty in separating policy into 
separate stages is that before the "implementation process" of the policy even starts, people’s (those 
privileged few who have learned of it) perceptions of what the policy may do could cause them to behave 
in a certain way--whether to try to circumvent the policy, or to enhance the likelihood of their gaining by 
it. This was true of land reform policy in India. When large landholders learned that its implementation 
was a possibility they took various counter-measures, such as putting land in servants’ and relatives’ 
names, to avoid losing even a small part of their holdings (see Herring, 1983). Furthermore, looking at 
the "stages" of a single policy obscures the implementer’s reality. India’s block development 
administrators, for example, have always implemented more than one policy simultaneously, which 
affects what they do with each one.29
Many writers on development policy have judged a policy a success or failure by whether it has 
been implemented in the way intended (publicly) by its designers (Montgomery, 1980 and Grindle et al., 
1980). In a majority of cases, the policy will not have been implemented according to design, its "goals" 
not been achieved and therefore its implementation will be deemed a failure.30 Policy which has not 
achieved its "goals" should not be simply dismissed as a failure, however, as it is more important to 
analyse what impact it has had, and why. As Bernard Schaffer (1984: 189) has argued, "public policy is, 
after all, what it does,” and not what it is meant to do. "What it does" has much to do with the "fit" 
between the policy’s design and the local administrator’s environment Therefore, it would be a useful 
exercise to point out as many of the demands made on the local implementer as possible, where these 
originate from, and how they might affect his allocation of policy resources.
Ironically, if a policy has not been implemented as it is meant, from certain perspectives it may be a 
great success-from the perspective, for example, of those who have, perhaps, unintentionally benefited 
(Cleaves, 1980 makes this argument). Sivaraman (1976: 403) argues, however (primarily with reference 
to agricultural extension), that rural elites in India do not unintentionally benefit from rural development 
policies; rather they ensure that policy benefits flow to them through their contacts with political and 
administrative actors. The same has been true to a certain extent of IRDP; the well-connected building 
contractor in the block has a better chance of taking charge of fifty subsidised loans than the agricultural 
labourer has of getting one subsidised loan.
It is important not to abstract one policy’s implementation from the context of other policies. The 
concurrent availability of a number of policies’ resources gives a relative value to each, thus helping to 
determine the demand for each. Policy should also be put into the context of policies which have been 
implemented in the past. When a "new" policy is to be implemented, the local administrators already will
29A BDO listed the following policies which he is in charge of (this does not include ad hoc tasks, attending meetings, writing 
reports, and many other responsibilities): IRDP, NREP, RLEGP, Massive Program of Assistance for Small and Marginal Fanners, 
Village Works Program, Family Welfare, Small Savings, Bio-Gas, Construction of Women Teachers’ Houses, Maintenance of Hand 
and Power Pumps, Construction of Sanitary Facilities (especially public latrines), other miscellaneous works, and the Noon Meal 
Scheme.
30Some suggestions, such as Cleaves’ (1980), to make policy goals clearer for administrators to understand and follow, are aimed 
at improving implementadon. My data on IRDP suggest that this would tend to have a positive effect, but a quantitative one rather 
than a qualitative one.
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have established styles of implementation which incorporate particular relations with villagers (excepting, 
of course, if a newly established department is involved, but in this case the villagers will have certain 
expectations—which would affect the new officials-based on their relations with existing departments). 
This past experience will have an important effect on the way the current policy’s resources are allocated. 
Many policies Indian block officials implement now are termed "poverty alleviation policies," but this has 
not resulted in them changing their main contacts in the rural areas developed over many years.
I try to avoid the "success-failure" dichotomy of the linear development policy literature. The local 
administrators’ allocation of policy resources reveals much about what the impact of the policy resources 
in the villages might be, ie., it tells us who has taken control of which resources and how. Analysing 
policy in terms of its "stages" and its success or failure, blurs both the process of resource allocation, and 
the administrator’s relations with those of his political and socio-economic environment. "Success- 
failure" forces one to judge a policy’s implementation with reference to its stated goals, rather than to 
examine the reasons why the local officials have chosen to implement a policy in a certain way.
The linear development policy and management administration literature have been both too 
institutional and "regime" or "statesman"-oriented, with, perhaps, too much credence given to political 
leaders’ overt policy goals. Policy makers themselves have shown a lack of awareness of the local 
administrator’s political and socio-economic environment which has led them to devise policies, such as 
ERDP, which cannot both be implemented according to its mles and have its targets met. The literature 
has been too prescriptive, with too great a tendency to discuss the implementing administrators’ 
behaviour without reference to their socio-economic and political environment The community 
participation literature called for the need to "close the gap" between the bureaucracy and the poor 
(Korten, 1980). It is just as important, however, to close the gap between senior officials and the 
implementers who are at the centre of development policy resource exchange in the state.
1.3. Area and Methods
The research for this study was undertaken in Tiruchirappalli (Tiruchi) District of central Tamil 
Nadu. It has an area of 11,095 square kilometres, making it the second largest of Tamil Nadu’s nineteen 
districts. There is a state government proposal to bifurcate Tiruchirappalli, but nothing concrete (as of 
mid-1988) has yet been done toward carrying this out. I decided to work in Tiruchirappalli District for a 
number of reasons. First, it is fairly typical of Tamil Nadu as a whole in that its agricultural economy is 
based both on paddy and other grains, and it has both riverine and groundwater sources of irrigation. 
Because the district has both "wet" and "dry" areas, it offers an opportunity to study the same program, 
under the same district administration but under quite different socio-economic conditions.31 Second, 
Tiruchi has never been under the purview of any special program which would lead to its blocks having 
differing administrative arrangements from the usual. Third, unlike its neighbour Tanjavur, it has not 
already been the subject of numerous political and administrative studies.
The district’s population according to the latest (1981) census is 3,612,320 of which 2,688,596 
(74%) is classified as rural. Tiruchirappalli has thirty-one community development blocks with rural
31Pattems of landholdings and of caste structure vary markedly between wet and dry areas of Tamil Nadu. See in particular, 
Haro, Mizushima and Nakamura (1982).
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populations that vary from a low of 72,100 in one block of 20 village and town panchayats32 to a high of 
158,600 in 32 village and town panchayats (this largest block, Kulithalai, was bifurcated in 1986, but 
because the central government has yet to recognise it, Tiruchi District still receives central government 
funds for 31 blocks).
The two blocks I chose to work in are Lalgudi (47 village and town panchayats-population of 
118,902) and Thuraiyur (34 village and town panchayats and one town-rural population of 86,788 and a 
total population of 110,380). Both blocks contain taluk headquarters (the towns of Lalgudi and 
Thuraiyur).33 I chose to work in the blocks of Thuraiyur and Lalgudi because I did initially want to 
compare the administration of the program under differing agro-economic conditions. I had been led to 
expect differences in program impact in "wet" and "dry" blocks (see for example, Baker (1984)), but soon 
found out that the pattern of IRDP’s implementation in the two blocks was virtually identical. Lalgudi is 
one of the two wettest blocks in Tiruchirappalli while Thuraiyur is dry.34 I chose Thuraiyur because, 
besides being dry, it has a fairly large number of villages and a good record of spending under ERDP (I 
did not want to work in a block with a poor performance under the program as I was most interested in 
seeing how it is being implemented, rather than looking for reasons as to why it is not). Admittedly, it 
also has good public transport facilities.
Before embarking on the block and village research I interviewed senior administrators 
(reinterviewing some of them at later stages in the project) of the Local Administration and Rural 
Development Department in Madras to ascertain their perspectives of IRDP’s problems and successes in 
Tamil Nadu, and the areas where they think improvement is needed. After these interviews, I went to the 
district headquarters of Tiruchirappalli where I spoke with district officials and bankers, which gave me a 
good idea as to what their opinions of the block officials are. In both blocks I chose villages on the basis 
of the ERDP subsidies that had flowed into them. I visited those at the top and bottom ends of the 
spending scales (with preference given to those at the top), so that I could see what factors were at work 
in drawing the program benefits to particular villages and not to others. During the village survey work 
(six months in 1985 and two months in 1986), I lived first in lalgudi Block and then in Thuraiyur.
I decided not to survey a large number of officials as I found that they were often adept at both 
telling interviewers what they thought the latter wanted to hear, and in presenting facts the way their 
supervisors would want to hear them. Because of this, I had a larger number of unstructured discussions 
with a few officials, as I found that as they became better acquainted with me, they began to speak more 
frankly about sensitive issues, such as their relations with political people. I interviewed twenty district 
and block bank officials and about forty administrators in Tamil Nadu, from Rural Welfare Officers at the 
bottom of the pecking order to a former Chief Secretary of the state; the majority of officials I spoke with 
were posted within Tiruchi District.
32According to census classifications, the village and town panchayat population is rural, while that in a town is urban. Both 
village and town panchayats have elected panchayat councils. Village and town panchayats often are comprised of a number of 
settlements, or hamlets.
3jThe taluk is the smallest revenue administration unit with a headquarters. In Tamil Nadu it generally comprises two to four 
community development blocks. Tiruchi District, for example, has thirty-two blocks, ten taluks, and eight development divisions.
^ I  quickly discovered in Tiruchi District that there is "dry" and "very dry." Distinctions have long been drawn in the literature 
between "wet" and "dry" without a distinction drawn between "backward dry" and "forward dry." While I do not wish to enter a 
wet-dry debate here, it is clear that historians have been guilty of accepting land revenue records at their face value. Even today, 
after the "sprouting" of numerous electric pumps in Tamil Nadu, land revenue does not classify well-irrigated lands as "wet." 
Thuraiyur Block, for example, is "dry" in the sense that it has no riverine irrigation and few reliable tanks, but it has many reliable 
wells which have led it to a thriving cash crop (onions, chilies, sunflowers, limes, and grapes) economy. I might have found more 
differences between the two blocks in the implementation of IRDP, had Thuraiyur been a "backward dry" block, rather than 
"forward dry." (My observations on this issue have greatly profited by discussions with colleagues, especially V. K. Ramachandran, 
at tire Madras Institute of Development Studies.)
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I did not ask villagers or officials directly about "resource exchange." This seemed a counter­
productive way to proceed, as respondents would be pushed into my framework of analysis. For 
example, when we interviewed ERDP milk society presidents, I first asked them generally about how and 
why they started a society, and then moved into more specific questions about which officials they had 
had contact with, and whether they had continuing contacts with them. Our interviews with beneficiaries, 
without any prodding, quickly showed that many had paid bribes to officials-a common example of 
corrupt resource exchange. Admittedly, I found out the least about resource exchange from the officials 
themselves (primarily because of the element of corruption in it), but some tactful questioning about their 
relations with the public, politicians, and other administrators gave me valuable insights on the local 
administrator as a resource trader.
To collect information about the villages, I visited nineteen panchayat villages, including all their 
hamlets, with the help of a research assistant35, and information was gathered on one other village by my 
field assistants alone, with eleven villages surveyed in Lalgudi and nine in Thuraiyur. We consulted 
people who were considered "opinion leaders" in the villages. In all, we spoke with over 300 "opinion 
leaders," who ranged from ex-Panchayat Presidents (and newly elected Presidents in 1986) to building 
contractors, caste (jati) leaders, political party village representatives, credit society officials, teachers, 
and parish priests. While I had prepared a list of core questions about the villages (regarding village land 
use patterns, caste structure, bus facilities, schools, proximity of veterinary clinics, year of electrification, 
etcetra), we asked more of respondents depending on their career or caste backgrounds. These interviews 
varied in length from thirty minutes to three hours depending on the respondent’s knowledge, loquacity, 
and suspicions about our intentions (some people thought, despite our explanations to the contrary, that 
we were from the government). In every village we visited, we interviewed about fifteen to twenty 
(occasionally less) "opinion leaders," which generally took four or five days.
IRDP beneficiary surveys were completed by a research assistant generally working independently. 
His task, not always easy, was to find the beneficiaries and ask them questions relating to their education, 
household size, employment, landholdings, how they learned of the program, costs incurred in acquiring 
the asset(s), what procedures were followed in acquiring the asset(s), whether they still had it/them, the 
loan and subsidy amounts, whether they thought they had profited by acquiring the asset, and how they 
had voted in the last state and federal elections. If the beneficiary volunteered further information of 
interest, it was also noted. Some of the information volunteered by the beneficiaries proved to be 
invaluable. I found out from beneficiaries, for example, about some of them being forced by their milk 
society president to purchase their assets (cattle) only at certain markets, or through particular brokers.
Overall, I felt that by carrying out extensive interviews in villages rather than in block development 
offices, it was possible to assemble a more accurate picture of the pattern of IRDP’s implementation, 
including the officials’ resource exchanges with villagers, and its impact.
35I speak Tamil, but felt it would appear too unseemly for a woman to visit villages and talk to men alone. Moreover, my 
command of Tamil is not good enough to capture all the nuances of my respondents’ replies. It should be noted that all village 
names given in the study are the actual names.
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Chapter 2
The Development Administration’s 
Structure and Function: Room for Exchange
"You want the Himalayas in North Arcot? Yes, sir! The Ganga in Tamil Nadu? I can do it!"—A  BDO  
explaining how he responds to face-to-face demands from senior administrators.
The block administration, the most important agent of development policy implementation, does 
not operate in a vacuum impervious to external pressures. Its officials work in an "environment of 
demands" which, for ease of presentation, I break into two parts. In this chapter I examine the policy and 
administrative context of the block, looking at the block office’s denizens, administrators senior to them, 
the relations between the two, and the rural development policies the block administration has been 
responsible for implementing since Independence. In the next chapter I will discuss the current political 
and socio-economic context of the block official. These two chapters taken together set the "stage," 
"props," and "leading actors" of IRDP’s implementation. Block officials have "stage directions" in the 
form of the policy’s rules and guidelines, but the directions are unlikely to be followed if the available 
props are not as envisioned in the directions and if the other supporting actors are using different scripts. 
However, once the local administrator is placed in his political and administrative environment (once his 
actual props are found and the other actors’ scripts understood), his allocation of IRDP’s resources 
through resource exchange (through rewriting the stage directions) is easily explained.
I argue that the major inducements to local administrative resource exchange lie in the political and 
socio-economic side of his immediate environment, but that the policy and administrative side offer little 
by way of hindrances to this behaviour. The block officials, for example, have a large number of policies 
to implement concurrently which encourages them to seek means by which they can meet their policy 
targets in the least amount of time. Resource exchange is the most commonly used means by which the 
block officials both save time and develop useful connections with other administrators and those outside 
of the administration (the latter will be examined in Chapter Three). Moreover, while there is a rigid 
administrative hierarchy, it is exercised primarily with reference to the achievement of quantitative policy 
targets rather than the quality of the local official’s implementation. This gives the local administrator 
some freedom in choosing implementation strategies which, as in IRDP’s case, bear little relationship to 
program implementation guidelines.
When India gained its independence from the British in 1947, experience in development policy 
formulation and implementation on the Subcontinent was minimal. The British had not concerned 
themselves much with rural development, and their bureaucracy, particularly that part of it which 
extended into rural areas, was geared primarily, although not wholly, to the extraction of agricultural and 
land taxes and, of course the maintenance of law and order. One could, however, occasionally find 
programs such as are found in rural India today. These included, for example, the creation of credit 
co-operatives (especially in Madras Presidency-see Robert, 1979) and rural works programs explicitly
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for Harijans, such as building paths from their hutments to burial grounds (see Tiruchirappalli District 
Gazetteer Supplement, 1927). In 1943 the British launched the Grow More Food campaign (GMF) after 
the Japanese invasion and takeover of Burma and the consequent loss of rice imports into India from 
Burma (Sarma, 1981: 11). The British expanded and improved irrigation facilities in major river systems, 
and undertook famine relief works (precursors of the National Rural Employment Program), but they had 
little by way of systematic agricultural or rural development policy.
Today’s block administration is based directly on American engineer, Albert Mayer’s ideas. 
Mayer’s famous pilot project which was started in 1948 in Etawah District of Uttar Pradesh was largely 
responsible for the design, not only of the Community Development program but of the National 
Extension Service as well, and was the forerunner of the development administration in India. He put 
into effect a system which was comprised of generalist and specialist administrators in an administrative 
unit significantly smaller than the district-the Community Development Block. Hereafter, particularly 
after the introduction of Panchayati Raj institutions, the block rather than the district, would be the main 
focus of development policy implementation and, theoretically at least, of planning as well.1 The block 
would have Village Level Workers (Gram Sevaks) at the bottom of what Mayer hoped would not be a 
rigid hierarchy (Mayer et al., 1958: 70-75). The Block Development Officer, the senior officer at the 
block level and a generalist administrator, has a staff of technical/specialist extension officers and 
generalist Village Level Workers. The success, however, of India’s Community Development program 
and the National Extension Service rested on the shoulders of the Gram Sevak, but the administration was 
never structured to help the Gram Sevak to bear their weight.
Despite the importance Prime Minister Nehru and others ascribed to the task of rural development 
in the early post-Independence years, it is evident that the development administration was structured so 
that it would not be a threat to the precedence of existing administrative departments, especially the 
revenue administration which, by virtue of its long history in British India, was one of the most firmly 
entrenched bureaucratic structures at Independence. In the districts the revenue administration, with the 
primacy of the District Collector, had no administrative rivals. The solution, then, was to create an 
administration extending to the field, and which could undertake agricultural extension work, but which 
would not challenge the revenue administration.2 This was accomplished by also having the Collector in 
charge of the development administration at the district level. Any additional officers posted in the 
district for the purposes of development and/or extension work would be the Collector’s junior.
*111 Indian administrative history there is no denying the importance of the district. As it says in the First Five Year Plan (1951: 
128),
The structure of administration developed during the past century was based upon the district as the principal unit with the district officer as 
the government’s principal representative in touch with the people. . . .  In the hierarchy of administration, he enjoyed status and powers 
which gave him considerable influence over the local population. . . . The district is still the most important single unit of administration. 
Recent developments have, however, altered this position and emphasised the need for giving an altogether fresh orientation to district 
administration.
Agricultural Department officials did not want the creation of a new bureaucracy either, and the separate Community 
Development Ministry was subsumed by Agriculture by the mid-Sixties (Sussman, 1982: 58).
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2.1. The Development Administration Cast
2.1.1. In The Block
The Block Development Officer, or Panchayat Union Commissioner as he is called in Tamil Nadu, 
is the head administrator of the block and one of the key figures in the development administration 
hierarchy. Crucially, final control over development fund disbursements is vested with him. The block 
budget has increased ten-fold since the early sixties, and the Block Development Officer of 1987 has a 
greater number of policies and programs under his purview than the BDO of 1962. The development 
administration in Tamil Nadu no longer does agricultural work at all. At the same time that Tamil Nadu’s 
Rural Development and Local Administration Department had agricultural extension work removed from 
its purview (early 1980s), it also lost jurisdiction over health and education (despite this, however, the 
block office is still responsible for running special "camps," such as for eye care, and it also retains 
responsibility for the construction and maintenance of village school buildings and women teachers’ 
quarters). Despite these "losses," however, with the addition of ERDP, RLEGP, NREP, and a number of 
other programs, the block budget increased dramatically in the 1980s.
The BDO’s is likely one of the most "high-pressure" jobs in the state public service-although it can 
also be lucrative-as the person who holds it must respond to administrative and political masters whose 
demands may be at cross-purposes with one another. Moreover, the BDO is vulnerable, as the politicians 
such as Block Chairmen and MLAs have the powers to have a block official transferred if he does not 
comply with their demands (this issue is examined in Chapter Three). One BDO remarked woefully on 
the number of heart attacks suffered by BDOs in the previous few years. Moreover, a senior 
administrator in Madras, himself formerly attached to the development administration for about four 
years, termed the development administration "the most demoralised department in Tamil Nadu." One 
reason for this is the very limited opportunities for promotion afforded to the non-IAS officials in the 
development administration, particularly those in the block. Another reason, however, is the political 
pressure (primarily from MLAs but now also from Block Chairmen) on block staff which leads to rapid 
transfers and job insecurity for them.3
BDOs vary considerably in their level of skills as BDOs, but there is'equally considerable 
divergence between the views of senior administrators and politicians regarding whether a BDO is "good" 
or not Politicians, for example, prefer a malleable official who disburses contracts according to their 
wishes. Senior administrators are keen on local officials who are good at meeting their targets (or at least 
skilled at appearing to meet their targets). If the BDO meets his targets and keeps the politician satisfied, 
then his chances for a good transfer or promotion are highest. Unfortunately, the BDO’s chances of 
promotion are not based on what, for example, IRDP beneficiaries think of his work. The "skilled" BDO, 
then, "survives" in the block of his choice for a maximum period of three years, but in so doing must be 
able to satisfy both administrators’ and politicians’ demands, which means relegating a low priority to the 
poor’s needs.
The one block, however, which even the "skilled" BDO cannot choose to be transferred to is his 
"native" place. In fact, the BDO in Tamil Nadu (I am uncertain of the practice in other states) cannot
■The BDO can please the MLA by favouring his supporters, and make some money out of it as well. The latter may cause its 
own kind of pressure, however, in that the occasional BDO is caught. Copestake (1987: 161) notes that 40 BDOs (of 378) were 
facing disciplinary charges in Tamil Nadu in 1986.
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even be posted in the taluk of his birth. This is an administrative rule which acknowledges the potential 
importance of family and place in biasing administrative behaviour. While the local administrator’s 
"primordial connections" are kept to a minimum, this has not precluded his rapid development of political 
and financial "connections" in the block.
BDOs represent the "middle"--they are middle-aged, middle class, and generally middle to high 
caste (although seldom Brahmin; Brahmins are much more frequently found in the elite Indian 
Administrative Service). Their average education is, however, much higher than that of the rural 
population’s, and generally higher than that of the politicians (including the MLA) they "serve." Many 
BDOs have Bachelor’s Degrees and most have attended tertiary educational institutions. One former 
BDO (now Divisional Development Officer) I interviewed has a Master’s Degree in Sociology. James 
Bjorkman (1979; 44) showed that of his sample of 275 block to district officials in Andhra Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, 58% had Bachelor’s Degrees, another 14% had M.A.s and/or Ph.D.s, while 4% had university 
Certificates or Diplomas. By comparison, 27% of Bjorkman’s sample of 214 politicians had tertiary 
educational qualifications. BDOs normally come from the state’s smaller urban centres.
The BDOs have been in the development administration for twenty years or so before reaching this 
post. Most of them would have spent a large number of years as block extension officers, quite possibly 
always within the same district, and so their knowledge of the workings of the block development 
machinery in the district would be considerable prior to being promoted to BDO. Moreover, some BDOs 
and former DDOs I spoke with had served first as extension officers and then as BDOs in the same blocks 
in Tiruchi District This would lessen the negative impact of rapid transfers noted by Chambers (1983). 
(He argues that rapid transfers prevent the official from knowing enough about the area he is posted in to 
formulate development plans for it.)
The monetary, "life-cycle" demands placed on the Block Development Officer (and other 
administrators as well) by his family may lead to his need to adopt a policy resource exchange strategy to 
maximise the pecuniary gains from his job. It is an expensive proposition to be a member of the 
middle-class in India today. The administrator probably would have had to pay a large sum of money not 
only to gain entrance to the state public service, but also to receive promotions and/or desirable transfers. 
Moreover, it is common knowledge in Tamil Nadu that a college/university education for a son or 
daughter will also be expensive because of the institutions’ practice of demanding thousands of rupees to 
secure a place, particularly for degree courses such as engineering and commerce which are generally 
seen as leading to fairly assured, and lucrative, employment.
Furthermore, the custom of giving dowry and holding lavish weddings is very widely practiced in 
South India; the cost of marrying a daughter to a similarly placed, college-educated boy is generally in 
excess of 100,000 rupees. The Block Development Officer may also pay for his children’s "entrance 
fees" for employment, meaning further expenditures of thousands of rupees. If one has had to pay so 
much to gain an education and employment, it is of little wonder that one would try to get as much out of 
the latter in a financial sense, particularly if it is known that further major "life-cycle" expenditures will 
have to be incurred. The Block Development Officer in Tamil Nadu will have a gross salary, including 
all allowances, on the order of Rs 26,000 per annum.
The BDO’s ability to meet the numerous demands for policy resource allocations is hindered on the 
administrative side by non-policy demands on his time. These are: the need to write reports, "host" 
senior administrators, and attend meetings at the divisional and district headquarters. In administrative 
terms the nemesis of the BDO is, perhaps, the report. Senior officials require reports at a high rate of
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frequency. One of the Personal Assistants to the Tiruchi Collector assured me that on average, including 
regular periodical reports and special requests for statistics, the BDO would have to submit as many as 
one hundred reports per month to more senior officials. A BDO also told me that he must submit about 
one hundred reports per month to "higher officials." The BDO, then, spends much time ensuring that 
sufficient data are gathered for all the reports.4
Moreover, whenever a "higher" official comes to the block, the BDO will have to be at his beck 
and call, again keeping him away from the active coordination of development activities in the block, or 
just keeping abreast of his juniors’ activities in the block. Administrators such as the Block Development 
Officer must play host to their administrative superiors when they come on inspection tours of the block. 
On these occasions, it is expected that the BDO will provide lunch and other necessary meals for the 
senior administrators and their accompanying staff without expecting any recompense. The BDOs do not 
like playing host, but see it as a necessary evil if they are to receive favours from the higher officials in 
future. (Mook, 1974 noted the same phenomenon of BDOs "hosting" more senior administrators in Tamil 
Nadu.)
There are always large number of additional (to actual policy implementation) and ad hoc tasks for 
the local administrators to take care of. When I was working in Tiruchirappalli District in 1985, for 
example, the Director of Rural Development (DRD) had issued orders that a detailed pump (for drinking 
water) census be taken in every panchayat village. At a district-wide meeting of development officials, 
the DRD forced one of the BDOs to produce the aforementioned census data. .Luckily for him, the task 
had been completed and he had the appropriate data with him, but if the job had not been done he would 
have risked an instant suspension. Therefore, the BDOs must often assign top priority to completing 
additional tasks, rather than to ongoing poverty alleviation policy.
The meeting is an important forum through which senior administrators make explicit their 
demands of the BDOs for program targets.5 BDOs are forced to attend meetings chaired by the Collector, 
Personal Assistants to the Collector, the Project Officer of the DRDA, the Divisional Development 
Officer, and the Director of Rural Development, although the latter is fairly rare. As one BDO said 
ruefully, "When we don’t have to go for meetings with the higher officials, they are coming here." At 
these meetings the senior officials take the opportunity to do two things. The first is to tell the BDOs 
which programs or policies need to be paid particular attention to, and the second is to criticise those 
present for not adequately fulfilling program targets. At administrative meetings I attended, the senior 
administrators always gave emphasis to targets over methods even while denying to me in interviews they 
were doing this. One BDO confessed to me that if he is called upon at a meeting by senior officials to 
discuss his block’s "performance statistics" for certain programs, he occasionally lies to avoid the 
haranguing and castigations of the senior officials. The BDO takes this as a calculated risk as he knows 
that the senior administrators seldom try to verify the block statistics presented to them.
Because so much of his time is taken up with "desk work" the BDO has little opportunity to travel 
within the block (the BDO, for example, is forced to initial virtually every piece of paper which either
4While looking at the agricultural extension machinery in Tamil Nadu’s North Arcot District in the 1970s, Robert Chambers et al. 
(1977: 163) discovered that a Deputy Agricultural Officer in a block would have to submit approximately 316 reports per year, a 
modest 26 or 27 per month, but still more than one per working day.
5My visits to block offices revealed pages and pages of government orders on various subjects, not the least of which were 
revisions to IRDP’s guidelines. Most of these "g.o.’s" are filed and conveniently forgotten until a senior official makes an issue of 
them at a meeting.
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enters or exits the office, including all bill payments). Among other drawbacks, he cannot be sure that, the 
work he assigns to extension officers and RWOs is actually done, nor can he be certain of the extent of 
corruption among other block officials outside of the office (Mook, 1974). The BDO has very little direct 
contact with villagers, except those who have regular business in the block office, and therefore does not 
receive much information from the general rural population about the work his staff is doing. I asked a 
BDO in 1985 with whom he had direct contact in the villages of his block, and the people he mentioned 
were parish priests, former Panchayat Presidents, an ex-MLA, contractors, and other similarly placed 
persons.
The BDOs I was in contact with received some complaints about their extension officers, but did 
not seem to care very much. A woman in charge of a milk society told me (her story was verified by 
bank officials) she had complained to the BDO about bribe-taking by the Animal Husbandry Officer 
(AHO) but that not only had her complaints fallen on deaf ears, the BDO reportedly told her she could go 
complain to the AHO herself; and he had just been transferred. People in the villages, outside the little 
group mentioned in the previous paragraph, have little knowledge of who the BDO is or what he is 
supposed to do, and the majority of our village respondents said they had never seen the BDO in their 
villages. The ones who knew who he was were usually building and/or road contractors who made 
frequent trips to the block office. (For an analysis of the relationship between contractors and block 
officials see the next chapter.)
The BDO’s relations with his own staff are not necessarily cordial, and may be confrontational. 
Many of his staff, particularly the permanent clerical staff, owe their jobs to political people which means 
that their positions in the office are secure, and they may be disinclined to take the BDO’s orders or 
remonstrations seriously. Also, some of the extension officers are on deputation from other departments 
and are not only disinclined to follow the BDO’s instructions, they try to establish themselves as powers 
unto themselves in the block. If an extension officer has direct relations with some of the more powerful 
people in die block he will be able to profit the most by them. (I observed this in one of the blocks when 
the Animal Husbandry Officer came to the BDO with a man to whom he wanted a block printing contract 
to go. Interestingly, this man is a former village Panchayat President, an associate of an ex-MLA, and a 
senior officer in a local bank). One BDO likened his position to ringmaster in a three-ring circus--it is 
only by cracking a whip that he can extract work from his minions. In a literal use of "the whip," a BDO 
I spoke with claimed that he had beaten one of the clerical workers in the block development office 
because of his corrupt activities regarding block cement supplies. This particular BDO also shouted 
regularly at the office staff which did not stand him in good stead in an incident involving himself, the 
office latrine, and a cobra.
The only regular contact point (and even that can be irregular) between the mass of villagers and 
the development administration is the Rural Welfare Officer.6 He should, although seldom does, have at 
most four villages under his purview, and he should visit each of the villages every week (one RWO told 
me, however, that with all the necessary office work he has to do, he only visits villages on two days a 
week making it impossible for him to go to each village every week). Every block was also to have 
posted one or two female Village Level Workers (Gram Sevikas). There are, however, few blocks which 
actually have any Gram Sevikas, and if they do have them, these women seldom visit the villages, 
working instead in the block office. With the introduction of the UNICEF-sponsored Development of
^’RWO" is Tamil Nadu’s current, official, name for the Hindi title, ’’Gram Sevak" which means servant o f the village. Prior to 
1982 RWOs were called Village Level Workers in the state. Nonetheless, villagers and many of the block staff refer to the RWO as 
the Gram Sevak or GS.
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Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) program in the 1980s, the blocks where DWCRA is 
implemented are required to have Gram Sevikas, but there is no guarantee that they will go to the villages 
either. A sampling of the Gram Sevak’s job description, written in 1962, indicates his multifarious 
duties:
1. He collects all facts about the villages in his charge.
2. He visits all villages regularly, discusses with villagers their problems and creates interest in 
them to solve their problems.
3. He prepares plans and programmes for the village. In this process he involves the village 
people and village institutions and brings about broad agreement among them . . .
4. He helps to organise village cooperative societies and when they are already organised he 
gives them guidance . . .
5. He uses several extension methods to induce people to adopt improved agricultural 
practices.
6. He stimulates group action in the villages by organising youth clubs and their projects.
7. He takes a direct interest in the family planning work, and helps panchayats to induce 
fathers to take to sterilisation. (From TNG.O. Ms. No. 751, RD & LA7 Dept., 28/3/62.)
(For current job descriptions of the RWO and BDO see Appendix A.)
By the early 1960s, however, the Gram Sevak’s main role was as an agricultural extension worker 
under the National Extension Service. Officially, he was supposed to spend 80% of his time on 
agriculture alone although he tended to spend less than that (Hunter, 1970: 70). The extension work 
involved visiting farmers’ Fields, checking on the condition of their crops, and suggesting improved 
methods of cultivation. The Gram Sevak was also to conduct field demonstrations for farmers. This was 
based on the idea that the farmers would be more willing to try the new methods of cultivation if they had 
someone there to show them what to do. If the Gram Sevak encountered any technical difficulties in his 
village extension work, he could easily, in theory, approach the appropriate extension officer in the block 
office to get advice.
Mayer and his associates felt that if the villagers had just one worker visiting them who, as a 
respondent in Tiruchi’s Collectorate described it, would be the "friend, guide, and philosopher" for the 
villagers, they would more readily accept all of his development programs, especially if those which most 
closely met their "felt needs" were begun with (Mayer et al., 1958: 25-26, 161-63). Villagers do not lead 
compartmentalised lives. Likewise, they should not be approached in a compartmentalised way by a 
large number of government officials, each with narrow, possibly overlapping, concerns.
As the Community Development program got underway, however, the number of tasks for the 
Gram Sevak increased, meaning in effect that a larger proportion of his responsibilities remained undone. 
With the introduction of the major poverty alleviation programs of the 1980s, his work load has reached 
unmanageable proportions (if he were to attempt to do everything on his job chart). Even at the 
beginning of the Community Development program the Gram Sevak was assigned too many tasks in too 
many villages to expect that they could be done effectively. The programs which were most difficult to 
implement, or required extra effort and follow-up action, were seldom attended, or only done 
superficially.
The initiation of the World Bank’s Training and Visit system during the Sixth Plan (1980-85)
7Rural Development and Local Administration. It is the Tamil Nadu government department which comprises the development 
administration.
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caused a major disruption in Tamil Nadu’s VLWs’ work routines. According to World Bank advisers, 
the program’s village extension officers must be expert in the field of agriculture, and not be saddled with 
additional duties (Benor and Harrison, 1977: 11). Hence, the Agriculture Department in Tamil Nadu, and 
in other states which agreed to establishing "T & V," had to acquire village level functionaries as well. 
Therefore, a number of Tamil Nadu’s Village Level Workers joined the Agriculture Department, thus 
leaving many blocks in the state with fewer than the requisite number of the now-called Rural Welfare 
Officers. A senior administrator in Madras told me that Tamil Nadu’s RWO staffing difficulties for the 
Rural Development and Local Administration Department had finally been settled by the end of 1985, 
and all the blocks should now have the appropriate number of RWOs, that is to say, ten. (Neither Lalgudi 
nor Thuraiyur, however, did have the full complement of ten RWOs while I was there in 1986.)
This change came at a critical juncture, in that the major new poverty alleviation programs like 
IRDP and NREP required much administrative effort to be implemented at all, let alone successfully. 
Moreover, when the elected village panchayats in Tamil Nadu became moribund in the late 1970s as a 
result of inadequate funding and the state government’s many excuses not to hold elections to them, the 
RWOs were given yet another set of tasks. From 1982 until March 1986 the RWOs had the legal powers 
as Group Executive Officers to undertake works in the village which had previously been the 
responsibility of the village panchayats. These new responsibilities included: the authority to supervise 
the work of village panchayat parttime staff, the assessment of taxes and other dues to the panchayats in 
their jurisdictions, augmenting the financial resources of panchayats, assisting the Special Officers (in 
other words, the Block Development Officers) in maintaining proper accounts, verifying accounts on a 
quarterly basis and submitting reports to the Extension Officer (Panchayats), and conducting panchayat 
meetings (from TN RD&LA Dept, mimeo, no date, but ca. 1983). As far as I know, aside from working 
with village panchayat staff, the RWOs were remiss in fulfilling these additional duties.
Although the RWO is directly responsible for the implementation of the state’s poverty alleviation 
and other programs, his avenues for promotion have never been wide. The average Gram Sevak can only 
hope that he will spend most of his career in blocks close to the district headquarters so that he and his 
family may take advantage of the amenities available in a larger centre. A very few Grade One RWOs 
(there are only two grades within the rank of RWO) will be promoted to Extension Officers in a block 
development office. Of late (starting in 1985) there has been a scheme introduced whereby senior RWOs 
are supposed to exchange jobs with senior clerks in the block office. This does not result in any change in 
rank for either set of officers and neither clerical nor field staff have welcomed this change. An RWO in 
one of the two blocks I studied received a promotion in 1986 to Noon-Meal Scheme Manager-after 
twenty-four years as an RWO. Rumour (which I could not substantiate) has it that he paid a significant 
amount of money to a politician to secure the promotion.
Many people in the villages told us that the Gram Sevaks "fifteen years ago” were diligent workers 
who visited the villages frequently, but that nowadays the Gram Sevaks are lazy and corrupt. In a sense, 
the good man of fifteen years ago is the lazy and corrupt man of the 1980s; if he had been able to look 
forward to regular promotions and pay increases, perhaps he would be less inclined to try to get payoffs 
for administratively-controlled resources-such as ERDP subsidies-from some of the poorest villagers. 
There is, moreover, a saying in Tamil Nadu that "once a Gram Sevak always a Gram Sevak." Although 
senior administrators claim that an additional problem in IRDP’s implementation lies in the RWOs’ lack 
of knowledge about implementing a poverty alleviation policy, in the context of non-motivation (and of 
political pressures), the lack of IRDP specific training for RWOs makes little difference to their activities 
in the villages.
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The extension officers posted in the block are supposed to have greater contact with villagers than 
the BDO. In practice, this seems not to occur as the extension officers, like the BDO, spend most of their 
time in the office, much of it helping the BDO file his reports with more senior administrators (I observed 
this in Lalgudi Block). As with the BDO, the extension officers’ contact with villagers (aside from the 
AHO whose job it is to tag IRDP animals’ ears prior to the beneficiaries’ purchase of the animals) occurs 
mostly in the block office rather than in the villages. The extension officers’ village work is mostly 
assigned to the Rural Welfare Officers, although they may not necessarily do it either. The Extension 
Officers may do few tasks which fit their job descriptions. Rather, the Block Development Officer 
delegates assignments to them as he sees fit. The BDO might have them help with a smallsavings drive, 
the family planning effort, a loans camp, the visit of an MLA, and many other tasks (Mook, 1974: 
129-34). When I had discussions with Extension Officers, it struck me that they were aware of the 
generalities of their jobs, but not the specifics. This underscores the paucity of their contacts with the 
villages. Not a single Extension Officer (Co-operatives), for example, could provide me with an accurate 
list of active co-operatives in the block (although two AHOs could).
The extension officers attached to the block office are as follows: the Animal Husbandry Officer, 
Extension Officer (Panchayats), Extension Officer (Small Industries), Extension Officer (Adi-Dravida8 
Welfare), Social Education Officer, and Extension Officer (Co-operation). There is also a Mukhiya 
Sevika, a woman, whose position could be likened to that of Extension Officer (Women’s Affairs). Only 
the extension officers for Panchayats, Social Education, and the Mukhiya Sevika are recruited directly 
into the Development Administration. The others are on deputation from their respective departments 
which causes at least two important problems. First, some of these extension officers are unwilling 
deputees from their home departments, meaning they are unlikely to put much effort into their two years 
as block development officials. Second, the BDO may be unable to exert much control over the deputed 
extension officers, as they know that the control over their promotions rests with their own department 
supervisors (Mook, 1974 and Ministry of Agriculture, 1985: 21).
Another key post in the block office, on the "building and maintenance" rather than "development 
side" is the Union Engineer’s (UE). (A former Collector argued to me that in money making terms, the 
Union Engineer’s is the most coveted position of all.) The Union Engineer, on deputation from the 
Highways Department, is in charge of all construction work valued at less than Rs 5000 undertaken 
within the block.9 He receives, and vets, tenders for building contracts, sets contract estimates, and has a 
major role to play in disbursing funds to contractors at successive stages of the project. In recent years, 
with construction-oriented development programs like NREP and RLEGP, the funding available within 
the block for construction has increased dramatically, thus enhancing the Union Engineer’s importance. 
In Lalgudi Block for 1984-85, the total number of non-NREP contracts was 45, while NREP "contracts" 
alone added up to 54 (including some incomplete works from the previous year) for a value of about Rs 
20 lakhs (the NREP target had been 10 lakhs.)
The Union Engineer’s juniors in the block office are the Overseer, an NREP Overseer, three road 
inspectors, and a few construction gang coolies (one of whom might work as a servant in the UE’s home 
and another in the EDO’s home). If the Block Development Officer, by vocation a generalist, does not 
have a fairly keen understanding of construction work, specifications, and the like, it is possible for the 
Union Engineer to amass a great deal of power for himself in the block office through his dealings with
8Harijan or Scheduled Caste.
9For higher estimates the UE needs the concurrence of more senior engineers in Highways.
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contractors. The BDO is, however, the only officer to have the power to sign pay bills for the block, and 
therefore can maintain a certain amount of leverage over the Union Engineer if need be. Union Engineers 
and BDOs often co-operate for profit, however, and it is not unusual to see the two officers transferred at 
the same time at the behest of a politician.
2.12. The Division, District and Madras
The officer immediately senior to the BDO and in charge of a division is the Divisional 
Development Officer. The DDO is a supervisor of the BDO, and in all likelihood was a BDO himself, 
thus giving him intimate knowledge of the actual functioning of the block development office. The point 
that the development administration was set up so as to cause the least challenge to other departments, 
particularly the revenue administration, is exemplified by the late creation of the post of DDO. Until 
1974 in Tamil Nadu a Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) (or, occasionally, a Deputy or Sub-Collector-a 
junior IAS officer) was the immediate superior of the BDO even though a functionary of the revenue 
administration.10
The DDO is, in part, an inspector for the blocks under his jurisdiction. One of his assignments is 
"to inspect Panchayat Union Offices annually and conduct cursory inspections of Panchayat Unions." He 
is also authorised to conduct surprise checks of block cash balances, of stocks of fertilisers in co-operative 
societies, and of midday meals centres in village schools. The DDO has a number of significant financial 
powers. He sanctions payments to block funds and village panchayats, and importantly, he has the 
"power to divert allotments under various schemes within the division." This would mean, for example, 
that the DDO could divert money from a block where there is difficulty in meeting financial targets under 
a program to a block where the money is easily spent In this way, the DDO is able to fulfill his 
division’s financial targets (job description from TNRD&LA Dept., 1974: G.O. Ms. No. 1529).
While the DDO’s is primarily a position which involves interactions with other officials, especially 
BDOs, the Project Officer of the DRDA and the Collector, he also meets with the public at the divisional 
headquarters. According to Mr. Kanagasabbai, DDO of Musiri Division, people from the villages come 
to see him if they have grievances against their BDO. Village Panchayat Presidents are also frequent 
visitors, as they try to lobby him for special dispensations, such as funding for housing for the landless of 
their villages. The DDO’s response often must be that funds are inadequate, and that the President will 
have to wait until his village is included under a program like NREP. He told me that "They [the 
Presidents] will all want extra funds, but we will note the ones who pester us the most." This is one of the 
most commonly used administrative tactics in dealing with demands from the public. The administrator 
denies the person while at the same time indicating that he will not be denied for long (whether it is true 
or not).
One of the most important posts in the British administration was held at district-level by the 
Collector (as in land revenue collector) who also functioned as a District Magistrate. The Collector was, 
and remains, the most powerful administrator in the district, although in India today, the District Collector
l0Every district in Tamil Nadu is comprised of a number of divisions (the revalue division and the development division are 
equivalent in the state), and Tiruchi District has four, with three, eight, ten, and eleven blocks respectively. The revenue division is 
made up of two or more taluks—the taluk is the smallest revenue unit, comprising anywhere from 65 to 175 revenue villages—and is 
under the charge either of a Revenue Divisional Officer or a Sub-Collector. Both Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks are in Musiri 
Division which has eight blocks.
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has lost some of his/her powers; s/he, for example, no longer functions as District Magistrate.11 But the 
Collector is ultimately in charge of both the development and revenue administrations within the district. 
Because the Collector’s is a post which allows for much discretionary power, the talents and predilections 
of the individual who holds it are important, and can make a significant difference to the tenor of district 
administration. 12 If a Collector takes active interest in a certain program, the Block Development Officers 
will soon learn of it, resulting in their making extra efforts to meet that program’s targets. But the 
Collector is not a policy maker. S/he will only take into account existing programs and choose from 
among them. While the Collector does not take pan in the day-to-day activities of the development and 
revenue administrations, he makes his wishes known through meetings, through his subordinates (such as 
his Personal Assistants) who are more frequent visitors to the blocks, and with written orders to BDOs 
and DDOs.13
The Collector’s role is far from merely "administrative.’’ It is also a position which is at the 
forefront of political lobbying at the district-level. When I asked a Collector how frequently he met with 
the district’s MLAs (there are eighteen), he replied, "Daily." Moreover, ML As often go to the Collector’s 
residence and meet with him there rather than at the Collectorate, thus conducting what should be public 
business in private. The Collector has the authority to transfer both development and revenue officers 
within the district, and s/he is under almost constant pressure from political people to effect transfers of 
RWOs and BDOs. S/he can resist MLAs’ and Block Chairmen’s demands that BDOs, RWOs, or 
Extension Officers be transferred, but if s/he does resist there is a good chance the MLA, for example, 
would go above the Collector’s head and seek the help of a Cabinet Minister in effecting the transfer.
Resource exchange is one of the most commonly used tactics by Collectors in dealing with political 
people. Politicians’ demands extend beyond administrative transfers and into government appointments, 
licensing of public transportation routes, liquor licenses (when prohibition is not in effect), and the 
location of major construction projects. The Collector cannot possibly meet more than a fraction of the 
politicians’ demands at once, but a negative response to an MLA can win even the Collector a transfer (if 
the MLA is sufficiently well-connected in the ruling party). A former Collector explained to me that 
"public relations" is one of the Collector’s most important resources. If, for example, a politician comes 
with a transfer or appointment request (of a block official) that the Collector does not want to fulfill, the 
Collector can promise that if the politician backs down with his demands, he can be on the platform and 
at the forefront of a number of public functions (arranged by the Collectorate), which politicians are eager 
to participate in for the free publicity. The former Collector also explained that Collectors do generally 
favour the ruling party in the placement of projects. He said, however, that a politically astute Collector 
would be able to circumvent some of the politicians’ particularistic demands by arguing, for example, that 
there will be "adverse political consequences to the politician" if he engages too much in overt "political 
favouritism." He added that if a politician were very adamant about his demand, the Collector would not 
have much choice but to go along with it.
n This is not to say, however, that the Collector’s powers went unchallenged or uncircumvented prior to 1947. See Lance 
Brennan (1977) for a discussion of the challenges mounted by district Congress leaders against the District Magistrate. Rosselli 
(1971) and Washbrook (1975) discuss how "underlings” could circumvent the Collector’s power by passing on misinformation to 
him.
12When I discussed the topic of "Collectors” with one of Tamil Nadu’s highest ranking officials, he said that of the then 19 
Collectors in the state, 4 or 5 were "very good," 4 or 5 were "poor," and the rest "average" in their performance. I mention this 
because personal ability is seldom mentioned in studies of administration, but when there is a post like a Collector’s which allows a 
significant degree of discretionary power, the abilities of the person who holds it have a major impact on the area under his control.
13From 1980 onwards District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs) under the leadership of a Project Officer (PO) were created 
in each district. For purely development purposes, the PO is the senior officer in the district, but is of far less importance than the 
Collector. The PO has a team of subject matter specialists (Assistant Project Officers--APOs) in the DRDA. For a discussion of the 
DRDA’s involvement in IRDP, see Chapter Four.
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In Madras the two most important development administrators are the Director of Rural 
Development (DRD) who concerns him or herself most closely with the implementation of rural 
development and poverty alleviation policy and the Secretary and Commissioner of the department. The 
DRD is the direct superior of both the Project Officers of the DRDAs, with whom he will have regular 
contact, and the District Collectors in terms of development matters. The DRD has a team of officials 
working in the directorate who are program specialists, ie., there will be a Joint Director for IRDP, 
another for NREP, one for Statistics, and another for Training. These "specialists" tend to interact mostly 
with their "specialist" counterparts (the Assistant Project Officers) in the DRDAs.
An important concern for the Director of Rural Development is the transfer of those personnel 
junior to the Collector in the district. While the Collector has control over the transfers of Block 
Development Officers and below within the district, it is not uncommon for politicians (including cabinet 
ministers) to approach the DRD directly in seeking the transfer of a BDO, especially if the Collector has 
not agreed to the transfer. A senior official in the development administration assured me that transfers 
which occur across districts are "political," and of transfers within the district, perhaps fifty percent would 
be requested by politicians.
Just as the Collector may choose to emphasise certain policies, or parts of policies over others, so 
too, the Director of Rural Development may exercise similar discretion over development policy 
implementation. An enterprising DRD can manipulate Government of India orders by the way in which 
s/he passes them to Collectors and PODRDAs, and by the way s/he treats officers who are found to be in 
contravention of the orders. An ex-DRD told me that when he was DRD he would not have any BDO 
punished who was using contractors in the implementation of NREP, (despite categorical Government of 
India instructions to the contrary) because without using contractors the BDOs would be unable to 
implement the program.
The seniormost official in Tamil Nadu’s development administration is the Secretary and 
Commissioner of the Rural Development and Local Administration Department The Secretary of the 
department has close contact with the DRD, but his/her attention is held more by central government 
officials, and s/he will regularly attend meetings in Delhi regarding, for example, the state’s immediate 
past performance under development programs, the targets for the coming financial year, and changes 
that need to be made in program guidelines. The Secretary is a liaison between the central government 
and the state government’s implementation machinery starting with the Director of Rural Development. 
A Secretary and Commissioner complained to me that the current system of development policy 
formation and implementation is "over-centralised," and quoted Harold J. Laski’s, there is "apoplexy at 
the centre and anemia at the periphery."
The "development cast" discussion, especially of the Block Development Officer, has provided a 
thumbnail "administrative ethnography." Mukhiya Sevikas do not go to villages, BDOs lie to their 
superiors about block statistics, Union Engineers have block "gang coolies" as servants, Extension 
Officers for Co-operatives do not know about the block’s co-operatives, and senior administrators expect 
to be "hosted" in the block. Moreover, all the officials, from the RWO to the Director of Rural 
Development, must respond to political demands. While political activities in the block and their 
implications for block officials’ allocation of policy resources will be discussed in the next chapter, it is 
noteworthy that the Collector, whose position is fairly powerful in its own right, employs resource 
exchange strategies to keep politicians at bay. Further down the line, the DDO holds out promises of 
future resources to Panchayat Presidents, thereby winning some relief from their immediate demands.
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And the BDO uses political and administrative connections he has garnered over the years (through past 
favours) to help his promotion chances. Thus, the development administration is comprised of 
administrators who, especially in the block, are responding as best they can to pressures which arise from 
their political, policy, and administrative environment.
2.2. The Development Administration: Structure and Style
This section examines the main features of the development administration which are an integral 
part of the local administrator’s environment, and have bearing on his allocation of policy resources. I 
start with a discussion of the administrative hierarchy. One of the important arguments of this section is 
that the administrative hierarchy in Tamil Nadu is not as rigid as it appears to the casual observer, 
primarily because the local administrator is able to circumvent it in a number of ways. But this is not 
new. During British rule in India, local people recruited into the bureaucracy were given little 
discretionary powers, with decision-making undertaken by foreign administrators at the top of the 
pyramid. What this meant, in effect, however, was that underlings learned at an early stage how to 
circumvent authority, and establish profitable lines of communication with those outside of the 
bureaucracy. (See Frykenberg, 1965 and Washbrook, 1975: 31-6.) The local administrator is judged by 
his seniors by his target achievement, resulting in policy implementation—IRDP’s implementation is not 
an exception-being equated to "the ends justifying the means." I also discuss targeting, red tape, and 
staffing.
2.2.1. Hierarchy—Manifestations and Circumvention
India’s top planners have often commented that over-centralised, rigid hierarchies are a major 
drawback of Indian administration, particularly the development administration. However, the oft-made 
statement in Tamil Nadu that development programs cannot flourish without the active interest of more 
senior officers reflects the belief held there in the need for administrative hierarchy. Senior officials think 
that lower level officials, such as the Block Development Officers, would not, of their own accord, 
complete the tasks required of them. The Block Development Officers, in turn, feel the same way about 
their juniors in the development administration. Whenever I spoke with officials in Tamil Nadu, they 
would complain of the difficulties in "extracting" work from their underlings. Junior officials were never 
trusted to get their required work done, unless someone was standing over them with a whip. My 
research assistants found that this was not far from the truth, in that their arrivals at the block office when 
the BDO was absent invariably revealed most of the clerical staff and a large number of extension officers 
(if they were present at all) at their leisure.
Development policy is largely formulated by IAS officers, and they are also implementation 
supervisors from the district upwards in every state. The Indian Administrative Service, created in 1946 
so that it would be operative at Independence, is the direct descendant of the old Indian Civil Service (the 
"steel frame" of Imperial Britain’s bureaucracy), which in turn sprang from the East India Company’s 
"civil servants" of the 1700s (Taub, 1969: 6). Britain’s "steel frame," just as the IAS is today, was based 
primarily on generalist administrators renowned for their administrative skills. The LAS is 
unquestionably the elite domestic administrative cadre in India, as the seniormost officers of virtually all 
departments and the heads of state corporations are IAS. According to a former Chief Secretary of Tamil 
Nadu, there are about 328 IAS officers in the state, and between 800,000 and 900,000 non-IAS public
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servants.14
I observed in Tamil Nadu, as have others (especially Heginbotham, 1975), that there is a sharp 
dichotomy in the behaviour of the state public service commission recruit, and the IAS officer. IAS 
officers are, in essence, trained to be decision and policy makers. They should be analytical and 
experimental, although, unfortunately, they do not seem to exercise these talents as often as they might. 
The lower level, non-IAS, officer follows orders, fulfills targets as best he can, and is often treated as a 
misbehaving child by his superiors. I saw this at a number of meetings presided over by senior 
administrators and attended by Block Development Officers. The BDOs accept this behaviour at the 
meetings, but one BDO told me angrily in private, "They [senior administrators] treat us like children!" 
The non-IAS officer tries to please his superiors by fulfilling the targets they set him and within that 
framework there is little room for him to be a planner or an independent thinker in terms of policy and 
administrative rules.
The BDO pays heed to the demands of the more senior administrators that specified program 
targets be met partly out of a sense of duty (see Heginbotham, 1975: 109), but more concretely because 
they hold some control over job transfers, promotions, suspensions, and a number of other lesser 
punishments (such as removal of the block jeep). The BDO, however, is not without his own resources 
when it comes to interactions with the "higher officials," and employs intra-administrative resource 
exchange to his advantage whenever he can. In one of the blocks I studied, the BDO and his DDO had 
been under transfer orders which neither of them wanted. Because of a number of good political and 
administrative connections developed over his years of being a BDO, the BDO was able to prevent both 
transfers. The BDO in this case approached a senior administrator in Madras who had been a Collector of 
Tiruchi District. During the senior administrator’s time as Collector the BDO had developed a good 
relationship with him which allowed the BDO later to ask him for help in preventing the transfers. The 
DDO would then owe the BDO a favour such as preparing a positive report on his block development 
office (which this DDO did) or about the BDO himself.
The local bureaucrat in Tamil Nadu is not as bound by the rules and norms of the rigid 
administrative hierarchy as might appear on the surface. A useful phrase, "street-level discretion," which 
comes from the Western public administration literature (Lipsky, 1980) can be applied loosely to the 
Indian context as well. It leads away from the premise that a rigid hierarchy does not allow the junior 
administrator to exercise his own judgement in implementing policy, nor respond to demands made by 
those outside of the administrative hierarchy. As indicated above, an important source of "street-level 
discretion" for the BDO is his set of connections with the political world. An administrator with close 
political contacts may exercise more leverage vis-a-vis more senior administrators than the administrator 
without, and is also more likely to ignore remonstrations from senior administrators.
An important example of discretionary administrative powers which the Block Development 
Officer exercises lies in his shifting of funds between headings of the block budget. The BDO should 
have clearance from the DDO or Collector to manipulate his budget, but in actuality the BDO may 
present the supervising official with a fait accompli. One BDO told me that he had moved Rs 40,000
14IAS officers are recruited by competitive exam, and those successful are given a year long training course, an important part of 
which is spent in a district of the state to which they have been assigned. For the sake of "national integration," for every IAS 
officer posted to his/her home state, two IAS officers from other states are to be posted there as well. All IAS officers are assigned 
to state cadres, but it is not unusual for them to be deputed to central government ministries (some spend most of their careers in 
Delhi).
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from the block’s General Fund (LFD1) to his IRDP account, and then released it to a local bank for 
crediting to IRDP beneficiaries’ loan accounts. He did this without the consent of the Collector but sent a 
letter to the effect that "I am sure your permission will be forthcoming . . . "  Many BDOs, however, are 
forced to manipulate their block budgets just to pay office staff because the block is running at a deficit. 
It is not unusual for funds from development headings to find their way, at least temporarily, into general 
administrative accounts to keep the office functioning. In one block office I visited the BDO was having 
difficulty in keeping the block funds in order because the block accountant was shifting funds to pay 
contractors without the BDO’s permission.
The physical distance between administrative offices also contributes to the local official’s ability 
to exercise discretionary powers. A district is a large area. Tiruchirappalli, for example, is 14,291 square 
kilometres, and has a population of over 3.6 million. The distance from the district headquarters where 
the Collectorate is to the more farflung block offices is eighty kilometres and more, and travelling in rural 
India is a time-consuming proposition, even by jeep or automobile. Divisional offices are closer to the 
block offices of the division, but may be twenty kilometres away. Therefore, day to day supervision of 
the block development office is impossible, and the senior officials are often ignorant of the specifics of 
what goes on in the block. Phone contact exists between offices, but the phone service remains sporadic 
and cannot be described as a reliable form of communication. It is quite common for the Collector’s 
office to issue telegrams to block development offices should urgent messages need conveying. Perhaps 
the knowledge that in practice it is difficult to supervise Block Development Officers contributes to the 
strident behaviour displayed by senior officials at meetings.
An administrative meeting I attended in 1985 was representative of this strident behaviour. It was 
chaired by Tamil Nadu’s Director of Rural Development. This meeting was a Tiruchi District Review of 
rural development programs, and was attended by the staff of the DRDA, the Divisional Development 
Officers, the Block Development Officers and a number of their extension officers (the block 
development officials came with stacks of ledgers and files, so that they would be prepared should the 
DRD suddenly call on them to produce statistics). The DRD was highly critical of Tiruchi District’s 
performance in a number of respects, and declared, "This district is just not responding to any 
instructions. I hold you PAs and DDOs responsible first. You are not exercising enough control over the 
BDOs." She also accused the BDOs of spending their time "running after politicians and not doing their 
work." She adopted a threatening, rather than encouraging, tone for the duration of the meeting, declaring 
there that she could suspend anyone on the spot for not doing their work properly.
The paragraph above illustrates the way in which administrative hierarchy manifests itself in Tamil 
Nadu’s development administration. Senior administrators feel they must exercise control over their 
underlings to "extract" an adequate amount of work from them. The "underlings" seem to take up the 
challenge of avoiding the senior official’s authority whenever and wherever possible. There seems to be 
little intra-administrative co-operation-mutual antagonism describes the norm better-to implement the 
state’s rural development and poverty alleviation policies, although the officials do co-operate when it is 
in their interests to do so, such as to prevent transfers. The hierarchy is exercised in a limited way with 
senior administrators making their demands largely in terms of programs’ quantitative targets. This, in 
combination with the distance factor mentioned above, allows the local administrator much discretion in 
responding to both administrative and political demands for policy resource allocations.
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2.2.2. Targeting, Red Tape, and Staffing
In ail parts of the Indian bureaucracy, there is excessive reliance on the "target" as an indicator of 
implementation performance. The main problem is that the quantitative target is virtually the only means 
by which senior administrators judge local administrative performance. If the local administrator is able 
to fulfill his targets then he is doing well, particularly if he achieves them for high priority programs such 
as family planning.15 This allows block administrators to take a cavalier attitude toward program rules. 
Since it is the quantitative rather than qualitative target which is emphasised, a program’s targets may be 
reached without it bearing much relation in the village to the original policy design. In IRDP’s case, for 
example, one-third of all beneficiaries must be women. In Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks the appropriate 
numbers of female beneficiaries were "benefited," but our village interviews revealed that few women 
were in de facto control of the assets.
Another disadvantage of relying on quantitative targets is that it is easier to fabricate them than if 
some qualitative assessment were undertaken as well. "Fudging" data to show target fulfillment is a 
time-honoured way of pleasing superiors, and was certainly true of the development administration in 
Tamil Nadu when it had to meet targets for acreages sown with High-Yielding Varieties (see Chinnappa, 
1977: 96).16 Senior administrators seldom check fulfilled targets for their veracity despite the existence of 
policy evaluation machinery at state-level, and so the deviations from the truth which exist in the Rural 
Welfare Officer’s village-level statistics are compounded many times over before they reach the all-India 
level.
This is not to say that there are no spot or surprise checks on block performance for ERDP and other 
programs, but the checking which the Divisional Development Officer, for example, would do in a village 
is sporadic. Moreover, he may not choose a village for inspection at random, but rather at the behest of 
the BDO (especially if he and the BDO have a good relationship). Checks and audits are made much 
more frequently of the paperwork in the block office. I discovered, however, through working with block 
records followed up by village visits, that block records may be kept in order even while disorder prevails 
in the villages. For example, the neatly kept (in itself a rarity) IRDP subsidy register which balances with 
all the banks’ records of subsidies disbursed gives little indication of the state of the program in the 
villages, excepting the number of subsidies which has gone to each.17
A common complaint about virtually all administration in India is that it is ridden with red tape.18 
The need for writing numerous reports is one aspect of it. The British introduced the "Tottenham 
System"-named after the Indian Civil Service officer who devised it-which kept the decision-making 
powers of the Indian officials at the lower levels of the bureaucracy to a minimum, while at the same time
15If a BDO meets his family planning targets the Collector will not ask how he did it. An Indian Express, Madurai edition, story 
of 17 October, 1986 underscores this point. A widow in her late thirties died at a government hospital in Tiruchi District as a result 
of a tubectomy. She had been recruited for the operation by an RWO desperate to meet his targets.
16Rosselli (1971: 148) writes about local officials fabricating land revenue accounts in the 1820s.
17 For NREP the block accounts of wages and materials spent on a project may balance, but that does not say anything about the 
actual state of the project, nor about whether all the workers’ names listed correspond to a similar number of actual workers.
18Complaints about red tape are not confined to India. For a book on the subject in the United States, see Kaufman (1977) who 
observed (pg. 1), "Red Tape is everywhere and everywhere it is abhorred. How can any product o f the human mind be so unpopular 
yet so widespread and so enduring?"
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maximising their accountability.19
The Tottenham System, still in use today, involves the annotation of files by every concerned clerk 
and officer, until the file reaches the appropriate senionnost administrator in the office who makes a 
decision on it (Heginbotham, 1975: 115). But red tape is an important bureaucratic resource in three 
respects. It provides (or, appears to provide) controls for those more senior in the hierarchy over 
subordinates, and is a means of making extra money for administrators who interact with the public. A 
BDO confessed to me that local development administrators often created artificial hindrances when 
making bill payments to contractors, for example, to extract a larger "cut" from them. Third, the BDO 
may use red tape to deflect people’s demands which he cannot meet (See Chapter Six for further 
discussion.)
The local bureaucracy’s structural problems, especially those caused by staffing inadequacies, in 
implementing poverty alleviation policies have been the subject of concern in Delhi. It cannot be argued, 
however, that staff shortages are at the "heart" of administrative problems in India, nor do they explain 
why development policy resources do not reach the poor. In 1984 and 1985 two centrally-appointed 
committees to review the structure and functioning of the development administration tabled reports on 
the adequacy of the development administration for the development task. In June 1984 "The Informal 
Group to go into the Adequacy of Village Level Workers and General Structure of the Block" visited 
Tamil Nadu. They observed that block budgets had gone up from around six lakhs in the 1960s to 78 to 
80 lakhs in the early 1980s, that block populations had gone up from an average of 66,000 to 100,000, 
and that there are far more schemes to implement now than in the Sixties. However, the sanctioned 
staffing levels in the block development office remain the same as they were in 1960. The group states 
(1984: 2), "There is an urgent need, therefore, for the strengthening of the block machinery, otherwise 
there will be a total collapse," but suggested rather limply that there be one VLW for every 5000 people, 
and that an Additional or Joint BDO be posted along with additional Extension Officers and clerical staff 
(Report of the Informal Group, 1984: 2).
The 1985 CAARD20 Report also suggests the need for staffing changes in the block office. It 
argues that with the "dilution" of Community Development, current staff levels are less than what they 
were in the 1950s, despite.a central government scheme to restore block staffs to the same levels as the 
1950s (Ministry of Agriculture, 1985: 20). The report’s authors (1985: 21) go on to say that, "the sheer 
volume of work and funds now flowing in at the block level would necessitate a second look at the earlier 
schematic pattem evolved for the Community Development Programmes, assuming that even this had 
been fully restored." In other words, the CAARD report’s authors suggest that even if the staffing levels 
of the original Community Development Blocks were put into effect, they would still be inadequate for 
today’s blocks.
The "structure and style" of the development administration may be characterised in the main by 
rigid hierarchy (in theory, if less in practice), targeting, red tape, and staffing shortages. These 
characteristics are counter-productive for a bureaucracy which is supposed to be a dynamic agent of rural 
development, and have become heightened over the years since Independence. Adherence to targets is
19A s in the post-Independence period, however, pre-Independence lower-ranked officials, especially in the Collectorate, were 
able to circumvent the rigid hierarchy to their pecuniary advantage by establishing relations with locally influential people without 
the senior officials’ knowledge (Frykenberg, 1965; Rosselli, 1971; and Washbrook, 1975).
^Committee to Review the Existing Administrative Arrangements for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation Programs. It 
was chaired by the highly regarded G.V.K. Rao.
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excessive, and red tape provides the administrator with a ready excuse to seek gain from the public, rich 
and poor alike. In fact, the senior administrators’ emphasis on quantitative targets leaves the local 
administrator to adopt any method of implementation, as long as it results in the appropriate targets met in 
appropriate numbers.
Despite the desired changes in the basic functions of the development administration, from 
inducing community participation to increasing agricultural production to implementing poverty 
alleviation policies, no real attempt has been made to change its structure which still resembles that of the 
revenue administration, a bureaucracy whose main function is extraction. Furthermore, the development 
administration is something of a shadow of the revenue administration at the grassroots in Tamil Nadu 
because, as mentioned in Chapter One, Revenue has one Village Administration Officer posted for every 
revenue village (often the same size as the panchayat village) while the development administration 
generally has one RWO for a minimum of three or four panchayat villages.
2.3. Changing Responsibilities, Past Performance
In the heady, early days of Community Development and Panchayati Raj, Nehru and his Congress 
government saw the development administration as a crucial agent of change, inducing people to accept 
the ideology of development as their own. People’s participation was the clarion call of the 1950s. By 
the Third Plan (1962), however, the Government of India was more concerned with increasing 
agricultural production, for which extension work was supposed to be the most important ingredient for 
success. The notion of community participation for development was dropped, as the state’s emphasis 
shifted to inducing farmers to accept new methods of cultivation, new seeds, implements, and the like. 
Agricultural development took precedence over rural development. The "package program" of the Green 
Revolution heightened this emphasis, and Delhi’s planners expected the administration to concentrate on 
extension work. It was only in the 1980s that the development administration was expected to pay much 
attention to poverty alleviation.
In the aftermath of the block administration’s establishment and the introduction of the Community 
Development program, block officials had primary contact with the richer landholders as they found there 
was a demand for "community" works on their lands. The National Extension Service and later extension 
programs of the 1960s also saw officials interact primarily with the richer farmers. It was easier to 
convince them, as opposed to smallholders, to accept larger quantities of the new, high-yielding seeds 
along with fertilisers, thus making it easier for the officials to meet their targets. By the time the poverty 
alleviation programs were introduced on a larger scale in 1980, long-established patterns of interaction 
between officials and rural people had precluded the necessary increased contact between officials and 
the poor. IRDP’s implementation also represents a continuation of these long-established patterns of 
interaction.
Both Byron Mook (1974) and Stanley Heginbotham (1975) working separately on the development 
bureaucracy in different districts of Tamil Nadu, (focusing especially on the block office which was then 
still in charge of agricultural extension work) showed that various agricultural policies, such as promoting 
the use of High-Yielding Variety (HYV) seeds, were implemented by way of resource exchange. 
Heginbotham argued that the Gram Sevak (now RWO) and other extension officers who visited the 
villages were most valued by the villagers in terms of the resources they could exchange, and became 
"centres of commercial exchange" (Heginbotham, 1975: 180). He (1975: 166) also argued that a Gram 
Sevak’s or Agricultural Extension Officer’s "most powerful strategy" in implementing policy lay in
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"using resources under their own control to stimulate farmer participation in unpopular programs." Mook 
(1974: 141) also showed that the block development staff could meet its targets more easily if there were 
some exchange of resources between the staff and wealthier rural public.21
2.3.1. Community Development to Green Revolution
One of the main ideas behind the Community Development Program, launched in selected districts 
in 1952, was that resources for development, including funds and labour, could be "mobilised" by the 
people themselves, and the planners envisioned, unrealistically, that the whole village would volunteer 
either labour or resources (or both) for rural works. Technical expertise, where required for local projects, 
would be provided by the development administration. If funding for the project were lacking, villagers 
could apply for some limited financial aid through the local development administration office. By the 
Third Plan (1961-1966) most of India’s villages were covered by the Community Development program, 
and the country’s districts all divided into blocks, but except in isolated cases Community Development 
was of little help to the nation’s poor. (For an impressionistic but compelling account, see Nair, 1961.)
The National Extension Service (NES) began in 1954 in 112 blocks, but the Indian government 
decided that by 1961 the entire countryside should have NES blocks (meaning, in effect, having adequate 
extension personnel posted in the blocks, but the need for so many VLWs in such a short time resulted in 
both understaffing and the posting of inadequately trained personnel), and by that year their number had 
gone up to 3100 (Sussman, 1982: 73). The Community Development blocks had a greater variety of 
programs and more funding but because the planners wanted to cover the whole country quickly, by the 
Third Plan there was no longer a distinction made between the two types of blocks, with the blocks 
funded and staffed at the rate for the less intensive NES program (Sussman, 1982: 73-74).
Nehru and India’s planners saw Panchayati Raj, which began in the states of Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh in 1959, as a necessary complement to Community Development. The rural works and general 
village improvement programs were to be planned by the villages’ elected panchayats which would thus 
be instruments of community participation. Importantly, the planners believed that if enough people were 
to participate in the development process, possible inefficiency and corruption in the development 
administration would be kept to a minimum (First Plan, 1952: 145-46). The panchayats did not operate, 
however, (except in rare instances) as instruments of development not the least because the state 
governments actively curtailed their sources of funds because they were seen, especially in the form of 
the Block Chairmen, as a challenge to state politicians (Ministry of Agriculture, 1985: 40). In the late 
1970s the centrally-appointed Ashok Mehta committee studied the panchayats’ operation and concluded 
that (1978: 6):
Panchayati Raj institutions are dominated by economically or socially privileged sections o f society and 
have as such facilitated the emergence of oligarchic forces yielding no benefits to weaker sections. The 
performance of PRIs has also been vitiated by political factionalism, rendering development thrusts either 
warped or diluted. Corruption, inefficiency, scant regard for procedures, political interference in day-to- 
day administration, parochial loyalties, motivated actions, power concentration instead o f service 
consciousness—all these have seriously limited the utility of Panchayati Raj for the average villager.
As the above quotation indicates, the Panchayati Raj institutions have been dominated by the rich 
peasantry. They, in turn, have established close relations with the local administrators to gain control of
21 It has been well-established that in the Sixties and Seventies, for example, the development/agricultural extension 
administrators met their targets for acreages of High Yielding Varieties seeds largely by falsifying statistics, but also through 
exchanging resources (for agricultural production) with the rich fanners for money and/or other considerations such as help with 
non-agricultural programs (Chambers and Wickremanayake, 1977: 163-4 and Chinnappa, 1977: 96-7).
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the available resources under the latter’s control. Rather than preventing or curtailing administrative 
corruption and promoting an administration which would be responsive to the needs of a broad range of 
villagers, the panchayats had the opposite effect in most cases. Community Development never received 
enough funding or administrative impetus to get off the ground, and Gram Sevaks quickly found that the 
targets for "community projects" could be most easily met by narrowing the definition of "community" to 
village elite. This spilled into extension programs as well, and improved agricultural techniques and 
inputs found their way onto the rich peasant’s lands first.
India’s planners realised with a shock in the aftermath of the Census of 1961 that the country’s 
population growth was much higher than any of their earlier calculations had led them to believe. The 
high population growth rates and low agricultural growth rates caused the planners to renew their interest 
in raising agricultural productivity. That interest had lagged behind concerns with rapid industrial growth 
in the Second Plan. Thus, the Ford Foundation team’s suggestion in 1961 that the Intensive Agricultural 
Districts Program (IADP), the immediate precursor of the Green Revolution, be adopted was eagerly 
accepted in Delhi. It represented a radical departure from Community Development programs as it 
focused on India’s most productive districts with the aim of increasing their already comparatively high 
productivity. In administrative terms, this was to be accomplished by doubling the number of Village 
Level Workers from ten to twenty per block. The extra VLWs were to ensure that farmers used higher 
quality seeds and greater amounts of fertiliser which, along with institutional credit, were to be made 
more easily available to "all farmers" (Third Plan, 1961: 316).
With the failure of Indian agriculture to withstand the exigencies of two poor monsoons (1965-66 
and 1966-67), the planners needed urgendy to arrive at answers to India’s food crop production woes. 
They saw salvation in the Green Revolution and the "package program" of inputs consisting of improved 
High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of seeds along with adequate water, fertilisers, and pesticides.22 The 
package program has been of greater benefit to larger landholders, despite the insistence by agricultural 
economists that it is not biased against smallholders and that they are more "efficient" and hence more 
productive users of inputs than largeholders.23 Largeholders are more easily able to purchase adequate 
amounts of the expensive inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides, and have better access to assured 
sources of irrigation. As Harriss (1987b: 4) points out, even in the heart of Green Revolution areas (he 
refers to Punjab and northern Tamil Nadu) the incomes of "adopting" marginal and small farmers and of 
agricultural labourers remain at the poverty line.
23 2 .  Poverty Alleviation to the Fore
In some parts of India in the late 1960s, notably Naxalbari District in West Bengal and Tanjavur 
District in Tamil Nadu, there were violent altercations between landlords and landless agricultural 
labourers which led to widespread speculation that the Green Revolution would turn "Red" (see Sharma 
and Gough, 1973). This eventuality did not occur, but the violence in Tanjavur and Naxalbari, in 
combination with a number of important political events in the late Sixties and early Seventies, such as 
the split in the Congress Party, caused poverty alleviation to be brought to the political foreground by
^The Green Revolution was, however, a "revolution" only in the sense of increased wheat production, particularly in the states of 
Punjab and Haryana. While yields in rice have increased as well, they have not been as dramatic as the increases found with wheat. 
In fact, observers have noted that rice yields increased by more from 1949 to 1965 than from 1967 to 1985 (Harriss, 1987b: 1 citing 
Agricultural Situation in India, January 1986).
23There is a major, and unresolved debate in India about the "efficiencies of scale" in agricultural production. For a recent 
addition, which includes class analysis, see Athreya et al. (1986).
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Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The 1971 general elections, after four years of shaky Congress rule and the 
split of the Congress Party, saw Mrs. Gandhi win a two-thirds majority of seats in Parliament after a 
campaign in which she raised the cry of Garibi Hatao-Abolish Poverty.24 Mrs. Gandhi’s decision to seek 
the bulk of her support from the "weaker sections" of the rural areas for the election campaign of 1971 
had a good reason-according to a Government of India report, smallholders and agricultural labourers 
together represented 76% of total rural households (Fourth Plan: 149).
The development administration’s list of responsibilities underwent an important change with the 
introduction of poverty alleviation programs in the early 1970s, but especially from 1980 onwards when 
these programs were introduced on a larger scale and with greater publicity. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, from 1982 onwards the development administration in Tamil Nadu was divested of its 
responsibilities for agriculture. Consequently, the RWOs and BDOs were suddenly to switch their efforts 
from agriculture to poverty alleviation. Central planners, with little heed to the local officials’ possible 
difficulties in changing emphasis quickly, again raised community participation as an achievable ideal, 
although differently than during the height of Community Development in the 1950s. There were no 
more attempts at "consciousness-raising" of the broad mass of villagers, but rather people were invited to 
participate in specific development programs, such as IRDP and NREP, especially on a family basis.
The Seventies saw a renewed emphasis on "programs for the people" after the high technology 
strategies of the Green Revolution, but this emphasis was much more rhetorical than substantive, and it 
was not until 1980 and the beginning of the Sixth Plan that as much as 5% of Plan outlays was directly 
allotted to rural poverty alleviation. India’s Fourth Plan (1969-1974), however, was a self-avowed break 
from the trends of the earlier three plans. Mrs. Gandhi wrote in her introduction to the Fourth Plan (July 
1970) that "The Fourth Plan . . . provides a necessary corrective to the earlier trend which helped 
particularly the stronger sections in agriculture as well as in industry . . . "  (Fourth Plan, 1970: v). 
Therefore, in addition to devising "area programs" (Drought-Prone Area Program, Command Area 
Development Program, Desert Development Program) to remove regional imbalances, a new program to 
help poor cultivators was also developed called the Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA).
The SFDA arose directly from the recommendations of the All-India Rural Credit Review 
Committee in 1969 (Fourth Plan, 1970: 149 and 221) which favoured the provision of additional 
institutional credit to small cultivators (owning/controlling upto two hectares) who constitute 52% of 
rural households, and whose potential for output increases was as yet untapped. Also underlying the 
central planners’ concern that over fifty percent of rural households were inadequately represented on 
bank and co-operative loan records was the fear, mentioned above, that the Green Revolution could turn 
"red." This concern was expressed in the Fourth Plan (149):
. . .the pattern of landholding is such that only about 19% of the cropped area is comprised within small 
holdings. In this uneven situation, the new agricultural technology tends to add a further dimension of 
disparity between those who have the resources to make use of it and those who have not. There is thus the 
danger of emergence of a sharp polarisation between the more privileged and less privileged classes in the 
rural sector [emphasis added], the privilege in this instance relating to the resources and tools of 
development.
Mrs. Gandhi’s Emergency, declared on June 25, 1975, was presented as a major step in the fight 
against poverty. Her main justification for it was that foreign elements and divisive forces were at work 
in the country (Hart 1976: 29). These "forces" were derailing the government’s programs of development,
24Garibi Hatao has since been used extensively as a catch-phrase in India, particularly by academics writing about poverty 
alleviation policies.
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particularly those in aid of the country’s poor. It required the Emergency to ensure Garibi Hatao’s 
implementation. To help prove her point that the Emergency was to pick up the pace of economic growth 
and to put greater emphasis on removing inequality, Mrs. Gandhi instituted the "Twenty Point Economic 
Programme” from July 1, 1975. On the order of 50% of the states’ outlays under different headings, such 
as land reforms, irrigation, and minor irrigation were now deemed to be included under the Twenty Points 
(Fifth Plan, 1976).25
The Twenty Points included declaring bonded labour illegal, providing more housesites for the 
rural landless, planning to liquidate rural indebtedness with a moratorium on the recovery of loans from 
landless labourers, and a review of laws on minimum agricultural wages. Mrs. Gandhi’s Twenty Points 
did not represent a new departure in rural development In fact, bonded labour had already been declared 
illegal in the Constitution of India (Blair, 1980: 256), and land reforms had long been advocated as a 
strategy to promote greater equality in the rural areas. Significantly, as Harry Blair (1980: 256) argues, 
none of the Emergency reforms aimed at the rural sector "was undertaken in more than a rhetorical way." 
He reasons (1980: 254-55) that the Emergency did not change "the existing reality" of the "the consistent 
ability of dominant elites to maintain their position in the system." The Emergency may have appeared to 
make major changes to the nation’s administration (the trains ran on time and public servants arrived at 
their desks punctually), but it did not attempt to change the underlying relations between administrators 
and local, especially rural, elites.
"Minimum Needs" appeared in India in the mid-1970s and like the Twenty Points, does not 
represent anything new in Indian development policy planning, nor does it necessarily represent increased 
expenditures under these particular headings.26 The Minimum Needs program is infrastructural in focus 
and includes eight components which are: 1. Elementary education 2. Rural health 3. Rural water supply 
4. Rural roads 5. Rural electrification 6. Housing assistance to rural landless labourers 7. Environmental 
improvement of urban slums 8. Nutrition (Planning Commission, 1982: 29). When I asked BDOs about 
their responsibilities in the block, they did not mention Minimum Needs. This gives emphasis to the idea 
that Minimum Needs may be more for public consumption than for effective implementation. Some of 
the policies which are under the block’s purview are included under Minimum Needs, but this is an 
accounting procedure rather than a means by which a sense of urgency is lent to the need to implement 
them. Part of NREP’s expenditure, for example, could be placed under point 1 (school buildings), 3 
(well-deepening), 4, 6, and even 8 because wages for labourers are to be paid partly in food grains.
The Moraiji Desai government’s (which only lasted from 1977 to 1979) Sixth Plan (1978-80) is 
noteworthy for its introduction of two poverty alleviation programs which were later expanded in the 
1980-1985 Sixth Plan. They were the Food for Work Program (renamed the National Rural Employment 
Program in 1980) which started on a nationwide scale in April 1977, and the Integrated Rural 
Development Program which replaced the SFDA projects of the 1970s. Two programs similar to IRDP 
and NREP introduced during the Sixth Plan (1980-85)(and continuing in the Seventh-1985-90) are: 1)
^Since the first "Twenty Points” in 1975, there have been several more versions. Rajiv Gandhi’s Twenty Points (circa 1986) are 
as follows: 1. Attack on rural poverty 2. Strategy for rainfed agriculture 3. Better use of irrigation water 4. Bigger harvests 5. 
Enforcement of land reforms 6. Special programs for rural labour 7. Clean drinking water 8. Health for all 9. Two-child norm 10. 
Expansion of education 11. Justice to SCs and STs 12. Equality for women 13. New opportunities for youth 14. Housing for the 
people 15. Improvement of slums 16. New strategy for forestry 17. Protection of the environment 18. Concern for the consumer 
19. Energy for the villages 20. A responsive administration.
^Minimum Needs likely received emphasis in the Seventies because of Western aid agency concerns with "basic needs,” (Ruttan, 
1984: 397) although some Indian planners had stressed the overriding necessity of meeting people’s minimum needs as early as the 
1950s, and they circulated a report in 1962 entitled in part, "Implications of Planning for a Minimum Level of Living."
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the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP) which is also a food for work program, 
and implemented partly through departments like Public Works and Soil Conservation and partly through 
the development administration, and 2) the Massive Program of Assistance for Small and Marginal 
Farmers (otherwise known as "Massive") which is a continuation on a minor scale of the SFDA as it is 
supposed to provide subsidised loans for specifically agricultural production purposes (land 
improvements and minor irrigation). "Massive” is also implemented through the development 
bureaucracy, although in Tamil Nadu it no longer does agricultural work.
Tamil Nadu, as the other states, has developed some policies outside the purview of the five year 
plans, and which the block administration is also responsible for implementing. Two development 
policies in the state are, for example, the Self-Sufficiency Scheme (SSS-nicknamed the Self-Satisfaction 
Scheme because of the reportedly large profits made by both contractors and officials involved in it) and 
the ongoing Nutritious Noon-Meal Scheme (to provide lunches to needy school age children and old age 
pensioners throughout the state). The SSS was implemented for only three years (1980-83), and was an 
intensive rural construction works program which resulted in a large infusion of money (equivalent to 
about half of what the block budget would have been otherwise) for the block office to disburse. The 
works were all undertaken on a contract-basis, and the ones I visited in Lalgudi Block (bridges over 
irrigation canals) had never been completed and are unusable. The NMS was started on a large scale in 
1982. A midday meal scheme has long existed in Tamil Nadu, but it was not a major program until the 
1980s when the Chief Minister, M. G. Ramachandran, took a personal interest in the program and had it 
much enlarged.
The Self-Sufficiency Scheme mentioned above highlights the major practical implications for the 
block officials in the changeover from agricultural extension to poverty alleviation-more money to spend 
in the block and more targets to meet. The senior administrators’ and top politicians’ anti-poverty 
rhetoric as exemplified by the preface to the Sixth Plan,27 has little to do with the realities of the Block 
Development Officer’s environment in the block. While the senior administrators talk about "effective 
attacks on poverty," the local officials do what they can to meet their targets. In that respect there is little 
change from Green Revolution to poverty alleviation; in both cases the BDOs are given sets of targets to 
meet, and in both cases the BDOs have established exchange relations with the village elites to meet those 
targets as quickly, and with the most in return, as possible. As argued in this section, the Emergency had 
no effect on the relations between rural vested interests and officials, and there is little reason to expect 
that poverty alleviation rhetoric in New Delhi would have much greater effect.
2 .33 . Family Planning
I include a discussion of Family Planning because it is so prominent on every block’s list of 
responsibilities and block officials always list family planning as the top-priority program for them to 
implement. Moreover, it is an anomaly in terms of resource exchange as not only is it impossible for the 
administrators to make profits through its implementation, they have to pay people to elicit their 
participation. The family "welfare" program causes the Gram Sevak, the official primarily responsible 
for its implementation, more difficulty than other programs, but still he spends much time with it. The 
program entails convincing couples with two or more children that the wife should have a sterilisation
27See especially page xix, "Its [Planning Commission’s] overriding concern has been to give practical shape to the nation’s 
collective will for using all the latent resources and energies of the nation for an effective attack on poverty, unemployment and 
inequalities."
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operation.28 People’s reluctance to accept sterilisation operations, which include fears that the operation 
has permanent debilitating effects on the woman’s strength, causes the local development officials' great 
difficulties in meedng the program’s targets.
The family planning program’s importance in Tamil Nadu is directly related to one of the 
seniormost administrators in the state government A former Chief Secretary, and now head of the State 
Planning Commission, Mr. T. V. Antony, considers the family planning program to have a crucial role in 
the success of the country’s economic development Prior to becoming Chief Secretary, Antony was 
Additional Chief Secretary, and had been concerned with the family planning program since his days as a 
Collector in the 1970s.29
The concerns of this senior administrator have become translated into the observation by the 
centrally-appointed "Informal Group to go into the Adequacy of Village Level Workers" (1984: 2) that as 
much as 85% of the Village Level Worker’s time "has been taken by the Family Welfare Program." The 
family welfare program is largely the responsibility of the District Collectors, and so program targets are 
set for both the revenue and the development administration, although they are highest for the block 
officials. One of my respondents, a former BDO and now a DDO in a neighbouring district, complained 
that BDOs could easily get away with administrative malpractices as long as they met their family 
planning targets. This is, perhaps, an exaggeration, but it does give an indication of the importance 
attached to the program by senior officials.
In the development administration the person who must ultimately meet the targets is the RWO 
(VLW), and there is intense administrative pressure on him to find "acceptors." The RWOs universally 
complain about needing to do family planning work, saying that they are set an impossibly high target of 
40 "cases" each per year. Not only must the RWOs find "acceptors," they must accompany them to the 
Government Hospital in the district headquarters, provide meals and cover transportation costs for the 
accompanying relatives, bribe various of the hospital personnel so that the "acceptor" need not wait for 
hours for the operation, wait at the hospital until the operation has been completed, and bribe the 
"acceptor" with more money and gifts than provided under the program (at about Rs 120 in 1985). The 
RWOs say that their problems are compounded by the village revenue officers’ (VAO) need to find cases 
as well, and that the competition for cases between the two officers drives up the acceptors’ asking price 
(sometimes to Rs 500), especially at the end of the financial year when the officials are most desperate to 
Find "acceptors."30
The family planning program provides a good example of the powerful effect which top 
administrative pressure can have on the officials at the local level. When this administrative pressure is 
prolonged and intense, it has an effect on the block administrator which is as strong as that wielded by 
politicians, especially the Block Chairmen and ML As. Therefore, while family planning is anomalous in 
terms of local administrative resource exchange with political actors, it is consistent with intra- 
administrative resource exchange. To repeat one of my informants’ views: BDOs can get away with any 
sort of administrative malpractice as long as they meet their family planning targets.
^No other form of family planning is practiced to speak of in Tamil Nadu, and women who said they had "had family planning" 
meant that they’d had a tubal ligation or equivalent.
^Antony’s effects on the state’s propagation of the family planning message are renowned. It is impossible to go more than two 
kilometres along virtually any road in Tamil Nadu without being confronted with a family planning message. Also, all publicly 
owned transport vehicles bear family planning slogans.
^Family planning has led to the unusual situation of one policy fueling corruption in the implementation of other policies. If an 
RWO needs to give an "acceptor" and her family Rs 500, he will have to find the money somewhere—certainly not his own pocket
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2.4. Conclusion
The continuing need for changes in rural development policies over the years since Independence 
underscores the lack of ameliorative impact these policies have had in the rural areas. The state has only 
directed a limited amount of resources to its rural poor-never more than 5 % of its plan outlays--and no 
more than a limited percentage of these few resources injected into the rural areas have reached, and 
helped, the poor. During the British era agricultural credit co-operatives quickly became dominated by 
the rich peasantry (Robert, 1979), and since Independence "vested interests" have controlled the impact of 
programs in the rural areas-from Community Development and Panchayati Raj to SFDA to NREP and 
IRDP. It was assumed for too long in India, and was politically and economically expedient to believe, 
that increasing agricultural production would lead automatically to the eradication of rural poverty.
These policy shifts, however, have not been accompanied by changes in the local administration’s 
style of implementation which has seen the block officials, from Village Level Worker to Block 
Development Officer, interact primarily with the rich peasantry, thus ensuring that they are the major 
recipients of policy resources. The linear development policy and management administration literature 
also examines the policy and administrative context, but not as I have done here. For example, its authors 
are more likely to accept the existing development administration hierarchy without exploring how it 
might be circumvented by administrative juniors. They might point to understaffing as a major cause of 
"poor" implementation without seeing that increasing the staff in the block is unlikely to change the 
administrator’s policy resource exchanges with the resource wealthy. They seldom analyse "red tape" in 
terms of it as a valuable resource for the administrator. Moreover, management development authors 
have missed the broad-ranging set of informal, often semi-private, relations among administrators 
themselves and between administrators, politicians, and villagers. These relations tell us the most about 
the ultimate effectiveness of the state’s interventions to promote rural development
In the next chapter I include an extensive discussion of the political-economic environment of the 
local development administrator which leads him to become a policy resource trader. Administrative 
resource exchange in Tamil Nadu’s local development administration flies in the face of the "common 
wisdom" that this behaviour would not be possible given the rigid hierarchy of the development 
administration, and the plethora of specific program targets that need to be met within a framework of 
equally specific program rules.
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Chapter 3
Resource Exchange in the Block: 
BDOs, Contractors and Politicians
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the most important cause of local 
administrative resource exchange lies in the socio-economic and political environment of the block. I 
will discuss the local administrator’s, especially the Block Development Officer, ''environment" in terms 
of the effects it has on his disbursal of policy resources. I argue that the local development official’s set 
of interactions with the actors of his environment, especially rich peasants and politicians, can best be 
explained in terms of exchanging policy resources. These interactions tend to exclude the poor, even from 
policies of which they are the "primary beneficiaries." It will be further argued in Chapter Five that the 
block administrators’ exchange relations have a determining, and negative, effect on the impact of the 
Integrated Rural Development Program in the block’s villages.
The local administrator trades the state’s policy resources at his disposal to maximise his time, earn 
resources for his personal use (especially money), and minimise his vulnerability vis-a-vis politicians and 
senior administrators. The local administrator’s vulnerability has a profound impact on his behaviour. 
He is financially vulnerable because of cost requirements in terms of, for example, hosting administrative 
superiors’ visits to the block, paying for publicity functions for the politician, and for his own "life-cycle" 
events such as offspring’s weddings. He is vulnerable in a career-sense in that rapid transfers are a 
prominent (as prominent as promotions are rare) feature of the development administration. The Block 
Development Officer who does not comply with the politician’s demands may quickly find himself in a 
"backward" area.
The previous chapter and this one together examine two layers of the development administration. 
In Chapter Two I presented the more obvious, outer layer of the administration although showing some of 
the administrators’ interactions which are often hidden beneath it. In this chapter I present much more of 
the inner, often semi-private and semi-legal, layer of the local development administration which is 
largely untouched by development management studies. The evidence presented in this chapter is based 
on extensive coverage, mostly through interviews, of local politics and administration in Lalgudi and 
Thuraiyur blocks of Tiruchi District. I argue that such factors as the pressures MLAs put on block 
officials, have an important, indirect, effect on administrative behaviour in terms of poverty alleviation 
policy implementation. These data underscore the argument made in Chapter One that prescriptions for 
administrative reform, such as decentralisation of administrative hierarchies, are unlikely to have an 
ameliorative impact on the local administration’s allocation of poverty alleviation policy resources. 
Moreover, the reinstitution of the village panchayats, often with Presidents who have particularistic 
interests, is equally unlikely to have much of an impact on administrative behaviour, especially when the 
Presidents themselves engage in lucrative resource exchange and sharing with the block officials.
The development administration is in itself a resource of crucial importance to the MLA, and as
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will be explained the BDO can almost be likened to a partyworker for the MLA. The single most 
important resource under the local development administration’s control is the money made available for 
construction projects. As a result of politicians’ concerns about contract works, almost to the exclusion of 
any other program in the block, ERDP is pushed down the Block Development Officer’s list of priorities. 
Rather than receiving the major attention it requires in order to be implemented according to its rules of 
implementation (examined in the next chapter), it receives the minimum amount of time required to 
ensure that its targets are met. Family planning, as argued, is an exception to this pattem, but that is 
because of the intensive administrative pressure to meet its targets. Because the block administrator 
himself is a valuable resource for the MLA, the latter even worry about the posting of RWOs since they 
do not necessarily favour the MLA’s supporters.1 Understandably, s/he (the MLA) exploits his/her 
administrative resource as much as possible. In his search for a reduction in vulnerability, the BDO does 
what he can to comply with the politician’s demands, although he also employs some resources in a 
defence against excessive demands.
3.1. Politicians and the Administrative Transfer
The transfer, already a "rapid transfer" in British India, is one of the most prominent features of 
India’s administration, and is a major contributor to the local administrator’s need to be a resource trader 
(often a corrupt one) (Frykenberg, 1965: 72; Washbrook, 1975: 31, and my reading of Tiruchi District’s 
pre-Independence list of Collectors showed that they were unlikely to stay in the district longer than 
eighteen months). Robert Chambers (1983: 213) refers to the transfer as "the slipping clutch" of 
development projects and programs. The idea in British India was that the generalist administrator did 
not need to be in any one place for long, as with his generalist’s adaptability, he could easily fit into any 
new posting. Administrators now find themselves in posts for as short as six months, and it is rare to find 
anyone in a post for longer than two years. Part of the rationale for the rapid transfer in post- 
Independence India is that it would prevent administrators from developing vested interests in a particular 
locale. But in light of political demands on local bureaucrats, this rationale has been defeated, and 
bureaucrats develop "vested interests" with amazing rapidity, sometimes even before they reach a 
particular area.2
Administrative vulnerability in the matter of transfers is caused by the administrators’ 
understandable reluctance to spend any time in "backward" blocks. Even a district like Tiruchirappalli 
which is not especially "backward," has blocks which are far distant from Tiruchi, from any major roads, 
and which have villages (as small as 4500 people) as block headquarters. Moreover, it is possible for an 
MLA to have a BDO punished by transferring him to a district which has been designated "backward." 
Moving a family to such a place would be disruptive (educational facilities, for example, would be 
minimal), and the BDO may choose to leave his wife and children in a larger centre while working in a 
"backward" area, trying all the while to effect a transfer to a more desirable location. The other problem 
in being transferred to an economically poor area is that the money-making potential for the BDO 
particularly in the form of contract resource sharing will be curtailed. This would make it difficult for
JIn this way, the RWO’s has become a politicised administrative post as well. Many village respondents complained that the 
RWO favoured only one party’s or faction’s supporters in the village (whether it was true or not) and in some of the villages we 
visited the current RWOs were persona non grata because o f their alleged political biases.
I^n one of the two blocks I studied, it was widely rumoured among the local contractors that the incoming BDO had paid the 
MLA Rs 5000 in order to be assured o f the posting in that block. Bjorkman (1979 : 99) also discusses block and district 
administrators’ complaints that they must pay politicians for transfers and promotions.
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him to amass sufficient funds to buy himself into a better posting.3
The development administration vests much authority in senior administrators, and a less clearly 
demarcated but equally important amount of control is vested in politicians. MLAs in India have a great 
deal of control over transfers of officials who are posted within their constituencies, and now that 
elections have been held for the local bodies in Tamil Nadu, the Block Chairmen are also asking the 
Collector to have RWOs and BDOs transferred. The difficulties for the block staff in satisfying political 
people will have gready increased in light of these elections which resulted in many blocks now having 
opposition party Chairmen and ruling party MLAs (the panchayats’ term of office is only three years, 
however).4 If an MLA is unable to convince the Collector of the necessity of transferring the offending 
administrator, the MLA will next, perhaps, approach the Collector in the company of a number of other 
district MLAs or appeal directly to more senior politicians in the governing party who in turn will 
approach an administrator like the Director of Rural Development to secure the transfer orders. Although 
the MLAs’ and Block Chairmen’s reasons for wanting transfers almost always have to do with their 
concerns about their supporters being favoured in adequate numbers, they couch their demands in a far 
different vocabulary which includes words like "inefficiency" and "unresponsiveness to people’s 
demands."
An ex-DRD confessed that political demands for BDOs’ transfers are an administrative headache. 
The Minister might phone his DRD in the morning to request or demand a transfer and then check back 
the same day to see if the transfer order had been completed. "How," the ex-DRD mused, "could I check 
on the legitimacy of such demands?" Politicians also have some say in administrative promotions and 
suspensions. One BDO told me that he owed his promotion from Extension Officer (Industries) to Block 
Development Officer in 1974 to M. Karunanidhi, leader of the DMK and then Chief Minister of Tamil 
Nadu.
The Block Development Officer and his staff are often at the mercy of their local MLA. If s/he is 
particularly demanding and difficult to satisfy, the block office staff may look forward to a reign of 
terror.5 If not, some of the staff may find themselves with improved opportunities for promotion or, 
transfer to a more desirable location. The local official must respond to two masters, an administrative 
one and a political one, but there are more immediate, and adverse, consequences (immediate transfer to a 
"backward" block, physical threats) for the BDO if he does not satisfy his political master. At one of the 
divisional meetings I attended, the DDO told the BDOs and other block officials present that if they did 
not meet their targets for drinking water projects they would be subject to a lot of "pressure" and/or 
"trouble" from the MLAs. In other words, the DDO strengthened his admonishments by adding the 
weight of the politicians’ potential wrath. (For critical discussions of political control over the 
administration, see Khan, 1973 and Bhambhri, 1982.)
3AIthough Wade (1985) discusses lower officials’ payments for transfers to more senior officials in a south India irrigation 
department, I have no evidence (not even circumstantial) that this occurs in Tamil Nadu’s development administration.
^Elections to Tamil Nadu’s village and town panchayats, municipalities, and for Panchayat Union Chairmen were held in late 
February 1986 after a lapse of sixteen years. The elections for Panchayat Union Chairmen and the latter two civic bodies were held 
on a party basis. For these elections, then, the ruling All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kalagham (ALADMK) formed an alliance 
with the Congress (I) while the opposition Dravida Munnetra Kalagham (DMK) fought the elections with the two Communist 
Parties and the Muslim League. For the municipalities, the DMK won 64 of 97 councils, ’with its allies capturing another 4 seats 
while the ALADMK won only 11 councils and the Congress (I) another 11. In elections for Panchayat Union Chairmen, the 
AIADMK won 129 seats and Congress (I) 68. The DMK won 138 of these posts, while its allies picked up another 13 seats. For 
the town panchayats (information available for 417 of 428 councils), the DMK won 181 panchayats, its allies 33, while the 
AIADMK captured 117 town panchayat councils and Congress (I) 86 (Indian Express, Madurai edition, 28/2/86).
5When I was in Tamil Nadu in 1 9 8 5 ,1 heard about disgruntled MLAs threatening to have, or having, BDOs beaten because of 
their distribution of and payment for contract work. One block was without a BDO for several months because no one wanted to be 
posted there in wake of the ill-treatment meted out to the previous BDO by the MLA.
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A difficulty for the BDO lies in the politicians having favourites among the RWOs, because the 
RWOs who are favourites do not respond to administrative remonstrations from the BOO. Because of 
pressures from politicians, certain RWOs will be given charge of more villages than the other RWOs. In 
Lalgudi, for example, one RWO, a politician’s favourite, had thirteen villages in his group while four 
RWOs in the block had only four villages each, and two had only three each (the populations under each 
man’s jurisdiction varied from a low of 6600 to a high of 22,000.) In return for more villages he is 
supposed to favour the politician’s supporters in his group. This is an important example of resource 
exchange between a low-ranked official and a powerful person external to the administration which 
allows the juniormost official in the office to avoid the authority of the seniormosL The example of 
RWO-MLA resource exchange is important, for it shows how an official at the bottom of a hierarchy can 
use external connections to circumvent that hierarchy. BDOs also do the same thing. They help the 
MLA’s major supporters in the block, host impressive functions for the MLA, and ultimately pay him/her 
directly in return for a desirable transfer or even a promotion. The BDO’s connections with the politician, 
for example, would make it difficult for the DDO to exert much authority over the BDO. If the BDO’s 
political connections are good enough he would not only be able to ignore the DDO, he may be able to 
convince the politician to have him (the DDO) transferred if he is too critical of the BDO. (This is not as 
farfetched as it sounds. I know of one instance where a PODRDA was transferred for suspending the 
DRDA driver.)
The First Five Year Plan’s authors, presumably with Nehru’s concurrence, raised as a spectre the 
potential for corruption in all areas of the administration. Their warnings bear repeating here:
The influence of corruption is insidious. It not only inflicts wrongs which are difficult to redress, but it 
undermines the structure of administration and the confidence of the public in the administration. There 
must, therefore, be a continuous war against every species of corruption within the administration as well as 
in public life generally and the methods to root out this evil should be constantly reviewed. (1951: 115).
With the apparently increasing political corruption in the post-Independence years, however,
administrative corruption is a systemic reality. My interviews with people at every level, from the village
to senior administrative offices, pointed to increasing political and administrative corruption in Tamil
Nadu in the twenty years since the DMK, and subsequently ALADMK, took office, but this observation
must remain an impressionistic one. My impressions, however, are given weight by the following
quotation of Indira Gandhi’s:
If there is unanimity about anything it is in regard to inflation and corruption. Both are increasing and 
both are eating into the vitals of our society. Inflation is statistically provable, corruption is not—but its 
pervasiveness is felt. (Quoted in Kurukshetra, Vol. 29, No. 20, 1980.)
According to a former Collector, the BDO in Tamil Nadu must be corrupt to survive as a BDO, and 
there is no doubt that the politically shrewd BDO has the best chance for career survival and 
advancement I know of one BDO, however, who "overplayed" his political cards by trying to favour all 
of the most important political people (belonging to different parties) in his block, thereby satisfying 
none. He was subjected to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiries (called for by a disgruntled 
political party representative in the block) of his sources of income, and was eventually transferred from a 
"forward" block near Tiruchi to Ramnad District, considered one of the most "backward" areas of Tamil 
Nadu.
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3.2. Politics and the BDO
In the immediate post-Independence years India’s leaders felt that political control over the 
bureaucracy would be an important corrective to the latter’s years of servitude to colonial masters. 
Ironically, the situation has now been reversed and many observers in India (Bhambhri, 1982) feel that 
some corrective is needed for political control over the bureaucracy. In this section I will explain the type 
of relations which political people have with the Block Development Officer, particularly in relation to 
building contracts which are the MLAs’ and Block Chairmen’s main area of concern. The BDO’s 
success in a block in Tamil Nadu depends more on his astuteness in distributing contracts than on his 
ability to devise a block economic plan or to implement a policy like IRDP. The BDO is like a 
partyworker for the MLA in his distribution of contracts, because he is generally partial towards the 
MLA’s supporters in the block in exchange for hoped for favours from the MLA.* 6
The ruling party in Tamil Nadu is the All-India Anna DMK (AIADMK) formerly led by 
M. G. Ramachandran (known as "MGR" in Tamil Nadu), an ex-film star.7 MGR broke away from the 
then-ruling DMK in 1972, and his party won the next state elections held in 1977. MGR and the 
AIADMK have held power in Tamil Nadu ever since. The DMK, one of the first "linguistic nationalist" 
parties in India, is the main opposition party in Tamil Nadu. It held power in the state from 1967 to 1977, 
and has been led by M. Karunanidhi since 1969. The third main party in Tamil Nadu, loosely allied with 
the AIADMK, is the Congress (I),8 the ruling party at the national level in India.
Political parties in Tamil Nadu are factionalised, and in the ruling AIADMK there are at least three 
identifiable factions. These factions can cause difficulties for the BDO when the different factions are 
represented in the same block. In one block I studied, for example, the Town Secretary of the AIADMK 
supported one party faction leader and the current MLA, while the former MLA supported another leader 
and is a rival of the current MLA. Both the Secretary and former MLA were powerful in terms of having 
contractors allied with them, and two BDOs were transferred out of the block in rapid succession because 
they could not find the appropriate "blend" of contract disbursals to keep the two sides satisfied.9 The 
party factions exist primarily among Cabinet Ministers, ordinary MLAs, and among party bureaucrats 
down to senior party workers in the block, rather than extending to the villages.
The literature on Indian administration and public policy tends to suggest that the politician’s 
control extends widely in his constituency and that he will have a determining influence over the flow of
<T he rural legislative constituency is generally the equivalent of two or three blocks (one taluk) in Tamil Nadu, with its
boundaries generally coinciding with block boundaries, so that two MLAs representing one block is a rarity. Because the
constituency consists of two or three blocks, the Block Development Officer "shares” the MLA’s full set of demands with at least
one other BDO. Both of the blocks I studied are part of two-block constituencies, (one with an AIADMK MLA and the other with a
Congress (I) MLA) The Congress (I) M LA’s election was quashed by the Madras High Court in 1986, as his name did not appear in
any electoral list in the state, and in his nomination papers he had fraudulently misrepresented himself as another person by the same 
name whose name is on the electoral roll for the constituency. Presumably, his nearest rival, a member of a very small party in 
Tamil Nadu, would have been declared elected (Indian Express, Madurai edition, 24/4/86).
7MGR died in December 1987, and his widow Janaki took over as Chief Minister. However, opposition mounted and President’s 
Rule was imposed in Tamil Nadu in early 1988. As I have not been back to Tamil Nadu in the advent of MGR’s death, I confine 
my "politics" discussion to the period prior to his death.
8T  stands for Indira.
9Upto MGR’s death the two principal faction leaders in the AIADMK were a deposed (by MGR in October 1986) Cabinet 
Minister, R. M. Veerappan, and one of MGR’s former 'leading ladies” and now a Rajya Sabha (federal upper house) member and 
AIADMK Propaganda Secretary, Jayalalitha. The faction leaders all claimed allegiance to MGR, and each took an "I am closer to 
him than you are" attitude. In Tiruchirappalli District there were three important Cabinet Ministers, two of whom were identified 
with the separate factions mentioned above. The Tiruchi Cabinet Minister, Mr. N. Nallusamy, who was loosely aligned with 
Veerappan in his opposition to layalalitha, was also dropped from the Cabinet in October 1986.
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benefits into villages (Hadden, 1980: 181-83). Given the large number of villages in an MLA’s 
constituency, this is not too likely. The constituency may include over one hundred panchayat villages 
and their hamlets each with a population of no more than three or four thousand, and some as small as 
fifty or sixty. The politician takes little interest in the villages, and does not have many direct contacts in 
them, except for people in his native village (if he is from a village), relatives who may be scattered 
around other villages, and some local contractors.
The politicians generally want to make an impact on a wide population. As far as winning the 
maximum number of votes is concerned, it makes sense for the politician to concentrate his efforts on 
large, highly visible projects for his constituency, such as a hospital, schools, important link roads, 
additional bus routes, and the like (that the construction or licensing of these would result in large 
payments to the politician is an equally important consideration). Small works for villages are at a low 
priority for the MLA (perhaps higher for the Chairman), and programs like IRDP which are supposed to 
be in aid of the poor individual have virtually no interest for the MLA at all. The outcome of this is that 
the block officials do not have much political pressure on them to implement poverty alleviation 
programs that do not have a contract component.
It is widely believed in Tamil Nadu that most politicians want to make up the cost (said to be a 
minimum of two or three lakhs of rupees) of their election victories during a single four or five year 
term.10 Wade (1985: 490) suggests that the MLA in another Southern state spends on the order of ten 
lakhs to gain "the dominant party’s ticket and win the election." One of the ways an MLA may earn big 
profits is by having close contacts (in anticipation of "commissions") with departments like Public Works 
or even Forestry, which are in control of large contract funds. The development administration controls 
comparatively few funds but represents an important resource for the MLA in two ways. First, the 
development administration is one of the only departments which extends to the villages, and which 
provides them useful, if sporadic, services such as constructing school and other public buildings or 
maintaining street lights and drinking water facilities. The contract works it undertakes in the villages 
gives the politician the opportunity to build a coterie of needed grassroots supporters in the form of local, 
parttime contractors. Second, through the opening ceremony (see below) in particular the administration 
performs an important, free, public relations function for the politician.
It may not be an exaggeration to say that the BDO is the most important party-worker the MLA 
has, or even that the governing party has at the block level, and that he is judged by his abilities on that 
score. A senior official in Madras suggested to me that the AIADMK government’s primary rationale 
behind the Self-Sufficiency Scheme (see Chapter Two) in Tamil Nadu was to provide spoils of victory to 
party people who had not been able to reap any profits during MGR’s first term in office, 1977 to 1980. 
The SSS was implemented through the development bureaucracy (in fact, additional SSS BDOs were 
posted in the blocks where the program was being implemented), which would have to ensure that the 
appropriate number of governing party people received an appropriate number of contracts. During 
election campaigns the block development staff are run ragged with demands from the incumbent to get
10In keeping with this observation, a senior administrator in Madras suggested to me that in Tamil Nadu some politicians do not 
seek re-election, but rather endeavour to make the largest possible profit in a single term and then "retire" from active politics. 
Moreover, the ruling circle of the ruling party has, in the last two state elections chosen new candidates for constituencies even 
when the incumbent had won the previous election by a solid majority. In Tiruchi District, of 12 AIADMK winners in 1984, 9 are 
"new faces" in the Assembly. Of these 9, only 2 are new because they had defeated opposition incumbents. Six of the 9 new 
AIADMK MLAs replaced AIADMK incumbents, and one of the 9 was the winner of a 1983 by-election which was caused by the 
forced resignation of the AIADMK incumbent It was proved in court that he misrepresented himself as a tribal person so that he 
could fraudulently contest the election for this ST reserved constituency. The constituency is called Uppiliapuram and includes 
Thuraiyur Block.
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tasks completed in his/her constituency.11
3.3. The Opening Ceremony: Three Perspectives
Politicians make few visits to villages, but there is one occasion which usually brings the politician 
to the village—the opening function. When the development administration has been responsible for 
construction work in the village, especially a school, midday meals centre or other building, there is 
generally a grand ribbon-cutting ceremony. The Block Development Officer will arrange for a ceremony 
to be attended by the villagers, the local MLA, other MLAs, preferably a Minister, some of the block 
development staff, and other political people, especially those in the MLA’s retinue. If possible, the BDO 
will uy to arrange for a number of these functions to take place in different villages on the same day. The 
opening ceremony involves resource exchange in a number of ways. On one plane the BDO endeavours 
to "put on a good show" for the politician in return for political favours or even to ensure lesser 
harassment from him/her. The MLA’s satisfaction is its own reward. On another plane the BDO must 
raise the necessary funds for the ribbon-cutting ceremony and he does this through his relations with 
locally influential people.
One of the most important considerations for the Block Development Officer in arranging these 
opening functions is their cost. One Block Development Officer told me that he had once spent over Rs 
5000 in a single day on the occasion of some politicians’ visit to his block for opening functions (other 
BDOs said that Rs 2000 was commonly needed to cover the costs of opening ceremonies). The 
Government of Tamil Nadu provides a small grant, no more than Rs 500, for such official functions but 
the rest must be raised by the Block Development Officer. The politician and his people will not provide 
any funds for the occasion, although they expect a lavish function complete with colour photographs, 
garlands, and good food, not to mention a proper stage, sound and light equipment, and printed 
invitations. The better the function the better the politician looks. The Block Development Officer would 
not raise all the requisite funds from his own pocket. Rather, he would put his extension officers in 
charge of particular elements of the ceremony. Undoubtedly, for functions like these misappropriated 
policy resources in the block development office find some public use. Additionally, the BDO may be 
able to raise money to pay for the function through some of the village influentials. In a good example of 
resource exchange, they are often willing to help with the function for the privilege of sitting on the dais 
with the politicians, having pictures taken with them, and later sharing a meal with them.
Organising the opening function may cause a number of problems for the Block Development 
Officer. Even if he has raised the requisite amount of funds, other difficulties may arise. Factions in the 
political party are a source of trouble for the BDO in organising a successful function. Local 
party workers from opposing factions occasionally invite MLAs from opposing factions to the same 
function. If the Block Development Officer is lucky, he will be able to persuade the workers of one 
faction to have their MLA participate in another function at a later date. An article from the Indian 
Express of August 4, 1985 indicates the difficulties local officials may face in arranging functions with 
politicians:
The differences between the two Ministers hailing from Pudukottai District-Mr. R. M. Veerappan and
11 From all accounts, the worst case for the BIX) is when his block is part o f a constituency where a by-election is being held. 
Then, the attention of the whole state is focused on the one area, and there will be numerous visits by important people from all the 
parties. The demands to get things done in the villages will flow fast and furious, and the concerned BDOs will have to get special 
dispensations from the Collector in order to meet the demands. One block in a constituency which had had a by-election in 1983 
was still in debt three years after the election.
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Mr. S. Thirunavukkarasu (who belong to rival factions in the AIADM K) had its echo at a government 
function held in Ponnamaravathi yesterday. The occasion was the laying o f the foundation stone for a 
powerloom  com plex under the auspices o f  the Ponnamaravathi W eavers’ Co-operative Society. Mr. 
Veerappan, who was to have laid the foundation stone did not attend the function even though he was in the 
district yesterday. Mr. Thirunavukkarasu and Mr. V. V. Swaminathan, Handlcom Minister participated in 
the function.
Referring to the posters issued for the function, Mr. Thirunavukkarasu said that he found a M inister’s 
name published in bold letters and the names o f two other Ministers in small letters and appealed to the 
officials that they should not discriminate between the Ministers. The C hief M inister him self has said that 
in Government functions the size o f the M inisters’ names in the posters should be the same size.
Another potential problem for the BDO stems from factions within the village. It is possible for a faction
leader, with his followers, to boycott an opening function or even hold some kind of demonstration while
it is going on. For the Block Development Officer trying to impress his MLA with a well-organised and
well-attended function, this is a mortifying prospect, and he will do everything he can to make sure that
everyone in the village participates in the function. (This responsibility tends to fall on the shoulders of
the RWO in charge of the village.)
These village opening functions have far greater importance for local administrators and MLAs 
than appearances would suggest First, as argued above, they are one of the causes of corruption in the 
block development office. Second, they are one of the few forums for public relations that a politician 
has in the rural areas. At an opening function the politician is able to take credit for bringing a specific 
good to the village, thereby probably winning some electoral support with virtually no effort made. Both 
politician and development administrators can engage in mutual back-patting, thus projecting the 
appropriate image to the nonetheless increasingly sceptical villagers.
The opening function, or any other village function at which senior political or administrative 
people might be expected to attend, has a different significance from the villagers’ point of view. It is one 
of the few occasions when they can make demands or, more realistically, supplications of those in control 
of resources they want, especially employment.12 At an opening function the villagers present the 
politician(s) with a flood of petitions and letters requesting help of various types. Both the petition and the 
letter, however, have become devalued currencies in terms of the villagers getting requests fulfilled 
because they are so overused. An ex-Collector told me that it had not been uncommon for him to receive 
as many as 200 letters and petitions on any single visit to a village in his district. He further added that he 
might have been able to do more about them had they been about "village upliftment," but most were 
individuals’ requests for employment, and there was little he could do to help. Therefore, unlike village 
leaders and contractors, the "average" villager has almost no opportunity to exchange resources with 
either administrators or politicians, leaving them with ineffectual tools (letters/petitions) to try to get what 
they want from the political and administrative system.13 The MLA’s constituency office provides 
further evidence of ordinary people’s attempts to gain employment, for example, through political 
influence. His anteroom is always crowded with supplicants, few of whom will be successful. People 
understand where the power lies, but their problem is in gaming access to it. A few of our village 
respondents, especially small contractors, said they were formally joining the ruling party so that they 
could look forward to greater benefits. (The material on the opening ceremony was gathered primarily 
through interviews with officials. I have visited a number of MLAs’ offices.)
12With the increasing percentage of educated youth in the rural areas, there is a concomitant increase in the demand for urban, 
especially government (because it is both secure and pensionable), employment.
13 Another common, also ineffectual, tactic villagers employ in making requests of important politicians is, when they learn of a 
politician’s visit to their area, to wait at a crossroads where the politician’s motorcade will pass in hopes that he will stop and talk to 
them.
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3.4. The "Contract System”
Most MLAs at the block-level are primarily concerned with the disbursal of contract work. They 
have a group of contracting supporters within the block for whom they put pressure on the block officials 
to disburse contracts in exchange (with the contractors) for financial support. This means that the 
demands the MLA makes on the BDO for various measures in the block have little direct bearing on the 
implementation of development policy at the village level. A program like IRDP, for example, when seen 
on a subsidy by subsidy basis, involves much too small an amount of money for an MLA to pay much 
attention to it  It was, perhaps, because of their lack of pecuniary interest in the program, that a few 
MLAs made complaints to the media about IRDP’s implementation (they were generally quiet about 
programs involving contract works). The block’s "contract system" is a complex set of resource exchange 
(and sharing), interactions involving block officials, MLAs, Block Chairmen, contracting rich peasants, 
and fulltime contractors.14
The MLA seldom interferes in the BDO’s handling of contract work on a daily basis, but rather has 
a more general concern that an appropriate number of party (or same faction) contractors receive 
contracts compared with opposition party contractors. One BDO told me that he was doing government 
party work in his block. On pressing him, I discovered that what he meant by this cryptic statement was 
that the MLA expected him to pay attention to local contractors’ factional alignments. The BDO had to 
disburse more contracts to those party contractors identified with the MLA and the faction he belonged to 
or risk the unpleasant prospect of an unwanted transfer. This evokes the "evolution metaphor" of Chapter 
One. The BDO mentioned here has become so well-adapted to his political environment that he 
distinguishes not only between ruling party and opposition party, but also between factions within the 
ruling party.
All contractors, including ruling party contractors, are expected to give a percentage of the 
contract’s value to the block development staff and political people. There was reportedly, however, a 
differentiation in the percentage that a party contractor should give compared with an opposition party 
contractor, with opposition contractors having to part with a higher percentage of the contract estimate. 
Some of the contractors we interviewed spoke of the profit-sharing arrangements they made with the 
block officials, although most were understandably unwilling to discuss the specifics. One contractor said 
that for a Rs 20,000 road contract in 1982-83 he and the other two contractors involved in the project 
were told that Rs 10,000 would have to be shared (with the bulk to the officials), meaning that the road 
would be constructed for Rs 10,000 or less. Other contractors mentioned that they were given estimates 
by the block development office, and then told that the project should be constructed for forty percent of 
the given estimate, with the rest of the funds to be shared. In one of the blocks a contract to construct 
public latrines was given to the brother of one of the block’s road inspectors. The contractor said that the 
estimate given for the project was for Rs 17,000. He was told he would not get more than Rs 8000, and 
he said that he actually spent only Rs 5000 on the work.
The implications of construction fund resource sharing are that the quality of materials used is poor, 
the quantity used may be less than required, and projects may not even be completed. Another
14Contractors can count on some help from MLAs, but generally must be quite assertive in their own right to get contracts. Mook 
(1974: 127) noted that block contractors tended to spend long hours at the block office (my observations confirm his). He does not 
offer any reasons for this but I would suggest two explanations. First, the local contractors would want to have the first information 
about any available contracts, and second when the time comes to collect bill payments, they would be able to apply pressure at the 
appropriate points in the office, thus reducing the officials’ "insider information" advantage. It also does not hurt their interests to 
make friends with some of the clerks in the office (to speed up bill payments).
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contractor’s confessed wrongdoings exemplify this statement- He was working on a village school 
building and said that he normally used a ratio of cement to sand of 1:9, but for this school building he 
was using a ratio of 1:5 (apparently the appropriate ratio for buildings is 1:4). When asked as to why he 
was doing a better job on this building, he replied that this was his own village, and the school would 
have to last as long as his son would be attending classes there.
Not every building/road contractor in the block15 can be identified with a political party-some of 
them hedge their bets, and make donations to, or otherwise have contacts with, a number of political 
parties, and some of them do contracts for more than one government department. Compared with a 
department like Public Works/Highways which has enormous contracts under its control, the contracts 
which the block development office disburses are for relatively small amounts. Nonetheless, for a 
landholding villager contracting is a profitable sideline to agriculture. The local party contractor is often 
the only "grassroots organisation" a political party has in the sense that he is one of the few people the 
MLA has contact with in the block and who, in turn, may have some influence over voting in his village, 
and would be a source of funding for the MLA. Moreover, if an MLA is in a constituency where he has 
factional rivals, it is important for him to be able to point to useful supporters (especially at election 
candidate selection time).
Locally powerful people are not dependent on party politicians (the former’s power springs from 
local economic sources of power such as ownership and control of land), and there is a symbiotic 
relationship between the two in that the politicians require both visible supporters in a constituency and 
financial support. The rich peasant who is also a local contractor satisfies the two conditions, and the 
contractors, with their political connections, are helped to get adequate contracts from the administration 
by the politician and his supporters in the local party bureaucracy. Because many local contractors are 
rich peasants, they are not dependent on contracting for their livelihoods. This gives them a significant 
degree of independence from the politicians. Moreover, contractors in a block who normally support 
different political parties sometimes share contracts among themselves, thus cutting across lines of party 
support In Thuraiyur Block I knew of two examples of cross-party contract-sharing, the first involving 
two Panchayat Presidents, one an AIADMK man and the other DMK, and in the other instance a 
powerful DMK contractor shared some of his contracts with a Congress (I) man.
Although contractors and block development officials are engaged in contracts for mutual profit 
rather than for the commonweal, the active local contractor is an important figure in determining where 
contract works are undertaken, including those for poverty alleviation programs such as NREP and 
RLEGP. This was true of the political-administrative system without the elected village panchayats, and 
remains true in the aftermath of the elections. The Panchayat Presidents are often themselves at least 
parttime contractors; over half of the newly installed Presidents in the Lalgudi research villages do 
contracting as a sideline, if not their main occupation. They were, and presumably still are, able to get 
around the letter of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act (1958) which prohibits panchayat council members 
from undertaking any panchayat contracts, through the use of benami transactions. This means that a 
person will have a transaction conducted in someone else’s name, but control over the business or asset 
transacted will continue to be vested with the person. In India this is a time-honoured method of avoiding 
legislation (especially land reform legislation) and otherwise misappropriating policy resources. (Bruce 
L. Robert (1979: 172) noted the rich peasants’ use of the benami transaction for illegal profits in the
15Not all the contractors who undertake work in a block are actually residents of the block. Some of them may be from 
neighbouring blocks, or even from the district headquarters.
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pre-Independence agricultural credit co-operatives in Madras Presidency.) The benami transaction is one 
of the oldest and most commonly used tactics by the rich peasantry in diverting policy resources but the 
implications of this for policy in India, including poverty alleviation policy, have not been confronted by 
Delhi’s policy makers.
An AIADMK contractor in Thuraiyur, closely connected with the former AIADMK MLA of the 
area, explained how a contractor can influence block development office decisions as to where projects 
are undertaken. He said that in his own village no one put pressure on the union officials to get projects 
until he himself decided to. With the help of the ex-MLA, he managed to have two NREP social forestry 
projects allocated to his village (which he undertook, ie., he constructed the necessary wells for them 
which means that his own benefits from his work for the village were substantial). Moreover, he said that 
for 1985-86 his and another village were both supposed to have panchayat buildings constructed in them, 
but the block budget was cut by one building and the other village lost the building project. He reasoned 
that the other, although much larger, village (his village’s population: 1785, the other village: 5127) did 
not get the project because it did not have anyone to put pressure on the block officials. (This contractor 
was elected President of his village in the 1986 panchayat elections.) The significance of this for 
development projects is that the block officials are most inclined to locate them where the well-connected 
contractor wants them, rather than where they are most needed.
The "well-adapted" Block Development Officer takes account of factional alignments in the ruling 
party and the importance of politically powerful people outside of the ruling party in his decisions about 
whose demands for resource allocations he should pay the most attention to. I was particularly interested, 
then, in a Block Development Officer’s assessment of who was and who was not politically powerful 
within his block. He said there were no AIADMK notables, and gave the following example to illustrate. 
The Extension Officer (Cooperatives) was about to be transferred to another block. He had good contacts 
with various AIADMK people in this block, and they wanted him to retain his post longer. Apparently, 
they asked one of the Cabinet Ministers in Tiruchi to reverse the transfer orders but to no avail. The BDO 
reasoned, therefore, that they had little political pull outside of the block, and further added rather 
disparagingly that his own contacts with the AIADMK ministers were better than those of the self- 
acclaimed "influential" AIADMK people. This assessment meant that he could ignore many of the 
demands of the AIADMK block leaders and concentrate on others instead. His block is in a Congress 
MLA’s and a Congress MP’s constituency, but the most powerful man in the block (certainly politically 
if not economically) is an ex-Cabinet Minister from the previous DMK regime, even though he is no 
longer an MLA (having lost his seat in the last Tamil Nadu state elections), and the BDO did take his 
demands seriously. This man had been a Block Chairman for many years, and had accumulated a number 
of positions of power, especially at the district-level, which include Chairman of the District Co-operative 
Bank and President of the District Co-operative Weaving Mill. He also owns a lucrative public 
transportation company which operates along a number of highly lucrative routes. The ex-Cabinet 
Minister continues to be powerful both because he is adept at translating his continuing political and 
business positions into power and influence, and is still able to exert influence through his political and 
administrative connections built up in the past. (In terms of resource exchange, this man would have so 
much "credit" from having been a Cabinet Minister that he is still able to recall "debts.")
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3.4.1. The NREP " Sh elf
A good example of how administrators interact with contractors and politicians in the block in 
implementing a "contract" program is provided by how projects are chosen (put on the "shelf’ in program 
parlance) for the National Rural Employment Program.16 The NREP projects are to be selected for the 
villages based on what the greatest needs of the villages are, whether they be an additional school or other 
public building, culverts, or a link road with another village or main road. At the beginning of the 
financial year the BDO puts together a list (the "shelf') of eligible projects and their estimates for funding 
under NREP (taking into account targets for the different program components such as roads, schools, 
and group houses). I asked a BDO how he put projects "on the shelf," and he said that he had consulted 
with the current MLA, the ex-Cabinet Minister from the constituency, and the MLA for the neighbouring 
constituency whose native village is in the BDO’s block. His reasoning was that if he satisfied the 
important political people’s demands first, they would not cause him trouble, and that they could be 
helpful when it came time for him to be transferred. (Additionally, this BDO wanted to start up a business 
venture and said that if he pleased his administrative superiors by overfulfilling program targets, and 
satisfied the political people, he would have little trouble in procuring the necessary licences.)
On one occasion when I was at the block development office, a phone call came for the BDO. The 
caller, an AIADMK contractor in one of the block’s villages, wanted to inquire as to whether the bathing 
ghat (cement and stone staircase) at his village’s tank (artificial pond used for irrigation) was included on 
the list of NREP projects. "Yes," said the BDO, "it was." The village in question was one that I had 
visited, and I knew, and the BDO admitted, that there was little need for a bathing ghat there. The tank 
was dry for most of the year, and people tended to bathe or wash clothes within the village at one of two 
electric pumps. But this particular person was a big landowner, a contractor, a Co-operative Milk Society 
President, and an AIADMK man, and he wanted a contract that would be convenient for him to 
undertake.
In another example of the way projects are put on the "shelf," I noticed one day in early April (the 
time when project lists must be forwarded to the DRDA) that the ex-Cabinet Minister had paid a visit to 
the block office. Among other things, he had wanted to inquire about two NREP projects for his village. 
When I asked about the projects, I discovered that both of them would benefit the ex-Cabinet Minister’s 
lands. The BDO was later forced to take these projects "off the shelf’ by the current Congress (I) MLA 
which meant a sudden shortfall on the BDO’s list of NREP projects. Fortuitously, another contractor (a 
wealthy Scheduled Caste man and now a Panchayat President) and a political rival of the ex-Cabinet 
Minister’s (thus acceptable to the MLA), came into the block office with a proposal to undertake some 
projects under NREP which would not only make up for the loss of the ex-Cabinet Minister’s projects, 
they would make the BDO look good to his administrative superiors because the new projects would be 
of apparent benefit to SC people. The contractor’s projects were put on the shelf instead. Miraculously, 
however, one of the ex-Cabinet Minister’s projects reappeared on the shelf at a later stage, thus reflecting 
his continued importance in the block, and the BDO’s reluctance to refuse him. One might ask where the 
needs of the poorest villagers fit into this scenario, but it is evident that they have had no input on project 
selection or location, although the NREP Guidelines (1983: 17) state that "while preparing the shelf of 
projects a conscious effort should be made to particularly include (sic) those works which benefit the 
weaker sections of the community."
16Officially, NREP projects are not to be delegated to contractors, but rather should be under the control o f the block development 
office, generally the RWO. Unofficially, contractors undertake most of the projects under NREP, which leads to an important 
accountability problem. Because officially the work is all done through the RWO, the contractor’s name will not appear on any 
documents, and hence he cannot be held legally responsible for the quality o f his work.
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3.5. The Village: Politics and Administration
In this section I discuss the political and administrative life of a village based on my observations 
gathered through visits to villages in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks. I provide a "political anthropology" 
of the composite village because it helps to explain how the administrators are able to interact with so few 
villagers, despite the development administration being one of the main points of contact between state 
and rural society (the others are the revenue and agricultural administrations), and the state’s main agent 
of rural development and poverty alleviation. I include a discussion of the, at times, adversarial but 
mostly non-existent relationship between the MLA and the villagers, and the paucity of political activity 
in the villages to show that the bulk of villagers unhappy with the local administration have little 
opportunity to exert pressure on the administration through a more powerful political representative. This 
both encourages and reinforces the resource exchange relationship between a few rich peasants and 
development administrators. The internal socio-economic dynamics of the villages lead primarily rich 
peasants to become "resource traders" with those who are perceived to control valuable resources outside 
of the village, including development administration personnel. The poor, again, are largely omitted from 
interactions with the development administration.
Generally, when the village panchayat councils operated in the Sixties and early Seventies in Tamil 
Nadu, the Panchayat President and to a lesser extent his councillors had the greatest amount of contact 
both with the Block Development Officer, his staff, and with the elected Block Chairman. The latter, a 
local politician, could be a powerful person, and have a great deal of influence over the activities of the 
block development officials. As Heginbotham (1975: 104) wrote,
If a Chairman chose to do so, he could tie his BDO in procedural knots by delaying or killing council 
resolutions. He could—and frequently did—also demand special attention, privileges, and projects for his 
personal followers, often in contravention of government rules. The BDO who could not work out a modus 
vivendi with his Chairman was in serious trouble. Besides his powers in the block, the Chairman was 
generally also an important regional politician with powerful contacts in his party’s hierarchy. Through 
these contacts or independently, he could generally arrange the replacement of his BDO by a more 
malleable—or skillful—one.
Many people, from villagers to Secretary of the Rural Development and Local Administration 
Department, complained to me that without the panchayats the block development staff, and the BDO in 
particular, had become like minor rajas with no political checks on their activities aside from the MLA’s. 
One senior development administration official in Madras told me in 1986 that he expected, 
optimistically perhaps, the newly elected panchayats to have a "checks and balances" influence on the 
local administrators’ activities, including their corruption. However, as I pointed out in the previous 
section, many Panchayat Presidents themselves use benami transactions to continue contracting in the 
block, so that far from having a "checks and balances" influence on administrators, it is "business as 
usual."
The villagers we interviewed in 1985 saw the days of the panchayats as a time when the 
administration was more responsive to the villages’ needs, partly because the Presidents were more adept 
than the Gram Sevaks in informing the BDO about basic amenities requiring attention in the villages. As 
many of our village respondents pointed out, there is one President for every village, but one Gram Sevak 
has three, four, or more villages under his jurisdiction. The village panchayat council also could put 
pressure on the administration, either directly, or indirectly through the Chairman. Many people felt that 
without the panchayats, their villages lacked leadership and hence, lacked anyone to put pressure on the 
administration for basic amenities. In the wake of the panchayat elections, people were cautiously 
optimistic about the good the new councils would do. If nothing else, in most of the villages we visited in 
1986 the Panchayat Presidents had had all the village streetlighting repaired. However, virtually all
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studies of the panchayats in Tamil Nadu (see Mencher, 1978 and Djurfeldt and Lindberg, 1975), and the 
Government of India’s Ashok Mehta Committee Report (1978) on Panchayati Raj Institutions, argue that 
they favoured particularistic interests in the villages, and that demands they made were in aid of the few 
rather than the many. Nonetheless, elected village councils make more demands for amenities in the 
villages, not the least because the President is interested in the profits possible from construction projects 
in the village, and the councils themselves are in charge of local concerns such as street lights.
When visiting villages I soon learned that political activities there, such as public meetings and 
visits from the politicians, were minimal, primarily existing during election campaigns. The AIADMK 
and DMK did generally have a party representative each per panchayat village, but this person was often 
little more than a figurehead. Party meetings were seldom, if ever, held in the villages, and the political 
party worker was not usually seen as someone who could be approached to act as an intermediary 
between villager and more senior party people and/or the MLA. It often seemed that economically 
powerful people in the villages had better contacts with the ruling party than did the party workers (when 
the two were not one and the same).
During election campaigns the candidates running for MLA, sometimes not even all the candidates, 
visit the village, perhaps hold a meeting, make extravagant promises, accept petitions from villagers for 
employment and village-wide needs, and sometimes, in an obvious example of resource exchange, their 
workers would distribute money to potential voters.17 In an all too common showing of political 
opportunism (and another example of election-specific resource exchange), the ruling party candidate 
would, perhaps, start additional bus routes to villages during the campaign, but stop them as soon as the 
election was over. (This had happened to a village visited by my research assistants in Thuraiyur Block.) 
Likewise, village street lights all functioned during election campaigns, but were not maintained properly 
afterwards.18 During the state elections of 1984 television sets were installed in every panchayat village 
of one of my research blocks-not coincidentally a block where the ruling party feared that the DMK or 
one of its allies could do well. (Since then TVs have been installed in many of Tamil Nadu’s blocks). 
After an election, the winning candidate generally makes a "thanksgiving tour" during which s/he revisits 
the constituency’s villages, thanking the voters for their support. After that, however, the elected MLA 
spends most of the rest of the term engaged in the "semi-private" politics of backroom meetings with 
local and district officials, with senior partyworkers, other MLAs, and favoured supporters in the 
constituency. The majority of the villagers and their needs do not, literally or metaphorically, enter the 
politicians’ backrooms.
People in the villages quite rightly took a rather dim view of the local politicians’ activities, and 
many complained about their lack of concern for the plight of the villages. There was, however, a sharp 
distinction made, not necessarily consciously, between the local politician and MGR. MGR’s reputation
17Many people recounted tales of vote-buying in the panchayat elections of 1986. If an election were held at all (in some villages 
the Presidential candidate was unopposed), the general campaigning involved door-to-door canvassing, rather than holding public 
meetings. The candidates seemed to rely on winning votes of their caste mates. However, vote-buying at Rs 5 to Rs 10 a vote was 
rampant in the Scheduled Caste areas. This campaign tactic was quite successful as people did tend to vote for the "highest bidder." 
This made the local election process very expensive with presidential candidates of even small villages dess than 1000 voters) 
spending on the order of Rs 3000 to Rs 5000 each for their campaigns. Moreover, candidates also made donations to temples 
(especially for renovations) in sections of the village where they wanted to win more votes.
18In visits to villages in 1985, we heard numerous complaints about the street lighting, and the corruption that surrounded the 
provision of this basic amenity. It was, apparently, common practice for block officials to order tube (fluorescent) lights for village 
streets, sell the tube lights, and install cheaper, less durable, incandescent bulbs instead. Moreover, some of our village respondents 
told us that burnt out lights from one village would be installed in another, with the money for the replacement lights of the one 
village pocketed. I cannot say how widely these practices were followed among officials, but there were, indeed, numerous villages 
which had low wattage, bare bulbs where fittings for tube lights existed.
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as a champion of the poor, the downtrodden, and women remained unsullied, even while his partymen 
were reviled. He received praise from many villagers for his populist schemes in Tamil Nadu, such as the 
high-profile Noon-Meal Scheme, and schemes to distribute clothes to the poor, wheelchairs to the 
handicapped, electricity connections for huts, etcetra. Our IRDP respondents also gave MGR credit for 
wanting to help poor people with loan-subsidy programs like IRDP, a centrally-sponsored scheme. 
Colleagues at M.I.D.S. who had also done research on IRDP said that some villagers they had spoken 
with even thought that MGR did not want poor people to repay their IRDP loans.
The only resource people felt they could use against the nefarious politician was the election 
boycott, and the last two elections in Tamil Nadu (1980 and 1984) have witnessed a number of villages, 
in their entirety, boycotting the elections. In a few of the villages we visited, village leaders had had 
plans to boycott which did not quite come to fruition. In at least one village, none of the candidates were 
allowed to enter the village during the campaign, although a number of people did vote in the election. It 
seemed to take a serious, specific, village-wide problem, such as inadequate drinking water to encourage 
a village-wide election boycott rather than grumblings about the MLA’s inattentiveness to village 
problems generally. Anything less than a village-wide boycott did not attract media or other attention and 
hence, was ineffective. The villagers realise fully well that their votes are a valuable resource for the 
MLA at election time, and are showing increasing willingness to withhold them if the politician has not 
provided them with anything concrete during his/her term of office.
We also asked people about non-party or non-govemmental organisations in the villages. Most of 
the villages had them, but most of the organisations were dormant. Many it seemed, had never been 
active. In the 1950s block officials had been charged with helping to increase (or create) people’s 
participation in their own development, and one of the ways in which they were supposed to encourage 
this participation was by forming organisations, such as for women and youth, in the villages. Hence, the 
legion of inactive organisations in the villages I visited. There were, occasionally, active caste and youth 
organisations, but their activities also were quite sporadic primarily because of a lack of funds.19 I 
mention non-govemmental organisations because they can be, more theoretically than practically 
unfortunately, a valuable resource in effectively making demands of the administration for villagers who 
have few resources. The evidence I have strongly suggests that poor villagers cannot even hope (with 
rare exceptions) that the MLA, Block.Chairman, or Panchayat President will put pressure on the block 
administration to ensure that the majority of development policy resources flow to them (the poor). Their 
individual efforts are equally unlikely to win them rewards.
There was little evidence of development administration activity in the villages. In fact, the revenue 
administration was more prominent in the villages than the development administration. As mentioned, 
Revenue’s Village Administration Officers are posted at a rate of one per revenue village. The VAO 
generally has a small "office" in the village and people know where they can find him. Not so with the 
RWO who is seldom available in the village, and is not easy to find in the block office either. (During our 
village visits which took place over a six month period, we saw a number of VAOs, but I only once saw 
an RWO in a village.) The RWO is in charge of a number of panchayat villages and even people who 
knew who he was (many did not) had no idea when his next visit would be, and they could not be sure
19In October 1985, Mrs. Gomathi Srinivasan, Tamil Nadu’s then Social Welfare Minister, announced that government-sponsored 
women’s organisations in the villages, Mahalir Mandrams, would be revitalised, but when I returned to the state in 1986 I did not 
learn of any that had been initiated. The plan Mrs. Srinivasan announced was that each development block in Tamil Nadu should 
adopt one mandram, "and provide all assistance to its members in educating women on health care, child care and on 
self-employment" (Indian Express, Madras edition, 11/10/85).
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that they would find him when he did visit. A few of our respondents in some of the villages said the 
RWO’s visits were frequent. Most others indicated that the visits were sporadic or rare. The RWO was, 
therefore, contacting the same people all the time, and made little attempt to contact others, especially the 
Scheduled Castes.20 People who want something for themselves or for the village through the 
development administration generally have to visit the block office, often on numerous occasions before 
they can see the concerned clerk or officer. With the new panchayat councils, however, people can also 
ask the Panchayat President about improvements to village amenities. The agricultural extension officer 
for the Training and Visit program, also in contrast to the RWO, is a "visible" official who visits villages 
on dates fixed in advance. Moreover, he has a list of "contact farmers," so there is no guessing as to where 
he will be, or who he will visit when he comes to the village.
The internal characteristics of the villages also help to explain why the relations between villagers 
and administrators are so limited. I visited twenty panchayat villages in two blocks of Tiruchirappalli 
District, and can offer something of a composite picture of a "village." A panchayat village is not usually 
a single hamlet, and many of the villages we visited are comprised of two or more hamlets. The distances 
between hamlets vary considerably, from a couple of hundred metres to 1500 metres and more. Often, 
although not always, the hamlets are made up of a single caste. Scheduled Caste people always live in 
separate hamlets or "streets" away from the caste people. For example, the panchayat village of Alangudi 
Mahajanam (population: 1296) in Lalgudi Block is made up of four named hamlets: Alangudi
Mahajanam, Kalathilvendrarpettai, Kumarapalayam, and Kollu Medu. The latter is a Scheduled Caste 
"colony" (recent settlement), while the others are multi-caste hamlets, two of which contain Scheduled 
Caste populations dwelling in separate "streets." Scheduled Caste populations vary from village to 
village; in Lalgudi there is a high of 43% SC people in one village, with the percentage dropping as low 
as 6% in others (officially, one of the villages I visited has no SCs because they had all converted to 
Christianity and are therefore no longer officially recognised as SCs) (see Tables 5-5 and 5-6 in Chapter 
Five).
As far as class structure and landholdings are concerned, the information I have is sketchy, as I 
personally did not spend more than a few days (total research days per village were about thirteen, 
including one research assistant’s independent visits, and additional visits in 1986) in any one of the 
research villages (although I did stay at a couple of them) and people are understandably reticent to 
discuss landholdings (less reticent to discuss other people’s, however). Nonetheless, the incidences of 
landlessness in the wet villages was estimated at 40% to 50% of households with over 50% of households 
relying on agricultural labour alone or the output from a small landholding plus agricultural labour. In 
Thuraiyur, a dry area, the incidence of landlessness was less, but many people have tiny, unirrigated plots 
of land which are worth little, either in terms of actual value or production. There are fairly high 
incidences of tenancy in the wet area (often with Hindu temples as the landlords), but virtually no 
share-cropping, while the situation was reversed in the dry area. The following table adapted from the 
World Agricultural Census gives a rough picture of the inequity in landholdings in Tiruchi District, and 
the vast percentage (79.3) of holdings which are small enough to qualify their owners for IRDP benefits.
The economic conditions of the villages vary enormously, although the internal variation does not
20There is a spatial reason behind the RW Os’ rare visits to the Scheduled Caste "streets” of the villages. These areas are generally 
apart from the main village where all the caste people live, with the main village often located between the Scheduled Caste areas 
and the main road. The RWO who arrives by bus will go to the hamlet closest to the bus stop, seldom venturing into other hamlets 
of the village. In his work diary the RWO is able, truthfully, to record that he visited ”x" panchayat village, even though he may 
have only been to one hamlet or just sat in the village teashop.
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Table 3-1: Tiruchirappalli District:
Number of Operational Holdings and 
Area Operated by Size Class
SIZE CLASS 
(Hectares)
HOLDINGS
(Number)
HOLDINGS
(%)
AREA
(Hectares)
AREA
(%)
0 -1 386,989 59.2 163,235.23 17.0
1 -2 131,325 20.1 186,545.75 19.5
2 -3 56,555 8.7 137,158.42 14.3
3 -5 44,288 6.8 168,767.81 17.6
5-10 25,233 3.9 170,079.29 17.8
10-20 6,974 1.1 91,848.82 9.6
20+ 1,354 .2 40,083.76 4.2
TOTALS 652,718 100.0 957,719.71 100.0
Source: Adapted from Government of Tamil Nadu, World Agricultural 
Census, 1974: Volume H, p. 119.
seem to be quite so great from village to village, ie., most wet villages I visited, for example, have on the 
order of 50% agricultural labourers (including people with tiny plots of land) while the dry villages have 
about 40%.21 Moreover, in some of the panchayat villages the economic conditions of the separate 
hamlets show considerable variation, most noticeably when one hamlet is made up of only Scheduled 
Caste people. Some of the villages are well-placed as far as irrigation facilities (canals or tanks) are 
concerned and therefore, have a secure agricultural economy. A few villages are near to other sources of 
investment and employment, such as brickfields/chambers, rock quarries, sugar factory or rice mills. Still 
others are so well-connected with a main town or even the district headquarters, that people are able to 
seek education and employment opportunities there.
Despite this variation, however, all the research villages have at least one thing in common which is 
that only a few people per village have regular contact with the development administration. This, 
however, should not be surprising given the estimated structure of landholdings in Tiruchi District shown 
in the table above-few people have enough profits from agriculture to invest in other areas, such as 
moneylending or contracting, the latter of which would bring them into close contact with the 
development administration. In some of the poorest villages I visited no one had any regular contact with 
the development administration, and these villages had little evidence of an inflow of development policy 
resources. (When agriculture was singularly lacking in profitability, the village was also singularly 
lacking in contacts with the administration.) Furthermore, if a main town is within easy reach of the 
village, people tended to turn their attention toward it rather than to the block development office, as their 
economic interests cannot as readily or assuredly be served by the development administration.
Despite the few formal mechanisms linking villages with larger political and administrative arenas, 
it should not be thought that villages are isolated, autarkical bodies. They probably never were, and they 
certainly are not now. In fact, with marriage networks, patterns of landholdings (ie., people from one 
village owning land in another), and other socio-economic connections existing between villages, many
21 It must be stressed that these are very rough data, based only on estimates given to us by villagers themselves. We did not 
undertake any household economic surveys.
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are closely tied with a number of neighbouring villages. In other words, villagers are not merely inwardly 
looking people. Many of them actively seek ties with those outside of their village in order to maximise 
their economic status and well-being (important resources in addition to being ends in themselves), and a 
few villagers (primarily rich peasants) try for success in larger political arenas (where, as argued earlier, 
the maximum possible rewards are available).22 Moreover, even people at the lowest end of the 
economic scale, agricultural labourers, have ties with other villages, in that they seek seasonal 
employment outside of their own village.
While influential villagers’ information and contact networks are normally confined to within the 
block boundaries, they do seek political contacts outside of the block, and they try to use them in efforts 
to gain more resources from the block office. I noticed, however, that influential people also use their 
knowledge about the workings of the development administration to go over the head of the Block 
Development Officer to try to get what they want from him. Some people, for example, went to the 
Divisional Development Officer, and others sought special sanctions from the district collector. In other 
words, they do not necessarily accept the BDO’s "no" for an answer, and try to have his decision reversed 
by administrators more senior to him. In some cases, the BDO’s negative response was not based on a 
wish to refuse the demander, but rather resulted from his having already allocated all of the block’s 
money for a particular program in that financial year. I know of two milk society presidents who were 
successful in gaining more IRDP subsidies after the BDO had disbursed his year’s allotment for IRDP 
because they had received, with the help of more influential political people, special orders from the 
Collector.
People complained bitterly that the development administration was failing in its main tasks, and 
tellingly the villagers think of the development administration primarily as a "building and maintenance" 
administration. Villagers complained that their streets suffered from poor lighting and bad drainage, or 
faulty water pumps and broken community radios. Now that the panchayat councils are functioning again, 
the villagers will be more likely to take their complaints to the councils, and also assign more blame to 
them if they cannot get required work done by the administration. However, the Panchayat President 
involved in lucrative contract resource sharing arrangements with the block administration is unlikely to 
be responsive to the needs of the villagers beyond those involving contracts he can undertake. Villagers 
did not usually complain that the development administration was not providing them any benefits under 
specific development programs (mainly because most people did not know of the existence of such 
programs), although there were complaints if villagers knew of a neighbouring village which had received 
a lot of IRDP benefits, for example. From the vantage point of the villagers, then, "development" 
administration is a misnomer. For the average villager, the "visible" aspect of the development 
administration has very little to do with "development," and, indeed, I never heard anyone refer to it as 
the "development" administration.
^In the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly’s Who's Who printed in the aftermath of the 1980 elections (as of October 1986, a new 
Who's Who had not been published for the late 1984 election.) Tiruchi’s eighteen MLAs listed their primary occupations thus: 
Agriculturalist: 7, Agriculture and Business: 3, Advocate: 3, Business: 1, Trade Unionist: 1, Politician: 1, Actor 1. Of the 20 
villages we visited three were the birthplaces and permanent residences of ex-MLAs. This shows, assuming some accuracy in the 
MLAs’ "bio-data,” that over half of Tiruchi District’s MLAs are likely to have a rich peasant background.
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3.6. Conclusion
For contract programs like NREP, the skillful administrator should be able to meet both the 
administrators’ and politician’s demands at one and the same time. This is extremely important for the 
BDO who is both vulnerable in a number of respects, and highly time-limited. The political emphasis on 
contracting means that poverty alleviation programs like IRDP which do not have a contract component 
will receive much less time than required for the block officials even nominally to implement them. By 
the end of this chapter it should have become clear that the interests of "the poor," the prime intended 
beneficiaries of poverty alleviation, amount to little in the local administrator’s scramble to meet 
politicians’ and administrators’ demands.
An important conclusion to draw from this chapter is that Tamil Nadu has not only a monetised 
rural economy, it also has a monetised political-administrative system. In this sort of system where the 
politician needs so much money to win an election, where an administrator may have to buy a transfer or 
promotion, where administrators regularly share proceeds of contract estimates and pay to host publicity 
functions for politicians, resources, especially money, are in constant demand (but in short supply). 
Administrators are closely involved in this resource "bazaar," and have many reasons, as argued in this 
and the previous chapter, for needing extra money. Only a small percentage of their money needs, but 
using a large percentage of their short supply of time, could be met by implementing policies in such a 
way as to help the poor. Moreover, their needs to meet politicians’ demands would also remain largely 
unfulfilled.
IRDP’s stage has been set. "Starring" in the piece are time-bound, rapidly transferred, money­
making, resource trading officials who are most responsive to the MLAs and Block Chairmen (who must 
be responsive to them if they are to survive). However, IRDP’s administrative "time and effort" 
requirements are high. Given the evidence in this and the preceding chapter, it is predictable that the local 
administrator will do what he can to minimise the time and effort required for IRDP’s implementation, 
thus simplifying the program’s complex guidelines to adjust them with his needs in the block.
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Chapter 4
IRDP--Complexity of Design, 
Simplicity of Implementation
The Approach to the Seventh Plan reiterates the goal of bringing down the percentage of population 
below the poverty line to less than ten by 1994-95. Therefore, the special programmes for income 
generation for the poor through assets endowment and wage employment for them will be continued at an 
accelerated pace during the Seventh Five Year Plan. Draft Seventh Five Year Plan, Chapter Two.
Senior administrators have designed ERDP’s rules and guidelines with scant regard for the local 
official’s environment in the block, and this chapter displays what happens to those rules when their "fit" 
with the local official’s environment is so poor. One of the keys to understanding IRDP’s 
implementation and impact is to assume that local administrators will either ignore or actively circumvent 
its guidelines. Block officials are also able to turn some of the rules to their advantage, either using them 
to make money or to deflect villagers’ demands. Rhetorically, and in senior administrative circles, IRDP 
is a high priority program, but given the political and other administrative demands on the block official, 
he has little choice but to reduce the program’s complicated rules to their simplest elements-the number 
of beneficiaries targeted in the financial year and the amount of money to be spent.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how IRDP is put into effect in the blocks, such that 
barely 15% of Tamil Nadu’s beneficiaries crossed the poverty line by the end of the Sixth Plan. I set out 
IRDP’s design and attendant administrative structure to highlight the differences from policy design 
which occur during the allocation of IRDP’s resources in the blocks of Tamil Nadu. I concentrate on 
IRDP’s milch animal component, as the vast majority of IRDP loans in the Sixth Plan was for cows and 
buffalos. Given the local administrator’s "environment of demands" and his placement in a hierarchy 
which is not as rigid as appearances suggest, these differences, termed "irrational" by senior 
administrators, are to be expected.
The resources available through the Integrated Rural Development Program are, taken on an 
individual basis, not worth much (during the Sixth Plan an average of less than Rs 1000 per subsidy) 
which would not seem conducive to the lucrative resource exchanges examined in Chapter Three. One of 
my most important findings about IRDP’s implementation, however, is that the distribution of the 
policy’s resources does not occur primarily on an individual basis. Rather, IRDP has been implemented 
largely, although not exclusively, through loan brokers (often parttime building contractors1) in the 
villages who are in charge of a large number of loans. The brokers have contacts, not only with 
development officials, but with bankers and political people as well, but are not the block’s most 
influential actors. The beneficiaries, on the other hand, have almost no contact with the officials, despite 
the rules which dictate the opposite. The concept of IRDP’s implementation is based on a one-to-one
!I do not concentrate on the contractor-loan broker in this chapter, but rather discuss his crucial role in determining IRDP’s 
impact in the villages in Chapter Five.
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relationship between officials and beneficiaries, but the environment in which the local officials work 
makes that relationship impossible to establish, if the block official wants to meet his program targets. 
There are numerous examples of both resource exchange and resource sharing which occur in the context 
of IRDP’s implementation, with the happy conclusion for local officials that through the exchange and/or 
sharing of resources with loan brokers in a limited number of villages, not only do they save valuable 
time in implementing the policy, they profit financially, and they satisfy their administrative superiors by 
meeting their physical and financial targets in terms of both overall numbers and the appropriate numbers 
of female and Scheduled Caste beneficiaries.
Both blocks I studied, although with different socio-economic bases, had fairly high spending for 
IRDP. Over the five years of the Sixth Plan, Rs 37.5 lakhs and Rs 36.7 lakhs were spent in Lalgudi and 
Thuraiyur respectively, exceeding the plan target of Rs 35 lakhs per block. The total spent on subsidies in 
the two blocks was about 35.83 lakhs and 34.97 lakhs. There were a number of blocks which had been 
unable to spend very much under IRDP during the Sixth Plan (in ten of Tiruchi’s thirty-one blocks there 
were shortfalls of Rs five lakhs and more over the five year period), but my main concern was to see how 
IRDP is being implemented, rather than to look for the reasons which would explain why it is not 
(statistics from Tiruchi DRDA, 1985: mimeo).
4.1. IRDP: Objectives and Program Elements
In the words of the Sixth Five Year Plan’s authors, "ERDP has been conceived essentially as an 
anti-poverty program. This objective is proposed to be achieved by enabling the poorest families to 
acquire productive assets, technology and skills as would make their economic activities viable" (Sixth 
Plan, 1981: 171). The main objective of IRDP, then, is to generate enough income for families 
significantly below the poverty line to enable them both to cross the poverty line and stay above it, and 
the means by which this is supposed to be accomplished is through subsidised loans from nationalised 
banks and other credit institutions for, among other things, milch animals, sheep, goats, tea shops, and 
tailoring endeavours. By 1985, however, the planners said about IRDP, "in view of the deficiencies 
noticed in the implementation of the IRDP, it has been suggested that greater priority should be assigned 
to rural employment programs by shifting resources away from IRDP" (Draft Seventh Plan, 1985: 112). 
Indeed, some priority has been shifted away from ERDP in that as a percentage of rural development 
outlays, the amount for IRDP has dropped from 28% in the Sixth Plan to 26% (Rs 23177.15 crores) in the 
Seventh Plan, while the food for work type programs (NREP and RLEGP) will receive 47% (Rs 4231.25 
crores) of rural development outlays (Rs 9074.22 crores, up from 5363.73 crores in the Sixth Plan~of 
which IRDP expenditure was 1661 crores-but still only representing 5% of Seventh Plan outlays) 
(Seventh Plan, Vol. I: Table 3.49a and Vol. II: 57).2
A secondary objective of ERDP, a rather surprising one, is to create among beneficiaries an 
entrepreneurial spirit The newly acquired assets would (theoretically) generate greater incomes for the 
beneficiaries, thereby encouraging them to invest further, and broaden the scope of their economic 
activities. Moreover, the "business-minded" among the poor are to be selected as beneficiaries:
Since the IRD Programme is intended to enable the beneficiaries to become small entrepreneurs by
give a comparative perspective on the place for "rural development" in Indian government spending, the total public sector 
outlay proposed for the Sixth Plan was 47,250 crores, while the amount spent on defence in the same period was about 25,800 
crores. In the next three years another 30,200 crores had been spent and/or budgeted for defence (The Hindu, International Edition, 
7/3/87: 1). In the Seventh Plan the largest chunk of plan resources is devoted to energy which is to receive 30% (Rs 54,821 crores) 
of the public sector outlays.
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Table 4-1: IRDP in India—Performance in the Sixth Plan
ITEM S TARG ETS ACH IEVEM ENTS
1980-85 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1980-85
1. Total allocation 1500.00 300.66 250.55 400.88 407.36 407.36 1766.81
(Rs cro res)
2. Total expenditure 1500.00 158.64 264.65 359.59 406.09 472.20 1661.17
(R s cro res)
3. Total num ber of 150.00 27.27 27.13 34.55 36.85 39.82 165.62beneficiaries (lakhs)
4. No. of SC/ST
beneficiaries (lakhs) 50.00 7.81 10.01 14.06 15.37 17.38 64.38
5. Per capita
subsidy (Rs) 1000.00 582 975 1041 1102 1186 1003
Sectorw ise C overaae  (%)
6. (a) Primary Sector 93.56 83.02 68.7 58.9
(b) Secondary  S ecto r 2.32 4.92 15.7 13.2
(c) Tertiary S ecto r 4.12 12.06 15.6 27.9
Source: Draft Seventh Five Year Plan, 1985: Table 2.1, page 118.
running economic enterprises of their own, it is necessary that the identified beneficiaries should have the 
willingness and ability to initiate and manage such economically viable enterprises either individually or in 
association with other similarly placed persons. It is, therefore, necessary that the selected beneficiaries 
have the required degree of motivation and a minimum managerial capability for starting and operating an 
enterprise financed through subsidies and loans provided under the IRD Programme. Those beneficiaries 
who do not possess these qualities even though poor, may not be in a position to avail themselves of 
assistance through the IRD Programme (G. of I. R.D. letter: 16 July 1982).
When I spoke with a Deputy Secretary for IRDP in New Delhi in November 1985 he evinced the same
attitude as that in the letter above, and said that the "non-entrepreneurial" poor should be helped under
NREP as construction labourers. I discovered, however, that there is so little contact between local
officials and beneficiaries that the former could not possibly have any idea about the latter’s "managerial
capability." The Deputy Secretary, however, did not seem to take this into account
Theoretically, IRDP’s implementation requires the co-ordinated efforts of the elected village 
panchayats and/or village councils (if they exist), the block administration, other departments such as 
Animal Husbandry, Co-operation and even Fisheries, nationalised banks and rural credit co-operatives. 
The block development administration’s implementation of IRDP is, as with other programs, supervised 
by the Divisional Development Officer (DDO), the Project Officer of the District Rural Development 
Agency (PODRDA) and the District Collector. In Madras the Director of Rural Development and 
Secretary of Rural Development also act as supervisors of the program and occasionally make visits to 
the districts and blocks to check on the implementation of IRDP and other rural development programs. 
There are also a State-Level Coordination Committee and Project Formulation-cum-Monitoring Cell in 
Madras. The State-level Coordination Committee is comprised of senior administrators and meets every 
three months, but it was never mentioned to me in Tamil Nadu, and I assume it is a figurehead. The IRDP 
Monitoring Cell in Tamil Nadu is part of the Directorate of Rural Development, and seems to be 
primarily a statistics gathering body. Practically, despite the administrative machinery which has been set 
up to facilitate IRDP’s implementation, the block officials do what they can to meet IRDP’s targets, and 
the statistics they present to their supervisors are seldom checked for their veracity.
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IRDP is a target group program, and ihe Government of India has defined IRDP’s target group 
broadly as the poorest of the poor in the rural areas. More specifically this target group includes small 
farmers, marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, non-agricultural labourers, and rural artisans with an 
emphasis on Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe beneficiaries. The Government of India’s definitions 
for the various occupational categories are as follows:
Small Farmer-"A cultivator with a landholding of 5 acres or below is a small farmer. If he has "Class I" 
irrigated land, [ie., river canal irrigated] then the land ceiling is 2.5 acres."
Marginal Farmer-The land ceilings wiih respect to dry and canal-irrigated land are exactly half that for 
small farmers.
Agricultural Labourer-"A person without any land but having a homestead and deriving more that 50% of 
his income from agricultural wages is an agricultural labourer.
Non-Agricultural Labourer-"A person whose total income from wage-earning does not exceed Rs 200 per 
month. Persons who derive their income partly from agricultural and partly from other sources can also be 
brought under this category, provided at least 50% of their income is from non-agricultural sources. They 
need not have a homestead but must be residents of the village in which they are identified." (IRDP 
Manual, 1980: Para 2.1)
The definitions are further refined with the restrictions that small and marginal farmers "should 
themselves be cultivators" and that their off-farm income should not exceed Rs 200 per month. 
Furthermore, while the emphasis for definitional purposes is on the occupation of the identified 
beneficiary, the incomes of other household members must also be taken into account, and during the 
Sixth Plan the total household income could not exceed Rs 700 per person. (The "household" has been 
defined as "persons connected by blood and marriage and normally living together" and the average rural 
household is considered to have five persons (IRDP Manual, 1980: Para 2.3 and Ministry of Agriculture, 
1986: 1). With the revision of the poverty line to Rs 6400 in the Seventh Plan, the new cut-off income for 
IRDP beneficiaries is Rs 4800 per household.3 In practice, these elaborate income definitions have 
played virtually no role in the block officials’ selection of beneficiaries because they have not taken rural 
household surveys to determine what people’s incomes actually are.
Although the economic conditions in some districts require a different application of IRDP’s rules 
or a broader interpretation of some of the program definitions, New Delhi’s administrators tend to be 
stridently protective of its rules. On the issue of land ceilings for beneficiaries there was a query from 
Madras as to whether tribal beneficiaries in Thuraiyur taluk of Tiruchi District who have five acres more 
than the five acre program ceiling could still be considered as beneficiaries because their "income from 
out of this ten acres is far below the poverty line” (TN RD & LA Dept. Letter No. 19122/IRD-IH/82-5: 
May 25, 1982). The reply received from Delhi stated that "it is regretted that no relaxation can be 
allowed in the norms relating to landholdings" (G. of I., RD Letter No. 14016/7/82-IRD-IÜ: July 15, 
1982). The irony of this exchange is that while this posturing between Madras and Delhi is occurring, at 
least twenty percent of IRDP benefits are going to "agricultural labourers" and "small and marginal" 
farmers who belong to these categories only on paper (Rath, 1985: 243).
The "weaker sections" are supposed to get the most out of the IRDP benefits equation, and the 
Government of India has decreed that "a high priority should be given to cover Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes" (SCs and STs) going on to state in the ERDP Manual (1980: Para 2.13):
3Further on rural incomes and IRDP assistance, the Government o f India, in its 1986 Manual on IRDP states (1986: 1) that 
"families with an annual income upto Rs 3500 . . .  [must be] assisted first After all such families have been assisted in a block, the 
block level officer would report to the DRDA that all the families with annual income upto Rs 3500 have been assisted. The DRDA  
would then verify the situation by issuing public notices and give sanction to the block to assist the families in 3501-4800 income 
bracket."
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In view of the fact that these special programmes are specially aimed at ameliorating the lot of the 
weakest among the weak, the proportion of beneficiaries belonging to SCs/STs should be much higher than 
the percentage of SC/ST population in the total population of the area.
In Tiruchirappalli District, some blocks of which have an SC population of over thirty percent, the target
set for the number of SC/ST beneficiaries is fifty percent (Tiruchi DRDA, 1985: 1). The Government of
India rules also state that the percentage of SC/ST beneficiaries must be equivalent to the percentage they
receive of the total subsidy amount disbursed to prevent BDOs from "tokenism" in meeting SC/ST
targets. The Government of India has also recognised that women are often among the poorer and more
oppressed sections of the rural population, and therefore, thirty percent of total IRDP beneficiaries must
be women (Ministry of Agriculture, 1986: 2).4
4.1.1. The Subsidy
The program rules are also specific about the loan-subsidy ceilings for the different occupational 
categories of beneficiaries. For agricultural labourers and marginal farmers, the subsidy should be 33% 
of the loan amount, with a maximum subsidy of Rs 3000 which may be reached over a number of loans.5 
If the beneficiary is a small farmer then he is only entitled to a subsidy of 25% of the loan amount, 
although the subsidy ceiling is the same. This has led to some beneficiary cheating with "small farmers" 
claiming they, or their wives, are "marginal farmers" or even "agricultural labourers" so that they may get 
the maximum subsidy.6 If the beneficiary belongs to a Scheduled Tribe then he is entitled to a subsidy of 
50% with a ceiling of Rs 5000. In the Seventh Plan (1985: 127) the minimum recommended individual 
subsidies were raised first to Rs 1333 and then to Rs 2000 but the total maximum subsidy per household 
continues at Rs 3000 (Min. of Agriculture, 1986: 12). The increased subsidy of Rs 2000 is "to enable 
them to cross the poverty line once and for all" (TNDRD7 letter 69127/K1: 20 June 1986).
During the Sixth Plan it was possible for Scheduled Caste beneficiaries to receive a 50% IRDP 
subsidy through the central government’s "Special Component Program." For SC beneficiaries to receive 
the additional subsidy component, the BDO must send advice regarding their number to the PODRDA. 
The PODRDA accordingly sends these statistics to the Government of India which then should release 
the appropriate funds (subject to availability). This money eventually reaches the block via the district 
and from block accounts it should go into the beneficiaries’ loan accounts. This cumbersome procedure 
may take months before the beneficiary actually has any of the extra subsidy money credited to his 
account, and in some years of the Sixth Plan the money was not actually forthcoming (from discussions 
with beneficiaries). Therefore, some SC beneficiaries received only a 33% subsidy even though their 
milk society presidents had told them to expect 50%. (I got the impression, however, that the milk society 
presidents, who are actually in contact with the block officials, passed on the wrong information to the SC 
beneficiaries because they were more concerned with enlisting a large number of members, thus 
enhancing the society’s potential profits rather than the welfare of the society members.)
The block office’s disbursal of subsidies showed improvement over the years of the program. At
4In order to help women still further, the Government of India, with aid from UNICEF, devised an additional scheme (from 1982) 
called Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) which seeks to aid women from low-income families in 
groups of 15 to 20 in selected districts in India. During the Sixth Plan about 21 crores was spent on DWCRA (Ministry o f  
Agriculture, 1986: 33-34 and Draft Seventh Plan: 123).
^  beneficiaries live in a block which is covered by the Drought-Prone Area Program (DPAP), then the subsidy limit is Rs 4000.
6For a concise list of malpractices under IRDP, including both official and beneficiary "cheating," see Appendix B.
7Tamil Nadu Department of Rural Development.
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first the BDOs tended to disburse subsidies worth as little as Rs 25 for such things as coconut palm 
seedlings. It is unlikely that anyone would have thought that such a small amount for an "asset" that 
would not give rise to any income for a number of years, would actually result in an IRDP beneficiary 
crossing the "poverty line." Rather, the practice of disbursing small subsidies was a product of the Block 
Development Officers’ attempts to meet their targets in terms of the numbers of beneficiaries, and also 
reflects the lag time in finding "loan brokers" who willingly take charge of a large number of loans. Over 
the years of the Sixth Plan BDOs became more adept at disbursing greater numbers of subsidies which is 
not a reflection of their having followed the program rules more closely, but rather of their having found 
suitable numbers of people to act as milk society presidents.
Significantly, in both Lalgudi and Thuraiyur blocks the BDOs began to rely on loan brokers at an 
early stage, and in bouh blocks the first loan brokers were not new milk society presidents, but rather 
people who already had some interest in, or knowledge of, the milk business. In Thuraiyur these were 
private milk vendors, and in Lalgudi parish priests were initially involved in IRDP (this was because the 
diocese in which Lalgudi is located had started sponsoring milch animal loans for poor Catholics in the 
late 1970s). As IRDP became more widely known in the blocks, people who had no initial interest in it 
became more aware of its potential benefits for themselves, and began to make demands for its resources. 
This made the BDOs’ target-filling task much easier, as they could ask that these people form milk 
societies as required by the program rules and demanded by senior administrators.
Most block records indicate an increase in spending over the years of the Sixth Plan which in some 
blocks, including Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, outpaced the increases in the block allocations under IRDP. The 
number of beneficiaries and the amount spent both increased, generally in such a way that beneficiaries 
were receiving larger subsidies in the final years of the Sixth Plan. These trends are shown in Table 4-2 
below. The two blocks show rather erratic trends in the per capita amount spent (subsidies alone 
unavailable) but both started with higher than average per capita spending than for the district as a whole.
Table 4-2: IRDP Spending in Tiruchi District,
Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks—1980-1985
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85
TIRUCHI DISTRICT
Beneficiaries 14078 26886 24782 23153 20181
Subsidy Totals 41.54 143.35 212.46 219.11 238.58
(lakhs)
Subsidy /cap 295 533 857 946 1181
LALGUDI BLOCK
Beneficiaries 354 935 622 1292 1165
Totals (lakhs) 1.61 6.66 8.29 9.92 11.05
Amount /cap 455 712 1332 768 948
THURAIYUR BLOCK
Beneficiaries 389 662 832 1200 1008
Totals (lakhs) 3.00 6.46 8.34 9.37 9.90
Amount /cap 771 976 1000 781 982
Source: Mimeos provided by Tiruchi DRDA. Block data are inclusive of 
expenditures in addition to subsidy. Subsidy alone unavailable.
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There are specific rules which regulate how the IRDP subsidies should be administered, and the 
foremost rule is that the subsidy should not actually be paid to the beneficiary in cash, but rather be 
credited to his loan account, or be paid to him in kind. When the beneficiary is ready to purchase the 
asset (especially a milch animal), he may receive a cheque for the purchasing price from the bank which 
is then cashed and the money handed to the seller in the presence of the bank’s Agricultural Officer, a 
block official, perhaps the president of the milk society to which the milch animal beneficiary belongs, 
and the beneficiary. This method of subsidy release, ironically as it turns out, is to ensure that the 
beneficiary cannot misutilise the subsidy, and that s/he gets the best quality asset.8
The block officials’ involvement in animal purchase committees indicates where some resource 
sharing occurs. Through co-operating with one another, the block official (especially the Animal 
Husbandry Officer), the cattle broker, cattle seller, milk society official and, occasionally, the bank 
official are able to profit handsomely at the beneficiary’s expense. Moreover, the milk society president 
sometimes tells the milch animal beneficiary to use a particular broker or go to a particular cattle market; 
in this instance, the president gains a commission for having increased a broker’s business. Bribes paid 
by the beneficiary to the RWO and Animal Husbandry Officer also represent a form of resource exchange 
in that if the bribe is not paid the official does not provide the service.
At the time of purchase of the IRDP animal (cows, buffalos, plough bullocks, goats and sheep), the 
animal must have a numbered tag put on its ear by a vet attached to the participating bank,9 or by the 
block Animal Husbandry Officer (AHO). The AHO or vet is to ascertain the health and age of the animal, 
and if it is not in good health or too old, he will not tag the animal’s ear, and the beneficiary will be forced 
to look for another animal. The system of ear tagging was devised to ensure that the beneficiaries do, 
indeed, acquire a good quality animal, and also to prevent them from not buying an animal at all. 
Discussions with bankers and beneficiaries revealed that the main purpose the tagging serves in practice 
is to enhance the AHO’s salary.
Unfortunately, the animal purchases by committee have led to many cases of collusive corruption. 
These are almost impossible to document accurately, and the beneficiaries often did not realise they were 
being cheated. My understanding is that beneficiaries were made to feel by the officials involved in the 
cattle purchases that their "share" was the subsidy portion of the loan, and that if they were entitled to 
that, then the other people participating in the acquisition of animals should be able to get some benefits 
as well. Many beneficiaries in Thuraiyur Block told us openly that they had to bribe the RWO and AHO. 
In this respect, there was a difference between Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks; the Lalgudi beneficiaries 
were less likely to mention bribe-giving than were the Thuraiyur beneficiaries, although I do not think 
this is an indication of less corruption in Lalgudi, but rather of a greater incidence of milk society 
presidents collecting bribes on behalf of the officials without telling the beneficiaries. (In Thuraiyur, at 
least one milk society president refused to collect bribes for the RWO, and said that he would have to do 
it himself. He did.).
8A s a one-year experiment in the Seventh Plan, twenty-two blocks in India were chosen (one of them is Manachanallur 
sandwiched between Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks in Tiruchi District) in which the beneficiaries are given cash and are not be 
forced to purchase assets through a purchase committee. According to the Lead Bank Officer for Tiruchi District, the system was 
working quite well, and the instances of beneficiaiy wrongdoing were no higher than where the purchase committees operated 
(Interview: 14/10/86). A Reserve Bank of India official admitted that one reason for this cash experiment was that it was better if 
the beneficiaries themselves misappropriated some of the funds, rather than "middlemen.”
9Larger bank branches which specialise in agricultural lending, such as the Agricultural Development Banks of the State Bank of 
India employ veterinaries as "Rural Development Officers.”
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One of my research assistants was able to get some idea of the collusive corruption (considered 
IRDP’s worst problem by a senior official in Madras) in animal purchases through extensive discussions 
in July 1985 with a cattle broker. The broker said that he had been personally involved in twenty-three 
IRDP milch animal sales near Lalgudi in 1984-85. He thought the loan animals were always deliberately 
overvalued by at least Rs 200 to 500, making the Rs 2500 loan animal worth Rs 2000 and less. The cattle 
seller would be given the money in front of the beneficiary, but generally it would be less than the loan 
amount, although still more than the actual value of the animal to "purchase" the seller’s acquiescence. If 
the seller, or buyer, objected to this arrangement, the AHO would suddenly find some "fault" with the 
animal, and refuse to tag its ear. The cattle broker said that if the milk society president were there he 
would share in the proceeds as well.
4.12. Many Schemes, More Cows
IRDP is a composite program for which there are a large number of bankable schemes. Some of 
these include a pair of milch animals, a pair of work bullocks, bullock cart (whether with wooden wheels 
or rubber tyres), a sheep "unit" (20 ewes and one ram), pigs, sericulture, bee-keeping, farm forestry, 
poultry "units" (50 to 200 layers), fresh, brackish, and marine fishing, horticulture and the like in the 
primary sector. Small industries, service, business (known as ISB) and artisans’ activities should also be 
financed under IRDP. In the small business sector, for example, there are loans for teashops, provisions 
stores, vegetable stalls, bicycle repair and rental shops, tailoring, jewellery making and repair. A 
beneficiary may be trained and then receive a subsidised loan to buy a tool kit in such areas as radio, 
hand-pump, tractor, and even television repair, although an obvious problem lies in the lack of adequate 
demand for these services, and in the beneficiaries’ lack of adequate skills and equipment to repair these 
items properly.
Training for IRDP beneficiaries is given through TRYSEM (Training of Rural Youth for Self- 
Employment), which is termed by the Government of India a "facilitating component of the Integrated 
Rural Development Program." It is to "provide technical skills to rural youth [18-35] from families below 
the poverty line to enable them to take up self-employment. . ."  Under TRYSEM forty beneficiaries per 
year per block should be selected and given training for a length of time such that they would be able to 
take up a career/job in that field when the training is over. In practice, however, the training period never 
extends beyond six months, and most trainees do not receive the training required for successful self- 
employment ventures, if they have received any training at all. Because TRYSEM trainees could 
previously be included in the BDO’s list of IRDP beneficiaries, he tended to send the RWOs out to enlist 
participants for training, then give the "trainees" a stipend for a few months without worrying about 
providing any training, just so that he could meet his IRDP beneficiary targets (MIDS, 1980 and EFMR, 
1984: 240, and see also Min. of Agriculture, 1986: 27 and 31).
The Government of India, in its Manuals on IRDP (1980 and 1986), has indicated that its list of 
schemes is not exhaustive, and that state and district planners should take into account the economic 
conditions prevailing in their own states, and devise further additions. Although the manual lists many 
primary sector schemes that are eligible for assistance under IRDP, in practice the Government of India 
wants to encourage some diversification in the rural economy. Therefore, throughout the Sixth Plan, of 
the 600 families to be benefited under IRDP in any given year, no more than 400 of them were to receive 
assistance under agriculture and "allied activities," while 200 were to be benefited under various of the 
non-agricultural schemes, particularly in the ISB sector. During the Sixth Plan, however, an 
overwhelming number of loans was given in the area of Animal Husbandry, and the Government of India
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eventually responded by revising the target structure in the Seventh Plan. From 1986-87 onwards, 50% 
of all beneficiaries must receive loans under ISB with 50% of the subsidy allotment as well. But in the 
First year of the Seventh Plan (1985-86) in Tiruchi District 63% of the IRDP loans disbursed still came 
under the headings of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, with the remaining 37% of the loans under 
ISB.
Even the Government of India, however, has encouraged the milch animal component of IRDP. 
This is because it saw IRDP as functioning in conjunction with another program called "Operation Rood" 
which is a centrally sponsored scheme, the costs of which for "Stage I"—1970-1981—were met by the 
EEC through the World Food Program. Operation Rood seeks to improve the infrastructural facilities for 
milk transport, chilling, and processing, thereby increasing the flow of milk into urban centres from the 
rural areas, and rural producers should be organised into milk co-operatives (for a critique of Operation 
Flood and its efficacy for the villager, see Shanti George, 1984: 2161-70; for a defence, Atkins, 1988). 
However, even if the Government of India had not emphasised IRDP’s milch animal component, the 
block officials themselves have several compelling reasons to focus on it.
IRDP has been so dominated by loans for milch animals that many people we interviewed in the 
villages, to the extent that they knew of the program at all, did not know it was for anything besides milch 
animals. Moreover, the Institute for Financial and Management Research (1984: vii) reported that the 
block development officials themselves seemed virtually unaware of anything but IRDP’s milch animal 
component. This assessment by the EFMR would no longer be true in the aftermath of the emphasis 
senior officials have given to the ISB sector of IRDP. Furthermore, in the Seventh Plan, the milch animal 
component has been reduced, amidst vociferous protests from the BDOs, to a maximum of fifty animals 
per block.
There is a good reason for the officials’ concentration on milch animals--ease of implementation. It 
is less difficult to meet targets for a program when subsidies can be distributed en masse through the 
auspices of a milk society president, as opposed to when potential beneficiaries must be contacted 
individually. Moreover, because every milch animal beneficiary is supposed to receive two animals 
(counted as one "loan unit" by the banks, but until the end of the Sixth Plan as two subsidies by the 
development administration), the block officials used to be able to count on distributing the same number 
of subsidies for second milch animals in the next year with no effort whatsoever (besides crediting the 
requisite number of subsidies to the appropriate bank), thus making targets for two Financial years easier 
to meet With the change in subsidy accounting procedures, however, the block official now must count 
the second milch animal as a "spillover," and cannot call it an additional subsidy. Undoubtedly, the main 
purpose of IRDP is to raise a poor person’s income above the poverty line and keep it there through the 
productive asset’s continued provision of additional income, but the most compelling reason for local 
officials to have concentrated on the milch animal component is the opportunity it gives to disburse so 
many loans through so few people. By allocating the control over a large number of subsidised loans to 
the contractor who metes them out with few administrative restrictions imposed on him, the block official 
further ingratiates himself with those who are powerful in his area, thus enhancing his "survivability" in 
the block. Moreover, the banks also prefer milch animal loans because they then have "tie-up" 
arrangements with the milk society management for the beneficiaries’ loan repayments.
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4.2. IRDP in the Block: What Happens to the Rules
The Government of India is very specific as to how the objectives of IRDP should be achieved in 
the block despite paying considerable lipservice to the concept of local planning. The districts and blocks 
are, according to Delhi, not merely implementers of IRDP, but program planners as well. However, the 
specificity of the Government of India’s instructions pertaining to IRDP leaves the district or block 
officer with little in the way of autonomous planning powers. The local official, however, exerts 
considerable discretionary powers in implementing IRDP and other rural development programs, 
although not in a way which furthers the program’s official aims.
The block development office is the crucial agent of IRDP’s implementation. Its main task lies in 
identifying poor (entrepreneurial) beneficiaries who would like to be participants in the program, sending 
the beneficiaries’ names to a bank in the same area, and ensuring that the beneficiaries’ subsidies are 
deposited with the bank as quickly as possible, so that they need not repay more than the subsidised loan 
amount. The local administrator’s role in IRDP does not, theoretically, end with the subsidy 
appropriately credited to the beneficiaries’ loan accounts, however. The block administrator also should 
"monitor" the beneficiaries’ progress. If a beneficiary family is having any difficulty with its new asset, 
and especially if its income is not being raised to any appreciable extent, the development administration 
should intervene to assist the beneficiary (IRDP Manual, 1980: Para 2.17). Moreover, the block 
development administrative machinery must ensure that "forward and backward linkages"10 are 
established in the block.
During the Sixth Plan each development block in India was set the same physical and financial 
targets. In physical terms, each block was to have 600 beneficiaries per year (3000 for the plan—over 
1.13 million for the state of Tamil Nadu),11 while in financial terms each block was to spend five lakhs of 
rupees for the first year of the Plan, six lakhs in each of the second and third years, and eight lakhs for 
each of the final two years. This style of all-India targeting does not take into account that the percentages 
of rural population below the poverty line vary a great deal-from a low of 12% in Punjab to a high of 
69% in Orissa (according to a 1977 NSSO survey). The Government of India has recognised this "over- 
uniformity" problem if its main aim is to reach the maximum number of poor people. It states in the 
Draft Seventh Five Year Plan (1985: 129), that IRDP will undergo an important funding change:
The outlays under the Programme will be based upon the principle of selectivity geared to actual 
incidence of poverty in different States. For the first two years, 50% of the allocations will be made on the 
basis of incidence of poverty determined by the NSSO survey. From the third year onwards, the allocations 
would be based entirely on the incidence of poverty.
The plan authors give no clue as to how the "principle of selectivity" will be applied, but another 
difficulty stems from the states’ even distribution of money across their development blocks. This means 
that the same type of discrimination which occurred across states, will still occur blockwise within a 
single state-the wealthy block with a small population is eligible to receive the same amount of money as 
the poor block with a larger population. Moreover, the former type of block, because the money is more
10This means that the beneficiary must have various types of infrastructural support to help him earn a profit from his new asset. 
If, for example, he receives a milch animal, he must have not only adequate veterinary facilities, but milk marketing facilities as 
well. Albert Hirschman first coined this phrase in 1958 with regard to industrial investment planning (Hirschman, 1967: 178).
u The Government of Tamil Nadu, in a document published by the Department o f Rural Development (1986) purports to have 
assisted 44.5% o f its total rural households (that is, 2.89 million of 6.49 million; the latter figure is derived from 1981 Census data) 
under IRDP by the end of the Sixth Plan. However, the Department of Rural Development’s "IRDP Monitoring C ell’s" year by 
year performance statistics on IRDP gives the total number of assisted households as 1.39 million which is only 21.5% of Tamil 
Nadu’s rural households.
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easily spent there, is more likely to receive extra funds to spend at year-end from district officials eager to 
meet overall district targets. In a letter (No. 14012/14/86-CRD-III: 1 May 1986) from the Government of 
India’s Department of Rural Development, there is a list of every district in Tamil Nadu and the amount 
of money which will be provided for each. In all cases, the magnitude of funding was based only on the 
number of blocks, rather than taking into account additional variables such as the district’s rural 
population.12
4.2.1. Block Planning
One of the first evidences of the senior administrators’ distance from the realities of the block 
officials’ political and socio-economic environment lies in their insistence on block planning for IRDP. 
The first administrative task for the development officials to complete, and one which is done 
perfunctorily, is preparing block plans. The block officials give planning very low priority, despite 
central administrators emphasising its importance. The administrators have so many pressing demands on 
them which arise from political quarters, they have little time to devote to genuine planning. Moreover, 
senior administrators themselves often set difficult and/or time-consuming tasks for the BDOs which 
must be attended to "immediately." Nonetheless, the first manual on IRDP, which is comprised of 
Government Orders and memos dating prior to 1980 (some of them had been used for the SFDA 
program), gives six objectives of a "model" block plan, ranging from identifying the block’s "growth 
potential" to formulating "a package of schemes/programs which will seek to optimise production and 
augment the duration and productivity of employment of the poor." The proposed "stages of block-level 
planning and implementation" are given in the Manual, along with a time frame and who is responsible 
for executing each stage (see Table 4-3). Senior administrators continue to emphasise block plans into 
the Seventh Plan even though the plans have never transcended a "fill-in-the-blanks" exercise, and are 
largely a waste of time. The local administrators just complete the central government’s pro formae and 
then go ahead and dispense resources to whom they would have dispensed them anyway.
One of the most important stages in IRDP’s planning phase is identifying beneficiaries by means of 
household surveys. Without appropriately identifying the beneficiaries, the block officials cannot 
disburse resources to people significantly below the poverty line. Beneficiaries are to be selected 
according to the principle of "antyodaya"13 which means that the poorest of the poor should receive 
program assets first, but even surveying only poor block households is no small endeavour. Because 
Tamil Nadu’s rural population below the poverty line was estimated at 56% (Sixth Plan, 1981: 16), a 
block of 20,000 households (100,000 people) would include over 11,000 which are below the poverty 
line.14 This is an implementation task, however, which the block officials usually have done by their 
trading partners (genuine surveys are not done, however). They thus satisfy a program requirement 
without having to do the work themselves, with the result that the identification and selection of 
beneficiaries is left in the hands of village loan brokers.
12The inequity of two districts with the same number of blocks receiving the same funding is exemplified by Tamil Nadu’s South 
Arcot and Salem. The former has a rural population of 3.5 million while the latter’s is 2.45, and there is no reason to suppose that 
the depth of poverty would be much different in the two districts.
13This copies the Antyodaya Program in Rajasthan begun in October 1977. Under this program, the five poorest families in each 
village were to be selected for varying types of economic aid (Verma, 1980: 24-25).
14The Government of Tamil Nadu, in the same document which states that 44.5% of rural households were aided under IRDP 
during the Sixth Plan, claims that its rural poverty ratio has dropped from almost 56% in 1977-78 to 40% in 1985-86, and states that 
"the perceptible decline indicates the effect of implementation of poverty alleviation programs" (TNDRD, 1986). However, the 
Government of India set a new poverty line of Rs 6400 for the Seventh Plan which means that at least for the first year of this new 
poverty line, the percentage of people living in poverty should have increased, as it would be impossible that those who had 
"crossed" a poverty line of Rs 3500 could suddenly also have incomes over Rs 6400.
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Table 4-3: The Stages of Block Planning
Planning Stage Who Responsible Time Needed
1. Resource inventory BDO)
} 30 days
2. Review of on-going BDO)
programs
3. Resource analysis Project Officer 7 days
4. Preparation of 5 year
Plan and identifica­
tion of clusters
PO/Planning Team) 
}
}
15. Preparation of credit 45 days
plan, allocation of }
clusters among the PO/Planning Team)
banks and Lead Bank }
6. Identification of BDO will use village
beneficiaries by school teachers, 45 days
household survey. village officers, 
statistical assistants
7. Preparation of family BDO with assistance
plans from VLWs, Bank, 
Co-op Officials
15 days
Source: Manual on the Integrated Rural Development Program, 1980.
Second, the program guidelines require that the household economic surveys not be conducted in 
villages chosen at random. In any given year the Block Development Officer, in consultation with bank 
officials, is to choose a "cluster" of villages in which the household surveys will be completed and the 
poorest households chosen as beneficiaries. The Government of India has insisted on the "cluster 
approach," which means in essence that villages which are near to each other or to the same financial 
institution, or have some other important feature in common, such as being on the same milk collection 
route, may be considered a cluster. The senior administrators’ rationale for the "cluster approach" is that 
by virtue of giving loans to a group of villages together, the local officials would more effectively 
encourage the formation of "forward linkages" by which marketing arrangements for beneficiaries’ 
produce could be most efficiently made. Central planners have also said that villages with the greatest 
number of poor (a "concentration of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections 
below the poverty line") should be given priority in selection. There are some contradictions, however, 
between a village’s poverty and, for example, its access to a financial institution (ie., generally speaking, 
the more remote a village, the poorer it is likely to be).
During the Sixth Plan senior officials in New Delhi said that the "cluster approach" was not really 
understood and therefore not being strictly followed. My evidence, however, is that the BDOs choose 
clusters as quickly as possible for the same reason they ignore planning directives-their most pressing 
demands in the block bear no relation to selecting cluster villages. Indicative of senior administrators’ 
attitudes to the local officials, is an August 1984 letter from Madras to all the District Collectors and 
PODRDAs for circulation to BDOs:
(T]t has been brought to the notice of the Government that some of the BDOs have selected cluster 
villages not on a rational basis [emphasis added] and without any relevance to the Antvodaya approach. 
Hence the Panchayat Union Commissioners [another name for BDO] are informed that they should select 
only villages which have accent on the population below the poverty line and utmost care should be taken 
to select cluster villages based on the instructions of the state government and Government of India 
following the Antvodaya approach. (TN DRD, 26/8/84).
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The above quotation is important because it demonstrates how far-removed the senior 
administrators are from the block. They think that the BDOs choose the cluster villages "not on a rational 
basis," but in terms of the BDOs’ overall "environment of demands," the BDOs have acted rationally by 
not paying much attention to the clusters. Letters of criticism circulated state-wide have no effect on the 
BDO in the block, while his lack of attention to a politician’s demands has immediate repercussions. In 
support of the senior administrators, however, the first impression one does get about LRDP in the block 
development office is disorder-subsidy registers were not properly maintained, and lists of identified 
beneficiaries from the cluster villages bore little relation to the lists of actual beneficiaries. Moreover, the 
"antyodaya" principal had little bearing on either the villages’ or the beneficiaries’ selection because the 
BDOs have relied on loan brokers to provide them with names of beneficiaries. But confusion in 
program accounting procedures and the BDOs not doing all they are supposed to for the program, cannot 
be equated with irrational BDOs. In terms of their "environment," there is far more "method" than 
"madness" in the BDOs’ allocation of ERDP’s resources.
The block records tell us which are the "cluster” villages for each year of the Sixth Plan, but the 
subsidy registers revealed that the "cluster approach" was followed nominally. The number of loans- 
subsidies a village received in any given year did not generally depend on its inclusion in the year’s 
"cluster." Some villages, for example, received far more loans in the years they were not in a cluster than 
in the year they were, and some villages were included in more than one cluster over the five years, but 
still received few loans. The BDOs were primarily concerned, to satisfy their administrative superiors, 
that each village of the block had been at least nominally included in a cluster by the end of the Sixth 
Plan. In any given year there should not be more than one or two "cluster villages" under any one RWO’s 
jurisdiction. This is a sensible administrative rule as it would keep the RWOs’ IRDP workload evenly 
distributed, but it is observed in the breach. In Lalgudi in 1984-85, for example, of the 1061 (of a total of 
1125) subsidies’ destinations I could determine, 444 went to nine villages under the jurisdiction of a 
single RWO. I found, however, that some RWOs turned the "cluster" rule to their advantage when they 
were confronted with more demands for IRDP’s resources than they could handle. A number of villagers 
told us that their villages had not received loans because the RWOs told them these villages had not yet 
been selected (but would be chosen "next year"). The block records showed that these villages had been 
in a cluster already, but had not received many loans.
Although the Block Development Officer is in charge of the implementation of the Integrated Rural 
Development Program, the RWO shoulders the primary responsibility for it, as he does with virtually 
every other program implemented in the block. The RWO should undertake household economic surveys 
in the cluster villages and prepare a "list of identified beneficiaries" (the poorest people in the villages) 
based on the results of the surveys, finding out which ERDP scheme each beneficiary would like to 
participate in.15 Numerous discussions with villagers in both Lalgudi and Thuraiyur reveal the surveys 
had not been done, or were so cursory as to be unremembered. The RWOs did complete the requisite list 
of identified beneficiaries for IRDP but largely by having the lists compiled for them by milk society 
presidents interested in large numbers of IRDP loans. This is an important example of resource exchange 
between influential people and local administrators-the loan broker who helps the RWO will not have 
any interference from the officials in the operation of his milk society.
15The "list of identified beneficiaries" is composed of about double the total number of actual beneficiaries for the year (if the 
government has set a target o f 600 beneficiaries, then a list of 1200 potential beneficiaries would have to be prepared by the RWOs). 
These potential beneficiaries belong to the "cluster villages" only. It is a bit paradoxical, perhaps, that the Government of India 
insists that a list of potential beneficiaries only from the cluster villages is drawn up, but then also insists that no more than half the 
year’s beneficiaries be selected from the cluster. These lists have even less relevance in the Seventh Plan, as most of the 
beneficiaries are to have been aided during the Sixth Plan.
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The duly compiled "lists of identified beneficiaries" are available for scrutiny in the block 
development offices. The information in the lists pertains to household size, occupation, caste, 
landholdings, off-farm income, and total income. The list also includes "scheme prepared by the family." 
In Lalgudi Block’s 1984-85 list there was a perfect correlation between the family-suggested schemes and 
"schemes suggested to the families to tally with Block Plan" primarily because families were not asked 
about which schemes they would prefer. I checked one of the lists against names and household 
information contained in the subsidy registers, and discovered that while the data from the two lists did 
roughly correspond with each other, there were a number of discrepancies. If a person were categorised 
in the list as a marginal or small farmer, s/he would likely appear in the subsidy register as an agricultural 
labourer. For the village of Koppavali (Lalgudi Block), for example, of forty loanees listed in the subsidy 
register for 1983-84, there were mistakes (deliberate, I assume) in the economic status of fourteen of 
them. In thirteen of the fourteen cases, people originally listed as owning land were put down as landless 
agricultural labourers in the subsidy register.
After the seven planning stages described in Table 4-3 have been completed, there is a schedule of 
implementation activities pertaining to district, block, and bank officials. This schedule is an attempted 
corrective to the "bunching" of IRDP subsidy allocations at the end of the financial year (March 31). 
"Bunching" causes many difficulties for the banks which must then process a large number of loan 
applications at once. Each implementation activity (including such things as preparing and then 
forwarding loan applications to the concerned bank) has four deadlines during the year, so that if officials 
meet them they will avoid doing most of the targeted 600 loan applications at year-end. Block officials 
ignore this schedule.
"Monitoring" is a continuous activity slated for the Rural Welfare Officer, and he is supposed to 
record the beneficiaries’ economic progress in identity-cum-monitoring cards (also called vikas patrika). 
One copy of the vikas patrika should be given to the beneficiary, and another kept at the block 
headquarters. The Manual on IRDP states that "follow-up should normally be done for a period of two 
years after the beneficiary takes up his activity/scheme by which time the beneficiary household would 
normally [emphasis added] be able to cross the poverty line" (IRDP Manual, 1980: Para 2.17 and 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1986: 26). I discovered, however, that not only is there no follow-up, the RWOs 
used the vikas patrika as an excuse to ask beneficiaries for bribes of Rs 25 to 50, thus showing the value 
to the official of a program rule which is supposed to be in aid of the beneficiary.
This section has highlighted the local officials’ methods of coping with a program’s rules which 
they simply cannot adhere to. They have three basic strategies; they follow the rules nominally or 
superficially (as in preparation of block plans), they ignore the rules (household economic surveys, 
monitoring beneficiaries’ progress), or they follow them by proxy (have a milk society president put 
together a list of identified beneficiaries). The irony of this is that while the local officials occasionally 
turn these rules to their advantage ("selling" the vikas patrika or using the "cluster approach" as a means 
of deflecting villagers’ demands), senior administrators think they are in charge of a tightly-designed 
policy, the many rules of which cannot help but ensure that block officials will select the appropriate 
"entrepreneurial" beneficiaries and then help supervise their economic progress. The senior 
administrators’ attitudes are evinced in the quotation above from the IRDP Manual which boldly asserts 
that beneficiaries will normally cross the poverty line within two years.
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4.22 . Popular Participation
The central planners envision the participation of local elected bodies (including panchayats, 
panchayat union councils, and zilla parishads--the latter is a district representative body which does not 
exist in Tamil Nadu) in the implementation of IRDP. In Tamil Nadu, because panchayat elections were 
only held in 1986 (after a hiatus of sixteen years), there was no formal popular participation as such in 
IRDP until the second year of the Seventh Plan and by that time the panchayats’ active participation was 
no longer required on a large scale.16 The main role for the panchayats (in effect, the Panchayat 
Presidents) lies in the identification of new beneficiaries, and the evidence I have suggests that the newly 
installed Presidents selected their supporters as beneficiaries. Moreover, given the evidence of the Ashok 
Mehta Committee and others who have commented on the panchayats, the Government of India’s 
continuing faith in the efficacy of village panchayats seems misplaced. The Government of India insists, 
however:
Active participation of the local people in the implementation of the programme starts with the 
association of the entire village community with the procedure of identification of the beneficiaries. In 
addition, the prominent voluntary action group and bodies engaged in socio-economic activities with the 
objective of rural uplift should also be associated with the programme (Ministry of Agriculture, 1986: 24).
In the beginning of the Seventh Plan the Government of India has specifically stated that of its rural
development outlays, Rs 100 to 150 crores (about 1.4% of rural development outlays) "may be earmarked
for use in active collaboration with voluntary agencies" (Seventh Plan, Vol. II, 1985: 69-70).
An issue raised by the panchayat elections held in Tamil Nadu in.early 1986 is whether having 
elected representatives in the villages again, and a political counterpart-the Block Chairman-to the 
Block Development Officer would have an impact on the implementation of IRDP. When I returned to 
Tiruchi District in autumn 1986 I found that the new panchayat councils had little effect on IRDP’s 
implementation. The newly elected Panchayat Presidents and the Block Chairmen were largely 
uninvolved in IRDP’s implementation, as they turned their attention mostly to the more lucrative NREP, 
the works of which may be entrusted to the Presidents (I discovered, however, that the Panchayat 
Presidents often took charge of NREP works, but then sub-contracted them out to fulltime contractors if 
they were not themselves contractors.)
The block administrators continue to rely on the milk society presidents rather than turning to the 
Panchayat Presidents for help in meeting their IRDP targets, even with few additional milch animal loans 
as a tradable resource from 1986-87 onwards. The officials have continued their dealings with the milk 
society presidents because of the new rule which states that two-thirds of the beneficiaries per year in the 
Seventh Plan must be chosen from among ones who had been aided previously, but have not yet "crossed 
the poverty line." By far the easiest way for block officials to meet their new targets is to give a sheaf of 
subsidy-loan application forms to the president of a large milk society and ask him to find some of his 
society’s members to be beneficiaries for another type of loan (the third loan cannot be for a milch 
animal). (I met some milk society presidents in Lalgudi who told me they were trying to convince some 
of their members to take plough bullock loans as third loans.)
The Government of India has also suggested that in the Seventh Plan "Block Level Beneficiaries’ 
Advisory Committees" and "Panchayat Beneficiaries’ Sub-Committees," comprised of beneficiaries 
themselves, should be established to further the ends of increased public participation in IRDP. There is
16With the reduction in the beneficiaries ’ targeted number per block in the Seventh Plan, a village may be eligible to have at most 
twenty new beneficiaries in a year.
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no provision, however, which states that the block’s implementing officials need pay any attention to 
recommendations made by the committees, and I did not leam of any such committees that had been set 
up in Tiruchirappalli District by the end of 1986 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1986: 24-25), although one 
BDO suggested that if such committees were established they would have to be comprised of AIADMK 
supporters. In effect, the "community’s participation" has been kept to a minimum in IRDP’s 
implementation in the blocks.
4.3. District Officials
While the block officials are directly responsible for the implementation of IRDP, district officials 
have a co-ordinating and supervisory role to play. The District Rural Development Agency (in some 
districts, including Tiruchirappalli, the successor to the Small Farmers Development Agency) headed by a 
Project Officer, is the main body responsible for centrally-sponsored rural development policies 
(programs which are wholly state-sponsored, such as the Noon Meal Scheme in Tamil Nadu, do not come 
under the purview of the DRDA).
The Project Officer and his Assistant Project Officers (APOs) make occasional inspections of the 
activities under IRDP and other rural development programs in the block (more often the DDO goes on 
inspection tours of the blocks in his division and reports to the DRDA), ensure that block plans have been 
prepared properly, and disburse the subsidy money they have received from the state and central 
governments to the blocks’ bank accounts in two or three installments per financial year. The Project 
Officer can and does exercise discretion, especially towards the end of the financial year, in shifting 
money around the blocks. If a Block Development Officer feels he can spend more than he has been 
allocated for IRDP or any other centrally-sponsored scheme, he will lobby the PODRDA or Collector for 
more funds, as overspending financial targets makes him look good to his administrative superiors.
As the BDOs’ abilities to overspend their financial targets under IRDP increased during the Sixth 
Plan, competition began between some BDOs for extra money above their yearly allocations. The 
Lalgudi BDO was very keen on finishing first in the district for spending under IRDP in 1984-85, and 
knew he had competition in this regard from the BDO of Musiri Block. As a result, the Block 
Development Officers of both blocks sent emissaries (various of their extension officers) to the DRDA to 
request extra funding from both the Assistant Project Officers and the Project Officer himself. The 
Lalgudi BDO insisted on sending his Extension Officer (Co-operatives) to see the Project Officer, 
primarily because he knew they were distantly related, and felt that this would play a positive role in his 
pleas for additional funds. As it turned out, however, neither Lalgudi nor Musiri finished first for 
1984-85. The Lalgudi BDO was most indignant at this turn of events, and insisted that the "winning” 
BDO must have "played some tricks" (especially with his accounts) to finish first. He and the Musiri 
BDO tied for second place, behind the winning block, Veppur, by Rs 20,000.17
The DRDAs are also supposed to check and approve the block plans, but in the Seventh Plan the 
Government of Tamil Nadu removed this function from the purview of the DRDAs, again detracting from 
the Government of India’s apparent commitment to decentralised planning:
Though in the IRDP Manual published by Government of India in January 1986, Government of India
17This raises the question as to why BDOs would want to compete with each other for extra funding. Interviews with BDOs 
revealed the opinion that if they did well, ie., overfulfilled their targets, in a program that received a lot o f attention from senior 
administrators, their career prospects would be enhanced. This is an example of intra-administrative resource trading. The BDO 
provides his superiors with overfulfilled targets in high priority programs, and expects help in another area in return.
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have vested the powers for the approval of the Block Plans to the DRDAs themselves, in order to have 
uniformity and to have a check in the preparation of the Block Plan, it is informed that the DRDAs shall 
prepare the Block Plan and get the approval of the Government through the Director of Rural Development 
as was done during last year (TNDRD letter no. 69127/86 Kl: 20/6/86).
The PODRDA through his/her APOs, also collects statistics from the blocks to collate district-wide
spending statistics w'hich then must be sent to the state government for its assessment of the district’s
IRDP performance.
The District Collector plays a supervisory role in IRDP’s implementation. However, the 
Collector’s role in IRDP has its greatest importance in the discretionary powers s/he is able to exercise 
with regard to program funds and target ceilings. Although the PODRDA is supposed to make decisions 
about shifting funds among the blocks, the Collector is behind some of them, and Block Development 
Officers will occasionally approach the Collector direcdy about extra funds. A Collector can also bend 
the rules of implementation vis-a-vis funding ceilings for villages (ie., allow a village milk society to 
receive 100 loans rather than just 50). One of Tiruchi’s former Collectors, Shantha Sheela Nair, urged the 
BDOs to start up as many women’s milk producers’ co-operatives as possible, and as a result many were.
Although the personnel in the district have only a supervisory role to play in IRDP’s 
implementation, they have a much better idea of the policy’s implementation than administrators in 
Madras or Delhi. The plethora of government implementation orders, however, gives them little chance 
to change program rules to make them more in keeping with what they know goes on in the blocks and 
villages. During the course of a three-day seminar on IRDP in March 1985, the then PODRDA of 
Tiruchi, Mr. M. Thangavel spoke about an IRDP inspection tour he had made. In his talk he described a 
visit to a village which had eighty IRDP beneficiaries. He interviewed eight of them, and could say that 
seven of the eight had "crossed the poverty line" because they had started off above it. When I 
interviewed the Collector of Tiruchi in August 1985, and questioned him about some of the 
administrative malpractices under IRDP, his rather surprising response was, "We can’t say that it’s 100% 
corruption," indicating both his awareness of the significant amount of corruption in IRDP’s 
implementation, but also an unwillingness to do anything about it. I did not ask him what percentage 
might be more realistic.
4.4. The Banks and IRDP
While IRDP is administered through the development administration, as a program it cannot 
function without the active participation of credit institutions including credit co-operatives, land 
development banks, private banks, and nationalised banks. The nationalised banks have the largest role to 
play in IRDP, and are obliged to follow rules and regulations regarding lending practices, interest rates 
and the like as set out by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The banks have "priority sector" lending 
targets which means that forty percent of their total lending must go to agriculture and rural development. 
IRDP lending forms part of the "priority sector," and so any lending a bank does under IRDP helps it to 
fulfill its priority sector lending quota. When there are a number of nationalised banks in a block, as is the 
case in both Lalgudi and Thuraiyur,18 it is easier for the BDO to meet his IRDP targets, as he will be able 
to divide the required loans among a larger number of banks, and if one bank is unwilling to participate in 
IRDP, then another bank will likely fill the gap. In Lalgudi Block the State Bank of India, ADB 
(Agricultural Development Bank) is most actively involved in the implementation of IRDP, and disbursed
18Lalgu<ti has six nationalised banks and four private banks, while Thuraiyur has four nationalised bank branches and one private 
bank.
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over half the block’s IRDP loans in 1984-85. It serves about forty villages in two blocks, and has eight 
Agricultural Officers on staff.19
For the successful allocation of IRDP’s resources there must be close co-ordination between the 
block officials and local bankers and to a lesser extent between the District Rural Development Agency 
and the Lead Bank. In every district of India one bank is chosen by the Reserve Bank of India to act as 
"lead bank." This is normally the bank with the most branches in the district. In Tiruchirappalli District, 
for example, the Indian Overseas Bank is lead bank, and its main task, among other things, is to 
co-ordinate the lending activities of all nationalised banks in the district with regard to IRDP and to 
ensure that they follow RBI lending norms for i t  Another function of the lead bank is to host and/or 
participate in, district seminars and meetings on the implementation of IRDP. The latter, generally held 
twice or thrice a year, are attended by both development officials and bankers, and are used to discuss any 
problems that arise in implementation. Suggestions for improvement are made, and then circulated to all 
the participants in the form of minutes, although like the Government of India’s written orders, they are 
generally disregarded in the blocks. The meetings are attended by what is known as the District-Level 
Review Committee, chaired by the District Collector and convened by the Regional Manager of the lead 
bank.
I interviewed the Lead Bank Officer in Tiruchi a number of times about the banks’ perspectives on 
IRDP. On one occasion in October (1985) he complained that he could not yet issue guidelines to block 
bank branches20 as to block lending requirements under IRDP because the DRDA had yet to send him the 
block plans for 1985-86, a task that is supposed to be completed at the beginning of the financial year 
(April). He further added that it reflected poorly on the development administration that five years after 
the beginning of a program, it still took over six months to produce the block plans. The reason, of 
course, is that planning remains as time-consuming and as unimportant to the BDO in the context of all 
the demands made on him in the block in 1985 as it was in 1980. Within a few days of the above- 
mentioned interview with the Lead Bank Officer, I visited the DRDA where the Assistant Project Officer 
(Statistics) was still busily checking over the current year’s block development plans. The local planning 
exercise, perfunctory at best, is made a mockery of when the current year’s "plan" is not ready to be acted 
upon before halfway into the year.
Reserve Bank of India rules regarding banks’ lending under IRDP have changed since 1980 to 
make the terms as favourable as possible for the beneficiary. Initially, bankers insisted on borrowers 
making large deposits with them, or putting up some sort of collateral such as jewellery or land. When it 
was realised that the bankers were regularly asking the poorest of the potential beneficiaries to provide 
either large deposits or securities, the RBI insisted that no bank should demand collateral for any loan 
with a value of less than Rs 5000 which is a ceiling higher than the value of most IRDP loans 
(NABARD,21 1984: 19). Also, bankers are encouraged not to rush borrowers into making loan 
repayments faster than the set repayment schedules. For example, for two milch animal loans (treated by
19The nationalised banks in the blocks tend to "adopt” villages. This means that a bank branch will give loans only to certain 
villages, leaving other villages for another bank to "adopt." Villagers are not forced to use only the "adoptive" bank, but they will 
find, occasionally, that other banks do not wish to infringe on another’s "territory." Moreover, if  a village has not been "adopted" it 
is an indication, generally, o f both its remoteness and its poverty with most banks unwilling to extend their services to i t  According 
to C. S. Mahadevan (The Hindu, International Edition, 6/12/86: 12), the population served per bank branch was about 65,000 in 
1969 but had dropped to 16,000 by m id-1983.
^Excluding the cities of Tiruchi and Srirangam, Tiruchi District has 212 bank branches (IOB Annual Action Plan, 1985: 1-8).
^National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development.
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the bank as one unit), the RBI has set a repayment schedule of forty-eight months; the loan amount for 
two animals is no more than Rs 5000 (as of 1985),22 and with the subsidy of Rs 1666, the beneficiary 
would have four years to repay Rs 3334, often carrying a differential interest rate of only four percent, or 
a concessional rate of ten percent. Furthermore, all IRDP loans are entitled to a "recovery holiday" (some 
interest-free time) during the repayment period.
The RBI insists that all IRDP milch animal recipients be members of co-operative milk producers’ 
societies. This has largely been followed, although not initially in either Thuraiyur or Lalgudi. Banks 
have insisted on ERDP milch animal beneficiaries being organised into milk co-operatives because loan 
payments can then be handled through the offices of the milk society president and his accountants, and 
the banks do not have to "chase" the individual members of the society for loan payments. As long as 
there are no problems with the milk society leaders, the bank can be fairly assured that the IRDP 
borrowers’ loans will be repaid if they don’t sell their animals prior to loan repayment and use the 
proceeds for other purposes. Bankers told me that the default rate on IRDP loan repayments was not 
worse than that for crop loans, despite their initial fears that poor people would not repay their loans.
In the rural branches, the bankers’ role in IRDP does not end with vetting loan applications 
forwarded by the block development office, and then disbursing the loans. Some rural bank branches 
have on staff, Agricultural Officers (AOs) who are the main contact persons between the bank and its 
rural customer. The AO meets with customers in the branch, and also makes regular visits to villages to 
ensure that borrowers are using their loans properly. Unlike the RWO’s, the AO’s visits to villages are 
regular. Additionally, the Agricultural Officers may be members of IRDP purchase committees. 
According to Copestake (1987; 147), a bank official’s participation in a purchase committee reduces the 
element of official corruption. Local bank officers and block development officials, especially the BDO, 
should have close contact with one another in implementing IRDP, and are to have meetings once a 
month to discuss problems of mutual concern.
My experience in the two development blocks of Tiruchi District suggests that the banks are largely 
passive instruments in IRDP’s implementation. The block development office gives the banks lists of 
beneficiaries’ names which the latter do not generally have the opportunity to scrutinise adequately. One 
banker told me that of all the ERDP applications the bank receives, a maximum of only 5% are rejected. 
IRDP puts the banks in an awkward position because the control over who their borrowers are is vested 
with the development administration, although the bank, not the administration, suffers should the 
borrower not repay the loan. The borrower’s repayment of the IRDP loan is not the concern of the block 
development office. While block officials I interviewed did not have any major complaints against the 
banks, other studies of ERDP (MIDS, 1980; Bandyopadhyay, 1985) have shown that the banks have, on 
occasion, been obstructionist in their dealings with the local development administration, occasionally 
refusing IRDP loan applications on spurious grounds, such as an application form missing a non-vital 
piece of information. (One banker, however, said his branch sometimes received blank application forms 
from the block office having only a thumb impression at the bottom.)
While the banks are more passive than active in IRDP’s implementation, it should not be assumed 
that they are merely tools of the development administration which have had no impact on the shape of 
the program in a block. Bank officials have also been involved in resource exchange (sometimes in a
^Each item purchasable under IRDP is subject to a "unit cost." Therefore, even if a beneficiary purchases a milch animal for Rs 
3000, the bank will not finance him beyond the unit cost of Rs 2500, and the beneficiary will have to cover the extra Rs 500 by other 
means, usually an additional loan through informal credit channels.
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corrupt way) with officials, but have also on occasion, thwarted the block officials’ desired transactions. 
A bank manager, for example, may refuse to sanction further loans to a milk society if he feels the 
president has mismanaged it (see below). The leverage a bank can exert over block officials probably 
depends to a large extent on the number of banks in the block and how urgent it is for each to meet ERDP 
lending targets. If a bank manager is under pressure from his district headquarters to reach a certain 
target, he will be more likely to go along with the block officials’ requests, as it helps his cause as well. 
The banks themselves are closely involved with the milk society presidents who, in turn, are in charge of 
beneficiaries’ loan repayments. Bankers frequently turn a blind eye to presidents’ wrongdoings vis-a-vis 
beneficiaries for the sake of maintaining a good relationship with the president.
The Block Development Officer must have good relations with nearby bank managers, as it is 
possible for them to be unco-operative in terms of ERDP lending. If the BDO does have a good 
relationship with the bank manager, it may be possible for him to convince the bank to do things which, 
strictly speaking, are not allowed. In one of the blocks, for example, the BDO tried to release funds (one 
lakh) for ERDP to one of the banks on the day after the end of the financial year, with the request that this 
money be credited to the block’s ERDP loan account the day before. The bank manager refused, and the 
BDO made his request of another bank manager, who did accept the IRDP funds and credited them 
retrospectively. Oddly, when I heard this story from the BDO, he claimed that the first bank manager had 
''cheated” him in refusing to accept the money, although it is certainly against banking rules to do so. 
Perhaps the BDO had expected the manager would accept the money because the BDO had arranged with 
this bank to do much of IRDP’s lending. In other words, the BDO expected an exchange of resources 
which did not eventuate, and thus felt "cheated."
In another case the Block Development Officer requested that the State Bank of India (SBI) provide 
twenty-five loans to a certain milk society president. In this case SBI refused to co-operate because it felt 
that the milk society president had improperly managed his milk society. The bank official I interviewed, 
however, was anxious that the bank would be unable to refuse this president again in the coming year 
because he had good official connections, both in the block, and at the district level. The bank official 
further pointed out that the milk society president was "full of tricks," and that he had come to the bank 
saying that he had already arranged for a television program to be made on how the State Bank of India 
had helped the village. Despite this, however, the bank refused to sanction the loans. The SBI officer said 
that to offer some compensation to the milk society president for not sanctioning the milch animal loans, 
the bank gave him a subsidised loan for a bio-gas plant for his home.23 Another bank also refused to give 
second loans to a milk society, but a new person took over the society and he managed to get the second 
loans from a different bank in the block.
IRDP loans are a "burden" to the rural banks. First, there may be a fairly large number of them 
although individually, the loans are for small amounts, resulting in a lot of paperwork for the bank 
branches. (I was told at Lalgudi’s, State Bank of India (ADB), that in 1984-85 they had disbursed 5100 
crop loans for a total of Rs 1100 lakhs with an average of Rs 21,500 per loan. In the same year they had 
595 ERDP loans for a total of 19.1 lakhs, with an average of Rs 3200 per loan. Of the 595 IRDP accounts, 
488 (14.3 lakhs) were for milch animals. Of this bank’s total lending for 1984-85, ERDP represented just 
over 1.5% of the value but 9% of the number.) Second, as mentioned above, the banks have little control 
over who their ERDP borrowers are. Third, management rifts within the milk societies threaten loan
^This is a good example of "defensive" resource exchange, and is similar to the tactics employed by officials such as the 
Collector (see discussion in Chapter Six). Here, the bank is unwilling to give the president what he wants, and offers him something 
else in hopes that he will discontinue his demands.
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repayment schedules. Fourth, the banks involved in IRDP are forced to work with the development 
administration.
Most of the bankers I spoke with would have been happier to implement the program without the 
development administration’s participation at all, and some had major grievances against the officials. 
One of the first complaints all bankers directly involved in the program make is that IRDP applications 
are badly bunched at the end of the financial year reflecting the block officials’ concerns only that they 
meet their targets, and not that they meet them in such a way as to help either banks or beneficiaries (with 
so many loans given to beneficiaries at once, the prices for cattle are driven up).24 Throughout the year 
bankers have little to do for IRDP, and then suddenly in March virtually all loan applications are sent to 
them by the block development officials. The bankers are then required to sanction the loans by the end 
of the month leaving them no time to scrutinise the loan applications. Some bankers were dismayed 
about the high level of corruption among the development officials. One bank manager, for example, (his 
sentiments were echoed by other bank officials) said that as soon as the block development officials were 
involved in the IRDP milch animal purchase committees one could count on corruption and malpractices, 
with Animal Husbandry Officers always demanding bribes for tagging the animals’ ears.
Our interviews with villagers indicated a widespread feeling that the bank officials were honest, 
especially when compared to the block development officials. This, however, does not mean that the 
bank officials are paragons of virtue. In Lalgudi Block, for example, one of the Agricultural Officers of 
the SBI(ADB) was discovered to have swindled about Rs two lakhs, some of it through IRDP. He had 
been able to swindle this money by forging people’s signatures on loan documents or simply by making 
up names. A substantial number of beneficiaries in one Lalgudi village felt that the concerned bank’s 
"agri” had been dishonest in handling their animal purchases. They told us they had paid less than the 
loan amount for their animals, and with despair in their voices, beneficiary after beneficiary said that the 
bank’s Agricultural Officer "took it." I assumed that this was yet another type of corruption the IRDP 
beneficiaries had to suffer, but decided to check at the concerned bank. When I arrived there armed with 
the names of the appropriate beneficiaries, I was shown their loan records, which indicated that the 
amounts "taken" by the "agri" had been credited to their loan accounts. Unfortunately, because of their 
lack of education, their lack of experience with banks, and because their milk society president handles 
their loan accounts, the beneficiaries do not generally go to the banks themselves to check on the status of 
their loan accounts.
Some banks insist on holding a meeting in any village which is about to receive a large number of 
IRDP loans. At this meeting the bankers tell the potential borrowers about the program details, including 
loan repayment schedules. They also tell the villagers that the only legitimate expense they need incur is 
Rs 2,50 for the loan stamp duty and Rs 10,50 for the co-op society membership fee. The Agricultural 
Officer who gave me the above information admitted, however, that by the time of the animal purchase 
the beneficiaries may well have forgotten what they were told at the meeting. The beneficiaries may also 
feel, however, that they have no choice but to incur the extra expenses demanded of them, particularly by 
the block officials and milk society president SBI (ADB) in Lalgudi also conducts vet camps (it has a 
vet on staff) at milk producers’ societies it has financed.
Bankers were also asked to help settle disputes among milk society members (by the members
asked some BDOs and RWOs independently to list their top priority target and all said "family planning." IRDP’s relatively 
low priority in block explains why there is always a year-end rush to meet its target, rather than steady attempts throughout the year 
to implement the program, as with NREP.
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themselves). On at least one occasion I know of, villagers unhappy with the operation of their milk 
society called for the assistance of the concerned bank’s Agricultural Officer to settle the problem. The 
bank officials are, however, reluctant to become involved in disputes which involve the milk society 
presidents, but professed willingness to help villagers if there is a large majority in favour of a particular 
action to be taken. As one Agricultural Officer put it, "We have to work with the milk society presidents, 
so we’re not going to do anything to purposely upset them."
The Government of India is trying to change rural banking practices so that the banks favour poorer 
borrowers, but it is still not the business of bankers to help the poor. This is evident from their 
participation in IRDP. Bankers have put a stop to some of the desired transactions between block 
officials and milk society presidents when they think the latter are a particularly bad credit risk, and while 
this may help lessen the exploitation of beneficiaries, the bankers’ primary concern is with loan recovery 
rather than the relationship between milk society president and beneficiary. Occasionally, the bank 
official on a purchase committee may try to prevent resource (subsidy) sharing among committee 
members but this only counters a small percentage of purchase committee corruption. Overall, and 
despite mutual complaints, bankers and block officials do co-operate with each other so that both 
maximise their IRDP targets.
4.5. The Poverty Line: Sightings and Crossings
The Government of India was much too optimistic regarding the number of people who would 
"cross the poverty line" with IRDP assistance, originally suggesting that virtually all IRDP beneficiaries 
would cross the poverty line within two years of receiving the asset. In the Seventh Plan document 
(1985), however, the Government of India itself suggests that a maximum of no more than 40% of 
beneficiaries could have crossed the poverty line in the Sixth Plan, and in light of more recent evidence, 
even that is a generous estimate. At the end of the Sixth Plan the Government of India emphasised that 
evaluation studies of IRDP be taken, indicating that the states would have to undertake "concuiTent 
evaluations" of IRDP by way of surveys using Government of India pro formae in two blocks of two 
districts every month. This style of evaluation began in October 1985 (Dept, of Rural Development, 
1986: 10) and an article in The Overseas Hindustan Times (30/5/87: 9) reported that these evaluations 
have shown that on an all-India basis, only 12% of IRDP’s beneficiaries have crossed the poverty line so 
far. Tamil Nadu’s own IRDP Monitoring Cell has provided data which show that 15% of the state’s 
beneficiaries surveyed crossed the poverty line by the end of the Sixth Plan.
When central government IRDP officials realised by 1985 that the beneficiaries who were receiving 
assistance under IRDP were not actually crossing the poverty line in sufficient numbers, they proposed 
that for the first three years of the Seventh Plan those families which had already received assistance but 
had not been able to cross the poverty line should receive a "second dose of assistance." In a Government 
Order dated August 16,1985 the Joint Secretary of Rural Development, New Delhi stated that
a large proportion of beneficiaries have not yet been able to cross the poverty line. One o f the main tasks 
under IRDP in the first three years of the Seventh Plan would, therefore, be to help consolidate the 
achievements in the Sixth Plan through proper remedial steps for correcting the deficiencies which have 
adversely affected the implementation of IRDP in the past.
Families still below the poverty line, then, are eligible for a "supplementary dose of assistance," although 
the subsidy they receive cannot bring their total subsidy above the prescribed ceilings (generally, Rs 3000 
per family).
The Tamil Nadu government, following the instructions of the central government, set a target for
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the first year of the Seventh Plan (1985-86) of 724 beneficiaries per block, with a projected block outlay 
of 7.35 lakhs, down slightly from the eight lakhs targeted outlay per block in each of the final years of the 
Sixth Plan (for total state-spending in the Sixth Plan, see Table 4-4 below). Of the 724 beneficiaries, 543 
were to be beneficiaries who had received assistance in the first two years of the program (but were still 
"below the poverty line"), and 181, new beneficiaries (Interview: Mr. Sivapitchai APO Statistics, Timchi 
DRDA). For 1985-86, the first year of the Seventh Plan, all the "old" beneficiaries from 1980-81 and 
1981-82 were eligible to receive assistance provided they still had the asset(s) they originally received. 
The APO Statistics of Tiruchirappalli District informed me that the subsidy for the old beneficiaries 
should not be more than Rs 688 while that for new beneficiaries should be on the order of Rs 2000 per 
loan which would have the likely effect of attracting larger numbers of people "above the poverty line" 
than during the Sixth Plan. However, if an earlier subsidy of, say, Rs 1332 (the amount a milch animal 
beneficiary would receive for two animals from 1980 to 1982) were not enough to raise a household’s 
income above Rs 3500, it is unreasonable to think that a subsidy of Rs 688 would boost their income 
above Rs 6400.
Table 4-4: IRDP in Tamil Nadu-Sixth Plan
IT E M S T A R G E T S A C H IE V E M E N T S
1980-85 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85  1980-85
1. Total expend itu re  
(Rs lakhs)
13188 1691 2810 3416 3369 3375 14661
2. Subsidy expend . 
(Rs lakhs)
N.A. N.A. 2332 2659 2739 2864 10594
3. Total num ber of 
benefic iaries (lakhs)
11.30 2.55 3 .58 2 .72 2 .78 2.33 13.96
4. No. of SC /ST  
benefic iaries (lakhs) N.A. .49 .97 1.02 1.09 1.06 4.63
5. Per cap ita  
subsidy (Rs) 1000 N.A. 651 979 986 1228 929
Source: IRDP Monitoring Cell o f Rural Development Department. 
Madras, 1986: Mimeo.
To give a "second dose" to the beneficiaries of 1980-81 and 1981-82, the Government of Tamil 
Nadu at the instance of the Government of India had surveys taken in the blocks, largely by National 
Sample Survey Organisation youth volunteers. The compiled results of the surveys as made available by 
the Department of Rural Development do not give much reason to hope for the success of the "second 
dose of assistance" as a corrective for insufficient aid to the Sixth Plan’s beneficiaries. Of the total 
613,548 beneficiaries assisted in the first two years of the Sixth Plan in Tamil Nadu, 332,552 were 
surveyed (54%) and of these beneficiaries, only 48,718 (15%) were deemed to have crossed the poverty 
line. However, a further 100,478 beneficiaries (30%) had disposed of their assets and were thus 
automatically ineligible for further assistance even if they had not crossed the poverty line. Another 
112,169 (34%) beneficiaries were ineligible for the second dose because they were deemed to have 
defaulted on loan repayments. In the final analysis only 63,832 beneficiaries were eligible for more IRDP 
loans.
If we then divide the 63,832 beneficiaries by the number of blocks in Tamil Nadu (379), we arrive 
at a number of only 168 eligible "old" beneficiaries per block. In light of the numerical analysis
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presented above, the target of 543 "old" beneficiaries (which originated with the central government) was 
unrealistic. If the Government of Tamil Nadu were to have met its overall IRDP beneficiary targets for 
1985-86 in a manner commensurate with the survey findings and the targets for new beneficiaries, it 
should not have aided more than 132,431 beneficiaries [(181 new beneficiaries times 379) + 63,832] but 
in fact the IRDP Monitoring Cell says 209,686 beneficiaries received assistance in 1985-86.^
4.6. Conclusion
IRDP is an incremental rather than radical departure from earlier rural development policies in 
India. It is an extension and refinement of the earlier Small Farmers Development Agency (see Heyer, 
1981), but senior administrators have allowed it to inherit a large number of mistakes from the earlier 
SFDA policy. Some of these mistakes include too much uniformity, assigning too much importance to 
local planning (although at the same time not relinquishing any planning autonomy to the local official), 
and excessive reliance on quantitative targets. The major changes that have been made are to introduce 
the "antyodaya" or "poorest first" approach in IRDP (which has not been successful), broadening the 
scope of the program so that subsidised loans are available for non-agricultural purposes as well, and 
disbursing same-purpose loans to members of co-operative producers’ societies. Additionally, IRDP is 
implemented on a nation-wide scale, while SFDA was not.
The discussion in this chapter has served to highlight the vast differences between senior 
administrators’ conceptualisation of a poverty alleviation program and the block officials’ allocation of its 
resources. As the chapter tide indicates, senior administrators have designed a complex program with a 
myriad of rules, while its implementation in the blocks has been reduced to its simplest elements- 
achieving the physical and financial targets. While IRDP has been given much attention by senior 
administrators, the press, and academics in India, in practice it is just another set of targets for the block 
officials to meet (my interviews with the latter showed they are well aware of the senior officials’ 
attitudes, although the reverse is much less true). Senior administrators discuss "the deficiencies which 
have adversely affected the implementation of IRDP," but the block development officials have employed 
the best strategy, resource exchange, to meet the program’s targets. In administrative terms this is their 
primary aim, and in both Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks, this primary aim has been accomplished.
In the Seventh Plan senior administrators have introduced two important correctives to IRDP--the 
"second dose of assistance" and the drastic limitation on the disbursal of milch animals. These 
correctives may help IRDP’s implementation to a limited degree but they, as the original policy rules, 
reveal the administrators’ failure to recognise what is at the root of IRDP’s ineffectiveness as a poverty 
alleviation program-the impossibility that a policy like IRDP could ever be implemented as designed in 
the political and socio-economic environment of the block administrator. The main failure lies in the 
senior administrators’ unwillingness to recognise the block officials’ "environment of demands," and then 
build a policy that will fit better with it. The senior administrators’ lack of understanding of the block 
officials’ environment is, perhaps, most reflected in the rule that block officials, especially the Rural 
Welfare Officer, must have a one-to-one relationship with beneficiaries. This simply ignores the local
■^ In 1986 another survey was undertaken to ascertain the beneficiaries still eligible for assistance from 1982 to 1985. The number 
of beneficiaries from these three years is given as 832,468 (incidentally, this is 50,000 more than the number of total beneficiaries 
given for these three years in another Government of Tamil Nadu source), while the number surveyed was 653,320 (78%). Of those 
surveyed, 126,401 (19%) are eligible for a "second dose," while of the ineligible beneficiaries, 98,573 are deemed to have crossed 
the poverty line (15% of 653,320), 177,612 (27%) no longer had the asset and 227,397 (35%) defaulted. In the meantime, prior to 
the completion of the survey the Government of India issued orders to say that 205,000 "old" beneficiaries should be assisted in 
1986-87 although the survey reveals that the number eligible falls 78,600 short of this target.
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official’s environment in the block. The allocation of IRDP’s resources does not deviate from the 
resource exchange pattern, including some of the main actors, which is particularly evident in the block’s 
contracting programs.
The block environment predictably led local development officials throughout Tamil Nadu to 
concentrate on milch animals during the Sixth Plan. This concentration reflects the block officials’ use of 
resource exchange strategies to their considerable advantage. Not only are they able to meet their targets 
with the greatest speed and efficiency using loan brokers, crucially, the block officials meet those targets 
in the appropriate percentages of female and Scheduled Caste beneficiaries without having a one-to-one 
relationship with them. In effect, the brokers do the development administration’s implementation tasks; 
they "recruit" the appropriate beneficiaries, give economic details (sometimes falsified) about them for 
the block office’s records, fill out the loan application forms, and get the required certificates to 
accompany the application forms. The president even collects bribes on behalf of the administration 
without telling the beneficiaries what he is doing, and shares in the proceeds of milch animal sales which 
go to the purchase committee. This exchange relationship between officials and vested interests in the 
rural areas has led not only to the "wrong" people profiting from the program, but to the economic 
exploitation of the "right" people.
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Chapter 5
The Results of Resource Exchange: 
IRDP in the Villages
If I could, purchase an animal with my own money, I would make a profit. Middlemen are involved with 
the [IRDP] loan and subsidy and they take the profits. Also, when the cattle seller knows you are buying a 
loan animal he asks for a higher price.-IRDP  beneficiary, Thuraiyur
I have argued that the block officials avoid doing anything for IRDP which is not specifically 
targeted, trading IRDP’s resources into the hands of those who will help them most in implementing the 
program. In this chapter I examine the program’s impact in the villages as a result of the officials’ trading 
of IRDP’s resources. The channeling of the program’s resources through loan brokers has led to the 
responsibility for its impact being placed firmly in the hands of the officials’ main trading partners. The 
loan broking milk society presidents have a free hand to run their societies in any way they see fit and, 
with a few important exceptions, do not try to help their members make a profit through owning an ERDP 
cow or buffalo. The style of allocation of IRDP’s resources combined with the treatment meted out to 
beneficiaries by their presidents has resulted in the poor beneficiaries’ interests being served last.
Many beneficiaries have lost rather than made money as a result of accepting the IRDP loan and 
purchasing a milch animal (see Section 5.2.4). The development management analysts critiqued in 
Chapter One would quite rightly point to the predominance of IRDP’s milch animal component and the 
consequent scarcity of good quality animals as an important reason for the beneficiaries’ losses, without 
fully exploring the role of loan brokers. Senior development administrators in New Delhi told me that the 
main reason for this dominance of the cow was that the beneficiaries themselves were only interested in 
cows and the block officials were not sufficiendy well-trained or motivated to convince the beneficiaries 
otherwise. The Secretary of Rural Development in India, Mr. D. Bandyopadhyay has written (1985: 
116), "The reason why animal husbandry could get such a high preference, both from the point of view of 
administrators and the beneficiaries, was that the agricultural labourers and marginal farmers had a 
hankering for owning such livestock." If a development policy’s implementation and impact are 
conceived of in these terms, then the influence of the local administrator’s political and socio-economic 
environment on his allocation of resources is not easily recognised.
I include here before I begin my description and analyses of IRDP in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, a 
discussion of a selection of its many critiques. While a few have come out in favour of IRDP, most have 
been highly critical. Despite the larger scale of most of the critiques and evaluations, covering more 
blocks than my study, many of their findings tally closely with mine. The main studies I discuss include 
that of the Madras Institute of Development Studies (1980), of the Institute for Financial and 
Management Research (1984), of the Planning Commission’s Program Evaluation Organisation (1985), 
Nilakanth Rath (1985) (his article in the Economic and Political Weekly spawned a series of articles in 
that journal on the theme of poverty alleviation programs), Canara Bank (1984), James Copestake for the 
Overseas Development Agency (1985 and 1987), and the Draft Seventh Five Year Plan (1985).
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The articles find much to criticise in ERDP. Even the Program Evaluation Organisation (PEO) 
report, the most optimistic appraisal, indicates there are severe administrative problems with the program, 
although at the same time it says that most of its sample beneficiaries reported increases in status, income, 
and employment as a result of receiving an ERDP loan-subsidy. The articles and reports cite numerous 
drawbacks of ERDP, from its conception to implementation, to administrative weaknesses in local 
planning, and to problems of co-ordination with the banks. As I also discovered, the complex design of 
ERDP lends itself to many weaknesses in its implementation. The different studies had different starting 
points, and few, for example, dealt with the question of whether ERDP is really "integrated" or not Rath 
(1985: 238-39), however, observes that ERDP has not lived up to the original, Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 
conception of it, and rather than being for "integrated rural development," it is an "anti-poverty program."
All the articles are concerned with ERDP’s main directive which is that its beneficiaries should, as a 
result of assistance made available under the program, "cross the poverty line." In this respect, the 
critiques vary quite a lot, although none are particularly sanguine. By far, the most optimistic report 
appears in the Draft Seventh Five Year Plan, in which the Government of India (1985: 119) states that 
40% of the Sixth Five Year Plan’s ERDP beneficiaries would have crossed the poverty line. Nilakanth 
Rath (1985: 243) estimates that realistically less than 10% of the beneficiaries would have crossed the 
poverty line, and goes on to say that "it would not be far wrong to estimate that at the end of seven years 
of ERDP’s operation, about 3% of the poor households in rural India would have been helped to live 
above poverty, even if for a while only (1985: 243)." As pointed out, surveys done under the auspices of 
the Government of Tamil Nadu estimate that 15% of its beneficiaries crossed the poverty line.
Two of the studies (MIDS, 1980: 51 and Copestake, 1985: 10) conclude that beneficiaries under the 
milch animal component of the program (which all the studies indicate has been so over-emphasised that 
high-quality milch cattle are either unavailable or so overpriced as to be effectively unavailable) have not 
only not crossed the poverty line, but have actually lost money for having accepted the loan-subsidy. A 
number of studies summarised in the Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, also conclude that poor 
ERDP beneficiaries have lost rather than made money from owning an ERDP milch animal (see Singh, 
Khatkar and Shukla, all in the IJAE, October-December 1986). Copestake (1985: 11) argues that 
beneficiaries’ losses were minimised where, in contradiction to program intentions, they sold their 
animals. My research corroborates these conclusions in that I also found that the easiest way for a 
beneficiary to profit was through selling his/her milch animal and defaulting on the bank loan if 
necessary. (His/her profits are highest when s/he is able to keep the animal until an advanced stage of 
pregnancy before selling it-see Tables 5-13 to 5-15.)
Another point which all the studies make is that ERDP has not, so far, lived up to its important 
objective of helping the poorest villagers first. Rath (1985: 241) says that at least 15% of those identified 
as poor are not poor, the Government of India accepts that 15 to 20% of the beneficiaries were wrongly 
identified, while the PEO (1985: 390) says that 26% of its sample households had incomes over Rs 3500 
before receiving any ERDP benefits, and that only 15% of the households could be categorised as the 
"poorest of the poor." The MIDS study (1980: 75) indicates that in one village in Tamil Nadu’s former 
Ramnad District (now three districts) which its research team studied intensively, about 32% (40 of 123 
beneficiaries) of the beneficiaries were ineligible to receive IRDP benefits. Generally speaking, MIDS 
found that about 20% of the beneficiaries were Small Farmers passing themselves off as either Marginal 
Farmers or Agricultural Labourers. In the group of villages I surveyed the minimum of beneficiaries "not 
poor" was 13%, with the maximum at 46% (non-milch animal beneficiaries were usually above the 
poverty line) (Table 5-11). Two of the studies conclude that beneficiary families did report increases in
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income (PEO and Canara Bank). Importantly, the Canara Bank authors (1984: 13) state that virtually all 
the beneficiaries who reported any increases in their incomes, used those increases "for meeting 
consumption requirements," rather than for any further investment purposes, another main aim of the 
program.
There were numerous drawbacks cited in IRDP’s performance, especially with regard to the milch 
animal component of the program. Many of the studies (Copestake, 1985; IFMR, 1984; Canara Bank, 
1984 and PEO, 1985) point to recycling of milch cattle, meaning that poor quality animals are circulated 
from one beneficiary to the next. They also indicate that the necessary infrastructure, such as adequate 
veterinary and marketing facilities were lacking. The PEO evaluation (1985: 375) reports, moreover, that 
many milch animal beneficiaries were unable to acquire a second milch animal, despite the guidelines 
which unequivocally state that all of these beneficiaries should receive a second animal as soon as the 
first one goes dry. Very few beneficiaries who wanted one in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks did not 
receive a second animal, but they were seldom able to purchase the second animal within a year of the 
first.
A serious administrative failing mentioned in the studies is that the requisite district and block 
planning was either not done at all, or done very poorly (IFMR, 1984: 209). It also tended to be 
completed well into the financial year, whereas it should be completed at the beginning. The Government 
of India (1985: 121) points out that the block and district development administration suffer from a lack 
of qualified staff, while the PEO (1985: 367) states that "the block machinery was found to be quite weak 
for providing an appropriate and integrated delivery system [for program benefits]."
Corruption received some attention in the studies, but tended to be glossed over. The IFMR study 
(1984: 208), for example, reported that the block officials "functioned in a completely ad hoc manner, 
and the result has been that the flows of assistance have tended to bypass the poor." (I draw the opposite 
conclusion about the officials’ behaviour, as there are good reasons for officials to direct "flows of 
assistance" past the poor.) The Government of India in the Draft Seventh Plan (1985: 120) accepts that 
there has been collusion between "government functionaries and vested interests in some areas” as a 
cause for the program’s benefits bypassing the poor. The MIDS study (1980: 49) also supports the view 
that administrative corruption is a cause for the wrong people receiving benefits under the program, and 
the Canara Bank authors (1984: 18), without actually mentioning corruption as such, say that the presence 
of purchase committees at the cattle markets "boosts the costs of animals, thus forcing the beneficiaries to 
go for low quality animals." Even the PEO report, generally positive about IRDP’s outcomes, says that 
there were instances where the subsidy amount was misappropriated with the "connivance of the banks 
and block officials."
The PEO evaluation of ERDP, geographically the most ambitious as it covered thirty-two districts 
in sixteen states, devoted a chapter to the quality of the development administration in charge of IRDP’s 
implementation. In addition to the difficulties in planning mentioned above, the PEO uncovered 
numerous other administrative infrastructure problems. These included delays in establishing the District 
Rural Development Agencies, overly rapid transfers of Project Officers and Assistant Project Officers at 
the DRDAs, and staff shortages at the DRDAs caused by "specialist" departments’ deputees’ reluctance 
to be seconded there. Moreover, in only four of sixteen states were the requisite household surveys 
conducted, and there was no follow-up of the beneficiaries’ progress after the receipt of their assets (PEO, 
1985: 362-75). The MIDS survey (1980: 375) of IRDP in two districts of Tamil Nadu concluded that "at 
all levels of the administration" there was an over-concern for the "achievement of financial targets." My 
study, conducted in 1985 and 1986, confirms the MIDS conclusion in Tamil Nadu.
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The IFMR report, in its introduction, lays some blame for the poor implementation of IRDP and 
other poverty alleviation programs at the feet of politicians, saying that "the ordinary ML A or MP has 
been more concerned with the disposal of funds for supporters than with the cause of the poor (1984: x)." 
(My findings are that "the ordinary ML A or MP" is virtually uninvolved with IRDP resource disbursal.) 
Indra Hirway (1985: 562), in a critique of Nilakanth Rath’s article, suggests that political people be 
removed entirely from IRDP’s implementation. More common, however, was the view that village-level 
political people should be more involved as they would aid in IRDP’s implementation, particularly if 
elected village councils were to play a prominent role in beneficiary selection.
I give the final word on IRDP to the Government of India which in its Draft Seventh Five Year 
Plan (1985: 123) stated that
many of the shortcomings of the Integrated Rural Development Programme . . . would appear to stem 
from the fact that a programme of massive dimensions, having a multiplicity of critical parameters and 
functioning in a highly diverse environment, was launched with what can be called very tittle preparation.
The Sixth Plan period could thus be called a period of trial in which the Programme has gradually come to 
be known, understood and even stabilised. The gaps that have been revealed and the weaknesses that have 
been experienced in the process will be remedied in the Seventh Plan so as to make IRDP an effective 
instrument of poverty alleviation.
This statement reveals, perhaps, unwarranted optimism on the Government of India’s part. The style of 
IRDP’s implementation is deep-rooted in the relations between administrators and vested interests in the 
rural areas, and it will take much more than the Seventh Plan "to make IRDP an effective instrument of 
poverty alleviation."
5.1. Resource Exchange: First Evidence
I began my research in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks by looking for a concentration of IRDP 
benefits in the block’s villages. Since the program guidelines direct that benefits are to be disbursed to 
"cluster" villages, looking for a concentration of IRDP benefits in a few villages would not automatically 
reject alternative explanations to resource exchange for the concentration. I first checked through the 
IRDP Subsidy Registers (they provide the only evidence of the flow of IRDP subsidies in a block; bank 
records are too dispersed to use) for the years 1981 to 1985. The blocks’ IRDP Subsidy Registers, an 
administrative requisite, are a hand-written (sometimes barely legible, whether in English or Tamil) 
record of the beneficiary’s name, address, occupation, if Scheduled Caste or not, the asset received, the 
subsidy amount, the sanction date of the loan, and if applicable, the serial number of the IRDP animal’s 
ear tag. I could only use the Subsidy Registers from the year 1981-82 onwards, as the earlier registers 
were virtually non-existent. There was much initial confusion in the block office as to how the IRDP 
records should be maintained and for the first couple of years of the program they were largely 
incomplete (in later years of the program they were still, unfortunately, partly incomplete).
There was an extremely high concentration of IRDP benefits in a very few villages in Lalgudi, with 
the top three villages getting over 150 loans each over a four year period, and the bottom villages less 
than ten.1 The top village in Lalgudi received about 235 loans from 1981 to 1985 and the bottom village 
three; in money terms, the top village received Rs 209, 800 (Rs 950 per family of five) while the bottom 
one got Rs 2800 (Rs 6 per family). What is, perhaps, even more striking evidence of the concentration of 
benefits is that the top village in Lalgudi received more in IRDP subsidies than the bottom twenty villages
Tor ease of accounting, I counted each milch animal received as one loan, although the banks count two milch animals as one 
loan unit. For my purposes this would have added an element of confusion, as there were a number of instances where beneficiaries 
received only one milch animal, and I was hesitant to count this as half a loan. Moreover, the beneficiaries with two milch animals 
saw themselves as being the recipients of two loans.
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put together (Tables 5-1 and 2). A similar condition held true in Thuraiyur, with the top village receiving 
over Rs 250,000 in subsidies and 241 loans, while the bottom village had three loans and Rs 3500 (Tables 
5-3 and 4). Thuraiyur, with only 33 village panchayats compared to Lalgudi’s 45, had greater equity in 
subsidy distribution among its villages, although not necessarily among each village’s hamlets (Tables 
5-7 and 5-8). My main task on a village-wise basis, then, was to explain why certain villages, to the 
exclusion of others, should receive a large number of benefits.
I calculated the total number (and amount) of IRDP subsidies each village had received from 1981 
to 1985, and from this list chose which villages to visit in the block. I was concerned that the subsidy 
registers were giving a skewed picture of the concentration of IRDP benefits because in both blocks they 
omitted about 30% of the total claimed number of beneficiaries. The concentration of benefits in the two 
blocks may be enhanced by the missing subsidies, but I also suspect that some of the missing subsidies 
are for largely spurious items such as tree seedlings. Moreover, the total number of block beneficiaries 
seems to have included TRYSEM beneficiaries whose names would not appear in the subsidy registers, 
but who would account for a substantial number of beneficiaries in the earlier years of the program— 
Lalgudi records indicated that there were over 300 TRYSEM beneficiaries from 1981 to 1984. The 
incomplete registers are nonetheless fairly accurate indicators of subsidy concentration. When we visited 
villages I had identified as low IRDP recipients, people there told us their villages had received very few 
IRDP loans, and sometimes did not know about any that might have been received. Furthermore, there 
were two high recipient villages we visited which had more loans than the registers recorded.
Table 5-1: IRDP In Lalgudi (1981-85):
Top 10 Recipient Villages (Total Subsidies)
VILLAGE POPULA­
TION
SUBSIDY
(No.)
SUBSIDY
/1000
SUBSIDY
(Rs)
SUBSIDY
/Fam.*
1. MANGUDI 1106 237 215 209768 948
2. M’PURAM 2063 181 88 152477 370
3. ALANGUDI 1296 156 120 103433 399
4. A’NALLUR 2110 138 65 103052 244
5. NATHAM 953 112 118 98172 515
6. Madakkudi 3250 127 39 94004 145
7. Thiru’medu 3460 100 29 89899 130
8. KEELANBEL 1382 90 65 84024 304
9. KOPPAVALI 950 81 85 64585 340
10. T’mangalam 3049 87 29 59717 98
TOTALS 19619 1309 67 10.59** 270
*family of five **lakhs
Villages in upper case were visited.
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Table 5-2: IRDP In Lalgudi (1981-85):
Bottom 10 Recipients (Total Subsidies)
VILLAGE POPULA- SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY
TION (No.) /1000 (Rs) /Fam.*
1. NER’KUDI 2322 3 1.3 2833 6.0
2. Marudur 1938 16 8.3 3438 8.9
3. Ariyur 2705 5 1.8 3748 6.9
4. Angarai 2830 10 3.5 3882 6.9
5. MANAKKAL 3527 5 1.4 4690 6.6
6. J’puram 1536 6 3.9 5161 16.8
7. P’suthi 1182 7 5.9 5432 23.0
8. P. UTH’UR 2652 9 3.4 5756 10.9
9. Valadi 2741 31 11.3 6215 11.3
10. Esanakorai 1680 17 10.1 6706 20.0
TOTALS 23113 109 4.7 47861 10.4
♦family of five
Villages in upper case were visited.
Table 5-3: IRDP In Thuraiyur (1981-85):
Top 10 Recipient Villages (Total Subsidies)
VILLAGE POPULA- SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY
TION (No.) /1000 (Rs) /Fam*
1. S’PALAYAM 1573 241 153 251467 799
2. KUNNUPATTI 2647 191 72 176465 333
3. Pagalavadi 3958 137 35 143221 180
4. SORATHUR 1527 132 86 104712 343
5. R’PURAM 2272 130 57 104507 230
6. Adanur 2770 131 47 99384 179
7. V’patti 4040 114 28 94964 118
8. Maruvathur 3123 88 28 94206 151
9. N’S’PURAM 1785 98 55 86563 242
10. V’PUR AM 1362 124 91 84419 310
TOTALS 25057 1386 55 12.40** 247
♦family of five ♦♦lakhs
Villages in upper case were visited.
Table 5-4: IRDP In Thuraiyur (1981-85):
Bottom 10 Recipients (Total Subsidies)
VILLAGE POPULA- SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY SUBSIDY
TION (No.) /1000 (Rs) /Fam.*
1. KOLLAPATTI 1229 3 2.4 3499 14.2
2. C’puram 995 7 7.0 6356 31.9
3. MTALAYAM 1533 11 7.2 7830 25.5
4. Ammapatti 1218 14 11.5 11512 47.2
5. NATURAM 2201 13 5.9 13223 30.0
6. Va’puram 5127 32 6.2 22232 21.7
7. V.A.Sam’ram 1759 32 18.2 26145 74.3
8. Kottaiyur 2111 43 20.4 26353 62.4
9. Naduvalur 1629 51 31.3 34729 106.6
10. Madurapuri 2079 53 25.5 36468 87.7
TOTALS 19881 259 13.0 188347 47.4
♦family of five
Villages in upper case were visited.
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5.2. IRDP in the Villages
This section contains four "profiles" to highlight IRDP’s impact in the villages-a profile of the 
average village which has received a large number of IRDP loans, one of the milk society president, one 
of the IRDP beneficiary, and one of his/her IRDP milch animal. I first discuss the IRDP village and the 
factors which lead to its receiving a large number of loans. I then go on to describe IRDP’s primary 
resource trader, the milk society president, how he runs his society, and the main reasons for his/her 
involvement in IRDP. His reasons for involvement have led to a marked variation from village to village 
in people below the poverty line. I also discuss the important differences between "loan brokers" and 
"intermediaries," and how they make an impact on the beneficiaries’ economic progress after receipt of 
the loan. I include a brief discussion of IRDP’s non-milch animal component in which resource exchange 
occurs predominantly on a one-to-one basis rather than under the auspices of a loan broker and conclude 
the chapter with a note on the non-beneficiary.
5.2.1. Profile One: The Village
Resource traders, with few exceptions locally (within a panchayat village or small group of 
villages) influential people rather than MLAs or Block Chairmen, are mainly responsible for determining 
the flow of development policy resources into the villages. Other features of the village such as 
transportation facilities, depth of poverty, caste structure, and distance from the block office had little 
effect on the flows of benefits in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur (Tables 5-5 and 5-6). Because those who have 
studied IRDP have largely assumed that the block officials have tried to follow its rules of 
implementation, they have not looked at the important role of influential individuals in the villages both 
in channeling the flow of benefits, and later in determining their impact
There is no relation between a village’s distance (and quality of the transportation facilities) from 
the block office and the number of IRDP loans it received. The busy local administrator avoids going to 
the far-distant village, but this does not preclude the contractor from the distant village who has regular 
business in the block office from becoming interested in setting up a milk society. In Lalgudi there was 
virtually an inverse relationship between good transportation facilities and the number of loans received, 
as some of the villages most distant from headquarters and with decidedly poor bus services had the 
greatest number of loans. Relatively speaking, however, neither Lalgudi nor Thuraiyur have poor 
transportation facilities compared to other parts of Tamil Nadu (none of the villages we visited had less 
than two buses a day connecting them with the main town in the block); in blocks with inadequate 
transportation networks, especially larger blocks, distance would probably play a greater role in 
determining the flow of IRDP benefits.
There seemed to be little relation between caste and benefits received for villages as a whole, as 
villages with the same economically dominant caste finished at opposite ends of the IRDP benefits 
spectrum (Tables 5-5 and 5-6). I include this observation as a corrective to authors like Fred Riggs (1956 
and 1964), who argue in favour of the prominence of "traditional," ascriptive factors in determining 
administrative behaviour. While my findings do not negate the "forces of tradition" analysis, they should 
make one wary of using it unreservedly, and without also taking political-economic factors into account 
in explaining administrative behaviour.
If a village with a number of hamlets receives loans, it is likely that some of its hamlets would be 
excluded from the benefits equation. This had happened in many of the villages with hamlets we visited;
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Table 5-5: Lalgudi Villages: General Characteristics
LALGUDI
VILLAGES
IRDP
LOANS
No.
POP’N. S.C.
POP'N
XIAN
S.C.
POP'N.
NUMERICAL
DOMINANCE
(CASTE)
ECONOMIC
DOMINANCE
FACTION/
DISPUTE
KMS. FR. 
BLOCK 
OFFICE
BUSSES
Mangudi 237 1106 81 400 Kallar Kallar Yes 15 Poor
Mangam 181 2063 640 275 Pallar* Shared* No 13 Poor
Alangudi 156 1296 301 200 Kallar Kallar Yes 13 Poor
Agalanga 138 2110 125 260 Muthuraja Muthuraja No 5 Poor
Nath am 112 953 0 250 Kallar Kallar No 15 Poor
Keelanbil 90 1382 594 125 Pallar Chettiar No 13 Poor
Koppavali 81 950 61 0 Muthuraja Muthuraja Yes 9 Fair
Edayatha 31 2161 556 640 Pallar Muthuraja No 9 Fair
Pudur Uth 9 2652 365 320 Udayar Udayar No 7 Poor
Manakkal 5 3527 609 800 Muthuraja Muthuraja Yes 7 Good
Nerunjila 3 2322 841 0 Pallar & Muth. Vellala No 7 Excel.
* A Scheduled Caste.
** Economic dominance in this village is shared among the 
Chettiars, Kallars, and Muthurajas.
Lalgudi Block has quite a large number o f Christians in some of 
its villages. The numbers of "Christian Scheduled Castes" given 
in the table are estimates based on information gathered from  
villagers. Other population figures are from the 1981 Census.
A ll villages surveyed in Lalgudi Block have schools upto the 
Fifth Standard. Bus services are defined as follows: Poor - 
upto 3 busses/day from village to block hq; Fair - 4 - 6  busses;
Good - 7 - 9  busses; Excellent -10+ busses.
Table 5-6: Thuraiyur Villages: General Characteristics
THU RAIYU R
VILLAG ES
IRDP
LOANS
No.
P O P ’N. S.C.
P O P ’N.
N UM E R IC AL
D O M INANCE
ECO NO M IC
DO M INAN CE
FAC TIO N/
D ISPUTE
KMS. FR 
BLOCK 
O FFIC E
BUSSES
Sellipalaym 241 1573 504 R eddiar Reddiar Yes 11 G ood
Kunnupatti 191 2647 147 M uthuraja M uthuraja No 9 Poor*
Sorathur 132 1527 370 R eddiar Reddiar No 6 Poor
R enganatha 130 2272 394 Naidu Reddiar No 9 G ood
Venkatesh 124 1362 443 Reddiar Reddiar No 4 W alkab le
Narasinga 98 1785 316 M uthura ja Vella la No 12 G ood
Nagala 13 2201 667 Urali G ounder Reddiar Yes 12 Excellent
M uthiyum 11 1533 186 M uthuraja M uthura ja Yes 8 Poor
Kollapatti 3 ' 1229 29 M uthuraja M uthura ja No 5 Poor
* Two o f this village’s hamlets have poor services and two have 
excellent; the hamlets with poor services have more IRDP loans.
In contrast to Lalgudi, Thuraiyur has few Christians in its 
villages. The Thuraiyur villages we visited also have schools 
upto the Fifth Standard. Bus definitions as fo r Table 5-5.
benefits were concentrated in one or two hamlets, while others did not receive any, or only very few, 
loans (Tables 5-7 and 5-8). The hamlet, like panchayat village, concentration of IRDP loans again reflects 
the dominance of certain individuals in determining the flow of policy benefits. They largely decide who 
their village’s beneficiaries should be, and their choice of beneficiaries is often limited to their own and 
the nearest hamlet depending, for example, on their political aspirations (see discussion in next sub­
section). There was also little relation between the number of Scheduled Caste2 (and/or Christian
2The main Scheduled Castes of Tiruchi District are Pallars, Parayars and Chakliyars. The latter live exclusively in the district’s 
dry areas, and therefore are found in Thuraiyur Block but not in Lalgudi.
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Scheduled Caste3) people and the number of IRDP loans received. Assuming that a greater percentage of 
Scheduled Caste than other caste people are poor, this contradicts the administrative guideline that 
villages with an "accent on people below the poverty line" must be helped the most.
Table 5-7: Lalgudi Villages: Loan Distribution
LALGUDI
VILLAGES
IRDP
LOANS
N o .
M. ANIM AL  
LO ANS  
N o.
MILK
SOCIETY
LO AN
BROKERS
N o.
HAMLETS
N o.
LO A N S BY HAMLET
A B c D D /K
M angudi 237 185 Yes 1 1 237
M angam m 181 131 Yes 1 3 138 34 0 _____ 9
A lan gud i 156 135 Yes 2 4 61 48 42 0 5
A galanga 138 96 Yes 2 3 74 56 1 7
N ath am 112 83 Yes 2 1 112 ____ , _____
K eelanbil 90 82 Yes 1 2 63 27 _____ 0
K oppavali 81 68 Yes 1 1 81 — _____ _____
Edayatha 31 22 D efunct 1 2 31 0 _____ _____ 0
Pudur Uth 9 0 D efunct 0 1 9 ____ _____ _____
M anakkal 5 0 D efunct 0 2 5 0 . _ _ 0
N erunjilak 3 0 D efunct 0 4 3 0 0 0 0
1043 802 (77)
DIK  = Don’t know
Table 5-8: Thuraiyur Villages: Loan Distribution
T H U R A IY U R
V IL L A G E S
IR D P
L O A N S
N o.
M . A N IM A L  
L O A N S  
No.
M IL K
S O C IE T Y
LO A N
B R O K E R S
No.
H A M L E T S
N o.
L O A N S  B Y  H A M L E T
A B C D D /K
S e llip a la y a m 241 123 No 3* 1 241
K u n n u p a tti 191 94 N o 3 4 84 68 24 7 8
So rath  u r 132 106 D e fu n c t 2 1 132
R e n g a n a th a 130 97 Y e s 2 2 97 28 . . . 5
V e n k a te s h 124 117 Y es r * 1 124 . . .
N a ra s in g a 98 73 No 2 2 81 15 —- . . . 2
N a g a la p u r 13 0 No 0 2 11 2 _ . . . 0
M u th iyu m 11 0 No 0 3 6 3 2 . . . 0
K o lla p a ti 3 0 No 0 2 3 0 . . . . . . 0
943 610 (6 5 %)
* One o f these people is an intermediary. 
** This person is an intermediary.
One factor which did make a difference, at least in Lalgudi, as to whether a village received a lot of 
benefits is size. There was a strong, positive correlation between smaller size and greater benefits 
received in Lalgudi Block, although not in Thuraiyur. In Lalgudi (its forty-five village panchayats range 
in size from 922 to 5496, with an average of 2080), of the top ten recipient villages in per capita terms, 
eight have populations of less than 1400. Of the bottom ten recipients in per capita terms, nine have
3In India, people of Scheduled Castes (former untouchables) and Tribes are given special privileges to help make up for their poor 
economic condition and continuing low social status—a certain percentage of government posts will be reserved for Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes, and likewise a certain percentage of "seats" will be reserved for them in universities and other tertiary educational 
institutions. Moreover, a number of India’s constituencies are reserved for Scheduled Caste or Tribe candidates only. On 
conversion to another religion such as Christianity, Islam or Buddhism, however, a Scheduled Caste person loses the government 
privileges available to him, despite the fact that neither his economic nor social status will have changed. Among Christian converts 
in particular, a strict caste hierarchy is maintained, and there is no inter-marrying of people with differing Hindu caste origins.
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populations of 2300 and more (and six above 2300 also in terms of the fewest number of loans-Table 
5-9). I am at a loss to explain the Lalgudi trend, although I do not think it is related to Lalgudi being 
"wet" and Thuraiyur "dry," (excepting that the settlement pattern in a "wet" area lends itself to a greater 
number of smaller-sized villages). It is, perhaps, only coincidence that some of Lalgudi’s smallest villages 
would have important block contractors-cum-loan brokers residing in them. One would expect that other 
things being (relatively) equal, the larger villages would have more subsidies although, perhaps, a smaller 
subsidy amount per capita. This held partly true in Thuraiyur, with four of the largest ten villages 
finishing in the top ten for overall spending and only one in the bottom ten (Thuraiyur has 31 non-tribal 
village panchayats with an average population of 2477, and two tribal villages in the Pachamalai Hills 
which are treated as "special" in terms of development policy).
Table 5-9: Population and IRDP Benefits:
Top 10 Recipients in Per Capita Terms
LALGUDI THURAIYUR_____________________
1. Mangudi 1106* 1. S’palayam 1573*
2. Natham 953* 2. Sorathur 1527*
3. Alangudi 1296* 3. Kunnupatti 2647*
4. M’puram 2063* 4. V’puram 1362*
5. Koppavali 950* 5. N’s’puram 1785*
6. Keelanbil 1392* 6. R’puram 2272*
7. A’nallur 2110* 7. Pagalavadi 3958*
8. Met’patti 930 8. Adanur 2770*
9. Komakudi 944 9. S’nail ur 1234
10. Kon’kudi 1039 10. Venga’nur 1735
TOTALS 12783 20865
*Also in top 10 in terms of overall spending.
The influence of an ML A is often cited as a reason to explain skewed flows of policy benefits in a 
block (see Hadden, 1980 and EFMR, 1984). In Lalgudi Block one village which is a close neighbour of 
an ex-MLA’s home received many loans while another village, the actual home of an ex-MLA, received 
very few-both of the former MLAs are members of the state’s main opposition party, the DMK. In 
Thuraiyur, the one village in which an ex-MLA of the AIADMK lives did receive a large number of 
IRDP loans. This evidence shows the difficulty in attributing the flows of development policy benefits to 
the politician (MLA). The presence of an MLA is no guarantee that a village will receive more than its 
"share" of benefits. Moreover, in the two villages which did receive a large number of ERDP benefits, the 
ex-MLAs were not directly involved in lobbying the block officials for loans. In one case a close, 
long-time, associate of the ex-MLA (a contractor) was responsible for the loans. In the other village, the 
milk society president (a former Panchayat President) was not closely associated with the ex-MLA, but 
said the ex-MLA had given him some help in putting pressure on the block and divisional officials to 
sanction the IRDP loans.
The dominating variable in the village-wise distribution of IRDP benefits is a "pull" from the 
villages for benefits from individuals who, for varying reasons, are interested in disbursing benefits in the 
village. The real picture is more complicated, however, than one influential person within a village acting 
as a "loan broker" between potential beneficiaries and the administration (Tables 5-7 and 8 give numbers 
of brokers/village). It held true in some instances, but in others, a person from one village was 
responsible for loans in two or even more villages. This was especially true of the private milk vendors in 
Thuraiyur-one of whom was responsible for 140 milch animal loans in six villages within a ten kilometre 
radius-but also of two milk society presidents and a parish priest (all parttime contractors) in Lalgudi
95
who were each responsible for loans in two villages. (Bankers told me of another parish priest in Lalgudi 
who was responsible for loans in four villages.) In other instances, a non-influential person within a 
village received necessary information from someone with better administrative connections (and 
therefore with more program information) to lobby for a number of loans for the village. In Lalgudi 
Block one village received a number of loans in 1982 through a parish priest based in a neighbouring 
village who later encouraged one of the villagers, a Christian, to begin a milk society there in 1984.
Parish priests in Lalgudi provide a good example of the breadth of the block development officials’ 
trading relations with locally powerful people. One parish priest, who also did NREP contract works,4 
was able to get a number of IRDP loans for people in the hamlet where his church is located. He then 
operated a "milk society" (he did not actually register it), through which he purchased milk at a very low 
price from "members" and then sold it all on the lucrative private market (mostly to tea shops and "meals 
hotels"). Influential people in villages near to the parish priest first got the idea from him that operating a 
milk society can be a very profitable business (one milk society president admitted as much), highlighting 
the importance of effective information exchange networks in the rural areas. The priest had actually 
tried to arrange for loans for a number of Christians in a neighbouring village, but an influential person of 
that village quashed his attempts, and set up his own milk society.
There are occasions when one village has more than one influential person who is interested in 
IRDP loans. When this occurs it is possible that the local administrator will be able to satisfy both 
persons’ demands, depending, for example, on their timing, and if they live in the same hamlet or not. 
This was true of the village Alangudi Mahajanam. It has four small hamlets, of which three received 
IRDP loans. One person was responsible for the loans in one hamlet (1981-83), and another was 
responsible for the loans in two of the hamlets (1983-85). In Sellipalayam, the village to receive the most 
loans during the Sixth Plan in Thuraiyur, most of the subsidies had come through the auspices of two 
private milk vendors (who live in neighbouring villages) and a young Chakliyar (a Scheduled Caste) man 
who helped other people of his caste get milch animal and plough bullock loans by giving them the 
appropriate information and then helping them with loan application forms and trips to the bank and 
block office. There is also some ripple-effect in the village where a large number of people get loans as 
people who have not received loans through a loan broker may try to do so individually after finding out 
about the program from beneficiaries.
While this is impressionistic, the "dynamic" element of the villages in terms of bringing in 
resources from outside of the village is the rich peasantry. Those with the largest tracts of land, the 
landlords, seem either to maintain their interest in the land with few non-agricultural pursuits, or go to the 
opposite extreme of moving to urban areas, becoming absentee landlords, and perhaps eventually selling 
their land.5 Those with small holdings are caught up with concerns about subsistence and seldom think 
about gaining control of policy resources on a major scale. The small peasant may try to get a subsidised 
IRDP loan while the rich peasant thinks of establishing a profitable milk society with a large number of 
IRDP beneficiaries.
4When I originally discussed the National Rural Employment Program with the BDO, he told me that he had entrusted some of 
the works to voluntary church organisations which is allowed under the rules of the program. In reality the works were given over 
to the parish priest who acted just as a contractor would. His profit margins were much larger than would normally be possible for a 
local contractor doing an NREP contract work, in that he used donated food grains (wheat) from abroad as payment for workers, 
then sold the grain (rice) allotted by the development administration for his own profit.
5This was certainly true of the Brahmins in "wet" areas of Tamil Nadu. Many of them have sold their land and moved to urban 
areas (see Gough, 1960).
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As the evidence above indicates, the boundaries of a village are fluid in terms of people’s influence, 
with some people responsible for IRDP loans in more than one village. As far as the village as an entity 
is concerned, it is important, roughly speaking, that a village not be so wealthy that its people have no 
interest in administratively-controlled resources, nor so poor that it has not given rise to any rich peasants. 
In Lalgudi Block, for example, none of the villages situated along the main road between Lalgudi (the 
block’s largest town, but not the block headquarters) and Tiruchi got very many IRDP loans (five of the 
bottom ten villages listed in Table 5-2). It was, at first, a surprise to me that the villages with the best 
transportation facilities in the block should have the fewest number of IRDP loans, but while there may 
have been other factors involved as well, it seemed that the people in these villages who might otherwise 
be interested in gaining administrative resources, had their economic interests served through activities in 
either Lalgudi or Tiruchi.
5.22 . Profile Two: The Milk Society President, the Milk Society
In the local administrator’s allocation of IRDP’s resources the milk society president is a dominant 
figure who has a major role to play in determining the impact of the program’s resources in the village. 
IRDP rules notwithstanding, the milk society president’s contact with the administration precludes any 
but limited contact (largely relating to bribes) between the beneficiary and the administration. The milk 
society president is generally a fairly powerful person in the village, frequently a contractor, a large 
landholder (usually a rich peasant), and often a ruling party person. He has political-economic contacts 
with the world outside the village, and generally the larger the milk society, the greater the amount of 
contact between president and other influential people within the block, including the administrators. 
Less commonly, a highly motivated poor person, likely an educated Scheduled Caste youth among the 
agricultural labourers, also lobbies for loans or tries to intervene between officials and beneficiaries (or 
between the milk society president and beneficiaries) to help the latter..
It is important, however, not to overstate the power and influence of the milk society president. 
IRDP’s resources are not as valuable as those of contract programs, and therefore more prominent 
political people, especially those whose own connections and influence extend outside of the block, do 
not try to affect the flow of IRDP benefits. The ex-MLA, the Panchayat President, and others who have 
more at stake in the local political arena (the block), and less access to the resources of larger arenas are 
also more interested in the "division of spoils" in the villages. The block’s local elite, comprised to a 
large extent of the rich peasantry, have less interest in IRDP than in contract programs, although the 
control of IRDP resources may serve the rich peasants’ political and socio-economic aspirations in the 
village. The rich peasants who are most interested in gaining control of IRDP subsidies do not generally 
have institutional bases of political power, (although they may be village representatives of a political 
party)- The "political interference" (one of the most commonly offered excuses by senior administrators 
in India when "things go wrong" at the implementation level) which occurs in IRDP’s implementation is 
substantial, but not in terms of the MLA and other political people whose contacts extend widely outside 
of the block. IRDP is a program of the village in that the demands made on the BDO for its resources 
emanate from locally powerful people who are interested in using policy resources to enhance their power 
within the confines of the village and the block.
In many, although not all, the villages I visited, the richest people (big landlords and/or big 
contractors6) had little interest in any of the block officials’ activities, except as those related to the
6 A "big” contractor is someone who gets valuable contracts through, for example, the Public Works Department. This contractor 
does not concern himself with the less valuable contracts available through the development administration.
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maintenance of public amenities such as the overhead watertank or streetlights within the village proper. 
They were rarely interested in IRDP. However, rich peasants try to branch into more profitable activities 
besides agriculture, especially contracting in the local area (contracting is low risk and high profit), 
moneylending, and entrepreneurial activities.7 Henry Bernstein (1979: 431-32) writing about Africa also 
describes the rich peasant/kulak as a rural entrepreneur:
. . .it is worth recalling the original Russian meaning o f "kulak" as an "all-round" agent o f the extension o f  
com modity relations—an econom ic agent who not only operates as a commercial farmer em ploying 
labour-power but also rents out farm machinery, acts as a local merchant’s and money-lending capital, 
investing in crop purchasing, sm all-scale processing and manufacturing enterprises . . . [G]iven the 
backwardness o f  the circuits o f  commodity circulation in many areas, capital accumulated in agriculture is 
often invested in mercantile and transport activities which y ield  a better rate o f return than reinvestment in 
production.
In Tamil Nadu the rich peasants’ interests in profits greater than those possible from agricultural 
activities, have led them to seek increased contacts with the local administration thereby gaining access to 
valuable administratively-controlled resources.
The differences in efforts required by prospective milk society presidents in getting subsidised 
milch animal loans reflects the difference in the relations they have with the block officials and their 
political-economic status generally. The presidents of two milk societies in neighbouring Lalgudi 
villages exemplify this contrast. One president was a village AIADMK representative and a contractor, 
and he said that the block office’s Extension Officer for Co-operatives came to the village and asked him 
to become a president. Because the then Tiruchi Collector, Shantha Sheela Nair, was interested in "ladies’ 
societies," the members would all have to be women, and his wife the de jure president. He agreed, was 
immediately sanctioned 50 loans, and received subsidised loans for an additional 30 members in the 
following year. The neighbouring village’s milk society president, an uninfluential man, had to try for 
seven months to get IRDP subsidies. He told us he met with the RWO, the Panchayats Extension Officer, 
the Animal Husbandry Officer, the BDO, and even the Collector before he was sanctioned 69 subsidised 
loans. He even told us he had wept before the BDO in making his pleas for the subsidies (he further 
claimed he spent Rs 10,000 in setting up the milk society, although he refused to itemise these 
expenditures).
Three other milk society presidents, all of them parttime contractors in Lalgudi, had no trouble in 
getting large numbers of IRDP milch animal loans. In one village the president is an associate of an 
ex-Cabinet Minister of Tamil Nadu’s DMK governments. Another would-be president (loosely 
associated with the DMK) appealed directly to the Collector during an opening ceremony for a Noon 
Meal Centre (which this locally important contractor had had a hand in building) in the village. The 
Collector agreed to sanction fifty milch animal loans immediately. The president then lobbied the 
Collector’s office for another fifty loans, and with the help of the Block Development Officer, whom he 
had helped to stage the successful opening ceremony, got an additional forty-six. (This was one of the 
few instances I know of where a Collector was brought into the decision as to how many subsidies should 
go to one village.) The third milk society president, an AIADMK village representative, took charge of 
160 loans, which were disbursed both in his village (90) and a neighbouring village (70). The president 
put the loans in the neighbouring village under the care of a close relative of his wife.8 Interestingly in 
terms of political geography, the two milk societies mentioned above which had DMK presidents, each
7Harriss (1982: 195 and 1987a) also discusses the rich peasantry’s search for more lucrative investment opportunities outside of 
agriculture.
8This relative was interested in a share of the anticipated profits, and when he did not get what he felt was his due, he tried openly 
for over a year, including lobbying bank officials for support, to split his section of the society away from the main part. He was 
unsuccessful, at least partly because the bankers had identified him as a loan defaulter.
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had a larger milk society with an AIADMK president in the closest neighbouring village. Overall, a small 
majority of the presidents of large milk societies are AIADMK supporters with a significant minority in 
the DMK.
Some of the AIADMK milk society presidents in Lalgudi Block boasted to me (and others) about 
having close contacts with one or another of the Cabinet Ministers from Tiruchi District These contacts 
were, however, sometimes rather more illusory than real, and the bankers and officials had to decide how 
plausible the presidents’ claims were. Certain milk society presidents would not only claim they had 
important political contacts, they would adopt threatening tones if the bankers hesitated or refused to 
fulfill their demands (ie., threatening to have non-compliant officers transferred with the help of a 
politician). I suspect the milk society presidents would behave similarly towards block officials if they do 
not get what they want. Their behaviour, however, may be tempered by how much they expect from the 
officials (contracts, for example) in the near future, and also by their assessment of their own importance 
in the block.
Once the milk society president has a society in operation, he most often determines whether the 
IRDP beneficiaries actually make an incremental income. (It is, as mentioned, the block officials’ 
responsibility to make periodic checks on the beneficiaries’ "progress," but when we asked beneficiaries 
if the RWO came to check on how they were doing, the answer was universally, "No!"). When discussing 
IRDP with one of the Block Development Officers, I discovered that he did not even know what price 
beneficiaries were getting for their milk at any of the block’s milk societies, and thus had no idea as to 
whether they were crossing the poverty line or noL He just asserted they were. The IRDP beneficiary, 
then, is largely at the "mercy" of the milk society president and his accountants. If the president gives a 
good price for the milk to the society members, pays their loans to the bank properly (at some societies 
there were delays in money going to the bank-admittedly at times caused by late payments from the 
district milk union), and makes sure they are given an adequate monthly income from their milk sales, 
then the beneficiary will have a better chance of actually profiting by having taken an IRDP loan/subsidy 
(Tables 5-13 to 5-15). Unfortunately, however, there are numerous cases of wrongdoings by presidents or 
their accountants which have led to IRDP beneficiaries (and the banks as well) being swindled out of 
substantial amounts of money.
Just such a case was discussed at a three-day seminar on IRDP which I attended in Tiruchirappalli. 
The milk co-operative society was in Kulithalai Block west of Tiruchi city. The president of this society 
misappropriated a large proportion of the proceeds of milk sales that were to pay off the members’ loans, 
and of the total amount lent of Rs 113,000, Rs 68,000 were still in arrears when the Deputy Registrar of 
Dairying in Tiruchirappalli advised that all activities and transactions of the society be halted.9 
According to a written statement provided at the seminar, "the President left the society and is now doing 
some other occupation." It did not say whether the ex-president was still in possession of all the money 
he had misappropriated, and it also did not say what happened to the beneficiaries. Legally, although the 
milk society president and his accountants are in charge of repaying the beneficiaries’ loans to the bank, 
the beneficiaries must bear the responsibility if something goes amiss with the society’s handling of then- 
loan accounts. The only way the beneficiaries can seek redress is through legal action, but I did not hear 
of this occurring. Beneficiaries did occasionally complain to the concerned bank’s Agricultural Officer 
about the society’s handling of their accounts, but because bankers rely on the president for loan 
repayments they rarely try to take action against him.
9Once a milk society has been duly registered, it comes under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operatives (Dairying) 
who is based in Tiruchi, and only the Deputy Registrar’s office can take action, under the rules of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative 
Societies Act, against the officials of a village milk society.
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There were twelve operating milk societies when we stayed in Lalgudi Block in 1985, of which 
eight were visited and of these eight societies, five had building contractors as de facto presidents (the 
largest milk vendor in Thuraiyur was also a contractor), another’s president has a number of "official" 
connections in the block and in Tiruchi, and one other president, a poor Scheduled Caste man, was put 
forward for the presidency by a locally important AIADMK man (the village party representative). In 
any block the building contractor generally has the most business with development officials, and would, 
then, have picked up the most information as to what development resources are available in the block.
In two villages in Lalgudi the presidents had established societies at least partly to press for an 
advantage in village factional disputes.10 Faction leaders need an assured number of supporters, and 
when the factions are based on inter-caste or inter-religious disputes, the combatants will divide along 
religious or caste lines, and supporters found within the caste or religious group. When the factional 
dispute is between two people (or families) of the same caste (and class), their supporters will necessarily 
split the caste group. In order to maintain (or gain) the upper hand the main disputants will have to woo 
people from other castes. One way to attempt this is through a program like IRDP.
The struggle between two families in one of Lalgudi’s villages had a marked effect on the disbursal 
of ERDP loans there. In this village one of the faction leaders used IRDP milch animal loans to try to win 
Scheduled Caste agricultural labourers to his cause, but he did not allow any labourers who worked for 
his faction rival to receive any of the subsidised loans. There were, however, a number of labourers who, 
despite receiving a milch animal, went to work for the milk society president’s rival and were then unable 
to receive the second milch animal because the president told the bankers not to give them second loans. 
Moreover, the block office’s subsidy registers listed a number of people from this village as having 
received a first milch animal, but we discovered in the village that they had not. Further enquiries 
revealed that all of the non-recipients were supporters of the milk society president’s rival, and that the 
president had told the bankers not to give these people loans.11 The milk society president had planned to 
run in the election for village Panchayat President, but his pre-election enquiries revealed that he would 
lose to his faction opponent, (who won the election unopposed).12
When I returned to Tiruchirappalli District in the aftermath of the panchayat elections I discovered 
that a number of milk society presidents (and two milk vendors in Thuraiyur) had run in the panchayat 
elections with varying degrees of success. In Lalgudi, four milk society presidents ran, or seriously
10Village-based political and anthropological research over the years had led its readers to believe that most Indian villages are 
riven by factional struggles. About two-thirds of the twenty villages I visited did not have ongoing factional struggles, and only one 
village’s political and economic life was overwhelmingly dominated by a factional dispute. Other villages had factions or disputes 
which only manifested themselves in terms of religious events, such as temple festivals. Harriss (1982: 231) also found in his study 
of a village in Tamil Nadu’s North Arcot District that factions are not necessarily a predominant feature of a village’s 
political-economic landscape. For a critique of the use of "faction" in political analysis in India, see Hardiman (1982).
UI am uncertain as to how the rival’s supporters’ names would have appeared in the subsidy register but would suggest that the 
president may have given the block officials a long list of "potential beneficiaries" with the understanding that only his supporters 
would get the subsidised loans. The block officials accidentally listed people in the subsidy register the president did not want as 
beneficiaries.
12The factional rivalry in this Lalgudi village highlights the way in wliich the village leaders tend to use political connections as it 
suited them to further their own ends in the village. The milk society president in the village is a member of the AIADMK, while 
his brother is in the Congress (I), the major electoral alliance partner of the AIADMK. The brothers wanted to maximise their 
useful political contacts which, I discovered, is not an uncommon situation in Tamil Nadu. This sort of thinking occasionally 
appeared in terms of voting behaviour as well. People sometimes split their vote between the ruling and opposition parties because 
they said that way it would not matter who won. Their faction rival was, not surprisingly, a DMK supporter. Moreover, this 
particular factional dispute spanned more than one generation, and therefore predated by many years, the breakaway of the 
AIADMK from the DMK in 1972. The two sides used their separate party connections in order to get administratively-controlled 
resources such as building contracts, liquor licenses, and in the AIADMK man’s case, the presidency of a large milk society. Bailey 
(1969: 75) notes the case of a family in Orissa where one brother was Congress and the other Communist, with the rationale that 
"the family could never be on the losing side."
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considered running, for the post of village President. Of the three candidates, one was successful, and 
two others came second. In Thuraiyur Block, one milk society president became a village panchayat 
councillor, as did one of the private milk vendors involved in IRDP loan disbursement, while another 
vendor contested in his village’s presidential election, but lost badly (one ex-milk society president is also 
an ex-village President). This indicates the presidents’ interest in using IRDP for political purposes, 
although it is difficult to say whether the political interest predated the interest in IRDP loans or not.
Some people became milk society presidents because they did, indeed, have political interests, and 
wanted to make sure that they would have a solid support base in the village. Most of the milk society 
presidents belong to economically dominant castes, and they can count automatically on the support of 
their caste fellows in an election (unless they have an intra-caste rival). However, they cannot count on 
the support of other caste groups, including the village’s Scheduled Caste agricultural labourers, 
(although some of them would tend to support the president if he is also their major employer), and it can 
be assumed that IRDP loans were used in a not always successful attempt to purchase people’s votes in 
advance.
At one of the hamlets of a Lalgudi village we visited, the people complained bitterly that the milk 
society president (of the same caste) had completely ignored their interests, as he wanted to have 
supporters from another, more populous, Scheduled Caste hamlet of the village. Their complaints had 
foundation, as the records showed that not a single person from this hamlet had received an IRDP loan 
during the Sixth Plan, while people from the other hamlet had received loans for milch animals and 
plough bullocks as well.
This milk society president was a DMK contractor, but the members of his milk society were both 
DMK and AIADMK supporters. The members of his society were from the Scheduled Caste hamlet (an 
uncharacteristically wealthy one), but he also made sure that a large number of fairly well-off fellow caste 
people got loans. He obviously realised that in order to be a successful presidential candidate in the 
panchayat election he would have to appeal to more voters than would be either members of the DMK or 
only of his own caste in the village. His strategy resulted nonetheless in a secondplace finish (to another 
DMK man who had been president of the local agricultural credit co-op society for seven years). The 
milk society president complained that he could have won the election with Scheduled Caste support 
except that an SC man stood for President as well, and split their votes.
I have only been discussing loan broking milk society presidents as important figures in LRDP’s 
implementation. There are also, however, milk society presidents with more philanthropic reasons for 
taking charge of IRDP milch animal loans. I call these people "intermediaries" to distinguish them from 
the more profit-oriented brokers who try to gain from IRDP beneficiaries’ acquisition and ownership of 
assets, although the intermediaries do perform a brokerage function for poor villagers. (There is further 
discussion of brokers and intermediaries in Chapter Six.) Significantly, in both blocks, all the 
intermediaries we met belong to the Scheduled Castes. There is undoubtedly a greater need for 
intermediaries in IRDP’s implementation, not the least because Scheduled Caste people appear to be 
among the worst exploited of the beneficiaries. In the two blocks I met five Scheduled Caste 
intermediaries (of whom two are milk society presidents; I do not, however, include number eight of the 
following "mini-profiles"), who had either lobbied the block officials for loans for their community or 
had intervened between officials and beneficiaries so that the latter would not be forced to pay such high 
bribes. The "motivated educated youth" is an important, although still uncommon, figure in IRDP as he, 
along with the occasional female milk society president, is an intermediary between the poor beneficiaries
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and the officials who tries to protect and even promote the former’s interests. Intermediaries are not 
financial resource traders, but they (the milk society presidents among them) do have a continuing set of 
relations with the local officials wherein they help them with implementing other programs, the resources 
of which are not in great demand in the block.
The "milk brokers" are crucial actors both in the process of allocating IRDP’s resources and in 
determining its impact, and I offer here brief notes on some of the milk society presidents, a private milk 
vendor and a parish priest we interviewed in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, to give the reader a more specific 
idea as to who these people are.
1. E.S.B.-Lalgudi. Brahmin (this caste formerly dominant in village), owner of local rice 
mill, connections with All-India Radio, gives talks in village for block development 
administration, no clear party affiliation, mismanaged society funds, and his small society 
no longer functional as bank refused to give additional loans.
2. V.D.-Lalgudi. Kallar (dominant caste of this village), large landholder employing 
numerous agricultural labourers, leader of faction in village, prominent member of local 
AIADMK, local contractor, wanted to be president of village (but knew would lose in 
election) so did not run in 1986. In charge of largest society in Lalgudi Block, but many 
members have sold cattle. Officially, his wife is in charge of this "ladies’ society."
3. R.G.-Thuraiyur. Reddiar (dominant caste of this village), former Panchayat President of 
village, operates a printing press, a senior official of Land Development Bank in Thuraiyur, 
had help from ex-MLA in setting up milk society, handed over operation of milk society to 
relations on discovering that he was being swindled by his own society accountant. Society 
is dormant and in arrears.
4. N.A.R.-(private milk vendor), Thuraiyur. Muslim (significant minority in this village), 
worked in Malaysia a number of years, an important building contractor, son is active 
member of AIADMK, was in charge of 140 loans in six villages in Thuraiyur Block, good 
connections with previous Animal Husbandry Officer, stood for President in panchayat 
elections but lost badly.
5. K.A.-Lalgudi. Kallar (dominant caste in this village), longstanding president of milk 
society (since early 1960s), very close connections with former (opposition party) ML A and 
Cabinet Minister, a building contractor, stood for president in panchayat elections and came 
second. Society functioning well (the society’s longevity is a testament to its proper 
management).
6. Father D.-Lalgudi. Roman Catholic priest at this village for about seven years, undertook 
numerous building contracts in block, close connections with powerful people in 
neighbouring villages, personally in control of a number of ERDP assets through use of 
benami transactions, in charge of just over forty ERDP milch animal loans for an informal 
milk society in village, expelled from priesthood in mid-1985 for abusing his position.
7. R.C.-Lalgudi. Kallar (dominant caste in this village), Panchayat President of this village, 
wealthy, party affiliation somewhat uncertain, has undertaken important contracts in the 
block, in control of number of ERDP assets through benami transactions, has also procured 
calf-rearing scheme for village. He has made substantial additional profits through the bulk 
purchase and resale to members of feeds and medicines. The society is functional, but 
many have sold their cattle.
8. K.K.-Lalgudi. Scheduled Caste (Pallar) (numerically dominant in this village, but little 
economic strength), member of AIADMK, accused of misappropriating milk society funds.
His name was suggested to block officials for presidency of society by important AIADMK 
man in village, K. lost control of society, and presidency taken over by AIADMK man.
9. A.R.--Lalgudi. Christian (numerically and economically important in village), got idea to 
start a milk society from a local parish priest from a neighbouring village, not a wealthy or 
influential man, accused of swindling society funds, deposed by others in society, society 
now being run by the village AIADMK youth leader.
10. AK.-Thuraiyur. Scheduled Caste (Pallar) (numerically dominant in village but no 
economic strength), an educated youth (has Secondary School Leaving Certificate-rare 
among SC agricultural labourers), tried long and hard to start society, of no particular 
influence in village although father is acknowledged leader of Pallars, is now member of 
elected village panchayat council, society is for Scheduled Caste women only, therefore
102
president is de facto rather than de jure. This milk society has milk fat-testing, and there is 
slight variation in prices given to members.
Of these ten people, only the last three qualify as beneficiaries, but of these three, only the last, 
A. R. of Thuraiyur, has been able to maintain his leadership of the milk society. None of the five wealthy 
and influential presidents had any leadership challenges from their "rank and file" members although their 
control over their societies was not entirely smooth. One of them (no. 3) was cheated by his own 
accountant (this also happened at a society in Lalgudi Block), and another was faced with an ultimately 
unsuccessful move to split the society. Only two of the five wealthier presidents mentioned above were 
entirely unchallenged, despite some grumblings among members about various wrongdoings.13
One of my discoveries, a fairly obvious one, was that the smaller the difference in socio-economic 
status between the president and a beneficiary, the better chance the latter has to challenge the authority 
of the former. In one Lalgudi village, for example (no. 2 above), most of the beneficiaries are Scheduled 
Caste (Pallars) people employed as agricultural labourers and construction gang coolies by the milk 
society president. They had no say in the operation of the society, and it seemed likely they were being 
cheated by those responsible for the accounts (evidenced by the amount of milk sold to the society, the 
excessively long payback periods for the loans and the small amounts of money given to the society 
members as their monthly cash—some beneficiaries said they did not get any cash while they were 
repaying their loans). About fifty percent of our respondents at this village made allegations of 
malpractices regarding the measurement of milk,14 and it was common for the milk society to sell milk to 
members who required extra milk at Rs 3,75 per litre, although the society bought it for Rs 2,25 from its 
members. Because milk was purchased from members at a low price, and also likely because of 
malpractices, the society profits from one year’s operation were, according to bankers’ records, Rs 
30,000.15 (While some of these profits are to be shared among all the members, the mathematically 
adroit milk society president is able to misappropriate the society’s profits for himself and select 
supporters.) Of the beneficiaries of this society who belong to the same caste as the president, 14 of 23 we 
interviewed did not take a second milch animal loan, primarily because they were unhappy with the way 
the society was being run, and felt that they could not make a profit from their milk sales to the society.
Of additional interest regarding this milk society is that it is one of the so-called "ladies’" milk 
societies; the de facto president’s wife is the de jure president of the society. This milk society was the 
largest in Lalgudi Block from 1983 to 1986, comprising members from two panchayat villages. Part of 
the reason for its original large size lies in the fact that it is a "ladies’ society" established while Shantha 
Sheela Nair was Collector. It was with little difficulty that a local AIADMK leader could arrange with 
the Block Development Officer to have a large number of IRDP loans. The only proviso was that all the 
loanees be women. Moreover, according to a milk society president in a neighbouring village, the 
president of the first society had wanted an even larger milk society, and had sent out feelers to people in
13Milk societies are generally quite short-lived. The effective lifespan of most milk societies does not stretch beyond three years. 
If internecine quarrels over accounts does not destroy the society, then members’ sales of animals does. In the two blocks there was 
only one long-lived society (no. 5 above) which had originated before 1980. Copestake (1985) also points to the short lifespans of 
societies in Madurai and Ramnad Districts.
14Society members all must have their animals milked at a common yard by a society "milking person." Malpractices enter the 
picture when the "milker" records, for example, two litres but has actually milked 2.3 litres. It is also common for milk society 
officials to add water to milk which is sold on the private market.
15Virtually all members of this society were compelled to buy buffalos. Buffalos give milk of a higher fat content than cows do, 
which means that beneficiaries should receive a higher price for it. At this society they did not. The society officials could dilute 
the buffalo milk with water and get paid by the Tiruchi District Milk Co-operative for a larger number of litres of "cow’s milk" (or 
mixed cow and buffalo milk) than the local society bought in terms of buffalo milk.
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the first man’s village to see if they would join his society. In both blocks there are "ladies’" milk 
producers’ societies with women as presidents, but the "ladies’" milk societies we visited in 1985 had 
men (generally the presidents’ husbands) in charge.
By 1986 this society’s fortunes had declined as a large number of its beneficiaries had sold their 
animals, and the amount of milk sold to the head milk producers’ co-operative in Tiruchi city had fallen 
drastically. The president had also started to lend money to beneficiaries using society funds, and an 
inquiry was being conducted into the society accounts by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operatives. 
Additionally, despite using all the political influence he could muster, the milk society president was 
unable to get a further round of IRDP milch animal loans, meaning that the future of his society was 
jeopardised. It is strictly against IRDP’s rules to finance beneficiaries a third time with milch animal 
loans, and the block officials’ compliance with this rule is easily checked by senior administrators. The 
president realised this, and in 1986 tried to get 25 milch animal loans without subsidies from SBI (ADB). 
The bank refused, saying that he had allowed too many people to sell their animals without first repaying 
their loans. The president threatened to take action against the bankers through a Tiruchi AIADMK 
Cabinet Minister, but the bankers maintained their refusal, and the president remained unsuccessful.
By contrast to the "ladies’" society described above, in 1986 I went to a ladies’ milk society (not in 
the survey villages) on the recommendation of bank officials and discovered a Scheduled Caste woman 
who was very much in charge of her society, and seemed to be doing her best to help the society members 
by making loan payments promptly, by giving a reasonable price (Rs 2,50) for milk, and even by formally 
complaining to the BDO and bank officials about the AHO’s corruption. Mrs. Valiyammal (pseudonym) 
provides a good example of the resource exchange intermediary in IRDP’s implementation. As I 
mentioned in Chapter Two, however, her complaints of administrative corruption fell on deaf ears, 
(although she had managed to reduce the AHO’s bribe price from Rs 25 to Rs 15). She was not a person 
of political consequence in the block, and it mattered little to the BDO that her members had to pay the 
AHO.
In another society also in Lalgudi (no. 8 above), the members and the president were all of the same 
socio-economic status. For three months before the society was officially operational, the beneficiaries 
took their cows to the society yard to be milked, but payments for this milk were never made to the 
beneficiaries nor were any credits made to the members’ loan accounts at the bank during this period. 
The society accountants claimed that the president had misappropriated these funds, and that he continued 
to misappropriate funds after the society’s official inception. They made this information public, despite 
threats of beatings from the president’s supporters, and with the help of two other local people (one of 
them an employee of the neighbouring block development office), convened a meeting at which it was 
decided that Rs 12,000 had gone astray, and that the president should show accounts for the money or 
have his assets confiscated. At the same meeting, the block development employee and his ally took 
charge of the society (apparently without a proper election).
A few months later, however, the original president was back in charge. The society had become 
factionalised, with a number of people continuing to support the original president There were numerous 
complaints against the new management, and the old president, capitalising on people’s discontent called 
a meeting of the society members at the grounds of the local temple. A vote was held on the presidency, 
and the members decided that the original president should once more take charge of the society. At this 
meeting he said that Rs 1600 had gone to meet officials’ expenses, but I am uncertain how he tried to 
account for the other Rs 10,400. It was obvious, however, that he remained a poor man (he had been
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unable to maintain his own IRDP milch animal and had sold it within a year of purchase) and people were 
willing to forgive him his wrongdoings.
In a further development, when I returned to this village in September 1986,1 discovered that a new 
president was about to take over the operation of the society. The old president, from all accounts, had 
been unable to exert any authority over either his accountants or the beneficiaries, and he could not 
manage the society. This milk society is a Scheduled Caste society (95% of its members are SCs), and 
the village it is in has a population of over 40% SCs, but the new president is from the village’s 
economically dominant caste (Kallar), and is a prominent local member of the ruling AIADMK (village 
secretary of the party). The incoming president said in an interview that when the RWO had originally 
come to the village about setting up a Harijans’ milk society, he (the AIADMK man) had suggested one 
of his supporters, K, to be president. Unfortunately, K’s tenure as president had been disastrous, with the 
members having lost a lot of money.
Although this subsection has been about the milk society president, the discussion of how he 
operates his society (and the examples of "internecine warfare") shows how difficult it is for the 
beneficiary to make a profit at his hands. When the socio-economic differences between beneficiary and 
president are not so great, the beneficiaries have a much better chance of, if not profiting, at least putting 
some pressure on the milk society president to respond to their demands for a better price for their milk or 
for more prompt loan repayments to the bank. Unfortunately, because both bank and block officials have 
the closest relationship with the milk society president, and also have no desire to alienate him, the 
beneficiaries who feel they are being cheated by the president and his accountants can rarely win the 
intervention of these officials in their grievances against the milk society.
IRDP’s resource traders are not the most important political people in the block. The more 
powerful people are much more interested in building or road contracts, and are usually successful in 
getting them. Admittedly, then, IRDP’s resources are not the rich peasants-cwm-contractors’ first 
preference, neither in terms of profitability nor ease with which they can use the resources for greater 
profit. However, the president who wants to receive administratively-controlled resources in the future 
may establish a society partly as a favour to the block officials. It is possible for a milk society president 
to make large short term profits not only through the actual operation of the milk society but with 
"spin-off’ activities as well, such as the bulk purchase and later resale of cattle feed or medicines to 
beneficiaries, making commission arrangements with cattle brokers, or in the resource sharing among 
purchase committee members. Moreover, the milk society president may feel that his prestige and support 
in the village will be enhanced by appearing to be magnanimous in his disbursal of subsidised loans.
Unfortunately, I was unable to document accurately what the milk society presidents’ profits were 
through IRDP-undoubtedly in a number of cases, they were less than anticipated. It would be 
inappropriate, at the least, for a broker to admit that he is primarily interested in his own profits in 
establishing a milk society (see discussion in Chapter Six), and further to itemise them for the researcher. 
Judging from numerous beneficiaries’ accounts, however, it is undeniable that the presidents were able to 
extract beneficiaries’ money to cover the starting up costs of the societies (including payments to 
officials), and that the way they operated the societies led to the enlarging of society coffers (the amount 
depending in part on the size of the society). In the final analysis, there is a correlation between the 
presidents’ concerns with large, short term profits and the imminent collapse of the society. At societies 
(only two in our sample) where the milk officials assigned greater value to the beneficiaries’ interests 
along with longer term (in the short term, reduced) profits for themselves, the societies were longer lived.
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Beneficiary and non-beneficiary members of these societies were more inclined to keep at least one cow 
or try to raise a heifer to adulthood.
The competition for ERDP’s resources is confined largely to within a single village, with occasional 
spillovers into neighbouring villages. IRDP beneficiaries are the main victims of this intra-village 
competition for control of the milk society and cannot hope for the mediation of either block or bank 
officials. The dynamic of IRDP’s impact in the villages gives the milk society officials the best chance to 
profit from ERDP.
5.23. Profile Three: The Milch Animal
The quality of the milch animal ultimately determines whether the beneficiary will be able to 
accrue any added income as a result of the program, (see Tables 5-12 to 5-15) and thus I provide its 
''profile" as well. Other "society" loans (such as for sheep) have not been as popular in the villages as the 
milch animals; for good reason, as the milk society is the only one which can yield such high profits for 
its leaders in so short a time, and consistently (ie., every month).16 However, the economic laws of 
supply and demand have conspired with resource exchange to prevent the beneficiary from profiting.
In the Government of India’s first ERDP Manual there are guidelines regarding the sort of animal 
which will qualify as "IRDP material." The ERDP milch animal should be a cross-bred cow or an 
"upgraded" buffalo. In this way the beneficiary would acquire an animal which, presumably, would have 
a higher milk yield than the local, "country" varieties, and be assured of a good profit. There are a 
number of problems with the guideline that ERDP beneficiaries should purchase "superior" milch animal 
breeds. The first problem is one of supply; most areas, not only of Tamil Nadu but India generally, do 
not have an adequate stock of cross-bred milch animals for anyone, let alone IRDP beneficiaries, to 
purchase (Rath, 1985: 244). Another problem is that the Government of India did not sanction a subsidy 
of more than Rs 833 by the end of the Sixth Plan for the purchase of a milch animal, resulting in a bank 
loan of no more than Rs 2500. With the high demand for milch animals created largely by IRDP, prices 
have skyrocketed, and Rs 2500 is often barely enough money to purchase a substandard animal in milk, 
particularly when purchase committee collusive corruption adds to the animal’s price as well. Yet 
another problem is that cross-bred animals (local varieties which have been bred with foreign breeds, 
such as Friesians or Jerseys) require more care and attention than wholly indigenous animals, and are 
more prone to disease. The poor beneficiaries, with barely adequate food and shelter for their own 
families, could scarcely be expected to lavish all the required care on an "exotic" breed of cow. Local 
breeds, while hardy, are low-yielding in terms of milk production, and hence provide little in the way of 
added income to beneficiaries.
What sort of animal gets the honour of becoming an IRDP cow/buffalo? Generally speaking, it is 
an overvalued one; often old, sometimes sick, and seldom worth the money the beneficiary has paid for it. 
It is also generally a local animal, purchased within fifty kilometres of the beneficiary’s village and 
almost always within the district, despite the guidelines which say that animals should be purchased from
16Thuraiyur Block, with its drier lands which cannot support huge numbers of cattle, does have more IRDP loans for sheep and 
goats than Lalgudi.
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outside the district.17 The animals are often purchased at cattle markets which are renowned for the 
cheating that goes on at them. If the beneficiary is a poor agricultural labourer, the chances are good that 
he will have little or no previous experience with milch animals and hence, will be even more easily 
cheated. Common malpractices by cattle sellers at the markets include not milking an animal for twenty- 
four hours so that on the day of sale it gives a lot of milk, lying about the animal’s age and number of 
pregnancies it has had, and putting a young calf with the animal so that it appears to have just begun its 
lactation period when in fact, it may be reaching the end.18 Moreover, if the purchaser arrives at the 
market with a cattle broker who knows the sellers there, the broker and seller will likely arrange, through 
hand signals for example, to set an exorbitant price for the animal. This is even more likely to happen 
when IRDP beneficiaries are the purchasers because everyone knows they have Rs 2500 to spend. 
Because the AHO who tags the animal’s ear often acts in collusion with cattle sellers and brokers he turns 
a blind eye to their malpractices, thus encouraging them to cheat the beneficiary.
Not only were beneficiaries cheated by cattle brokers and purchase committees, their milk society 
presidents would occasionally insist that they go to certain cattle markets or use particular cattle brokers. 
Undoubtedly, the presidents’ insistence arose out of their having made arrangements for commissions to 
be paid to them. On other occasions the Animal Husbandry Officer and bank’s Agricultural Officer have 
insisted that the beneficiaries purchase their cattle through one broker, indicating that they also had made 
special arrangements with certain brokers in advance. It is also common practice for brokers to purchase 
dry 3RDP animals from beneficiaries for Rs 600 or even less, keep the animals until they have calved, and 
then sell them to the next beneficiary for Rs 2500 to Rs 3000, even though they may be worth decidedly 
less than that.
In cases where beneficiaries had sold their animals, the price they received was often far less than 
the loan amount of Rs 2500. In one village in Thuraiyur, for example, my research assistant interviewed 
55 beneficiaries who had received a total of 105 animal loans from 1983 to 1985. Of these 105 animals, 
32 had been sold and 3 had died. Of the 32 that were sold, only five had been sold for Rs 2000 or more 
(representing a good profit for these beneficiaries), and there were nine that had been sold for less than Rs 
500 each (see Table 5-10). In another village of Thuraiyur, 41 of 81 animals had been sold, of which 24 
had been sold for between Rs 500 and Rs 1000, significantly less than the Rs 1767 of the loan (Rs 2500) 
minus the one-third subsidy amount (Rs 833) (and not taking interest payments into account). In Lalgudi 
we visited a number of villages in which beneficiaries had received loans only in 1984 and 1985. As a 
result few animals had been sold in 1985, as can be seen in Table 5-10. When we revisited these villages 
in 1986, however, most of the animals had been sold (according to bankers and villagers; I did not have a 
chance to do any systematic resurveying of beneficiaries). There is also a likely understatement in animal 
selling because most beneficiaries know they are not, in fact, allowed to sell the first animal if they are to 
get a second one.
The low selling prices indicate three possibilities: first, the beneficiaries have received low quality 
animals, and second, the beneficiaries are likely selling the animal during its dry period when they are 
unable to maintain it. A dry animal is worth the least amount of money, no more than Rs 500 to 600 
according to a Lalgudi bank vet. The third possibility is that adverse weather conditions have led
17This guideline strikes me as reflecting a belief in "the cow grows greener on the other side." Undoubtedly, some districts will 
have a larger stock of better quality animals, but it is unreasonable to expect a genuinely poor beneficiary to go searching hundreds 
of kilometres, entailing heavy expenditures, for a cow/buffalo which may (or may not) give more milk than one he can find within 
20 kilometres of his village.
18These malpractices do not stop at cattle, but extend to sheep and goats as well.
107
Table 5-10: Sales of IRDP Milch Animals at Five Villages
B L O C K  & 
V IL L A G E
M . A N IM A L  
L O A N S
S A L E S
N o.
S O LD  
<R s 500
Rs 500 
to 999
Rs 1000 
to  1499
Rs 1500 
to  1999
> R s  2 00 0 A N IM A L
D E A T H S *
La i. AI. 102 19 3 7 5 2 2 4
L a i. M a. 122 15 8 6 0 1 0 7
T h u . Re. 81 41 6 24 7 2 2 3
T h u . So 94 39 11 17 4 3 4 5
T h u . V e . 105 3 2 9 10 5 3 5 3
TO TALS 504 146 37  (25) 64 (44) 21 (14) 11 (8) 13 (9) 22
Source: Data derived from AL beneficiary surveys. Numbers 
in parentheses are percentages o f total number of cattle sold.
* Beneficiary reported that animal had died.
beneficiaries to make distress sales of their animals. This is an important difference between the wet 
block and the dry. The instances of distress sales in Thuraiyur were higher than in Lalgudi with 
beneficiaries in the former citing "drought conditions" and the consequent drying up of potential grazing 
land where they would normally be able to send their animals, as a major reason for the early sale of their 
cattle. A large number of sales at once would obviously depress the price a beneficiary can get for his 
animal.
Occasionally an IRDP milch animal is not, in fact, a purchased one. A potential beneficiary is 
sometimes able to present his own or a neighbour’s animal to the purchasing committee as the animal to 
be bought, in which case s/he gets the subsidised loan and uses it for a purpose other than the purchase of 
a milch animal. In one village we visited, 12 of 42 beneficiaries we interviewed admitted they had 
purposely bought animals worth only Rs 1000 to Rs 1200 because they wanted to have immediate cash. 
Another feature of the ERDP animal is that it is likely "recycled," meaning that when a beneficiary sells an 
animal, it is likely to be eventually purchased by another IRDP beneficiary. In some villages in northern 
Uttar Pradesh, however, the villagers recycled to their advantage. They knew that neither the bankers nor 
officials in their area would check the assets too closely, and the same animal was tied up at a number of 
people’s houses so that they could all take advantage of the subsidised loans without actually having to 
purchase a buffalo {Times of India, Ahmedabad, 13/8/87: 7). Apparently, to make it tougher for the 
beneficiaries to "recycle" the buffalos, it is now required that they get the signatures of six village, bank, 
and block officials. The outcome is that the beneficiaries must spend more of the subsidy amount in 
getting these signatures.
5.2.4. Profile Four: The IRD P Beneficiary
The IRDP beneficiary’s interests are the least protected among the actors involved in ERDP.19 The 
one program resource s/he is entitled to, the subsidy, is eroded by the more powerful people who control 
access to the beneficiary’s subsidy and acquisition of the asset. Resource exchange in IRDP’s 
implementation occurs on a number of planes, and much of it, unfortunately, is corrupt thereby hurting 
the beneficiary’s interests. The beneficiary must give money to his/her milk society president, to 
officials, and to cattle brokers to secure the subsidy and animal. Furthermore, the poor beneficiary’s
19The evidence of this section in particular is based largely on information gathered from questionnaires. W e surveyed over 900 
beneficiaries, chosen at random from the block offices’ IRDP subsidy registers, in 20 villages of Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks (527 
in Lalgudi and 380 in Thuraiyur). I tried to ensure that a proportionate number of Scheduled Caste beneficiaries was chosen for 
interviews.
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exploitation does not stop with the receipt of the milch animal, but continues in the milk society as well. 
In this profile of the beneficiary I examine the number of beneficiaries below the poverty line, how they 
become beneficiaries, their gains and losses by virtue of taking an IRDP milch animal loan, and their own 
views of their benefits from having taken a subsidised loan.
In terms of the beneficiaries’ acquisition of assets, there are two main points to be noted: First, 
virtually all the beneficiaries had to pay bribes, whether directly or indirectly, to receive their loan- 
subsidy. Second, beneficiaries had high overhead costs in finding and purchasing the assets which further 
ate into their subsidies and often necessitated borrowing from private sources. Asset acquisition costs 
varied but, not including money spent above the loan amount for the asset, averaged at around Rs 300. 
Many people also spent their own or privately borrowed funds (upto Rs 250 was commonly cited) above 
the loan amount to purchase what they hoped would be a good quality animal. Table 5-12 shows that 
there is little difference between Agricultural Labourers and Small Farmers in their acquisition of assets. 
SFs are also affected by the same purchase committee corruption which affects the average AL 
beneficiary. Both ALs and SFs, then, pay an average of Rs 500 to acquire a single animal. Rs 500 
represents 60% of a subsidy of Rs 833, and often necessitates borrowing on the private market, as the 
subsidies are not paid to the beneficiary in cash, but rather are credited to their loan accounts (sometimes 
later than the beginning date of the loan, resulting in the beneficiary having to pay more interest than 
necessary on the loan.)
The manner of ERDP asset acquisition highlights the complexity of "credit relations" in the rural 
areas, as people often borrowed the extra money (mortgaging jewels or household "vessels")needed to 
finance their initial IRDP costs from richer relations, from private milk vendors,20 from employers, and 
pawn-brokers to name a few.21 Their borrowings from private sources also mean that they have an 
additional loan to repay at a much higher interest rate than the bank loan. Unfortunately, I have little 
systematic data on private borrowings for IRDP and their effect on beneficiaries. I would guess, 
however, that where the beneficiary has a private loan, s/he would try to pay it back faster than the lower 
interest rate bank loan. IRDP’s implementation through loan brokers and bribery, then, has led to high 
acquisition costs and a need for borrowing on the private market not at all envisioned by program 
designers.
The genuinely poor milch animal beneficiaries are frequently exploited by the president and/or 
accountants of their milk society, and the poorer the beneficiaries, the more likely they are to be 
victimised, especially if they are Scheduled Caste. Many beneficiaries were worse off for having taken 
the loans (see Tables 5-12 to 5-15, MIDS, 1980 and Copestake, 1985). As a general rule, the poorer the 
beneficiary, the less chance s/he would have to make a profit, or even break even, from an IRDP milch 
animal loan because of his/her inability to maintain the animal through long dry periods between its 
lactations. Additionally, few beneficiaries have the requisite knowledge about the care and feeding of 
their animals which contributes to an animal’s poor health, poor milk yields and delayed pregnancies, and 
consequently results in poor returns for the beneficiary.
The majority of milch animal beneficiaries are, as required by the program rules, "below the
20 About half of the IRDP beneficiaries we spoke with who had had loans through vendors said that despite getting very low milk 
prices from them (as low as Rs 2), they would not want to join a milk society instead. The reason for this is that the private vendor 
is also a valuable moneylender for villagers who, importantly, does not need collateral and accepts loan repayments in milk.
211 inspected the loan records of a pawn-broking family in Thuraiyur town and discovered that the amounts they lent varied from 
as little as Rs 40 to as high as Rs 3500, all at an interest rate of 36% per annum.
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poverty line,” but a significant minority are not "below the poverty line" either in relative or absolute 
terms. This number varied considerably from village to village which had received a large number of 
loans (Table 5-11), and depended on the political and socio-economic interests of the loan brokers. There 
were also cases where a richer person was in de facto control of the poorer person’s asset. Most of the 
beneficiaries we interviewed in the villages of Lalgudi and Thuraiyur are agricultural labourers, many of 
whom are landless or near landless (the incidence of landlessness is higher in Lalgudi than in Thuraiyur). 
Most are semi-literate or illiterate, with few labourers having schooling beyond the fifth standard. 
Because we went to villages at which there were women’s milk producers’ societies, a significant number 
of our IRDP respondents were women (whose level of education was much lower than the men’s-many 
female respondents had not attended school beyond the second standard, even though the survey villages 
have schools upto the fifth standard). Education is an important resource the beneficiaries lack.22 As a 
result, they are more easily cheated by the milk society officials who know they are unlikely to go to the 
bank to check their accounts if they suspect there are discrepancies between the amount of milk sold and 
the money credited to their accounts.23 This is exacerbated by either the banks’ (not all banks) failure to 
issue loan passbooks, or the demand by milk officials that they keep the books until the loans are paid off. 
Because the beneficiaries often rely on a single source, the milk society president, for their information 
about the program they do not know precisely about the subsidy they are entitled to, and the amounts they 
need to pay for such things as animal insurance. (I came across instances where information given to 
beneficiaries about the program seemed purposely inaccurate in order to convince them to take loans-ie., 
they had been told by their president that they all would get 50% subsidies and three milch animals).
Table 5-11: IRDP Beneficiaries Above the Poverty Line: 
Lalgudi and Thuraiyur
LAL G U D I
V IL L A G E S
B E N E F IC IA R IE S
IN T E R V IE W E D
A B O V E  P O V .  LINE T H U R A IY U R
V IL L A G E S
B E N E F E C I A R I E S
IN T E R V IE W E D
A B O V E  P O V .  LINE
N o . % N o . %
M a n g u d i 104* 2 0 1 9 S e l l ip a la y a m 8 5 2 7 3 2
A g a l a n g . 8 6 11 1 3 K unnupatti 8 0 3 3 41
A la n g u d i 81 1 7 21 V e n k a t e s h 5 5 7 1 3
M a n g a m . 68** 31 4 6 R e n g a n a t h 5 2 9 1 7
K ee la n b i l 59** 9 15 S o r a th u r 4 8 8 1 7
N a th a m 5 6 1 0 18 N a r a s in g 4 2 9 21
K o p p a v a l i 4 2 11 2 6 N a g a l a p 9 7 8 9
E d a y a t h a . 1 6 8 5 0 M uthiyum 7 3 4 3
P u d u r  Uth. 7 5 71 Kollapatti 2 1 5 0
M a n a k k a l 5 4 8 0
N erunjila . 3 3 1 0 0
TOTALS 5 2 7 129 24 3 8 0 104 2 7
* Includes 12 beneficiaries from a neighbouring village not in 
the survey group.
** Includes four beneficiaries from a neighbouring village.
Table based on information given by beneficiaries themselves, 
with allowances made for discrepancies between what they told us 
and what seemed to be true.
^The rural literacy rate in Tiruchi District is 38%, and for the total Scheduled Caste population (urban and rural literacy rates not 
given separately for SCs, but 87% live in rural areas) in Tiruchi it is 31%. From Census of India, 1981. (Series 20) Tamil Nadu. 
Part II-B, Primary Census Abstract: 8, 13 and 14 facing page.
^Few  beneficiaries realised that they could check on the status of their accounts at the concerned bank. Admittedly, however, if 
the poor agricultural labourer discovers at the bank that s/he is being cheated by the milk society president who is also his/her 
employer, s/he is unlikely to take any action.
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It was impossible to say precisely whether people were below the poverty line or not Villagers 
give evasive answers about the extent of their land, making it notoriously difficult to gain the correct 
information without an extended stay in a village.24 It is possible, however, to make an estimate of 
people’s economic status, despite their efforts at obfuscation. At times, people owning large grain storage 
urns would tell us they were landless labourers. Or, someone living in a spacious, comfortable house 
would claim that he only had an acre to his name, and no other sources of income. Moreover, villagers 
are often willing to gossip about other people’s landholdings, thus offering correctives to tales of 
landlessness. The Village Administrative Officers (grassroots revenue officials)25 were not very helpful 
in clearing up the mystery surrounding landholdings, as their records are in individuals’ names, rather 
than by households, and it is often difficult to tell what the total holdings under the control of a single 
household are (especially as some people have land in more than one revenue village). One respondent, 
for example, said he has over fifty acres of land, although the VAO’s records only showed thirty-five.
There were some differences between Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks in how the villager became an 
IRDP beneficiary, although I do not believe these differences are related to Lalgudi being "wet" and 
Thuraiyur "dry" (see "wet-dry" discussion in Introduction). When interviewing ERDP beneficiaries, we 
asked them how they found out about the program. In Lalgudi Block beneficiaries seldom mentioned the 
RWO as a source of information about the program. Instead, they usually mentioned their milk society 
president or the bank Agricultural Officer. In one Lalgudi village, only 5 of 86 IRDP respondents 
mentioned the RWO or other government official as an information source. In two other Lalgudi 
villages, the proportion was higher—26 of 59 and 25 of 68. In a Thuraiyur village 23 of 55 respondents 
mentioned the RWO as the original source of program information, but 54 of 55 mention giving bribes to 
him.
The general sequence of events which leads to people joining an ERDP milk society in Lalgudi is 
that the president calls a meeting in the village (sometimes with the participation of bank officials), 
having first told his supporters and/or relatives about IRDP, explains about the program, solicits names 
(sometimes the president imposes a fee to have a name included in the original list),26 chooses from 
among them. The president then has the requisite IRDP forms filled out (for each of which Rs 5 would 
have to be paid to the RWO; the forms were only Rs 2 in 1985-86 if bought, illegally, from private 
printing presses), and pay the -necessary bribes to the development officials en bloc. The IRDP 
beneficiary in Lalgudi, then, would have virtually no contact with the development administration. Many 
IRDP respondents in Lalgudi said the RWO only ever visited the milk society president’s house.
The beneficiaries in some of Lalgudi’s villages mentioned large sums of money, from Rs 100 to Rs 
200, that they had paid to milk society presidents (this amount included a few legitimate expenses such as
^Evasive answers are given (and not just to foreign researchers) regarding landholdings for a number of good reasons: one is to 
avoid payment of any existing land taxes, another is to evade land ceiling legislation, and yet another is to take advantage of 
benefits, such as preferential interest rates at village co-operative credit societies and free supply of electricity for irrigation pumps, 
that are available only for "small" farmers. Families with larger holdings commonly divide their land, at least on paper, among 
family members so that they may take advantage of the concessions available in the state to small fanners.
25This post is a recent creation in Tamil Nadu. Prior to 1982, each revenue village had a karnam and munsiff. Both posts were 
traditionally inherited by local people, although in the years before the VAO post was created, the Tamil Nadu government 
appointed karnams on a parttime basis. The karnam was, and now the VAO is, in charge of maintaining all the village land records 
and registers which, according to one source may number upto twenty-four, including registers of land and water-use statistics (S. 
Subramaniam, ca. 1981: 25). Traditionally, and prior to the onset of the village panchayats, the munsiff was the village headman 
who then became more of a village policeman (arbitrating miner disputes). Importantly, the munsiff also helped with land tax 
collection.
^See Copestake (1987) who also notes that some people paid an initial fee to the milk society presidents but then did not get a 
loan, nor a refund.
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Rs 10,50 for the initial co-operative society membership fee), and in one village caste fellows of the milk 
society president paid him Rs 180, while the Scheduled Caste beneficiaries had to pay Rs 280. (In a 
further instance of Scheduled Caste beneficiary exploitation at another ERDP milk society, the SC 
members’ cows were always milked last, and if the milk collection van from Tiruchi arrived before the 
"SC animals" had been milked, these animals were not milked, and their owners would be denied much 
needed income.) Another president was apologetic about collecting a large fee from each beneficiary but 
claimed it was necessary to pay to officials (we could not verify this). In yet another village the 
beneficiaries paid Rs 100 to the milk society president, excepting those from one hamlet who paid a more 
reasonable Rs 41. This hamlet is the home of two educated Scheduled Caste youth who calculated that 
Rs 41 was an appropriate amount to pay, and then insisted that no one in the hamlet pay more than that to 
the milk society president. In most instances the Lalgudi beneficiaries did not know why their milk 
society presidents required so much money. Some respondents said they were told the money needed to 
be collected for the animals’ insurance, but the total stated to have been given for insurance was generally 
too high, and it is likely that some of the money was misappropriated by the presidents or their 
accountants. At one village people said they had each given the president Rs 200 for the second animal’s 
insurance; the actual amount should have been no more than a maximum of Rs 94P
Thuraiyur presented us with quite a different picture from Lalgudi in terms of RWO involvement in 
ERDP’s implementation. The Rural Welfare Officers in Thuraiyur were more directly involved in IRDP, 
although the primary reason for this was the need for them to collect bribes personally. The private milk 
vendors who played a large role in IRDP’s implementation in the first three years of the program in 
Thuraiyur Block did collect some bribes for the RWOs, but in general the beneficiaries paid money 
directly to the RWOs, and told us they had; these amounts varied, but averaged at about Rs 50. In most 
cases, the beneficiaries told us the justification the RWO offered for the bribe was that they needed to buy 
the vikas pairika which, from the beneficiary’s point of view is completely unnecessary. In one Thuraiyur 
village only 16 of 48 beneficiaries mention bribes, but all the beneficiaries mention the same amount of 
money they paid as an "advance" either to a milk society president (Rs 135) or a private vendor (Rs 200); 
some people, then, identified this as bribe-giving while others did not In another Thuraiyur village, 35 of 
42 people said they bribed officials, while in yet another village 76 of 80 beneficiaries (with loans for 
milch animals, sheep, plough bullocks, and carts) said they had to pay bribes to the RWO, AHO, and 
VAO.28
As mentioned, the AHOs in both blocks demanded Rs 25 to 50 from the beneficiaries for the 
requisite ear tags. There was little the beneficiaries could do to refuse an Animal Husbandry Officer’s 
demand for money as no animal purchase could be completed without his affixing the numbered tag to 
the animal’s ear. If they refused to pay the bribe they would not get their animals, and forego expenses 
already incurred, such as for travel and brokerage. At one milk society in Lalgudi the beneficiaries 
generally indicated they had paid Rs 25 for tagging their second animal’s ear, but not for the first. The 
reason for this was that the first animal purchases had been made with the help of the lending bank’s
^According to the latest IRDP guidelines (issued January 1986) on insurance, the animals should be insured at a cost of 2.25% of 
their value per annum. After subtracting the insurance subsidies which the beneficiaries are eligible for, the insurance premium 
should be 1% to 1.25% of the value of the animal, meaning that if the beneficiaries have a three-year policy for a Rs 2500 milch 
animal, they would have to pay Rs 75 to Rs 94 to cover the costs of the three-year package.
^If an IRDP beneficiary has any land, he must get certificates from the Village Administrative Officer. Most VAOs will charge a 
fee (often Rs 25 to 50) for any certificate they issue, although the issuees are entitled to the certificates at no cost. Beneficiaries are 
also supposed to produce "no dues certificates" from the village co-operative credit society they belong to. In Lalgudi block, milch 
animal beneficiaries seldom mentioned having to collect the various certificates, and I assume this work was done by the milk 
society presidents.
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veterinary, rather than the block development office’s AHO.29 The block development officials had 
apparently been adamant that their extension officer take over from the bank vet for the second round of 
animal purchases, and the reason why is clear--the collection of bribes. (At Rs 25 per animal, this may 
not seem like a lot of money, but if there are 600 or 700 animal purchases in the year—including plough 
bullocks and sheep-the AHO will earn an extra Rs 15,000 to Rs 17,500, which doubles his salary, 
although part of it would be shared with the BDO, or help to finance some of the block’s opening 
functions.)
In each village there were a few instances where the beneficiary named in the block’s subsidy 
register had never taken possession of the animal, with it going instead to someone ineligible to benefit 
under IRDP. The beneficiary might get some money out of this agreement, but is at risk because the loan 
is in his name. In other instances, however, beneficiaries "transferred" (sometimes privately mortgaged) 
animals during the loan repayment period because they could no longer afford to take care of them. 
Sometimes the beneficiary sent the animal to a richer relative or employer, but I am not sure as to what 
money would be involved in these transactions. I know of some examples in Lalgudi where the richer, 
caste people, returned (at the behest of the lending bank’s Agricultural Officer) the animals they had 
misappropriated from their Scheduled Caste labourers, but then demanded money from them for the 
cows’ maintenance even though they (the caste people) had received payment for the milk sales.30
The raison d’etre of IRDP is to give its beneficiaries a substantial additional income through the 
ownership of productive assets, and I tried to get an accurate impression as to whether IRDP beneficiaries 
were actually benefiting from the program, and whether they thought they were benefiting from having a 
milch animal or two. From loan payment schedules of the beneficiaries, the price at which their milk was 
bought, and the cost of feed for their animals, I calculated that most poor beneficiaries lost money while 
they were paying back their loans, and it was especially difficult for agricultural labourers to recoup their 
losses through continued milk sales over a number of lactations, especially with extended dry periods 
between lactations (Tables 5-13 to 5-15). As one female respondent put it, "The only income I get is 
from the cow’s dung.” (This would not add up to more than about Rs 100 for a year.) Others said, 
"Income?!? How can I tell you if I have any income? The milk society hasn’t shown us any accounts for 
months." In other instances people said the program was a good one, but that they could not make a 
profit because of the mismanagement and wrongdoings by the milk society officials.
Overall, however, people did think they had benefited by virtue of having received one or two 
milch animals, but not in the same terms as the program designers thought people should benefit which 
entails keeping the animals for at least three years each (Table 5-18). The vast majority of beneficiaries 
we interviewed felt they would gain by acquiring an asset (after their loans were paid off),31 not an asset 
they would keep to augment their income and assets further through "entrepreneurial activities," but 
rather one they could easily sell. In an economy where "cash in hand" is one of the scarcest
29Some beneficiaries complained that this particular vet had refused to tag certain animals. When I discussed his role on purchase 
committees with him, he said that he had been very strict about only tagging animals that were really worth Rs 2500, and he refused 
to tag some of the animals chosen for purchase by the beneficiaries, thereby forcing them to find other animals.
noticed that in different villages there were different relations between caste and Scheduled Caste people. The worst case was 
in a Lalgudi village not in the survey group—although I did visit it—where in September 1986, the Udayar landholders set fire to and 
destroyed the Scheduled Caste hutment (with one fatality) because the labourers had been so presumptuous as to ask for the 
statutory daily wage. The landowners also set fire to their Panchayat President’s house, a man of the same caste as themselves, 
because he had agreed to pay the Scheduled Caste labourers the statutory wage.
31 As long as the beneficiary owns his milch animal, as long as it continues to give milk, and as long as the milk society is 
operational, s/he has no choice in the matter of loan default, as the village milk society pays money directly to the bank. Therefore, 
when asked about IRDP milch animal loan repayment, bankers told me it was "good."
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commodities,32 having a saleable asset is extremely important, especially at times of extra need-such as a 
wedding, funeral, sickness, drought, and lean employment season. Unfortunately, however, the milch 
animal is as weather-dependent as rural people’s economic lives generally, ie., if dry conditions prevail in 
the area, agricultural labourers will have fewer days of labour, there will be less fodder for their animals, 
and they will no longer be able to maintain them (this was especially common in Thuraiyur). While some 
people thought they had been cheated in the purchase of their animals, they still believed that a poor 
quality saleable asset was better than no asset at all.
32Although this is a rough estimate, very few rural households would have even Rs 100 on hand at any given time, except after 
harvest.
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Table 5-12: ALs and SFs: IRDP Income I Expenditure Variables
(ALs N = 106) (SFs N = 29)
ASSET ACQUISITION
OVERHEADS ALs SFs
/ANIMAL no. % no. %
< Rs 150 12 11 4 14
150 -249 18 17 7 24
250 - 349 63 59 16 55
>350 13 12 2 7
TOTALS 106 99 29 100
AMOUNT PAID
/ANIMAL
(+/- loan amount)
> Rs 250 < loan 0 0 2 7
upto 250 < loan 16 16 3 10
upto 250 > loan 47 47 11 38
250 - 500 > loan 25 25 9 31
> 500 > loan 12 12 4 14
TOTALS 99* 100 29 100
SALES
ANIMAL 
SOLD (Rs)
< 500 16 24 0 0
500 - 1000 27 40 3 18
1001 - 1500 14 21 4 24
1501 - 1999 6 9 8 47
> 2000 4 6 2 12
TOTALS 67 100 17 101!
MILK VARIABLES’
LOAN 
REPAYMENT
50%**
66%
TOTALS
ALs
no. %
26 25 
80 75
106 100
SFs
no. %
0 0 
29 100
29 100
MILK SOLD 
/DAY***
<  3 litres
3 -  3.9
4 -  4.9 
>5
TOTALS
11 11 
69 67 
20 19 
3 3
103 100
2 7 
6 21
18 62
3 10
29 100
LACTATION
6 - 7 mos.
7 .5 -  8.5
8 .5 -  10#
TOTALS
15 14
77 73 
14 13
106 100
3 10
21 72 
5 17
29 100
PRICEV 
LITRE (Rs)
2.20 - 2.35 
2.36 - 2.50
TOTALS
74 70 
32 30
106 100
23 79
6 21
29 100
APPROX.
FEED COSTS/DAY
Table Notes:* Where less than 106, except under 'sales’ , did not 
have clear answer from beneficiaries. The 106 ALs had received 183 
cows and buffalos, while the 29 SFs had 52 animals. The data 
provided here refer to the firs t animals purchased (and sold). 
**Percentage o f monthly milk income. .'Rounding leads to total o f 101. 
* * *  This tends to be somewhat less than milk produced!day as 
families may keep some milk fo r  consumption.
# A longer lactation may not bring in much extra income; cows 
produce little milk toward the end o f lactation.
lactation
dry
3.50
1.00
4.00
.50
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Table 5-13: Agricultural Labourers' Ownership o f IRDP Cattle:
Options and Profits33
A L .A  S O U R C E S  O F IN C O M E
1. M ilk  (Rs 2.25,3 Is, 244 days) R s 1 6 4 7
2. S a le  o f C a lf 1 8 0
3. S a le  o f D u n g 1 2 0
4 .0  N o  s a le  o f c o w
4.1 S a le  o f c o w  @  6 0 0 6 0 0
4 .2  S a le  o f c o w  @  1 5 0 0 1 5 0 0
T O T A L  (4 .0 ) 1 9 4 7
T O T A L  (4 .1 ) 2 5 4 7
T O T A L  (4 .2 ) 3 4 4 7
D E B IT S
1. 2 /3  L o a n  re p a y m e n ts  (+ 10%  int.) * 1 1 5 3
2. F e e d  c o s ts  (Rs. 3.5, 244 days) 8 5 4
3 . F e e d  c o s ts  (Re. 1 ,121  days) 121
4. A s s e t a c q u is it io n  c o s ts 3 0 0
5. A m o u n t p a id  a b o v e  lo a n ** 2 0 0
6 . M ilk in g  fe e  (Rs 14/m on.) 1 1 2
7. In s u ra n c e  P re m iu m  (1%, 3 yrs) 7 5
8. B u ll o r  A .I .C h a rg e 10
T O T A L  D E B IT S 2 8 2 5
T O T A L  IN C O M E  F R O M  O N E  C O W
1. W ith o u t sa le  o f cow Rs 878
2. W ith  sa le  of cow  @  600 278
3. W ith  sa le  o f c o w  @  1500 + 5 3 7 #
A L .B  S O U R C E S  O F IN C O M E
1. M ilk  (Rs 2.5,3 Is, 244days) R s . 1 83 0
2. C a lf 180
3 . D u n g 120
4 .0 N o  s a le  o f c o w _
4.1 S a le  o f c o w  @  6 0 0 6 0 0
4 .2 S a le  o f c o w  @  1 5 0 0 1 50 0
T O T A L  (4 .0 ) 2 1 3 0
T O T A L  (4 .1 ) 2 7 3 0
T O T A L  (4 .2 ) 3 6 3 0
D E B ITS
1. 1 /2  L o a n  re p a y m e n ts 9 9 2
2. F e e d  c o s ts  (Rs. 3.5, 244days) 8 5 4
3 . F e e d  c o s ts  (Re. 1,121 days) 121
4 . A s s e t a c q u is it io n  c o s ts 3 0 0
5. A m o u n t p a id  a b o v e  loa n 2 0 0
6. M ilk in g  fe e  (Rs. 12/m on.) 96
7. In s u ra n c e  P re m iu m  (1%, 3 yrs) 75
8. B u ll o r  A .I. C h a rg e 10
T O T A L  D E B IT S 2 6 4 8
T O T A L  IN C O M E  FR O M  O N E C O W
1. W ith o u t s a le  of cow - Rs 518
2. W ith  sale  of cow  @  600 + 82
3. W ith  sale  of cow  @  1500 + 897 #
i  able Notes: *Loan repayments fo r ALA  are Rs 135/month, 
and A L3 , Rs 114 (interest "holiday," months 9-12).
** Beneficiary has paid Rs 2700fo r animal rather than Rs 2500. 
ft This amount takes into account feed costs (Rs 85) o f keeping 
animal until advanced pregnancy.
Remaining bank debt (plus interest) fo r A LA  is Rs 704 and fo r  
ALJ3 it is Rs 910.
33Tables 5-13, 14 and 16 provide a more detailed breakdown of expenditures and incomes than most beneficiaries provided us. 
By going over a large number of surveys, it became clear that beneficiaries regularly omitted, for example, incomes derived from 
sale of calves and dung. Thanks to James Copestake for advice in constructing these tables.
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Table 5-14: Agricu ltura l Labourers' Ownership o f IRDP Cattle:
The Second Year
AL.A  S O U R C ES OF IN C O M E
1. F irs t a n im a l’s m ilk  Rs. 1647
2. S e co n d  a n im a l’s m ilk 1647
3. S a le  o f C a lve s 36 0
4. S a le  o f D ung 240
5.0 S a le  o f C o w  1@  600 600
5.1 S a le  o f C o w  1 @  1500 1500
TO T A L (5 .0 ) 4 4 9 4
TO T A L (5 .1 ) 5 3 9 4
D EB ITS
1. A n im a l 1 loan  (+ 10% int.) 704
2. A n im a l 2 loan 1153
3. Feed  co s ts  (Rs. 7, 244 days) 1708
4. Feed  co s ts  (Rs. 2, 121 days) 242
5. A sse t a cq u is itio n  co s ts 300
6. A m o u n t p a id  a b o ve  loan 200
7. M ilk in g  fe e  (Rs. 28/mon.) 224
8. In su ra n ce  P re m iu m  (1%, 3 yrs.) 75
9. B u ll o r A .I. C h a rg e s 20
T O T A L D E B IT S 4 6 2 6
TO TA L IN C O M E  FRO M  TW O  CO W S
1. W ith Sale of cow  1 @  600 Rs 132
2. W ith Sale of cow  1 @  1500 + 68 3
AL.B SO U R C ES OF IN C O M E
1. F irs t a n im a l's  m ilk  r s . 1830
2. S e co n d  a n im a l's  m ilk 1830
3. S a le  o f ca lve s 36 0
4. S a le  o f dung 240
5.0 S a le  o f C ow  1 @  600 600
5.1 S a le  o f C ow  1 @  1500 1500
T O TA L (5 .0 ) 4 8 6 0
TO T A L (5 .1 ) 5 7 6 0
DEBITS
1. A n im a l 1 loan 9 1 0
2. A n im a l 2 loan 99 2
3. Feed  co s ts  (Rs. 7, 244 days) 1708
4. Feed  co s ts  (Rs. 2 ,12 1  days) 2 42
5. A sse t a cq u is itio n  co s ts 3 0 0
6. A m o u n t p a id  a b o ve  loan 200
7. M ilk ing  fee  (Rs. 24/mon.) 192
8. In su ra n ce  P re m iu m  (1%, 3yrs.) 75
9. Bull o r  A .I. C h a rg e s 20
T O T A L  D E B IT S 4 6 3 9
TO TA L IN C O M E FRO M  TW O  CO W S
1. W ith sale of cow  1 @  600 + Rs 221
2. W ith sale of cow  1 <a> 1500 + 1036
Table Notes: Remaining debt fo r  A L A  is now Rs 704 and 
3 ’s is  Rs 910. See Table 5-15 fo r  possible Third Year incomes.
By end of Animal 1 loan repayment AL.A has paid Rs 190 interest 
and AL.B, Rs 235.
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Table 5-15: ALs’ Three Year Options and Incomes
ALA  YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3* YEAR 3.1 **
(1 COW) (2 COWS)
A. No sale - 878 - 732 + 146 + 996
B. Rs 600 sale - 278 - 132 + 746 + 1596
C. Rs 1500 sale +537 +683 + 1561 + 2411
AL.A's income possibilities:
1B + 1B = - 556 (Sales of animals at end of first
1B + 1C = + 259 lactations. Remaining debt= Rs 1408)
__________1C + 1C = + 1074__________________________________
1A + 2A + 3.1A= - 614 (Follows program rules. No sales 
3 . 1 B = -  14 until Year 3. No bank debts.)
3.1C = +801
1A + 2B + 3 A = -  864 (Keeps Animal 2 at end of Year 3.)
1A + 2C + 3A = - 49______________________________
1A + 2B + 3 B = -  264 (Sells AnimaM at end of Year 2, 
1A + 2C + 3B = + 551 Animal 2 at end of Year 3.)
1A + 2C + 3C = + 1366 (No remaining bank debts.)
AL.B YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 3.1
(1 COW) (2 COWS)
A. No sale - 518 - 379 + 139 + 1188
B. Rs 600 sale + 82 + 221 + 739 + 1788
C. Rs 1500 sale + 897 + 1036 + 1554 +2603
AL.B's income possibilities:
1B + 1B = + 164 (Sales of animals at end of first
1B + 1C= + 979 lactations. Remaining debt = Rs 1820)
1C + 1C = + 1794
1A + 2A + 3.1 A = + 291 (Follows program rules. No sales until 
1A + 2A + 3.1B= + 890 Year 3. No bank debts.)
1A + 2A + 3.1C = + 1706
1A + 2B + 3A = - 158 (Keeps Animal I f  at end of Year 3)
+it<+ÜCM+< 657
1A + 2B + 3B = + 442 (No remaining bank debts.)
1A + 2B + 3C = + 1257 (Sells Animal 1 at end of Year 2,
1A + 2C + 3C = + 2072 Animal 2 at end of Year 3.
*Year 3 (B + C) represents the most preferred option o f keeping 
both Animal 1 and 2 through two lactations only.
**Year 3.1 represents a beneficiary’s income i f  s/he were to 
fo llo w  program guidelines and not sell either animal until the 
end o f Year 3.
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Table 5-16: Small Farmers' Ownership o fIR D P  Cattle: 
Options and Profits
S O U R C ES OF IN C O M E SO U R C ES OF IN C O M E
1. M ilk  (R s 2.25, 4 Is, 244 days) R s . 2196 1. First an im al's m ilk Rs. 2196
2. Sale of Calf 180 2. Second anim al's m ilk 2196
3. Sale of Dung 120 3. Sale of Calves 360
4.0 No sale of cow — 4. Sale of Dung 240
4.1 Sale of cow  @  1700 1700 5. Sale of Cow 1 1700
T O T A L  (4 .0 ) 2 4 9 6 TO T A L 6 6 9 2
T O T A L  (4 .1 ) 4 1 9 6
D EB ITS DEBITS
1. Anim al 1 loan 319
1. 2/3 Loan repaym ents! (+ 10% int) 1517 2. Anim al 2 loan 1517
2. Feed costs (R s  4 , 2 4 4  d a y s )* 976 3. Feed COStS (R s 7, 244 days) 1952
3 .  Feed costs (R e . .5, 121 d a y s )** 61 4 .  Feed costs (R e . 1, 121 days) 121
4. Asset acqu is ition  costs 300 5. Asset acquisition costs 300
5. Am ount paid above loan 200 6. Am ount paid above loan 200
6 .  M ilking fee (R s . 14 /m o n .) 112 7. M ilking fee (R s . 28 /m o n .) 224
7. Insurance Prem ium  ( i% ,3 y r s . ) 75 8 . Insurance Prem ium  (1% , 3  yrs.) 75
8. Bull o r A.I. C harge 10 9. Bull o r A.I. charges 20
T O T A L  D E B IT S 3251 TO TA L D E B IT S 4 7 2 8
T O T A L  IN C O M E FROM  O NE C O W TO TA L IN C O M E FRO M  TW O  C O W S
1. W ithout sale of cow  -Rs 755 1. W ith sale of cow  1 @  1700 + Rs 1914
2. W ith sale of cow  @  1700 + 895
Table Notes: SF’s loan repayments Rs 182lmonth; by 
end o f Loan 1, has paid Rs 169 interest. SFs interviewed 
managed to receive fu l l  33% subsidy rather than 25% they’re 
entitled to. When an SF sold an animal, it  was usually when 
the animal was at least in an advanced stage o f pregnancy.
* Feed costs fo r  an animal in m ilk are higher than ALs’ because 
the SF with a better quality animal must feed it more purchased 
feeds (oilcakes) to maintain higher milk production.
**Feed costs fo r  a dry animal are less than ALs' because o f 
reduced need fo r  purchased feeds; SF can use crop residues 
from  own land. #Accounts fo r  Rs 50 to keep animal until advanced 
pregnancy.
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Table 5-17: The Small Fanner: Three Year Incomes
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 3.1 
(1 COW) (2 COWS)
A. No sale - 755 + 264 + 1018 + 2356
B. Sale at Rs 17C0 +895 + 1914 + 2668 + 4006
1A + 2A + 3.1A = + 1865 Program guidelines.
1A + 2A + 3.1 B = + 3515 No bank debts.
1A + 2B + 3A = + 2177 No bank debts.
1A + 2B + 3B = + 3827
1B + 1B = + 1790 Remaining debt = Rs 638
Table 5-18: IRDP Cattle: The Impossible Optimum
S O U R C E S  O F IN C O M E YEAR 2 YEAR 3
1. Milk Animal 1 (Rs 2.5, 5 Is, 244 days) Rs 3050 Rs 3050 Rs 3050
2. Milk Animal 2 (Rs 2.5, 5 Is, 121 days)* 1513 3050 3050
3. Sale of calf 200 400 200
4. Sale of dung 250 360 360
TOTAL 5013 6860 6660
DEBITS
1. Animal 1 loan (+4% int.)** 833 923 . . .
2. Animal 2 loan 419 823 514
3. Feed COStS (Rs 5, 365 days) 1815 2440 2440
4. Feed costs (Re 1,121 days) 121 242 242
5. Assets acquisition 150 . . . —
6. Milking fee (Rs 10/mon.) 120 160 160
7. Insurance premium 150 . . . —
8. Bull or A.I. charges 20 20 20
TOTAL DEBITS 3628 4618 3522
TO TA L IN C O M E (YEAR 1) +Rs 1385 +Rs 2242 +Rs 3284
* Animal 2 is received as soon as firs t animal goes dry.
**Loan repayments ofRs lOOImonth. Rs 178 interest fo r both loans.
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Commentary on Tables 5-12 to 5-18 
Ownership of the IRDP Milch Animal
A major problem for all beneficiaries, whether agricultural labourer or small farmer, is the 
repayment rate of their loans. Whenever loans are repaid at a rate equivalent to 2/3 of the total milk 
income, the AL and SF beneficiary stands to make heavy losses in the first year no matter what quality 
animal s/he has. Table 5-18, the IRDP Optimum, shows how much easier it is for a beneficiary to earn a 
reasonable income when the loan repayments are not tied to milk income, but rather are fixed at a low 
monthly rate allowable under the Reserve Bank of India’s repayment schedule for two milch animals. 
AL.B in a society which uses a 50% repayment rate (and pays the beneficiaries a milk price about 11% 
higher than most societies we visited), benefits over AL.A in the first year of loan repayment, but has 
higher repayment costs over subsequent years of animal ownership. Nonetheless, the advantages of a 
lower repayment rate (and a slightly higher price for milk) in the first year when high overhead costs must 
also be absorbed, results in a higher net income for AL.B compared to AL.A over a two or three year 
period/4 PJ. Atkins (1988: 309), in a defence of Operation Flood, offers an estimate of yearly milk 
incomes in the co-operative sector.
The average gross receipt in 1985/86 was Rs 1845 for a year’s supply of milk, with an additional Rs 400 
or so in bonuses and the value o f any local sales.
His estimate of Rs 1845 plus Rs 400 is very close to my data on AL.B (Rs 1830 plus Rs 300) for 1984/85. 
But his argument that this represents a good income loses weight by his not taking expenditures into 
account.
I do not have any useful data on loan default and can only offer speculations on its frequency. 
(Government of Tamil Nadu data suggest that 34% of IRDP beneficiaries it surveyed had defaulted by the 
end of the Sixth Plan.) Part of the reason for the paucity of my data is the timing of interviews; many 
were conducted when the beneficiaries had just received second animals which means they could not be 
classified as loan defaulters (two animals equal one loan unit). Another part of the reason lies in the 
illegality of loan default; a beneficiary is unlikely to admit to having defaulted, or planning to default. 
Loan default is a good strategy for the beneficiary who wants to sell his/her first animal before it begins a 
second lactation. Nonetheless, one cannot recommend loan default without knowing about the stridency 
of the concerned bank in collecting unremitted debts, and whether the beneficiary might want to get loans 
from a bank in future (block bank branches check with each other on loan defaulters).
The quality of a milch animal in terms of the amount of milk it gives during a lactation period is 
extremely important for the IRDP beneficiary. As Table 5-12 shows, the average AL beneficiary is 
unlikely to have an animal which gives much more than three litres of milk per day (after any milk for 
household consumption is subtracted, although this amount was seldom reported as more than 150 
ml/day, if that). A comparison of the incomes given in Tables 5-13 and 14 with 5-16 demonstrates that 
having a better animal gives the beneficiary a better chance to benefit from the second year even when the 
society pays a low price for milk and uses a 2/3 loan repayment schedule. Not only does the animal 
which produces more milk produce more income, it will also have a better resale value. SFs are more 
likely to purchase a better quality animal than an AL because there is a greater chance that they will have 
owned a milch animal in the past or have close neighbours or relatives with milch animal experience and
■^Some milk society presidents insist that their members’ loans for the first animal be repaid before the second animal can be 
purchased. Bankers insist that their requirements are only that the beneficiary still have the first animal, and that the first part of the 
loan be about half-paid before purchase o f the second animal. However, if a president insists on his members repaying the entire 
amount of the first loan prior to the second animal’s purchase (as happened at two of the Lalgudi societies we visited), the bankers 
will not object as one of their first priorities is to ensure that their outstanding loans are repaid.
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who can offer useful advice. In light of the drastic effect having a poor quality animal has on the 
beneficiary, especially the one who knows nothing of good animal husbandry practices, the AHO’s 
failure to act honestly at the time of animal purchase, amounts to a far greater cost to the beneficiary than 
the Rs 25 to 50 for an eartag. If the AHO were as rigorous in ensuring that the beneficiaries buy decent 
animals as he is about bribe collecting, their chances to earn an income from owning a milch animal 
would be enhanced.
An agricultural labourers’ inability to pay for purchased feeds exacerbates the problem of having a 
low quality cow/buffalo. There is a direct relation between feed inputs and milk outputs. Therefore, if an 
animal which is capable of producing 5 litres/day receives too little feed, or the correct feeds but in the 
wrong ratios, it may only produce 3 litres. (On the importance of feeds, see Leaver and Fraser, 1987 and 
1988.) The reverse does not hold true, however. A cow/buffalo which can only produce 3 litres will not 
produce more than that with more feedstuffs (it will become fat and sluggish instead).35 Very few 
beneficiaries receive advice from vets as to appropriate feeding regimes, and the ALs’ lack of education 
in this regard is an important factor in their animals’ low milk production. It was difficult to get an 
accurate picture from the beneficiaries themselves as to how much they were spending on feeds for their 
animals. There was, as far as I could determine, almost universal exaggeration of feed costs in both 
Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks, but with little differences in the stated daily total (Copestake (1985: 17) 
observes the same phenomenon in Madurai and Ramnad Districts). Common wisdom suggests that feed 
costs may be higher in a dry area because of the need to buy more green and dry fodders, but this does not 
take into account that there are poorer quality animals in a dry area (dry areas are not traditional cattle 
"strongholds," but rather have higher numbers of sheep and goats). The person who owns an animal 
which gives only 2.5 litres of milk per day will not (indeed, should not) spend as much on feeds as 
someone who has an animal which gives double that amount Copestake (1985: 16) shows that IRDP 
beneficiaries in dry Ramnad District paid on average less than beneficiaries in an irrigated area of 
Madurai District for feeds. The main problem in a dry area in years of lower than average rainfall is 
availability of green and dry fodders. Copestake (1985) argues that fodders have such unstable markets 
that it is almost pointless to speak about fodder markets at all, and that when an area is deficit in fodder, 
there is little "import" from other areas. This leads to distress sales of animals. (Beneficiaries we spoke to 
who complained of dry conditions as a reason for selling their animals, did not say that fodders had 
become unaffordable but rather, unavailable.) Moreover, even if poor beneficiaries could purchase 
"imported" fodders, this would represent an added daily expenditure they cannot afford when their own 
days of work are reduced under prevailing dry conditions.
Another problem for beneficiaries is the length of time between receipt of milch animals. 
According to the IRDP guidelines, beneficiaries are supposed to receive their second animal as soon as, 
or shortly after, the first one goes dry (eight to ten months). In this way the milk sales from the second 
animal will support the purchase of feed for both animals, but in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur the second 
animals were almost always bought over a year after the first ones. (Table 5-18 shows the efficacy of 
receiving a second good animal as soon as the first one goes dry.) A negative aspect of milch animal 
ownership which cannot be tabulated is that AL women-usually in charge of caring for the milch 
animals-often have to rise at 3 a.m. (early even by Indian standards) to take their animal to the society
35Copestake (1985: 17) argues in fact that some milch animal beneficiaries, especially SFs who have a greater disposable income, 
feed their animals too much in relation to the milk they produce.
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milking yard where they have to queue to have their animals milked.-36 Some women also complained 
that they were losing income as daily wage labourers because there were some days they were forced to 
spend their time with the animal, and could not seek employment.
The IRDP beneficiary has a choice in purchasing a cow or a water buffalo. Although the tables do 
not indicate this, the beneficiary who invests in a buffalo is much more likely than a cow owner to do 
badly. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the water buffalo is a larger animal than a cow and 
requires extra feed just to maintain its body weight. Second, water buffalos do not, as a general rule, give 
as much milk as cows (buffalo milk has a higher fat content than cow milk and should receive a higher 
price, but the societies we visited with both cows and buffalos either paid the same rate or only 10 paise 
more for buffalo milk). Third, in addition to dependence on feeds to maintain milk production, water 
buffalos need to soak themselves in water everyday to stay healthy (many areas have water supplies too 
inadequate for buffalos). Fourth, buffalo conception rates are much worse than for cows. (This is 
because estrus for a buffalo is shorter and less noticeable to humans than a cow’s. Therefore, artificial 
insemination, which is being resorted to with greater frequency, is not very successful with buffalos. The 
male buffalo is more successful, but he is not a common creature in the villages--there may be only one in 
a number of villages, meaning that he cannot reach every female at the appropriate time.) The immediate 
consequence of the fourth point is that buffalos in the hands of inexperienced owners will likely have 
exceptionally long dry periods (ten months), if they conceive at all.
Long dry periods for both cows and buffalos are a great hindrance to the owners, and probably the 
single largest reason for sales.37 This is where lack of education and mistaken beliefs play a large role, 
thus belying the view of a Deputy Secretary for IRDP in New Delhi who assured me that "anyone" could 
satisfactorily keep a milch animal. A veterinary assured me that a milch animal should conceive in the 
third month of its lactation (confirmed by Leaver and Fraser (1987) who discuss intercalving periods of 
375 days), but that people commonly believed, without foundation, that if this occurs its milk production 
will decrease rapidly. Therefore, they delay conception, but this only serves to lengthen the animal’s dry 
period, which also has a deleterious effect on subsequent pregnancies (the animal’s conception rate 
decreases). He further added that at a bank-sponsored vet camp for an IRDP milk society, he and other 
vets checked all the animals to see if they were pregnant. Very few of the buffalos were, although eight 
months of milking had already gone past. This meant the beneficiaries would have to maintain those 
animals through dry periods of at least eight months. A follow-up visit to this Lalgudi village in 1986 
revealed that many of the beneficiaries had, as would be expected, sold their buffalos despite their 
president’s opposition to this course of action.
Animals which are dry require less purchased feeds to maintain their body weights than when they 
are in milk, but they do still require some purchased feeds (for the higher protein content) to stay healthy. 
I suspect, although am not certain, that many beneficiaries, especially agricultural labourers, only send 
their animals out to forage for themselves while they are dry rather than purchasing feeds. This may keep 
the beneficiaries’ short term costs down, but leads to the animal’s poor health, lower conception rates, and 
lower milk production. Table 5-12 includes data on lactation but not on dry periods as I have little 
systematic data on lengths of dry periods (because of my initial ignorance about milch animals). I was
•^Beneficiaries at different milk societies resented that milk society officials sold the dung collected from the milking yard, and 
some even suggested that the society milkers were instructed to work slowly so that more dung would accumulate at the yard.
37A long term study conducted in Scotland by Leaver and Fraser (1987 and 1988) on the effects of protein-enhanced feeds on 
milk production showed that the single most common reason for even these healthy, high-producing (upto 20 litres/day) cows to be 
culled from two test herds was failure to conceive within a specified period of time.
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provided general information by local vets, and by Copestake (personal communications) who did collect 
data on cow and buffalo dry periods.
Sales
I argue that it is generally by selling their animals that beneficiaries make profits. As Tables 5-13 
to 15 show, however, the timing of sales is very important Rs 600 represents an AL beneficiary’s 
animal’s average ’dry’ value, while Rs 1500 represents it ’wet’ value. Unfortunately, beneficiaries often 
sell their cattle, especially buffalos, because they cannot get them pregnant again, meaning sale of the 
animal when it is worth the least. If the beneficiary can keep the animal until it reaches advanced 
pregnancy, s/he can make a tidy profit (and will make more money by selling than keeping it for another 
lactation when the price for milk is low.)38 As Table 5-15 demonstrates, the beneficiary stands to make 
the most money when s/he keeps each animal for two lactations. In Table 5-15 compare, for example, 
AL.A’s net income derived from two end of first lactation sales (IB + lC=Rs 259, and Rs 1408 
outstanding debt), with two end of second lactation sales (1A + 2C + 2B=Rs 551, no debt). Generally 
speaking, it is not a good strategy for the beneficiary to sell the first animal at the end of its first lactation 
and then take another loan. If s/he does this, s/he will be forced to absorb the initial overhead costs and 
the high loan repayments without being able to offset these somewhat in the second year when the first 
animal’s remaining loan repayments will not be so high and when its acquisition overheads have been 
paid for. As Table 5-15 shows, the beneficiary who takes a loan in the first place should take a second 
one to minimise his first year losses (keeping the first animal until the end of the second year). 
Additionally, the beneficiaries’ firm belief in the value of receiving a saleable asset explains their 
willingness to take second loans, despite their losing money from having had the first milch animal loan. 
The lumpsum of Rs 500 or 600 the beneficiary can make from selling a dry cow is extremely valuable, 
especially if s/he gets that money during a lean work period. At all of the milk societies we visited, the 
presidents were very insistent that the beneficiaries take second loans which would also have an effect on 
the beneficiaries’ decision-making.
It must be asked, then, if the president is able to influence a beneficiary to take a second loan, why 
s/he is unable to prevent the beneficiary from early sales of milch animals. In this instance, the 
beneficiary’s need to sell the animal because of his/her inability to maintain it through long dry periods, 
or his/her immediate cash requirements, outweighs the president’s influence and the beneficiary’s desire 
not to fall out of favour with the president (more important where the latter is an employer or potential 
employer). If the beneficiary believes his/her animal will not have another lactation period, that belief 
would overrule any argument from any quarter to keep the animal. In a similar case from Bihar, Bell and 
Zusman (1976) document relations between landlords and tenants who also own small parcels of land. 
They show (1976: 581) that while the landlords wanted their tenants to devote the same level of care and 
input intensities to the leased land as the tenant’s own land, "the task w'as apparently beyond them in 
practice."
Table 5-15 also shows that when the program rules are followed, the AL beneficiary makes little 
income and must go through two years of heavy losses with no offsetting compensation of a lumpsum 
from cattle sales. Moreover, the chances of a beneficiary, even one who wants to, following the program 
rules and keeping each animal for a period of at least three years are extremely unlikely what with long 
dry periods and low milk production, not to mention the likelihood of the beneficiary having 
immediate/emergency cash needs, and selling an animal to help meet them, or the society itself
38Prices offered at the societies in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur remained low through 1985 and 1986. One of the reasons for this is that 
the price offered to the societies by the district milk producers’ union dropped from 1985 to 1986.
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succumbing to quarrels among those in charge of accounts. One more point to bear in mind regarding 
animals’ resale value is that, just as with capital goods or automobiles, their value (after their very first 
two lactations) decreases over time. The longer a beneficiary has his/her animal, the more it loses of its 
original value.
Generation of Added Yearly Income
Unfortunately, I do not have before and after incomes for beneficiaries, not the least because there 
were few beneficiaries in our sample who had achieved an appropriate "after" stage (Lalgudi’s largest 
milk societies only started in 1983-84, and many beneficiaries did not receive their first animals until 
1984.) Nonetheless, Table 5-15 indicates that the maximum possible net income for AL.A, the average 
agricultural labourer beneficiary, after three years is Rs 1546, an average of Rs 515 per year. With the 
Sixth Plan poverty line of Rs 3500, this means that only a family with an income of around Rs 3000 could 
hope (optimally with two cattle sales of Rs 1500) to be across the poverty line at the end of three years. 
The catch, of course, is that it is unlikely for the landless AL family 1) to be living so near the poverty 
line; and 2) to accrue as much as Rs 1546 over three years. When the AL beneficiaries’ animals have 
long dry periods and conception difficulties, and when there are malpractices in the milk societies, the 
most likely "income outcome" from the range offered in Table 5-15 is either IB + IB resulting in Rs 
-456, or 1A + 2B + 2B resulting in Rs -84—both losses, although they would be offset somewhat by the 
beneficiaries’ two time gain of Rs 600 as cash in hand. (Note the data on sale income provided in Table 
5-12: 64% of 67 animals sold by ALs resulted in a sale income of less than Rs 1000.)
According to my research data from Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, modest yearly incomes from IRDP 
cattle ownership are possible, but it would be very rare for an Agricultural Labourer family to earn 
enough money to win more than a brief respite from an existence below the poverty line. The family with 
land-the Small Farmer near to, or already above, the poverty line-is most likely to profit, and unlikely to 
lose money, from a subsidised IRDP loan for a milch animal.
5.3. Non-Milch Animal Loans
As the preceding discussion on the milch animal component of IRDP indicates, the program has 
been dominated by the disbursal of loans for cows and buffalos in Tiruchi District and, indeed, in many 
other parts of Tamil Nadu and India as a whole. The role of resource exchanging loan brokers is much 
reduced in IRDP’s non-milch animal component, which largely explains its lack of importance during the 
Sixth Plan. In the Seventh Five Year Plan, however, the predominance of the milch animal is being 
brought to an end, and in addition to the new restrictions on numbers of milch animals disbursed, there is 
a rule which states that half of all beneficiaries miist be aided under the ISB sector of IRDP.
In the last year or two of the Sixth Plan the "industries, service, business" sector of IRDP was 
heavily emphasised by senior officials (there were training seminars and manuals on promoting ISB), but 
to little avail in most blocks. Block officials cannot use broker-resource traders to implement ISB. In 
Lalgudi Block, however, the Block Development Officer did make some concerted attempts to do well 
under ISB because he was keen on pleasing his administrative superiors, and hoped to gain favours from 
them (I am using his terms). This resulted in quite a number of loans for existing, rather than new, small 
village shops (either "petty shops" or cycle hire shops). Frequently, however, people who had received 
loans for shops had used the loans for other purposes; no doubt in collusion with the RWOs who were 
sent out with the BDO’s orders to fulfill their ISB targets.
Although the non-milch animal and more particularly, the non-animal component of IRDP was
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relatively small during the Sixth Plan, it presents, nonetheless, an important contrast in style of 
implementation to the milch animal component. An initial major difference in the two components of the 
program, aside from the quantum of benefits distributed, is that the concentration of LRDP benefits in a 
few villages noted earlier in this chapter relates mostly to the milch animal component of the program. If 
one were to remove the subsidies for milch animals from the villages, there would be a much less marked 
concentration of benefits.
The main divergence in implementation between the two sides of the program is that the non-milch 
animal loans, aside from some for sheep and handlooms, are not implemented in groups through loan 
brokers. Instead, there is a one-to-one relationship between the beneficiary and the block officials, most 
often in the person of the RWO. Despite this one-to-one relationship, however, most of these 
beneficiaries did not get their initial information about the program from the RWO. Many of them 
mentioned bank officials, relatives or friends employed in the development administration, or said they 
had found out about IRDP when they had made a visit to the block or taluk office on some other business.
Another important dissimilarity lies in the amount of "beneficiary cheating" that goes on in the 
non-milch animal component of ERDP. Most of the bankers I spoke with said that aside from the milch 
animal component, there is a significant amount of beneficiary cheating. This commonly included 
painting and otherwise refurbishing bullock carts, and then presenting them as the assets to be bought, 
"borrowing" neighbours’ or relations’ sheep or goats so that not so many animals would have to be 
bought by the beneficiary,39 getting a loan for an existing shop and then not doing anything to effect 
improvements to it, getting false receipts from retailers, and the like. There was no evidence to suggest 
that political people were intervening in the block office on the behalf of individuals to enable them to get 
non-milch animal loans. In one village (which is home of an influential ex-Cabinet Minister) in Lalgudi 
Block, however, there were a large number of individual loans for such things as tyre carts (the most 
expensive item purchasable under IRDP in Tamil Nadu and the most useful for a landowner). Not a 
single beneficiary of the eight we interviewed (at random) from this village (which is not actually in the 
survey group-it is a close neighbour of two survey villages) was below the poverty line.
The value of loans for the non-milch animals is generally higher than for the milch animals. There 
was, then, a correspondingly higher bribe the beneficiary had to pay to the RWO (upto Rs 250). A 
number of the non-milch animal beneficiaries complained that the RWO had threatened that if they did 
not pay the requisite bribe to him, their loan-subsidy would not get sanctioned. People felt angry about 
this, but helpless to do anything against it. The number of people we interviewed who were "below the 
poverty line" in the non-milch animal sector of ERDP was much less than for milch animals, and the 
representation of Scheduled Castes is also much less. Ixjans for non-milch animals tended to be more 
profitable and more easily misused, but the poorest of the poor were seldom able to take advantage of 
them, being less well-informed, and in possession of fewer assets that could be used as "new" ones.
39Program rules stipulate "unit sizes." A sheep unit, for example, is 19 ewes and 1 ram.
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5.4. A Note on the Non-Beneficiary
I was curious about what non-beneficiaries in the villages knew about IRDP, and discovered that 
the non-beneficiaries’ knowledge of the program was rudimentary. In the two blocks 112 non-recipient, 
eligible people were interviewed, and we discovered that only five of them knew of the program in any 
detail. My research assistant found that few of the respondents (from eleven villages in the two blocks) 
knew anything about the program if he just mentioned it by name, whether in English or Tamil. He tried 
giving a brief explanation of IRDP, saying that it was a government-sponsored loan-subsidy program, but 
found that there were still forty people (36%) who did not know what he was talking about Of the 
remaining 72 respondents, only 15 (13% of 112) said their information had come from an RWO, with the 
majority mentioning fellow villagers (ones who had received loans) as their sources of information. In 
Lalgudi Block of thirty-nine people who said they knew about IRDP, thirty-two (82%) only knew of the 
milch animal component (Table 5-19).
Table 5-19: Non-Beneficiaries’ Knowledge about IRDP (N=T12)
KNEW IRDP W /O KNEW IRDP AFTER TOTAL NON-
EXPLANATION EXPLANATION RECOGNITION
5 67 40
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
RWO OR OTHER 2 13 .
BLOCK OFFICIAL
NEWS MEDIA 0 3
BANKERS 1 5
OTHER VILLAGERS 2 46
Sixty-nine people gave us their reasons for having not taken an ERDP loan-subsidy (Table 5-20). 
The responses were varied, with no one response dominating the others. There were 13 people (19%) 
who did not want the loans because they thought that repayment of the loan would be difficult, and/or that 
maintaining an animal would be difficult (2 people said they were afraid to take a "government loan"). 
Seven people (10%) cited official corruption as the main reason for not participating in IRDP and another 
four (6%) said they did not have enough money to cover the initial expenses required to get the subsidy, 
loan, and asset. Five (7%) people said they were not interested in the program, another five said they did 
not know how to go about getting the loan-subsidy, four who tried to get loans but were unsuccessful for 
reasons unknown to them, and another four who did not try because they thought there would be 
excessive delays in receiving the loan-subsidy.
5.5. Conclusion
IRDP’s impact in the villages is determined in an important but nonetheless indirect way by the 
officials’ use of resource exchange to implement rural development policy. The resource exchange 
strategy, necessary for the block administrator if he is to meet the maximum number of urgent political 
and administrative demands made of him in the block has led to the preponderance of the milch animal in 
ERDP. The result of IRDP’s implementation has been to allow a significant number of people, few of 
whom are beneficiaries, to make money. All those people who stand between the beneficiaries and their
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Table 5-20: Non-Beneficiaries' Reasons for not Taking IRDP Loans
REASONS OFFERED NO. %
1. Loan repaym ent too difficult 13 18.8
2. Officials too corrupt 7 10.1
3. Uninterested 5 7.2
4. Don't know procedure 5 7.2
5. Delays too long 4 5.8
6. Initial costs too high 4 5.8
7. Tried and failed 4 5.8
8. No loans available for landless 4 5.8
9. No loans available for non-SCs 3 4.3
10. No loans avail, for asset desired 3 4.3
11. Told missed loan deadline 3 4.3
12. Loans only for ruling party people 3 4.3
13. Told no loans avail, for this village 3 4.3
14. Afraid to take governm ent loan 2 2.9
15. Reason comprises no. of points above 6 8.7
69 99.6
assets—the RWO, the AHO, the VAO, the cattle broker, the milk society president, the BDO-may easily 
benefit through the allocation of ERDP’s resources. Those who are the "real" beneficiaries, the "target 
group," lose much of their subsidies, and then only make a little money for a lot of effort through 
ownership of the assets. During the beneficiaries’ ownership of the assets, the milk society president 
benefits as a middleman between the beneficiary and the district milk co-operative and between the 
beneficiary and the bank; it is unreasonable to expect the loan broking milk society president not to 
collect a "fee," even if it is illegitimate for him to do so, from the beneficiaries for his "services." Clearly, 
IRDP’s elaborate implementation guidelines and supporting structures (ie., local, district, and state 
committees) have done little to help the beneficiaries.
This chapter also shows that the results of IRDP on one plane are insidious. That is, to a large 
extent in Tamil Nadu the poor do form the vast majority of program beneficiaries, even in the appropriate 
numbers of Scheduled Castes and women. However, although modest incremental incomes are possible, 
the beneficiaries cannot acquire, or use, the assets in such a way as to benefit substantially, and they 
(beneficiaries) certainly are no more "entrepreneurial" for having participated in IRDP. It would have 
been more in keeping with the actual conditions in the rural areas, had the program designers developed a 
policy wherein the beneficiaries could receive the subsidy as cash, purchase a dry animal and some feeds 
with it (thereby obviating the need for a loan), keep the animal until, or shortly before, it calves and then 
sell it when it is worth the most amount of money. Even if it were sold while still dry, the beneficiary 
would make a net profit.
An irony of IRDP, and an indication of senior development administrators’ lack of understanding 
of the block "environment," is that the beneficiary most likely to profit from having an IRDP milch 
animal is the one who counters the program rules, and sells his/her animal, preferably in an advanced
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stage of pregnancy (after its second lactation). This beneficiary, however, is disallowed from receiving 
additional assistance in the Seventh Plan. Perhaps the greatest irony of the program is that the people 
whose entrepreneurial skills have been sharpened as a result of IRDP are those who are already relatively 
well-off. The contractors, the milk society presidents, the milk vendors, the parish priests, and others who 
have exchange relations with the local administrators through IRDP, have increased their volume of 
contacts with the block officials, thereby increasing their chances to receive development policy resources 
in the future. The poor, on the other hand, have not become entrepreneurs, and because they have been 
largely excluded from contact with the officials, have not developed useful skills in approaching local 
administrators and bankers.
The local administrators have little to do with the program after they have met its targets, and thus 
the loan broker has more direct influence on the impact of the program in the villages than do the local 
officials. One must understand local people’s motivations in becoming involved in the program as they 
play a key role in determining whether milch animal beneficiaries make a profit or not. With few 
exceptions, the rich peasant-contractor wants to use IRDP’s resources for his own ends, often resulting in 
the exploitation of the poor beneficiaries. This results, however, in short term windfall profits rather than 
continuous long term profits for the president, as the beneficiaries who are only losing money are more 
apt to sell their animals.
An important difference between the resource traders in IRDP and those in contracting programs is 
the presence of "intermediaries" in the former. It is largely a reflection of the lower value of IRDP’s 
resources to local elites, that people such as educated Scheduled Caste youths, who would not gain access 
to contract program money, are able to take charge on an albeit limited basis of IRDP milch animal loans. 
The existence of intermediaries in IRDP’s implementation is an indication that local officials are not the 
greedy, profit-maximisers they are sometimes depicted to be. When the block official has an IRDP milk 
society established through a poor, Scheduled Caste youth or woman, he forfeits his potential to make 
much money out of the transaction, but does not forfeit the chance to receive help from the intermediary 
on other policies. Moreover, the local administrator increases his chances to win commendations from 
superiors for having a "Scheduled Caste" milk society in his block (a ladies’ Scheduled Caste society is 
even better). The intermediaries’ greatest value, however, lies in their tendency to help their society 
members rather than to exploit them, as many of the brokers do. Tables 5-13 and 5-14 highlight the 
important difference a higher price for milk and lower rate of loan repayment makes to the beneficiaries’ 
income-making capabilities, even when they do not have good milch animals. The intermediary cannot 
improve the poor quality of cattle available for ERDP beneficiaries’ purchase, but s/he can help reduce the 
beneficiaries’ initial costs by challenging an official’s "right” to collect bribes, by refusing to participate 
in purchase committee corruption, and by not charging the beneficiary more than necessary to join the 
milk society. The intermediary-style president helps the beneficiary immeasurably by running the society 
in an honest, beneficiary-oriented way.
In the next chapter I discuss resource exchange theory in detail, explaining its advantages and 
disadvantages in providing explanations for administrative behaviour at the local level. I show how 
resource exchange as I use it to analyse development policy implementation diverges from its earlier uses 
primarily in the sociology, anthropology, and psychology literatures. Additionally, I take up the 
argument presented in the introduction that the prevalent linear/management style of development 
policy/administration analysis, employed by senior administrators in India, is of less utility in explaining 
policy implementation and impact than resource exchange when enough is known about the local 
officials’ environment.
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Chapter 6
Resource Exchange—Theoretical Applications
Hindu and in general Indian, Souih Asian society has developed transactional thinking perhaps further 
than has any other. It exhibits an elaborate transactional culture, characterized by explicit, 
institutionalized concern for givings and receivings of many kinds in kinship, work, and worship. ~ Me Kim 
Marriott (1976: 109).
Exchange is an important part of life in India, and the logic of using a resource exchange approach 
suggests itself in India’s long history of unequal socio-economic exchange, rationalised and concretised 
through the Hindu caste system. As the Marriott quotation above implies, Hindu society may be one of 
the most appropriate places in the world to apply social exchange analysis. In kinship relations, brides 
along with dowries are exchanged, as child-producing resources, between families. While the caste 
system is based on a ritual hierarchy governed by Hindu concepts of pollution and purity, it is 
operationalised in the village in an important, although not exclusive, way through rules governing the 
exchange of cooked and uncooked food (Marriott, 1976). (See among others Neale, 1957 and Orans, 
1968 on the economic aspects of caste relations.) Many areas of India have had longstanding and 
complex systems of patron-client relationships. Within the Hindu social order, these unequal 
relationships are part of the jajmani system (largely no longer in existence),1 with the privileged person 
(jajman) in respect of resources, receiving services from non-cultivators (including agricultural labourers) 
in return for resource bestowals, generally in the form of grain (see Kolenda, 1963; Gould, 1977 and 
B reman, 1979).
The primary purpose of this chapter is to elaborate a resource exchange approach to help explain 
poverty alleviation (that is, targeted, distributive) policy implementation.2 While resource exchange is a 
useful analytical tool for the study of administrative behaviour it has limitations, which are also discussed 
in this chapter. One of the strengths of resource exchange as I use it here is that unlike the "management 
approach" to development administration discussed in Chapter One, it forces the analyst to look at the 
local administrator as an integral part of his socio-economic and political environment. As anthropologist 
Harumi Befu (1977: 259) argued: "No exchange approach can operate in a cultural vacuum.
Specification of the cultural context is what brings life to an exchange approach." I have tried to specify 
the socio-economic and political context in this study.
Many of the styles of development policy analysis discussed in the first chapter are both ahistorical 
and acontextual; they do not take cognisance of the important "extra-administrative" elements of an 
administrator’s environment which impinge on his behaviour, nor have they, with their focus on the
^  Tamil Nadu, for example, agricultural labourers used to work as pannaiyals for large landholders meaning they would be 
employed on a yearly basis and receive wages and minor emoluments in cash and kind (mostly kind). This system has virtually died 
out, and most agricultural labourers are employed on a daily wage basis (excepting during the harvest of certain crops).
Resource exchange, as developed here, is also relevant as an explanatory tool for the implementation of agency-funded 
development projects, especially when their funding comes under the control of a local bureaucracy.
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single policy’s "cycle," recognised the continuities from one policy’s implementation to the next One of 
the most striking differences between development management and western administration studies is 
that the more sophisticated sociological theorising which has characterised some, by no means all, 
western administrative studies has not filtered into development management studies. The dominance of 
the management approach in the Third World reflects, perhaps, an ethnocentricity in Western academic 
research. The Western sociologist concerned with formal organisations seldom turns his/her interest to 
the Third World-the purview of anthropologists in the sociologist’s view-thus leaving Third World 
administration studies to "managers" who are preferred by the Third World governments and 
development agencies which hire them. Insofar as the self-avowed raison d’etre of the managerial 
approach is to improve the "management of development," its actual capacity to improve management is 
hindered by ignoring the political context of the "managers." As Moris (1981: 8) argues, "most authors 
simply chronicle the "irrational" deficiencies of third world administration in contrast to the "rational" and 
"efficient" nature of Western management."
The Integrated Rural Development Program opens important avenues for policy implementation 
analyses in that both its process of implementation and its impact in the village are different from those 
expected (publicly) by senior administrators. If a management analyst were to discuss ERDP, s/he would 
certainly criticise its implementation, as have I, but his/her criticisms would be focused on the structural 
deficiencies of the development administration, especially at the local level. S/he also would discuss the 
preponderance of the milch animal, but is likely to assume it is a result of a lack of administrative 
training, a lack of consultation between officials and the poor, a lack of proper local planning, and 
inadequate staffing. The management analyst may also discuss IRDP’s design as problematic.3 In fact, 
this analysis of IRDP’s implementation is not incorrect, but it misses out additional explanatory variables 
which would come under the aegis of resource exchange. ERDP is a policy of complex design which 
resulted in low block spending for it in the first couple of years of the Sixth Plan. But the local 
administrators solved IRDP’s complexity problem in their own way by ignoring its difficult, time- 
consuming aspects and concentrating on spending the program’s money through dealings with a limited 
number of brokers and/or intermediaries. It is difficult to think of this strategy as part of an "irrational" 
deficiency in local administration.
There is a widely held belief among development managers and senior administrators in the 
efficacy of the "target approach"-an underpinning of IRDP-which arises from downplaying the 
importance of the block official’s environment. The main assumption policy designers have made is that 
if the appropriate group is targeted to receive policy resources, then its economic condition will be 
ameliorated when it receives those resources. As I have demonstrated, however, just because a group, for 
ERDP a broadly defined "group" including the "poorest of the rural poor" (especially the "entrepreneurial" 
poor), has been targeted to receive policy resources and further, even if it actually receives them, it may 
not result in the group’s gaining adequate control over the resources to change its economic status for the 
better.
Many management analysts (including Leonard, 1977) are concerned with organisational 
productivity and point to the structural drawbacks mentioned above as a cause for this "productivity
3There is also much concern expressed in the literature over "policy goal" confusion (Pyle, 1980: 141). IRDP may be analysed in 
these terms, as "integrated rural development" is not the same as "poverty alleviation." I found, however, that the Government of 
India’s orders and guidelines for IRDP’s implementation were so detailed that even state-level administrators were immediately 
caught up with those details rather than in worrying about whether it was a development policy or a poverty alleviation policy they 
were supervising the implementation of.
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problem” (ie., chronic shortfalls in even reasonable policy targets). This again, is not exactly wrong, but 
omits too much of the policy environment to be a good explanation. The block administration in Tamil 
Nadu exhibits much variability in "productivity" from policy to policy (NREP is usually high, 
smallsavings and bio-gas are low), and leads the observer to search for explanations outside the structural 
for this variation. In the final analysis, if IRDP’s local implementers were more in number, better trained, 
and better planners there would undoubtedly have been a faster quantitative improvement in its 
implementation during the Sixth Plan. I would not, however, expect that much qualitative change would 
have occurred. As I have argued throughout, the context of IRDP is not confined to the development 
administration alone, and one has to examine the administrator’s environment carefully to understand 
why he has ignored most of IRDP’s rules, and disbursed the program’s resources to rich peasants willing 
to act as loan brokers. A development policy like IRDP provides a new set of resources in the rural areas, 
but these resources are exchanged by the administrators in a context of pre-existing relations. The new 
policy’s implementation rarely triggers new sets of relations in the rural areas or changes existing ones. 
These relations are unlikely to be altered by attempting to change administrative structures and improving 
policy design.
6.1. The Resource Exchange Approach: Summary and Limitations
Social exchange is an approach4 with proponents in sociology (Homans, Blau, Gouldner, Meeker), 
psychology (Adams, Emerson, Gergen), anthropology (Befu, Kapferer, Lebra, Levi-Strauss, Mauss, 
Sahlins), political science (Ilchman and Uphoff, L. L. Wade, Curry, Waldman) and even economics 
(Boulding, Heath). It thus has the potential which few theories have in the social sciences to draw on the 
strengths of a number of disciplines in explaining both individual behaviour and persistence and change 
in societal institutions. A problem, however, for theory building in social exchange is that with the 
multi-disciplinary backgrounds of its authors, there has been more "intra-exchange" sniping at each 
other’s choices of focus than attempts to build up the theory from the richness of a wide range of 
empirical material. Befu (1977: 276) argues that "a good deal of ink has been spilled over the conceptual 
status and theoretical nature of social exchange without sufficient empirical checking of the usefulness of 
concepts and models." Befu himself (1980) has attempted to draw together "motivational" and 
"structural-functional" approaches; Singelman (1972) brings together economic-oriented exchange and 
symbolic interactionism; while Weinstein and Tanur (1978) discuss the strengths of an approach that 
combines structural-functionalism, symbolic interactionism and choice-based exchange theory. These 
four theorists, however, are exceptions.
Theories incorporating social exchange to explain human behaviour are many, and have a fairly 
long history in both anthropology and sociology. Exchange has been successfully used by 
anthropologists in a large number of societies and is not culture-bound. Leonard (1977: 241) argues that 
exchange "is a process that occurs in all social settings." In sociology, exchange theory owes its 
propagation to George C. Homans (especially 1958 and 1961) and Peter M. Blau (1964a), both of whom, 
especially Blau, drew extensively from simple economic concepts. Exchange theory building, however, 
has occurred largely within sociology and psychology. The exchange work of Homans also relies on 
psychology and "operant conditioning" (from Skinner’s experiments with animals, notably the pigeon 
which Homans seems particularly fond of). Their works have inspired many further studies incorporating
4There is some debate over whether social exchange is a theory or an approach. Emerson (1972a: 38-39) argues that social 
exchange is better termed an "approach" (although he himself consistently refers to it as theory), "characterized by the use o f certain 
central concepts . . .  which place observations into a frame of reference called exchange" [his emphasis].
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social exchange, although few of them with an explicitly formal organisational focus (formal 
organisational exchange studies have tended toward the inter-organisational; see Levine and White, 1969; 
Galaskiewicz, 1979 and Nord, 1980). Moreover, I am unaware of any exchange theorist who has used 
exchange theory with as specific an organisational actor focus as I have used in this study with the block 
development official as the primary frame of reference for exchanges. Leonard (1977) does apply Blau’s 
exchange theory, but only to explain the relations between senior and junior staff in Kenya’s Ministry of 
Agriculture. He concludes (pg. 242) that "theories of social exchange coupled with the concept of 
relative expectations will prove powerful in analyzing organizational behavior in non-Westem settings. 
Even when applied to problems that have no counterpart in the West, the theories are remarkably useful."
The "force of history" is recognised as an important factor in exchange by theorists such as Homans 
(1961: 52-54). In sum, Homans looks at past stimuli, responses, and rewards to extrapolate future 
behaviour from them. He may be rightly accused of "postdiction," but is correct to argue that people’s 
pasts do shape their current behaviour. As explained in Chapter Two, when the development 
administration in Tamil Nadu was in charge of doing agricultural extension work, the primary contact the 
administrator had with the public was the rich peasant, and block officials have long met their targets 
through fairly exclusive relations with the village "big men."5 This relationship, too valuable to the local 
administrator for him to change it, continues to the present day despite the development administration’s 
current focus on poverty alleviation policy. While exchange theory is helpful in explaining the 
continuation of relationships, such as that between the rich peasantry and the development administration, 
over even long periods of time, it cannot tell us how those relationships were initiated. An exchange 
theorist can only assume, when a relationship’s initiation is not structurally determined, that two or more 
people initiate exchange in their general search for rewards which are greater than when they act 
independently. The initiation of the exchange relationship is, perhaps, the exchange theorist’s "black 
box."
A number of criticisms have been made of the use of social exchange theory to explain human 
behaviour.6 Bierstedt (1965: 789), for example, criticised Blau (1964a) for trying to use social exchange 
in an organisational milieu because exchanges "are carried on" in accordance with "norms to which all the 
participants conform "(a position I do not agree with, although many tasks in a bureaucracy are routinised 
and completed without the officials giving thought to exchange). He concludes (pg. 790) that "The 
economic model of exchange, in short, applies only to a limited range of social phenomena." Heath 
(1976a), on the other hand, severely criticises Blau’s economics, and argues that he has not even 
constructed his supply and demand curves correctly. Heath (1976a) does not, however, reject social 
exchange itself. Blau (1964a) has, perhaps, relied too heavily on economic concepts to explain social 
exchanges at both the micro and macro levels of society, thus overstretching economic concepts in his 
search for an elusive quantification of human exchange relations. A main goal of Blau’s (1964a) work, 
however, is to explain how the "emergent properties" of micro-level exchanges result in macro structures, 
thus avoiding the criticism of "psychological reductionism" which has been leveled at Homans (1961) 
and other exchange theorists (Waldman, 1972) who use psychology and learning theory as their starting 
points. Easton (1972) criticises Waldman’s (1972) essay on exchange in political processes, arguing (pg. 
137) that the latter’s approach to exchange "assumes we can explain the numerous aspects of political
5This is a direct translation of a Tamil word which connotes rich, powerful man. Interestingly, the term is also used in the same 
way in, among others, Melanesian cultures.
Romans (1961) has been criticised on a number of fronts, but primarily for tautology (Davis, 1962; Abrahamsson, 1971; 
Deutsch, 1971).
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relationships by reference exclusively to the subjective sentiments and cost-benefit assessments by the 
individual participants in the aggregate."
I also use economic terms to explain exchange processes, but much more loosely than Blau or 
Heath, and the resource exchange approach I favour should not be equated with approaches to human 
behaviour which assume that people are ever rational, profit-maximisers. Resource exchange should also 
not be confused with economic pluralism in society—it makes no assumption of equality of opportunity, 
nor of equal access to resources within society. Exchange should not be equated with a benign view of 
unequal relations in society, Homans’ (1961) and Blau’s (1964a) views of transactors exchanging rewards 
notwithstanding. Homans in particular makes explicit the notion that people seldom engage in a series of 
exchanges unless they are mutually rewarding (1961: 51-78). In other words, people do not as a rule 
exchange punishments. I argue, however, that one-way flows of punishments in exchanges are quite 
common in the development block; something Homans’ and Blau’s theories would not predict given their 
focus on rewards. Befit (1977: 259) observed that"[conceptualization of negative exchange . .  . lags far 
behind that of positive exchange and is a task left for the future."
As with any approach or theory, "resource exchange" offers an explanation for "the way things are" 
which must be simplified for the sake of clarity and explanatory power. Neither every actor nor every 
actor’s motives for behaviour can be speculated on. In the process of choosing which actors and what 
behaviour to focus on other variables which also have some powers of explanation will be missed. 
Resource exchange cannot fully explain every aspect of a poverty alleviation policy’s implementation and 
impact. I also do not assume, as some exchange theorists seem to, that all human behaviour can or should 
be explained in exchange terms. There are limits to the explanatory powers of "resource exchange," but 
the more one defines and understands of the local administrator’s environment the more these limits may 
be overcome in explaining development policy implementation.
Resource exchange is a decidedly non-institutional, non-technocratic approach to policy 
implementation which does not emphasise "structural" features of the implementing bureaucracy, as the 
primary determinants of administrative behaviour. I have argued, however, that the block officials 
scramble to meet the policy targets imposed on them by senior administrators. The phenomenon of 
targeting is not explainable or predictable by use of resource exchange at the block level, but at the same 
time it is a cause of resource exchange between the local administrator and the dominant peasantry. 
Targeting leads to resource exchange because first, senior administrators seldom check administrative 
performance beyond the narrow area of target achievement.7 Second, aside from falsifying data as a way 
of achieving targets, the local administrators use resource exchange to minimise the time they spend with 
each policy and maximise the number of policies for which they can show that an acceptable percentage 
of the targets has been achieved. The practice of rapid administrative transfers is also a direct cause of 
administrative resource exchange, and is important as an instrument of either reward or punishment in 
organisations such as the development administration which do not offer much scope for promotion. This 
underscores the importance of embedding "resource exchange" in an appropriately defined environment 
for the main actor(s) whose behaviour is to be explained.
One of the main reasons I employ a resource exchange approach is to present (rather more
7Senior administrators have their own imperatives for not checking on the "how” of target achievement. Part of the explanation 
for this lies in inter-departmental competition, and senior bureaucrats’ attempts to maintain their department’s budget. If a 
department as a whole does not spend the money allocated to it through central and state budgets, the administrators risk losing that 
money to other departments, hence jeopardising their own career prospects. It is ultimately, then, in senior administrators’ interests 
not to question how their "underlings'' meet targets.
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metaphorically than literally) a corrective to the structural-managerial approach to administration for the 
IAS officer in Madras or New Delhi. In order to be viable, this alternative approach should have some 
practical application for the senior administrator. The senior administrator tends to see the local official as 
acting in an ad hoc manner or irrationally; often as someone who is lazy and corrupt Resource exchange 
would make the senior administrator more aware of the local administrator’s environment, hopefully 
leading in the long term to more "environmentally sound" poverty alleviation policies. However, the more 
carefully one works to gain an accurate picture of the administrator’s environment, the longer it takes, and 
the more one is drawn to "political" explanations for policy implementation. An approach which is 
time-consuming to operationalise and demands that idiosyncracies of the individual’s environment be 
taken into account will have rather limited appeal for the harried LA.S officer under pressure to design 
policies which carry the answers-quickly and apolitically-to the nation’s poverty woes.
There are certain aspects of the distributive policy implementation process which resource 
exchange cannot explain adequately. Occasionally, policy resources do not fall into anyone’s hands, not 
necessarily because no one wants them, but because of exceptionally faulty or complicated policy design. 
Resource exchange also cannot explain the existence of "inadequate infrastructural facilities" as a major 
reason for a poor program beneficiary’s inability to make enough income to profit from an IRDP loan. 
While other policies, such as NREP, do not require much by way of infrastructural support, IRDP does 
require a basic infrastructural minimum to ensure its success for genuinely poor beneficiaries (who have 
not been exploited by various brokers and middlemen). If an intermediary has managed to get milch 
animal loans for beneficiaries so that they paid lower "overhead costs" and are receiving the maximum 
possible price for their milk, resource exchange would not help one to predict that the poor beneficiaries, 
just as in a milk society where beneficiaries are cheated, would lose money from keeping a cow (or cows) 
and generally sell their animals well before the program guidelines allow.
The resource exchange approach also does not, without stretching it, explain administrative 
behaviour that arises out of a moral imperative of "needing to do one’s duty." I do not assume that local 
administrators do not have a sense of duty, but I do assume that it is fairly narrowly defined in terms of 
meeting targets.8 Again, this does not imply that the local administrator in Tamil Nadu is necessarily, or 
even wishes to be, corrupt As a former Collector said (privately) of Tamil Nadu’s BDOs, "They are 
often forced to do things against their consciences." While some local administrators may, for the most 
part, not be corrupt, it does not imply that they would avoid implementing policy through resource 
exchange.
The most important things to keep in mind with regard to the exchange approach I use are: 1) 
Resource exchange is not just a polite way of discussing corruption; all corruption is exchange, but not all 
exchange is corruption. I do not subscribe to the view that the local administrator’s behaviour is 
determined by cupidity; 2) This approach is applied specifically with local administrators in mind. While 
Collectors have told me about their exchange relations with politicians, I do not attempt to explain the 
IAS officer’s behaviour in any detail-s/he works in an environment about which I do not know enough to 
embed a resource exchange approach; and 3) I use resource exchange primarily to explain the block 
officials’ current implementation of distributive policy, whether for subsidised credit or building 
contracts.
8See Heginbotham (1975) who has interpreted administrative behaviour in rural Tamil Nadu more "dutifully" than I have. I 
assume that the local administrator will experience some dissonance between policy goals as set out by senior administrators, and 
his personal goals of either career advancement or good transfers (both of which help his family), but I would predict that in the vast 
majority of decisions, he will favour personal over policy.
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6.2. The Elements of Exchange
Exchange is generally thought of involving individual choice, and as such it has a close association 
with the principles of micro-economic theory, and especially the economists’ assumption of economically 
rational behaviour in individuals. I also have focused on the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of 
class, caste and organisational determinants of behaviour, but I would not argue that individual goals are 
always individually determined; that is, people’s decisions to try to attain certain socio-economic goals 
are tempered by their place in society (to use an example from ERDP: the agricultural labourer interests 
himself in a cow, while the rich peasant wants to run a milk society). Weinstein and Tanur (1978: 
142-43) argue that the explanatory power of social exchange theory-foe used as it is on the individual- 
increases when it is used in combination with structural-functional approaches which view the individual 
in the context of his social location (anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1969) exemplifies the latter approach, 
and provides an elegant example of how exchange theory need not be associated with individual choice 
theory.)
The approach to resource exchange I use holds "rationality" as a corrective to explanations of local 
administrative behaviour in terms of "cupidity or stupidity," rather than as its central explanatory concept. 
Exchange theory, in its closest relation to economics, involves the individual’s ordering of interests 
without reference to societally imposed "normative scripts." Anthony Heath (1976a: 104) argues that "one 
of the great merits of the rational approach is that it forces us to abandon the notion of man as a ’cultural 
dope’ blindly following the norms and prescriptions of his culture." I have used the adjective "rational" 
to avoid the view of the local administrator as a "dope" if he does not follow the principles of 
"management" and rules of policy implementation, and have argued throughout, that given his political 
and socio-economic environment, the local official’s behaviour is far more rational and considered than 
irrational and ad hoc.
I do not, however, agree with Heath (1976a + b), when he argues that "rationality" must be the 
focal point for exchange theorists. Moreover, his definition of rationality is so broad that it could include 
with it many kinds of objectively irrational and even deviant behaviour. He argues first (1976a: 76) that 
"rational choice"9 should be discussed in terms of "people’s beliefs and knowledge" and further (1976a: 
79) that "rationality has nothing to do with the goals which men pursue but only with the means they use 
to achieve them" [his emphasis]. Heath asks whether people are efficient about achieving the goals they 
set for themselves, and argues that tautology in assessing rationality may be avoided if "we can 
independently discover what their actual goals are . . ." The "independent" discovery is, of course, 
problematic, and most economists take rational behaviour as a given.
It should not be extrapolated from this "rational" approach to administrative behaviour that all 
actors in the administrator’s environment are relentless profit-maximisers. In fact, much behaviour I 
observed or was told about in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur-ie., severe alcohol abuse and wife beating are 
primary examples-is economically irrational, and better explained in socio-psychological terms. As both 
Scott (1976) and Popkin (1979 and 1981) have argued, peasant behaviour is not best explained in terms of 
profit maximisation. The uncertainty in the "average" peasant’s environment is high enough to warrant 
his/her greater credence in social and economic institutions which yield the greatest amount of "life 
insurance" rather than the highest profit margins. "Uncertainty" also explains why people are more
^Rational choice should not be confused with public choice. The latter is a more narrowly defined version of the former, as it 
deals with individual decisions relating to "public goods" or institutions. For a critique of "public goods" theory, especially the 
definition of "public goods," see Goldin (1977).
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interested in short term rather than long term gains. Even when the long term might bring foreseeably 
higher gains, the likelihood is too great that the long term goal will be derailed by intervening disaster.
Having argued thus, however, it is possible to apply the profit-maximising behavioral assumption 
to the rich peasant in terms of his acquiring policy resources of interest to him. (Unfortunately, I did not 
question development officials on this point.) One may observe the rich peasant’s profit maximisation in 
his diversification of resource investments (although he does not necessarily follow maximisation 
strategies in all areas-especially agricultural production. See Nair, 1979). The rich peasant invests in a 
number of areas which yield higher returns than agricultural concerns (including urban businesses, 
causing a blurring in the urban-rural distinction favoured by Lipton, 1977), thus reducing his dependence 
in any one area (including agriculture), and maximising overall profit. I agree with Cancian’s (1966: 
467-69) position that "maximization is found as a norm only in some exchanges of material objects." He 
points out that this holds true in both Western and non-Western societies, and that the same person may 
be a maximiser in one exchange, but not in others. There is no reason, then, to believe that the rich 
peasant unconcerned with profit-maximisation in agricultural production could not be interested in 
maximisation of profit in other ventures.
The local administrator wishes to minimise the use of his time for most tasks (I assume that the 
BDOs and RWOs always have more tasks than time to do them in), and if possible to maximise the gain 
of other commodities, especially the achievement of policy targets. The administrator often, however, 
searches for and accepts, exchange outcomes which he knows are not "maximised" and is, perhaps, one of 
Simon’s (1958: 140-41) "satisficers."10 It is safest for the administrator to assume that each of his 
influential trading partners is, in fact, a profit maximiser. That way, he tries to assign the maximum 
possible quantity of demanded resources to each, hopefully to satisfy the maximum number of his 
partners. The local administrator who has survived for twenty years in the development administration to 
become a BDO, would only attempt to maximise target achievement for policies which have high demand 
from senior administrators and/or leading actors within the block. Because the administrator is most 
interested in the selective maximisation of targets, there is some room for non-profit intermediaries to 
operate. If administrators were only interested in financial gain, there would not be any place for 
intermediaries in the administrators’ exchange relations.
The Block Development Officer also lives with uncertainty. It should be speculated on, then, what 
forms of insurance the block official attempts to use to minimise his environmental uncertainty. His best 
insurance undoubtedly lies in keeping the population of his most powerful traders satisfied. If we assume 
that the block official seeks insurance in his environment by satisfying the demands of those who are able 
to cause him the most trouble if he does not, he is not by definition, a profit-maximiser. Rather, he is 
minimising potential losses (such as transfers to backward blocks). It would be too risky for a BDO, for 
example, to attempt to maximise his gains through exchanges with the MLA and supporters, when the 
Block Chairman or other political figure could mobilise opposition support and go to the Collector to 
have the BDO transferred. One way for the block official to have an effective "career insurance policy" is 
to build up a reserve of money and/or unpaid debts* 11 from influential people which can be called quickly 
in a time of extreme need.
10The administrator prefers to exchange policy resources for his own profit and with "future considerations" (a surplus trade). 
When he has to go to the unwanted extreme of paying out resources to meet his targets or to gain other help, it is a deficit trade.
11 Hence, the undesirability of debts which are discharged too quickly—they cannot be recalled at a time of need. This underscores 
the utility of accumulating "unspecified obligations" or future considerations from people. See Section 6.4.1.
Resource exchange is normally seen as a means that people use to achieve certain goals and 
outcomes. I have argued, for example, that the rich peasant uses IRDP’s resources in an effort to achieve 
both economic and political goals. However, exchange is not necessarily always a strategy per se. There 
are times when exchange may be seen as either a means to achieve long term, as opposed to short term, 
goals or as an end in itself. To analyse exchange as a valued outcome, it helps to turn to the 
anthropological literature, from Malinowski’s (1922) Kula ring to Marriott’s (1976) discussions of Hindu 
jatis’ exchanges of cooked and uncooked food in the village. Marriott (1976) argues that certain castes in 
villages may be seen as exchange maximisers; that is, they attempt to maximise the number of 
exchanges. There is, in fact, a continuum which may be constructed in terms of jan strategies which 
range from those who engage in no exchanges of food (minimisers) to the maximising strategy mentioned 
above. Marriott’s (1976) discussion underscores Cancian’s (1966) argument that maximisation should 
not be rejected outright in analysing non-Western societies, and adds a refinement to Cancian’s position; 
Marriott shows that maximisation as a norm may be applied selectively within the same institution (in this 
case, intercaste food exchange).
Exchange as an end and exchange as a means to a longterm end may be analytically 
indistinguishable (until we arrive at the longterm). A rich peasant may provide block or political officials 
with a meal in his home, not because he wants immediate rewards from them, but rather to establish 
connections with them (providing food to guests in one’s home carries greater significance in India than 
the West), and to show others in the village that he has such connections (other people in the village will 
be impressed with the sight of a car or government vehicle parked outside his home). In this instance, the 
visit of people who are acknowledged to have more influence in the block is desired in and of itself and 
well worth the expenditure on a good meal for them. The rich peasant would, however, hope to be able to 
"cash in" more specifically at a future date on what he sees as the establishment of a connection. This 
behaviour is also true of the local officials when, without prompting, they put on a lavish meal for a 
visiting official.
Blau’s (1964a) development of social exchange includes with it the concept of "rate of exchange." 
He argues (1964: 151) that
In the course of social exchange, a going rate of exchange between two social benefits becomes 
established. This going rate is governed by supply, and demand, though only in rough fashion, since 
considerations other than the two benefits in question influence exchange transactions, notably other 
benefits that simultaneously enter into exchange relations.
If one discusses a rate of exchange, then logically one should also be able to discuss a "currency" for the 
exchange. Because I focus on resource exchange, the currency should be expressed in units of resources 
exchanged. This is a straightforward calculation in the goods-for-money exchange involving payment of 
bribes for policy resources, such as IRDP subsidies, but is more difficult to calculate where future 
considerations enter the exchange as well. Blau discusses (1964a: 151-53) the going rate of exchange in 
terms of compliance for advice in an administrative office (he uses this situation repeatedly to provide at 
times thin proofs for his hypotheses) which is fairly simple to calculate as the transactors are all in the 
same "opportunity structure,"12 have a large number of observable transactions with each other, and use 
the same basic "currency."
The block officials’ exchanges are very different from Blau’s advice-seekers’ and givers’ because 
the resources given and received are not expressed in the same currency. The policy resource exchange is
12I discuss this concept (from Emerson, 1972b) in relation to environment in the next section, but briefly it is the main source of a 
person’s rewards or opportunities.
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a transforming medium which turns development policy funds into achieved targets (and likely help on 
other policies from his trading partners) for the BDO and the potential for increased social status and 
economic influence for the rich peasant. Homans (1961) and Blau (1964a) both discuss people’s seeking 
of rewards in the same currency because their transactors are in the same opportunity or reward structure. 
(Homans’ (1961) main concern is with "elementary" social behaviour, meaning behaviour within social 
structures no larger than the small, face-to-face, group.) The exchanges I focus on bring together 
transactors from different opportunity structures, making calculations of rates of exchange difficult;13 ie., 
how does one compare the value to a BDO of achieving 20% of his annual IRDP target (and probable 
help with the bio-gas scheme) through a single exchange, with the value to the rich peasant of being able 
to run a milk society with 120 members of his choosing and from each of whom he has been able to 
collect Rs 100? To make a valid comparison one would have to construct a fairly complete hierarchy of 
goal preferences for both transactors, and express the resources received as a percentage of each person’s 
total goals. This is a calculation beyond my powers to perform, and requires so much data (or 
assumptions) that it is hardly worth doing.
Power is a concept central to social exchange. Blau’s (1964a) definition of power from social 
exchange borrows from Emerson (1962), who discussed "power-dependence" in terms of alternatives 
open to the transactors. While Blau’s "social" power is a useful concept,14 it would have been 
strengthened had he discussed it in relation to something akin to the opportunity structure. He defines 
power (1964a; 117) as
the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either 
in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the 
former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction.
When the transactors are in the same opportunity structure, (as Blau’s advice-givers and receivers), 
those who are in a resource-superordinate position are more likely, ceteris paribus, to be able to establish 
power over resource-subordinates. If, for example, someone from Department X gives advice on a 
regular basis to someone from Department Y, this advice-giver’s source of power lies only in his/her 
ability to withdraw the advice. If they are in the same department, however, not only can "advice-giver" 
withdraw the advice, s/he may also be able to block "advice-receiver’s" promotion attempts or, 
conversely, help "advice-receiver" get a raise or promotion. In discussing power that arises from 
exchange, then, it is crucial to know whether Transactor A has control over resources with which s/he can 
reward or punish Transactor B, within B’s opportunity structure. Power based on both Person’s ability to 
withhold rewards and to punish by additional means important to Other, is greater than withholding 
rewards taken alone.
The exchange transactions in the block involving local administrators and the rich peasantry 
downplay power considerations because the two sets of actors are loosely interdependent The traders on 
both sides of the exchange usually have adequate alternate sources of desired/needed resources-neither is 
dependent on the other for their main sources of rewards.15 The same can be said of transactions which 
occur between the rich peasants and politicians. Politicians and local administrators also do not belong to
13This is not to argue, however, that "going rates" are not established, nor that the local administrator makes a conscious 
cost-benefit analysis for every exchange. For building contracts, for example, there are fairly well-established rates of exchange 
depending on, among other things, the contractor’s political affiliation.
14Blau defines (1964a: 116) the coercive aspects of power, including threats of violence, as being separate from power that arises 
from social exchange.
15Rich peasants may forego transactions with development officials entirely if  they have better, more reliable, sources of 
investment in, for example, a nearby market town.
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the same opportunity structure, and yet politicians clearly have power over the local administrators. The 
politicians have power over the local administrators which arises from their control over a crucial 
instrument of reward/punishment within the administrator’s opportunity structure: the transfer. If
politicians were to have the power of transfer removed from them (much easier said than done), their 
dominance over the local administrators would be reduced.
An aspect of social power discussed by Blau (1964a 133-35) is that it diminishes with use, 
especially when Person has only a small margin of power over Other. One of the more interesting, and 
puzzling, aspects of resource exchange I encountered in the blocks, was the RWOs (and AHOs) giving 
excuses to ER.DP beneficiaries to legitimise their illicit requests for money. These officials have adequate 
power vis-a-vis the poor to withhold the resource if it is not paid for. Why, then, do they use excuses they 
do not really need? The answer is related to the officials’ desire to maintain their power in a "positive 
balance" in their exchange relations with villagers. In Blau’s terms, the RWOs would expend some of 
their power every time they make unsubstantiated claims for bribe money. There is strength in this 
argument, in that the villager who has had to pay bold-faced bribes to the RWO (as opposed to paying 
him money because the policy rules require it), is less likely to do the RWO the favour of putting money 
into a smallsavings scheme. Gouldner (1960: 176) adds another perspective to this argument with his 
discussion of "status duties:" "the norm of reciprocity requires that if others have been fulfilling their 
status duties to you, you in turn have an additional second-order obligation (repayment) to fulfill your 
status duties to them." Every time an official asks for a bribe which is obviously a bribe, he is acting 
against his "status duty" (which is still perceived as providing policy resources free of charge), thereby 
absolving the bribe-payer from any further obligations to him.
Another important element of exchange is "distributive justice." This concept was introduced by 
Homans in 1958, developed further by him in 1961 and added to by Blau (1964b) and Alexander and 
Simpson (1971). When transactors to an exchange are in different opportunity structures, however, they 
may well have few expectations regarding distributive justice because there is little base on which to 
compare the resources each has gained. It is in this instance, perhaps, more useful to think in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis for the individual transactor. Salisbury (1976: 56-57), in a discussion about Indian 
trappers and the Hudson’s Bay Company, argues that prices (and trapping strategies) are arrived at which 
are best understood in terms of individual calculations of opportunity-costs. "Relativity" and relative 
deprivation would also have a role to play in the villager’s calculation of the exchange outcome. He may 
compare his expenditure for a quantum of resources with another person’s costs and benefits from a 
similar exchange in the neighbourhood (this is similar to Homans’ conceptualisation (1958: 604) of 
distributive justice), or with his own most recent exchange with development officials.
Insofar as a person’s social environment is subjectively defined, so too are his/her perceptions of 
his/her status in that environment, and what s/he is entitled to from exchanges. Working in hand with a 
notion of distributive justice is that of entitlement. The impression I carried from the blocks was that the 
politicians (MLAs in particular) had highly developed senses of entitlement, meaning that their view of 
what they are entitled to from others, including block development officials, is disproportionate to what 
they should be entitled to. The implications of this for the local administrator are serious. It means that 
he may find himself performing tasks for the politician without being able to look forward to any 
recompense--his favour has been reduced by the MLA.’s perceptions to a duty, with a consequent reduced 
obligation on the MLA’s part to reciprocate with a favour. Therefore, when the local administrator wants 
a favour from the MLA, he must pay for it.
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In this section I have introduced some attempted refinements to the social exchange approach, 
(especialy Blau’s), based on my analysis of the development administration’s implementation in the block 
and with the aid of Emerson’s (1972b) opportunity structure. The block officials’ exchange relations 
occur both within and across their inter-opportunity structure. This discussion is a departure from the 
works of Homans and Blau which are focused on exchanges within a single opportunity structure. When 
one can make comparisons in exchanges which occur within and across opportunity structures one may 
also add refinements, for example, to the concept of social power. Exchange theorists cannot avoid 
economics entirely, but as I have argued, it is possible to avoid using the major assumptions of economics 
(such as rationality and profit-maximisation) in the way that economists do. That is, largely without 
reference to the ways in which the transactors’ behaviour is bounded by their political and socio-cultural 
environment.
6.3. The Local Administrator in a ’Perilous’^Environment
Resource exchange analysis becomes effective when one defines the socio-economic and political 
"working" environment of the block development official who is directly in charge of allocating resources 
to the rural population of the block (this is opposed to officials who are in charge of allocating policy 
resources to other officials). It is analytically most useful to see the local administrator working in an 
"environment of demands"; in essence, a monetised political and administrative environment, the 
boundaries of which are not coterminous with the block boundaries. While I focus on exchange activities 
as they occur within the block, I recognise that they are impinged upon by actors and institutions outside 
this level. The conflict inherent in many of the demands on the BDO gives rise to the "peril" in his 
environment. The senior administrator, for example, may demand that more time be spent with Policy A 
in Village X, while the Block Chairman demands more contracts through Policy B, and the MLA’s 
supporters demand that Policy A’s resources go to Village Y which is ineligible to receive Policy A’s 
resources. On the other hand, Village Y could receive Policy B’s resources which would make the MLA 
happy, but anger the Block Chairman. And so forth.
Important environmental features include administrative organisation (where many development 
management analysts end their analyses), the dynamics of the political system at the local level of the 
state, and the type of economic infrastructure and socio-economic relations in the block. The local 
official’s environment must also include the total number and type of policies he is in charge of 
implementing at any given time, and the other tasks he is required to do, such as report writing and 
"hosting" politicians and senior administrators.17 Other organisational features of the environment which 
have a structuring effect on transactions include the elected panchayat union council, nationalised banks, 
and other administrative departments (I have, however, very little data on interdepartmental co-operation 
and competition.)
16The term ’perilous environment’ is from the title of Herbert Kaufman’s (1985) book: Time, Chance, 
and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment. His discussion, as the title suggests, is 
about organisations rather than officials, but the term is apt from the BDO’s perspective as well. Other 
authors, including Blau and Scott (1962) and Downs (1966), have also used die concept "organisational 
environment" without focusing on the individual administrator’s environment
17In the development administrator’s policy repertoire, a policy which is anomalous in terms of resource exchange is family 
planning. Considering that administrators spend much time with it, and lose money in the process, resource exchange would predict 
that administrators would avoid implementing this policy. The opposite is true in Tamil Nadu and, as explained in Chapter Two, the 
District Collectors place tremendous urgency on the need for BDOs to achieve their family planning targets. They, in turn, are 
under equally tremendous pressure from the state’s seniormost officials to reach district targets. Senior administrators, o f course, 
have control over resources with which they can take punitive action against their juniors, thus explaining why the latter do work 
hard-albeit with numerous complaints-to meet family planning targets.
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An official’s working environment or "environment of demands" will vary markedly with shifts 
from block office to division office, and especially from district to state-level offices. Because of this, the 
focus of this study has been squarely on the block. Resource exchange analysis could be carried 
effectively into senior administrative offices but painstaking care would have to be taken to identify the 
important elements of the IAS officer’s environment. From recruitment, through career patterns, to 
places of work, to political and administrative demands, the IAS officer, even if in the development 
administration, is in a very different "eco-niche" from the Block Development Officer who may never be 
posted outside of the blocks within a single district.
It is useful to see the Block Development Officer’s environment in two ways, as the block official 
is not usually firmly bounded by the block in terms of the actors with whom he interacts. The local 
official’s environment has rather loose boundaries, which relate to the outer limits from which demands 
reach him. On occasion, it could be argued that the limits of the environment stretch all the way to 
Madras or even to New Delhi, but I am primarily concerned with the BDO’s immediate environment--his 
epicentre of demands. Demands from more than a relatively short distance (the Collectorate) outside of 
the block will not reach the administrator, or only so indirectly, or weakly, as to be hardly felt. When an 
administrator in New Delhi says that 600 beneficiaries per block must receive IRDP loans, it means little 
to the BDO until it has been translated into an order from the Collectorate or DRDA.
The second way to see the local administrator’s environment is as a Venn Diagram (see Figure 6.1). 
This graphically portrays the complexity of the local administrator’s working environment, although the 
overlapping circles still do not emphasise enough the complexity and "peril" inherent in the local 
official’s environment. The Venn Diagram shows, however, that the block officials will be impinged 
upon by numerous actors, including the rich peasantry, the mass of villagers, local politicians, and more 
senior administrators. The areas on the local administrator’s circle which are overlapped by two other 
circles at the same juncture are critical, as they represent areas of especially strong demand, resulting 
from co-operation between actors with different resource sets (including the rich peasants and local 
politicians; local politicians and district administrators; rich peasants and district administrators). It 
should be noted that the intermediaries’ activities are strengthened immeasurably if they can get the 
support of an official like the Collector.
The Venn Diagram also represents two other important concepts for the resource exchange 
approach; the opportunity structure and the exchange network. As Figure 6.1 depicts, the block official’s 
environment is made up of actors who also have interactions with other actors in the official’s 
environment. One consequence of this is that the notion of dyadic exchange, commonly favoured by 
exchange theorists (see Lande’s (1977b), "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism"), is inadequate to describe 
the official’s transactions, as each actor is involved in other transactions which may have bearing on the 
exchange under scrutiny. 18t This also leads to the concept of opportunity structure introduced, although 
not developed, by Emerson (1972b: 70). The local official’s opportunity structure is not the same as his 
environment-it is rather a subset of his environment. As the name implies, it is the "structure" (a 
structure which varies in abstractness) which is someone’s main source of rewards (or punishments). For 
the block official, this may be equated with the district development administration from which he gets a 
salary, his transfer orders, promotions and suspensions, (he is also part of a social opportunity structure 
which involves kinship ties and obligations). Various actors’ opportunity structures overlap where they 
attempt to gain resources from each other which will help them in the opportunity structure which is their 
primary point of reference.
18Further discussion of dyadic versus network exchange is developed in Section 6.5.
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Figure 6-1: The Block Development Official’s Environment
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Figure Notes: The circles do not represent population 
size. Rich peasants are shown in two half circles to represent 
better their diverse strategies in gaining policy resources.
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In an organisational milieu such as the development administration, the local officials rely heavily 
on transactors thrown up by their environment An important hypothesis of the resource exchange 
approach is that the block officials require local traders to implement distributive policy (if they are 
going to meet an acceptable percentage of their targets). Because exchange theorists for obvious reasons 
focus on exchange, they tend to overlook situations where an actor cannot find adequate traders to take 
his resources (because they are already focused on exchange they don’t look for its preconditions). 
Without the aid of his trading partners the administrator would be unable to implement policy at all in 
some cases. If there had been no "big men" interested in forming milk societies during the Sixth Plan, the 
block development officials would have had much more difficulty in implementing IRDP.
I do not assume that there is always an adequate number of potential traders for the block officials. 
This corresponds to the "economically backward" block where BDOs chronically fall short of their 
targets. While this is highly speculative, it seems the backward block does not have a large enough 
population of rich peasants to sustain an exchange network extensive enough to enable a BDO, especially 
an unskilled one, to meet his program targets. The BDO with an inadequate population of traders in his 
own block may want to search for traders in a neighbouring block, but for all intents and purposes he is 
prevented from doing so by the neighbouring block officials. Moreover, the "backward" block is 
successfully avoided by the skilled BDO, thus meaning that it becomes a repository of the worst BDOs in 
the district.19 The "backward" block, then, would be a good place to encourage the activities of 
intermediaries. With a greater need for traders, the block officials would be more willing to exchange 
resources with genuine representatives of the poor. The intermediaries will have less competition from 
the smaller population of rich peasantry in the villages, and may even (eventually) be able to take control 
of block contracts. This strategy would, of course, take time. Skilled intermediaries do not spring up 
over night, and there is always the possibility that the policy itself may not provide appropriate resources, 
especially in an area which has little economic infrastructure to support the program.
The exchange approach I employ relies on the environment to set the context of policy resource 
exchanges which occur in the block. While I do not wish to go to the extreme of "environmental 
determinism," it is important to see the individual’s actions as being impinged upon by his/her 
environment. The local administrator’s environment is fraught with uncertainty, making much of his 
decision-making a stressful process. Returning to the "evolution-selection" metaphor of the introduction, 
the BDO is a "survival" rather than "change" agent, responding as best he can to survive in a perilous 
environment rather than acting effectively to change it. His lack of security within his environment has a 
number of implications, perhaps the most important being the manner in which he seeks "survival 
insurance" while implementing rural development policy.
6.3.1. Other Actors in the Block Environment
The other main actors involved in policy resource exchange are the rich peasantry (including 
Panchayat Presidents),20 and the local politicians (MLA, Block Chairman, party bureaucrats). Each of 
these actors controls resources which the others need or want. When someone gains control of resources
19Chambers (1983) laments the high correlation between "backwardness" and low-skilled administrators. In other words, the best 
avoid the worst.
^Some Presidents are not rich peasants but in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, these are few, and many of these few owe their positions to 
the rich peasantry of their villages. The rich peasant-Panchayat President’s access to additional resources as a result of his elected 
position is little greater than if he did not have the position.
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from another actor, especially one who has resources from another opportunity structure, he may be able 
to increase his control over still more resources, thus enabling himself to come nearer to certain socio­
economic or political goals.21 The poor, on the other hand, have few resources which the politically and 
economically powerful actors of the rural areas need (their labour is in oversupply and their votes are only 
needed at elections; for ERDP, of course, their willingness to take milch animals is needed by loan 
brokers), and are left out of the local administrator’s exchange network almost entirely, excepting limited, 
market-type exchanges involving direct payments (bribes) for policy resources.
One must be careful in assigning absolute values of power to the main traders in their exchange 
relations with each other. At the local level, however, the elected politician-the MLA-is undoubtedly 
the most advantaged (although not necessarily the most long-lived), especially because s/he wields 
considerable power over the local administrator. Furthermore, if a junior administrator has good 
connections with politicians, he is more likely to escape a variety of administrative punishments from his 
seniors (provided he has enough funds to buy the politician’s help). Since India’s Independence an 
increasing number of politicians at both the state and federal levels have come from the rich peasantry, 
and the two blocks I studied "boasted" four ex-MLAs, of whom only one was an "urbanite" (this also 
tends to dispel Lipton’s idea of "urban bias"). However, for the purposes of the discussion the politician 
should be considered in a different category from the rich peasant because of his/her control and influence 
over far superior resources. Politicians, despite their obvious strengths, do need support in the block, and 
they also need extra sources of income, as their election spending is enormous.
The rich peasant is the most long-lived transactor in the local administrator’s working environment. 
There is little a local administrator or politician can do to harm the rich peasants’ basic interests, although 
they may prevent him from achieving certain socio-economic and political goals. The rich peasant, as a 
major employer of rural labour, has wide-ranging, if exploitative, contacts with the agricultural labourers 
of his village which is a valuable resource for the administrator-through those contacts, for example, the 
rich peasant selects ERDP beneficiaries. Therefore, the rich peasants’ abilities as brokers between the 
development administration and the mass of villagers are highly valued by the administrator.22 The rich 
peasants’ desire for policy resources under the development administrator’s charge is largely based on 
intra-village competition for the same circumscribed set of resources. These include loyal workers and 
supporters, political party representation in the village, panchayat presidency, village construction 
contracts, and increased status. External resources are particularly valuable as a means for someone to 
gain or maintain an upper hand in village disputes. The factional dispute is at once, then, a divisive and 
dynamic force in the village, although far from every village is faction-ridden. Some policy resources 
(especially for building contracts) are inherently desirable in that they lead directly to large profit 
margins.
The exchange relations the administrators have with the rich peasants, then, are mutually 
profitable-the local officials divest themselves of policy resources, thereby meeting targets as demanded 
by senior administrators, and often keeping a percentage of the policy resources (especially contract 
resources) for themselves, while the latter gain control of them to make additional profits and ensure that
21 Simon (1969: 158) posits, "In general, it is thought not to be problematical to postulate that individuals have goals."
^In implementing NREP if block administrators had not, in contravention of one of the program’s most important rules, given 
over NREP projects to rich peasant-contractors (who hire the required labourers) it would have been impossible for them to 
complete even a fraction of the targeted projects. In implementing NREP through contractors, administrators in the two blocks I 
studied were able to meet the majority o f their targets (which does not imply, however, that the projects themselves were 
completed).
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they go to the appropriate supporters. Homans (1961) and Blau (1964a) both argue that the mutual 
profitability of social exchange is a truism-people would not be involved in them otherwise. Alfred 
Kuhn (cited in Emerson, 1972b: 62) argues that exchanges by definition are mutually profitable and that it 
is irrelevant to ask who came out "worse" until one imposes an external, normative standard on them. 
While the exchange relations between the local officials and rich peasantry may be characterised as 
"mutually profitable," the same cannot be said of the relations between senior and junior officials, Kuhn 
notwithstanding. While there are some mutually profitable aspects to their relations, for the most part 
they are characterised by a one-way flow of threats and exhortations from the senior officials to get 
various tasks completed, especially targets of "high-profile" policies.
Non-traders are largely omitted from gaining development policy resources on their own terms. 
The majority of non-traders are, in short, the poor-the landless agricultural labourers, the small and 
marginal peasants, the sharecroppers, and the small tenants. The resource exchange approach explains 
that these people are non-traders by virtue of their not having resources that those in control of tradable 
resources are interested in obtaining.23 (On the organisational side of the equation, non-traders are 
difficult to find in the block. The bankers involved in ERDP are, perhaps, the closest to non-traders, but 
that is largely in relation to borrowers rather than to actors from other organisations. Insofar as bankers 
are non-traders, it is out of choice rather than exclusion by other actors.) Gouldner (1960: 178), writing on 
the "norm of reciprocity," underscores this with the argument that "the norm may lead individuals to 
establish relations only or primarily with those who can reciprocate, thus inducing neglect of the needs of 
those unable to do so." The poor have numbers, but they form a highly diverse and farflung group which, 
partly for reasons of caste, does not often recognise its class interests. As Beteille (1974: 111) argued, 
"sharecroppers and agricultural labourers continue to be divided even within the village by a variety of 
distinctions based on both caste and economic opportunity and their extra-village links are limited, 
sporadic and have little political significance."
The resource exchange approach I employ does not assume that trading actors necessarily co­
operate with one another. Moreover, the patterns of resource co-operation and competition among the 
leading actors has a determining role to play in the spatial distribution of ERDP benefits. The same 
transactors who co-operate one day may compete the next, but this has not had the effect of skewing the 
terms of trade in favour of the poor, nor has it increased the number of transactions with them. The 
exchanging local official, unlike the administrative "gatekeeper," becomes closely involved with the 
leading actors in his environment, resulting in his partial allocation of resources (Thoden van Velzen, 
1977). Germane to this argument is S. N. Eisenstadt’s (1969: 307) notion of "debureaucratization" in 
which "there is subversion of the goals and activities of the bureaucracy in the interests of different 
groups with which it is in close interaction (clients, patrons, interested parties)." Unfortunately, the poor 
are seldom able to "subvert" the local development administration.
^It is, for example, more difficult for a poor person than a rich one to see any administrator in the block office, and most would 
find that numerous trips to the block office are necessary before they can see the right person and get the appropriate information or 
help from him. With the paucity of bus services, and the type of office hours kept by the administrators, it would be all too easy for 
someone to spend an entire working day, with no guarantee of success, trying to see an official.
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6.32. Brokers and Intermediaries
Not a single act here below appears ever to be done by a man free from self-love; whatever he performed, 
it is wrought from his desire of a reward.The Laws of Manu quoted in Orans (1968: 887).
For the purposes of the resource exchange approach a distinction should be drawn between brokers 
and intermediaries. Brokers are those people in a village who act as contacts between villagers and the 
outside world,24 but are motivated by self-interest in providing this service for their fellow villagers. I am 
not, however, using the term "broker" in an entirely conventional sense, as the broker for IRDP does not 
stop at getting the loans for other villagers, but continues to have some control over the assets by virtue of 
his role as president of a milk society. This broker, then, is also a "patron." In interviews brokers did not 
mention their own interests in profiting from the brokerage role, claiming instead that they were 
performing an important and beneficent function for their village.25 One milk society president (one of 
the most exploitative as far as I could determine) claimed in 1985 that through his efforts to get the largest 
number of IRDP loans in Lalgudi, he was using "Gandhian methods of upliftment" to remove the plight 
of his village’s agricultural labourers and "change their lives forever."26
While one normally thinks of a broker as a go-between for villagers in their dealings with 
"inscrutable" external institutions, the development administration is, as argued in Chapter Three, an 
important broker for the politician in its role as his/her rural public relations vehicle. The block 
administration is, however, to use Paine’s (1976: 83) argument, "the creature of that particular client (the 
politician)." Therefore, rather than performing a brokerage function in its own interests, as the broker 
normally does, it must perform it in the way dictated by the politician. The local development 
administration does not gain power over the politician by virtue of its brokerage function.
An intermediary’ on the other hand performs a function similar to a broker’s, but without thought of 
making profits for him or herself beyond, perhaps, an increase in status in the community. Voluntary 
agencies could be put in the intermediary category, along with the "educated unemployed youth" of the 
village.27 The "educated unemployed youth" is interested in promoting the welfare of his community, 
rather than in exploiting it. This is not to say that all "educated unemployed youth" are socialworkers, 
and all rich peasants are exploiters, but the trend is in that direction. An important difference between 
intermediaries and brokers is that the latter are skilled at spending other people’s resources in gaining 
resources for themselves, thus keeping their own expenditures to a minimum.
The intermediary, on the other hand, because s/he is not interested in trying to make a financial gain 
from the transaction, avoids giving any money to the administrator. While the intermediary would not 
collect anything beyond legitimate fees from the beneficiary, this does not mean that the latter would 
escape paying bribes, as the officials may still demand them personally. The intermediary has few
^Bailey (1963: 100-03) uses the term "broker" in this sense, although he further argues that "they are agents of social change" 
and identifies them with the "middle class."
^Cohen and Comaroff (1976: 90-95) argue in very similar terms about political brokers in the province of Newfoundland 
(Canada). They (1976: 93) say that the successful broker "must employ a rhetoric of legitimation which condemns any reward for 
himself."
26This is just one example of "double-talk" which is depressingly common when one enters poverty alleviation waters. 
Administrators and rural elites alike realise fully well that the development policy resources which they appropriate should go to the 
poor. They maintain a facade of concern for the poor’s welfare while at the same time taking control of all or part of the resources 
which should flow to the poor.
27In the two blocks in which I did research there was no activity by voluntary agencies (except for one church group which set up 
some childcare centres in a few villages in Lalgudi block).
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resources of monetary value to exchange, although s/he may be successful in bringing "moral pressure" to 
bear on more senior officials (such as the Divisional Development Officer and/or Collector). The 
intermediary’s tactic could be termed an appeal to a hoped-for altruism in the senior officials. (This issue 
is discussed by Katz and Danet, 1973, with reference to new immigrants to Israel and their dealings with 
customs officials.) It should be reiterated that the people whom I was able to identify as "intermediaries" 
in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks are all from Scheduled Castes.28
As the quotation from the Laws of Manu at the beginning of this subsection indicates, the search 
for "pure" altruists is likely to prove fruitless. Certainly, a resource exchange approach predicated on the 
notion of some sort of profit or reward from an exchange with another person or group would not predict 
the existence of altruists, or be able to explain their behaviour. The altruist only gives, not taking 
anything in return but commendations 29 Nonetheless, while the educated Scheduled Caste youth is 
unlikely to be a saint with no motives based on self-interest whatsoever, s/he is essentially altruistic, and 
should be accepted as such by the exchange theorist. The altruist’s motivation for helping his/her 
community may well be bom of a sense of personal injustice (ie., if educated but unemployed) which 
grows to a feeling of community injustice including, perhaps, elements of relative deprivation (on relative 
deprivation and social exchange, see Adams, 1965). While social exchange theory is inadequate to 
explain altruistic behaviour, it can help to explain the feelings which engender it. That is, the 
unemployed youth has not received adequate recompense from society for his/her investment in 
education, s/he still has low social status in the village and, being a Scheduled Caste person, s/he is 
unlikely to have wealthier kin from whom help could be received in finding employment.
The administrator, because he is interested in making some financial gain from policy resource 
transactions, prefers to interact with brokers than intermediaries, and intermediaries may find it difficult 
to obtain the resources their community (or clients, in the case of voluntary agencies) is actually entitled 
to. Intermediaries have been far less actively involved in IRDP than brokers which implies, correctly, 
that the majority of poor beneficiaries have received program resources not because they or a helping 
intermediary have demanded them, but rather as a result of the self-interested aspirations of brokers and 
administrators.
Self-interest is a theme which runs strongly through the exchange literature. It does provide a fairly 
compelling explanation of strategies in social exchange, but as the discussion on intermediaries 
demonstrates, one must be cautious in applying the "self-interested, profit-maximiser" model of human 
behaviour unreservedly. Nonetheless, in the resource exchange subset of social exchange, altruistic 
behaviour is rare, and intermediaries active in policy resource exchange are few and far between. In 
essence, policy resource exchange takes place in a resource scarce, monetised political-administrative 
environment which encourages self-interested behaviour. I do not argue for the self-interested maximiser 
as a given in social exchange generally, (there are too many cultural or other constraints against this 
behaviour), but it does hold true in a preponderance of exchanges involving the local officials, rich 
peasants, and politicians.
28The predominance of Scheduled Castes among intermediaries who are able to gamer policy resources for their communities 
reflects in part the impact of targeting on local administrative behaviour. Senior administrators place much emphasis on BDOs’ 
meeting their "SC targets," particularly for IRDP.
^This in itself may be a source of "psychic profit" for the giver, but essentially the altruist is not involved in exchange per se. 
See Befu (1977: 259-60) for a discussion, including a critique of Meeker (1971), who argues that even altruism should be included 
under the banner of social exchange, as an exchange in which Person assigns Other maximum pay-off (Meeker, 1971: 490).
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6.4. Resources
Resources are what exchange is usually about.30 I define resources here to mean anything which 
may be used to achieve an individual’s political or socio-economic (including career advancement) goals. 
These resources include: money and credit, supporters, ascriptive ties, "connections," control over jobs 
and contracts, land, information, and agricultural inputs such as water, fertilisers and seeds. In terms of 
distributive policy, resources are what the policy has to offer, whether goods (including money and 
subsidies) or services. In the rural areas, with their largely subsistence, cash-scarce economies, resource 
production is limited. (Unfortunately, a significant percentage of state-provided distributive policy 
resources are either extracted from the rural areas or wasted in village projects which are never 
completed.) Therefore, resources which are brought in from outside, including administratively-controlled 
resources, are generally in demand, especially among people who have a high enough income-level— 
primarily the rich peasantry-to enable them to consider investment opportunities outside of agriculture.
Because policy resources coming into a village are curtailed, sometimes severely, people do not 
expect there to be an assured supply. This leads to an intra-village zero-sum view of resource acquisition 
among competitors for the same resources. If a rich peasant takes control of a certain policy’s resources, 
other rich peasants within the village are unlikely to acquire the same policy’s resources. This represents 
a gain to the first person if the policy resources are generally valued. First person’s competitors realise 
that his gain of policy resources may be used to achieve political and socio-economic goals, including 
goals harmful to their political and socio-economic interests. If, however, one person takes control of one 
policy’s resources, someone else may try harder to gain resources available through other sources.
Transactors seldom want policy resources merely for the sake of having them; their value lies in 
what they can do with them once possession has been gained.31 Rich peasants do as much as possible 
with policy resources in order to further their political and/or economic aspirations, and are versatile in 
utilising the resources they take control of. They accumulate, trade, process and retrade, extract, hoard, 
and distribute resources. One of the most productive uses of resources for the rich peasant lies in 
"processing" them. As argued in Chapter Five, the real IRDP beneficiary is the milk society president 
who "processes" ERDP subsidies (through commission arrangements, exorbitant membership fees, 
participation on purchase committees, and lucrative private milk sales)- This is a "multiplier" effect, 
which sees the loan brokers increase income in a number of ways from the same, limited policy 
resources.32
An important conclusion I draw about resources, especially policy resources, is that their value is 
relative. Therefore, it is of little utility to analyse a policy separately from others which are being
30The "symbolic interactionists" led originally by George H. Mead (writing in the 1930s) and then by Blumer (1969 for a 
collection of his previously published articles) argue that people’s interactions should be analysed in terms of the meanings they 
transact. Needless to say, I do not use that approach here, although it clearly has a place in transactional views of society.
31 Anthropologists, notably Malinowski (1922, and cited in the works of Blau, Sahlins, Befu, and others), have discovered that 
certain "primitive" groups do, in fact, exchange resources of no intrinsic value. This describes the "Kula ring" o f  Trobriand 
Islanders observed by Malinowski. For them, the shell necklaces and armbands they exchange with other islanders have no value 
except as a symbol of the exchange itself. The act of exchange, rather than the item exchanged, is valued.
32In the implementation of NREP, policy resources are literally "processed." Although the development administration must 
directly supervise NREP projects, they are illicitly handed over to contractors. Wages for NREP are supposed to be paid to workers 
partly in cash and partly in kind (rice or wheat grain), but the sub-contractors frequently pay the workers entirely in cash (sometimes 
because the workers do not want the low-quality grain). They then take the unused grain to a local mill, have it repolished, and sell it 
for a higher price on the open market. (Herring and Edw'ards, 1983 : 580-81, 590, also discuss similar instances o f wage 
misappropriation in NREP’s precursor in Maharashtra, the Employment Guarantee Scheme.)
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implemented concurrently. The development administration (and others) always implements a number of 
policies at once, which creates a stock of policy resources. The current stock of available policy resources 
in the area helps to determine the demand for any given policy. People’s perceptions of resources and 
their productive (not only in economic terms) value has an important effect in determining the level of 
demand for them; that is, it should should not be assumed that demand relates only to supply and price 
(the concept of "price" is, at any rate, difficult to use as policy resources do not have production costs per 
se for the local administrator-see Section 6.4.1).
The block official’s perceptions of policy resources are quite different from the rich peasant’s or the 
politician’s. There are occasions when there is very little demand for policy resources, no matter what the 
available "stock," because they have no intrinsic value to the people of the block. These resources 
become a burden to the administrators. Quite simply, resources they cannot disburse are targets they 
cannot meet. Therefore, the most valuable policy resources to the administrator are the ones he can 
disburse to the satisfaction of his distant supervisors and (in the case of valued policy resources) his most 
influential "trading partners." The implication of this is that the "fulfilled target" is also a resource (its 
importance varying with the demand) for the local administrator which he can use to earn rewards from 
either district officials or the MLA. The block development official who does not meet his targets under a 
program, notably family planning33 can expect admonishments from his administrative superiors (not to 
mention suspensions and removal of block facilities).
There are some programs in the development administrators’ repertoire which do not provide any 
tradable resources at all, thus not involving any resources except the administrator’s time. These include 
taking a village water supply census, other information-gathering programs, maintenance programs, and 
even distributive policies have non-distributive aspects (ie., monitoring IRDP beneficiaries’ progress). As 
would be predicted with the resource exchange approach, unless senior administrators strongly emphasise 
the necessity of completing these "resource-less" tasks, they are seldom done. Village repair works are 
similarly "resource-less." While rich peasants scramble to get construction contracts in and around their 
villages, once the works are completed (if they are completed), there is no monetary incentive provided to 
keep them in good repair (there is, in fact, more incentive to have them disintegrate quickly, so that new 
contracts are tendered to do them over again). Not surprisingly, my visits to villages revealed that the 
state of repair of village roads, paths, latrines, and street lights was very poor.
The rich peasants’ most important, "basic" resource is land, the ownership and/or control of which 
has a structuring effect on the exchange of other resources in the rural areas.34 The amount of land which 
leads to a family’s relatively assured control of other resources and to greater investment opportunities 
outside of agriculture varies depending on the land’s natural productivity, the types of crops grown, 
access to assured water supplies, and the structure of landholdings in the area (landprices per acre quoted 
in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur varied from Rs 1000 and less, to Rs 40,000). Generally if a person has enough
33Family planning is far from the only "low demand" policy in the rural areas. Fortunately for the block officials, other "zero to 
low demand" policies such as the smallsavings scheme (under which villagers are to put money into postal and other institutional 
savings accounts every month) and the bio-gas scheme (whereby women would be able to cook over gas rather than with traditional, 
less efficient smoky fuels such as wood and/or dung/straw cakes) are not so heavily emphasised by senior administrators. Despite 
the government’s offer of major subsidies (just over 50%) for the purchase and installation of bio-gas plants, there has been to date 
little demand for them in Tamil Nadu. Interestingly, people who had bio-gas plants said they did not have to bribe the RWOs or 
other government officials (although unlike family planning, they did not receive any money from the local officials) in order to 
receive the necessary equipment.
34A distinction should be drawn between controlling resources and appearing to control them (or between gaining resources and 
appearing to gain them), as poverty alleviation policy resources often only appear to go to the right people. This is usually put into 
effect through the "benami name" (as it is termed in Tamil Nadu) or transaction. The benami transaction is so commonly used, it 
may be appropriately considered an important resource available to the rich peasant
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land (or enough access to land) to put him in the class of rich peasant, he will be involved in an exchange 
network which includes not only other similarly placed persons and a large population of employees, but 
also local administrators, bankers and politically important people in the block, (if not at a higher level).35
In some instances ascriptive ties can help make up for a lack of land. In Lalgudi and Thuraiyur 
Blocks I met two wealthy building contractors who had been agricultural/construction labourers (one of 
them had even worked as a coolie for the block office). Both men are caste mates and distant relatives of 
former MLAs, and managed to ingratiate themselves with their more powerful relatives to their 
advantage. These two men represent undoubtedly extremely good fortune in using "connections" to make 
it from "rags to riches," but the main point to be gleaned here is that the block official will have to pay 
close attention to the exercise of people’s asserted connections. That is, the more politically shrewd the 
BDO is, the better he will be able to judge the difference between effective and claimed connections. 
Based on that judgement the BDO can construct a rough hierarchy of "demanders" in the block, deciding 
who he can afford to ignore and who he cannot
While vertical connections are of undeniable importance, contacts and connections among rich 
peasants of different villages in the block or neighbouring blocks are also a resource. Whether through 
political affiliation, membership in growers’ associations, leadership in credit co-operatives, contract 
sharing, or through panchayat union council meetings, the rich peasants forge horizontal connections 
which allow them to co-operate to share the resources available from the state.36 As observed in Chapter 
Three, local contractors in the two blocks share contracts across lines of political affiliation, which thus 
limits competition among themselves and enables them to share in greater profits.37 Moreover, a number 
of rich peasant-contractors working together can more effectively lobby a politician or a more senior 
administrator to put pressure on the local official, if that official does not oblige them with their desired 
contract allocations. Vertical political and economic connections in India have been so stressed (to wit, 
the enormous literature on factions and patron-client relations) that the importance of horizontal 
connections has been downplayed. Beteille (1974: 109) observed, however: "The progressive farmers, 
like entrepreneurs of every kind, have shown considerable dynamism in cutting across the bonds of 
kinship, caste and community in order to develop networks of effective economic and political relations."
Social status and prestige, kinship ties and level of education are resources whose values are 
relative and vary with time and place. They are, moreover, in a group of "social" resources which cannot 
be exchanged, although they have a structuring effect on transactions which do occur. In terms of 
"tradability," resources like information, knowledge and skills (especially brokerage skills) may be 
offered for exchange without being lost to the possessor of the resource. Blau’s (1964a: 169-71) use of 
the economic concept, "diminishing marginal utility," is relevant to some of the resources under 
discussion here. A person’s information about a policy, for example, is important to another person 
once-the same piece of information would have little value a second time, unless something new were 
added. On the other hand, a person’s brokerage skills are likely to maintain their importance unless there
35 As always, there are exceptions to general rules in India. If, for example, a family with little land has been able to send a son to 
work in the Gulf, their income, with the foreign remittances, would rise above that of most rich peasants. In other instances, a rich 
peasant and his family may suffer from illnesses which prevent them from making much profit from their land, or poor investment 
choices (or too many daughters) may force them into excessive debt, thus drastically curtailing their economic power.
36There are also horizontal connections among the BDOs in a district through which information may be shared. Unfortunately, I 
was able to gain little data on this issue, and do not have a clear idea as to how widespread or how useful BDOs’ contacts with each 
other are.
37In this instance the economically rational actor view of man holds welL The contractors’ goal of attaining a larger number of 
contracts overrides political enmity.
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is a sudden growth in brokers with similar skills. However, given Gouldner’s norm of reciprocity and a 
degree of trust built up between exchange partners over a number of exchanges, the successful entrance of 
new brokers in the administrator’s exchange network may be militated against.
One of the most important non-policy resources for the local administrator is red tape. Red tape is 
for the administrator what education and status are to his non-administrative trading partners-a non- 
tradable resource which has a structuring effect on exchanges. It is a resource which helps him, if not 
dictate, then influence the terms of exchange, not the least because the administrator’s superior 
knowledge of the internal workings of the office, and of various rules and laws affecting the block allows 
him to pretend there is more red tape than in reality. The administrator can claim the existence of 
paperwork which may well increase with his judgement of how valuable the resource is to his trading 
partner, and how much the latter is willing to pay for reductions in delay. Red tape’s value, then, is 
closely related to time, and its short supply.38 Money or, perhaps, the promise of a service from a client 
unlocks policy resources more quickly from the local administrator’s keep. Hence, red tape (whether real 
or conjured by the official), is a lock and "speed money" a key to acquiring policy resources. Red tape 
affects rich and poor in procuring policy resources from local officials. The major difference is that the 
rich more often have resources which they can use to bargain with the administrator. Administrators also 
use program rules as a means to "channelise" demands. While they often flaunt program rules and 
regulations, they can also invoke them as a way to control demands for resource allocations. Red tape 
thus gives the local administrator a chance: 1) to control the timing of a policy resource exchange; and 2) 
demand more resources from his trading partner to complete the transaction.
Advantages over information give traders advantages in exchange. Policy information is 
particularly valuable in the block context because its dissemination is so limited. If there is a potentially 
high demand for program resources, it is in the administrators’ interests to restrict information flows to a 
limited number of people. Occasionally, however, the local administrator must use his information to 
create a demand, preferably among the "right" people from his perspective, for policy resources people 
might not otherwise be interested in. The RWOs are, of course, supposed to do "general advertising" 
about development policies in the villages, but their contacts with villagers are highly selective. 
Administrators do not, however, monopolise control over policy information. People in the upper 
economic strata have alternative and equally (or more) reliable sources of information, (revenue and bank 
officials, other government officials, local political party officials, newspapers, radio, and even 
television39) which enables them to make demands for policy resources well in advance of poorer people 
in the block.
Agricultural labourers, especially Scheduled Caste agricultural labourers, are the least likely to 
receive accurate information about programs that are supposed to benefit them and, with their limited 
pool of resources, are also the least able to take action even if they do have accurate information. The
38After Ilchman and Uphoff (1969: 90), time is considered not a resource per se, although it is an extremely important factor of 
production. As they argue (pg. 90), "Whereas time itself is infinite, the length of time in which a certain action may or must be 
accomplished is not"
39In late 1984 the Government of Tamil Nadu began to install television sets, another job for the development administration, at a 
rate of one per panchayat village. During the India vs. England cricket test match in autumn 1986 it was difficult to find informants 
at some villages as they were watching the match in the village TV room.
In early February 1985 the Government of Tamil Nadu placed a full page ad in the Madras edition of the Indian Express on the 
occasion of a regional conference of rural development secretaries. Near the bottom of the page there is a large arrow pointing 
upwards, and which has written above it: "Progressive Programmes of Government of Tamilnadu Lead to Rural Uplift." The base 
of the arrow depicts a family of six standing near a thatched roof hut, while in the arrow tip a lone television set is proudly displayed 
minus the family of six.
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development administration personnel do not pass on the required information to them, and they have few 
other sources of accurate information, meaning that in most cases there is little chance for them to lobby 
the local administrators-they may not even know the policies exist. Unfortunately, those with 
information deliberately mislead those without (as with information about ERDP subsidies, loan 
repayment schedules, and wages for NREP40) in order to increase their gain from the policy resources.41
"Numbers" in the sense of people with similar even if limited aims acting collectively, is another 
resource with temporal and spatial variations, but which remains by and large underutilised in the rural 
areas.42 Unfortunately, it is one of the only major resources which the poor have. The poor are, however, 
differentiated among various castes, in competition for a limited amount of employment, and are not a 
cohesive, tightly-knit group usually able to make political or economic demands effectively. The "rich" 
are also not a cohesive group, but they have so much more access to so many more resources that 
collective action is not as important a resource for them. There are instances in post-independence India 
of agricultural labourers acting in concert against exploitative employers, but these movements have been 
limited and sporadic. (Scott, 1985: 288, discusses rural rebellion in terms of "rare moments of historical 
crisis.")43
The poor have other resources which they use vis-a-vis the resource-rich on a daily basis, but they 
are "passive" rather than "active" resources.44 By these I mean subservience and compliance. The former 
is a "resource" one is constantly aware of in a block office. I have never seen a poor man enter a block 
office without acting (and often it is an act) in a submissive, humble and respectful manner (this, 
incidentally, is equally true of block officials in front of administrative superiors). By automatically 
offering one’s subservience, one acknowledges another’s superiority hopefully to engender the superior’s 
noblesse oblige. Katz and Danet (1973: 180) argue that subservience and compliance can be two sides of 
the same coin: "Subservience is . . . offered [by the client] in return for the official’s hoped-for
compliance." Blau (1964a: 21-22, 170-81) discusses compliance somewhat differently as an important 
resource for the "resource-inferior" person to encourage the continued supply of resources from the 
"resource-superior." This largely represents the compliance of the poor in Tamil Nadu, and emphasises 
again the importance of intermediaries who are willing to take action on the poor’s behalf.
The resources of a single policy are just that, limited resources in the rural areas which may or may 
not be in high demand, and which may be used in a number of ways, (some of the uses having little to do 
with the resources’ original form and envisioned function). The discussion in this section shows that an
40We interviewed some construction labourers who realised they were being underpaid. They said the contractor told them that if 
anyone came and asked what their wages were, they were to say Rs 12 per day rather than the Rs 8 they were really getting.
41Rich peasants have long been cast as "opinion leaders" and "information disseminators” of new methods of cultivation, and are 
the lynchpins—of debatable effectiveness, see Moore (1984)—in agricultural extension programs (especially the Training and Visit 
system), but they tend to pass on the information they have about development policy selectively, favouring those who work for 
them, or members of the same faction or caste.
42This corresponds to Olson’s (1965) "logic of collective action." He and his followers would predict the difficulty agricultural 
labourers, and people in general, have in acting for their collective, as opposed to self, interest even when it is more "rational" for 
them to act collectively. Olson argues that this is related to the "free rider” problem, whereby people do not act to gain "public 
goods" because they cannot be excluded from gaining them.
43Their geographic limits are exemplified by Lalgudi Block which, although a neighbour of Tanjavur District, and with a roughly 
similar socio-economic structure to the areas of Tanjavur which experienced unrest (although it is not adjacent to them), has not had 
the agricultural labourer "uprisings" that Tanjavur did in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Politically, while Tanjavur has had 
representatives of the Communist Party, Lalgudi has been DMK and Congress (I). On the limits of, and reasons for, the confined 
nature of "agrarian radicalism" in Tanjavur, see Bouton (1985).
^Scott (1985) in Weapons of the Weak discusses the poor’s "hidden transcript" whereby subservience toward "superiors" is 
displayed, but which hides true feelings of anger and resentment.
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analytical distinction should be drawn between the resources a potential trader already has which s/he can 
use to structure an exchange, the resources s/he offers in an exchange, and the ones s/he wishes to receive 
(the latter are Homans’ and Blau’s "rewards"). Lastly our understanding of resources is enhanced if we 
assume that resources received from an exchange may be processed to increase their value in the 
resource-recipient’s opportunity structure. Generally, resources made available from outside sources 
(originating outside the village and block) are in high demand, particularly as it may be possible to reap 
"multiplier effects" from them.
6.4.1. The Resource Bazaar
The words "trade," "exchange" and "transaction" do not represent smooth, market-like processes. 
Rather, in terms of poverty alleviation policy implementation it is preferable to think of them as located in 
a bazaar. The "bazaar" implies that its transactions will have a certain degree of disorder and uncertain 
outcomes, particularly for those unfamiliar with it (such as agricultural labourers). Nonetheless, even for 
active participants (rich peasants) the element of disorder and uncertainty, though reduced, will remain— 
the bazaar is not a formal, institutionalised economic venue. Resource exchange is a bazaar-like 
transaction in that payment for some transactions may be made in cash and/or future considerations45 and 
importantly, different prices may be offered to different customers. The customers are all equipped with 
different resources and bargaining skills, with a positive correlation between a greater control of resources 
and a higher level of bargaining skills.
Another important difference between bazaar and market exchange is the attitude of the transactors 
toward the exchange itself. There is nothing inherently valued by the transactors in the economists’ 
market exchange, except for the tangible products that may be gotten out of it. When one is in a bazaar, 
however, haggling over the price is a desired norm. The exchange process is drawn out, and the 
transactors may spend much time haggling over an item neither is particularly interested in. They may 
want to find out more about each other’s (non-exchangeable) resources, and decide whether it is worth 
bringing a larger, more valuable, resource into the fray. A protracted exchange process may increase the 
level of trust between the transactors, thus allowing them to include a larger proportion of future 
considerations in the settlement for the resource.
We cannot assume that everyone wants to be a customer in the resource exchange bazaar. Some 
people refrain from exchanges altogether because they fear that their own lack of resources would 
handicap them; the population of traders in the bazaar is always limited by the numbers who are actually 
aware of the resources available. Moreover, there are also those who might easily gain the resources, but 
are involved in other, more lucrative activities, thus declining to participate in this bazaar. Some people 
may not like the idea of open competition for the same policy’s resources (they may feel it is damaging to 
their status), and either refrain from entering the bazaar altogether or try to get the resources through a 
third party (through indirect transactions).
The bazaar has shifting parameters, with the number of customers and sellers constantly changing,
45This corresponds to Blau’s (1964a: 93-97) "unspecified obligations". Four examples of future considerations I observed are 
when milk society presidents later helped block officials with bio-gas loans, with the "second dose of assistance" for previously 
assisted beneficiaries, in selecting Scheduled Caste people for new houses (to be constructed under NREP er RLEGP), and in 
co-hosting special functions in the village attended by either the Collector or an MLA.
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and the two types of actor even switching roles.46 Prices are determined partly by supply and demand, but 
the final price depends upon the bargaining skills of the actors involved in the transaction, their 
perceptions of the resources, and their view of the alternatives available to them (there may be a better 
bazaar in the next town). The bazaar also has transactions occurring on a personal level, with price 
varying with the closeness of the traders in terms of friendship or kinship. The price would also vary with 
one participant’s perceptions of the other’s connections; that is, a low price may be offered to a customer, 
not so much as a favour to the customer but to the customer’s more powerful "patron.” As the bazaar 
metaphor indicates, exchanges should not be analysed in limited economic or technocratic terms of 
analysis, as there are intervening variables which may skew the results of the exchange in ways that 
economic theories alone would be unable to predict
Even though a bazaar may be thought of as a buying and selling market, I prefer to think of it as a 
trading venue. While administrators do "sell" policy resources on occasion, the term trading is preferable 
to selling because it carries with it both a connotation of continuity and the idea that the transactions are 
unlikely to be conducted only in goods-for-money terms. A sale is usually final with no further 
expectations from either party. This does not describe the transactions of the development policy bazaar. 
In social exchange, as opposed to market exchange, Blau’s (1964a: 93-97) "unspecified obligations" is 
the primary way by which debt is conceptualised; specifying social debts in monetary terms, as with 
repaying them too quickly, appears unseemly (Blau, 1964a; 99). The debt itself is part of the sustaining 
fabric of the relationship. Many of the transactions carried out in the policy resource bazaar resemble 
social rather than market exchanges (although "social" should not be thought of as necessarily friendly or 
equal).
The administrator is often a price-setter able to decide on a "price" for resources based on his 
estimate of the demand for the policy resources (notice that the administrator does not have "production 
costs" which help determine his asking price. His ’costs’ mount with his inability to divest the block 
office of the policy resources). The price decided upon is not necessarily "what the market will bear," 
and is open to negotiation. Because of the local administrator’s interest in accumulating "unspecified 
obligations" in policy bazaar transactions he may be more willing than would otherwise be expected to 
come down with his prices. The bargaining process is, however, at a minimum in the market-like 
exchanges involving officials (especially RWOs) on the one hand and poor peasants and agricultural 
labourers on the other. The price-setting official has an obvious advantage over the other transactor in 
this exchange, and seldom provides the desired resource at less than the asking price. Because the poor 
have little to offer the administrator aside from demonstrations of subservience, they are almost always in 
the highly disadvantaged price-taker position. Bazaar transactions vary, then, with both policies and 
actors. The economists’ market transaction does not vary with the actors involved in it; ie., if one of the 
parties to the exchange is substituted, the price would not change as long as there has not been a change in 
demand and supply.
In the administrator-rich peasant trading relationship, however, the rich peasant is not a price-taker. 
Because the rich peasant has resources which are essential to the administrator, the peasant is a bargainer, 
and does not necessarily accept the prices set by the administrator. He has enough resources under his 
control to make the administrator feel a loss should the exchange not be completed (if the administrator
46This characterises informal exchange: the resources of the exchange seldom change hands at once. Debts are allowed to 
accumulate, and a person may repay with more than necessary in order to engender a debt in the other party, thus ensuring the 
continuation of the exchange relationship. Moreover, as Gouldner (1960: 175) argues, "it is morally improper under the norms of 
reciprocity, to break off relations or to launch hostilities against those to whom you are still indebted [his emphasis]."
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does not have an adequate number of trading partners). The rich peasant may, however, have more at 
stake in the exchange-much depends on the number of alternatives open to the transactors. If the trade is 
not completed, the peasant may lose by virtue of being unable to gain valuable resources that would 
further his political and/or socio-economic interests. If the rich peasant does not have ready access to 
other more profitable resources, his perception of potential loss would increase should he not acquire the 
policy resources.
The policy resource bazaar is a metaphor, but is important for the resource exchange approach I 
employ. Much social exchange theory draws heavily from economics (this is especially true of Blau, 
1964a); the very concepts of exchange and resources come directly from economics. However, social 
exchange and its subset, resource exchange, have an uneasy relationship with economics. Hence, the 
utility of the resource bazaar as the abstract locus of policy resource exchange-it makes explicit, and is a 
constant reminder of, the differences between resource exchange and market exchange. Bazaar 
transactors are motivated by, and take into account, different variables than their counterparts, "economic 
men," in the market place.
6.5. A Typology of Exchange Transactions
In this section I discuss the main types of exchanges in the block administrator’s environment, and 
present them in opposite, "ideal-type" pairs. The pairs of exchange types considered here are market and 
generalised, dyadic and network, direct and indirect, positive and negative. These pairs are not exclusive 
in that a single exchange may exhibit a number of characteristics. Exchanges between local officials and 
the rich peasantry are usually direct, positive and generalised, while between local official and district 
official an exchange is more likely to be direct and negative, between local official and MLA, it is likely 
indirect, partly generalised and with a possibility of it being either positive or negative.
Generalised-Market
Marshall Sahlins (1965) was one of the first exchange theorists (he is an anthropologist) to develop 
a typology of exchange transactions. His continuum of exchange in the context of "primitive"47 society 
(which would not include rural India) has generalised and negative exchange at its extreme ends with 
balanced exchange in the middle. Sahlins’ (1965: 147) generalised exchange at its extreme includes 
altruism as a completely one-way flow of resources, but less extremely (p. 147), "Receiving goods lays 
on a diffuse obligation to reciprocate when necessary to the donor and/or possibly for the recipient. The 
requital thus may be very soon, but then again it may be never." Much of the exchange involving local 
administrators and the rich peasantry has a significant generalised component, with emphasis on 
unspecified obligations or future considerations.
This is contrary to expectation for exchange theorists like Sahlins because he posited (1965: 149) 
that "generalised" exchange would be most commonly found among close kin, or at least within the 
boundaries of a "community" where kin and community are not coterminous. The most common 
exchanges involving the local administrators and rich peasants are a mix between generalised and market 
exchange. The generalised and market component vary primarily with the combination of block and 
senior official demand that the policy’s resources be distributed. The greater the demand within the
47Sahlins’ (1965: 141) definition of "primitive" is "cultures lacking a political state, and it applies insofar as economy and social 
relations have not been modified by the historic penetration of states."
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block, the more inclined the administrator is to increase the market aspect of the exchange. The greater 
the demand from senior officials, the lower the market aspect (when block demand is low), until the 
family planning extreme is reached, with local officials paying acceptors. An important assumption I 
make is that as long as there is some minimum threshold48 of demand in the block for a policy’s 
resources, the local administrators will make every attempt to engage in at least a generalised exchange. 
As the local demand increases, the administrator increases the market component
Market exchange-Sahlins’ (1965: 14748) "balanced" exchange--as I have mentioned, is the 
simple goods-for-money transaction which is also temporally limited. This describes policy resources for 
bribes exchanges and politicians’ promises-sometimes including promises of money to individuals—for 
votes at election time. A classic example of a market exchange for political purposes is when the 
politician ensures that the administration does some work in the villages in the hopes that the majority of 
villagers will vote for him. Some of the constituents may later seek assistance from the ML A in securing 
government employment, although the chances of actually gaining his help are limited.49
Direct-Indirect
The directness of an exchange is a simple dichotomy-either the transactors of the exchange are 
face-to-face (direct) or they are not. Direct exchanges occur in both the context of generalised and market 
exchange and do not require further explanation. There are, however, direct exchanges in the block 
which have third parties behind them, transforming them into indirect exchanges. Indirect exchange 
occurs in IRDP’s implementation, for example, when loan brokers are involved. Indirect exchanges also 
occur in contract programs where the contractor is a close supporter of the local MLA. Superficially, the 
exchange is between block officials and contractor, but the politician’s interest in part of the proceeds 
from the contract causes him/her to have some interest in the exchange’s outcome. (His/her involvement 
is most likely felt if something goes wrong with the contract payments.) Much market (corrupt) 
exchange, especially for larger amounts, is also likely to be indirect, as the Block Development Officer 
himself would very rarely take money illicitly from any person in the block-the danger of being caught is 
too great
Regarding policy resources, virtually all exchange is indirect in the sense that the administrator 
does not exchange resources which belong to him. Policy resources are the state’s, and on the other side 
of the exchange, the rich peasant as broker does not risk his own resources in exchange, but rather those 
of the poorer villagers. The result of this is that insofar as trading partners want to profit financially from 
their exchanges, it is a simple matter with policy resource exchange, as they do not risk their own 
finances.
Negative-Positive
Sahlins (1965: 149) characterised negative reciprocity as a one-way flow of resources put into 
effect at its extreme by "cunning, guile, stealth, and violence" and including "the finesse of a well- 
conducted horse raid." Less extremely, Sahlins (p. 148) portrays "negative reciprocity" as "the most
“^ Calculating this threshold would involve a rough approximation of whether demand in the block would match the percentage of 
total target which should be reached.
49My enquiries about party support and voting in the villages revealed that people often voted in favour of a party leader 
(especially MGR, the former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu) rather than because of any belief in the efficacy of their local 
representative. In fact, none of the IRDP beneficiaries mentioned the good work of their local MLA as a reason for voting the way 
they did.
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impersonal son of exchange," in which "the participants confront each other as opposed interests, each 
looking to maximize utility at the other’s expense." In other words, it is the direct opposite of his 
altruistic, generalised exchange, and corresponds more to my "market exchange." I use the term negative 
exchange, however, to characterise exchange which is occasioned by negative sanctions or inducements 
which may also involve coercion or force. "Positive" exchange has been the major concern of exchange 
theorists, and the resultant focus of the exchange literature has been virtually entirely on exchanges 
involving rewards or positive inducements.
I found that in the block official’s environment negative exchange forms a much larger percentage 
of the administrator’s exchanges than would be predicted from the writings of Homans and Blau. The 
BDO is both on the "giving" and "receiving" end of negative exchange. Just as his administrative 
superiors threaten him with punishments if he does not produce X target or Y report, he also threatens his 
juniors with punishments if they do not produce the data for his report or the beneficiaries’ names for his 
target. My observations in block offices and at meetings leads to the conclusion that the majority of 
intra-administrative exchanges are negative. An important question for a "negative exchange theorist," 
and one which I cannot answer, is how refined the block officials’ sense is of the "enforceability" of 
threatened punishments. With the equally rapid transfer of district officials, and the high variability in 
Collectors’ styles of administration, it would be difficult for the local official to develop a perception of a 
"going rate of punishment," although in keeping with his "survival instincts" he may assume a worst-case 
scenario.
The block officials also have to cope with negative inducements from politicians. If the block 
official were under threat of transfer from the MLA alone, he would have a difficult time, but many more 
people than the MLA attempt to threaten him with transfer. It is not unusual for rich peasant-contractors 
from different villages to co-operate, sometimes with an MLA, to try to remove any official they feel is 
instrumental in not giving them enough contracts.50 It should not be assumed, however, that the rich 
peasant and politician would be able to join forces effectively enough to remove an obstreperous 
administrator. The administrator himself may have other, better, political connections, or the Collector 
(for his/her own reasons) may refuse the transfer request
Blau (1964a: 224) borrowing, from Homans (1961), says "punishment is a poor reinforcer." 
Homans (1961) argued (using a pigeon in a ’Skinner Box’ as his example) that negative reinforcements 
are not as effective as positive reinforcements in eliciting new behaviour and/or modifying existing 
patterns. Nonetheless, my data show that this is not the case when the punishment is as severe as an 
unwanted transfer is to the local administrator. He may not want to respond to negative inducements, but 
essentially his desire to avoid the punishment(s), which he knows are enforceable, is greater than his 
desire to avoid the performance of an unpleasant and/or illegal task.
Importantly, the plethora of negative exchanges involving the local administrator has spawned the 
defensive exchange, a type of exchange not mentioned by any exchange theorists, but which is in keeping 
with the view of the local administrator in a perilous environment (taking action to help protect himself 
from its "dangers"). The defensive exchange involves the official’s use of substitute resources to assuage 
demands for policy resources, and the better he is at it, the better chance he has to avoid unwanted 
transfers. Another type of defensive exchange occurs when the administrator tries to promise the desired
^Besides the transfer, another negative inducement which can be brought to bear against the administrator is the threat o f making 
disclosures, whether true or not, to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), so that it carries out an investigation into the 
administrator’s sources of income.
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resources in the "near" future (a favoured time is at the beginning of the forthcoming financial year). As 
argued earlier, red tape may also be used defensively (to "buy time"). The defensive exchange is not 
confined to the block office, but is used in the Collectorate and by bankers as well. The defensive 
exchange gives the person with adequate resources but in a less powerful position than another, the 
chance to deflect the others’ negative inducement before s/he employs it. (An agricultural labourer would 
be unable to engage in defensive exchange with an official or rich peasant. S/he does not have enough 
alternate resources to offer, should s/he be unable to provide the resource originally demanded.)
Dyadic-Network
One of the most crucial analytical distinctions to be made in exchange theory is between dyadic and 
network exchange.51 (Salisbury (1976), an economic anthropologist, argues that the most important 
distinction is between the individual and dyad.) As the name implies, dyadic exchange is between two 
parties (persons, groups, or organisations) while network exchange assumes that one person is part of 
many exchanges simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously) which are more or less interrelated and have 
an effect on any given exchange the person is involved in. (For an extensive treatment of dyads, see the 
articles, especially the introduction, by Lande in Schmidt et al., 1977.) Some theorists (Befu), working 
from dyadic exchange, have conceptualised groups as "chains of dyads" rather than as a network. Blau’s 
(1964a: 31-32) basic exchange type at the micro-level of society is the dyad within the same opportunity 
structure, although he argues somewhat obliquely that the network approach to exchange is more useful 
than the dyadic, but then remains curiously focused on dyads). From an analysis of observations in 
Lalgudi and Thuraiyur, I conclude that while dyadic exchanges are much easier to observe and analyse, 
the concept of network exchanges gives a much better approximation of reality in the block.
Blau’s discussion (1964a: 169-71) of advice-givers and recipients and diminishing marginal utility 
gives an indication of the drawback of the dyadic, single opportunity structure approach to exchange. 
Blau assumes there is diminishing marginal utility in a person always asking another for advice because 
he only looks at the two people in the one opportunity structure (he does say that change would occur 
with the addition of either more advice-givers of equal competence or more advice-receivers of equal 
incompetence). However, the advice-receiver is able to use the information in another situation in which 
he can display how much he knows—in a conversation with an official not in the group or with family and 
friends-and the additional status he perceives himself to have by appearing knowledgeable in another 
exchange may outweigh the cost to him of continually seeking advice from the same person(s) in the 
office.
The block administrator must, for practical reasons related to his own "survival," see his exchanges 
in network terms. When the BDO allots a building contract to contractor X, he cannot calculate the costs 
and benefits of this exchange in dyadic terms unless he wants to risk the dissatisfaction of those not 
involved in the exchange but who have an interest in the flow of resources resulting from it. The local 
official automatically thinks in network terms when he calculates whether X’s pleasure will outweigh Y’s 
displeasure, and whether Y’s displeasure will be great enough for him to contact Z and A who are likely 
to be able to have the administrator transferred. Clearly, the block official must not end his network at the 
people with whom he directly exchanges resources, but rather extend it to include the most important 
(influential) people with whom they have contact. The skilled local official will have a keen sense of 
anticipation of the differences in levels of satisfaction caused from one exchange. To a large degree his
51Some theorists, notably T. S. Lebra (1975), have employed a framework incorporating "triadic" exchange.
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career security and advancement is based on his ability to anticipate the most likely levels of satisfaction 
of the most influential people in his environment.
The network exchange framework also helps to explain how exchanges with block officials and the 
same set of brokers are maintained over a long period of time. If one were to conceptualise block 
official-rich peasant exchange in dyadic terms, it would be difficult to see how, in die light of rapid 
administrative transfers, the exchanges could be maintained. However, transferable block officials are 
not all transferred at the same time, and clerical staff are seldom transferred. This means that as long as 
the rich peasant has established connections with two or three block officials, even low-placed ones, his 
chances are good that he will be able to maintain long-lasting and profitable exchange relations with the 
development administration.
Resource exchange should not be thought of as "comparative statics" (Heath, 1976a). I have 
presented a typology to show that the dynamics of exchanges which involve the local development 
administrators vary with both the policies and the traders. Moreover, the data in Chapters Four and Five 
show that the implementation process of a single policy, IRDP, may encompass a number of exchange 
types-direct and indirect, positive and negative, market-generalised; each of which have important 
implications for policy impact. Each type of exchange is a product of the dynamics of the relations 
between the policy resource exchange partners. When one can explain what type of exchange has 
occurred and why, the process of distributive policy implementation is also explained. Therefore, when 
we collate the types of exchanges which occur, with the independent variables of the local economic 
infrastructure, a picture of how policy resources reach which people emerges which is more complete 
than when conventional, management approaches are used.
6.6. Conclusion
Resource exchange, part of the social exchange approach, has long been associated with economic 
choice theory involving the individual’s rational assessments of the costs and benefits available through 
his/her exchange relations. This starting point has led the majority of exchange theorists to focus on 
positive, dyadic exchange wherein people choose to exchange rewards, however unequally. This, 
however, provides at best an incomplete picture of human exchange. The local development 
administrator is involved in a network which includes almost as many negative exchanges as positive. He 
works in an opportunity structure which simply does not guarantee him adequate rewards. It is important 
to see the local administrator’s actions (including his implementation of IRDP) not as freely chosen, nor 
as unpattemed or irrational but as responses to the pressures and demands which arise from his 
environment. Resource exchange’s major advantage over conventional manager-oriented development 
policy and administration studies is that it does force the analyst to look at the local administrator within 
his political and socio-economic environment, and as a participant in it rather than an unbiased onlooker. 
When the official’s close relation to his environment is clearly defined, it prevents us from analysing his 
exchange behaviour as an economist would; that is, as comprising the results of his internally-structured 
goal preferences.
The block official’s insecurity is one of the root causes of his need to exchange policy resources- 
resource exchange, especially including defensive exchange, provides him with far greater insurance than 
if he were simply to follow the carefully laid out rules of policy implementation. Moreover, because of 
monetary requirements which spring from his work and familial opportunity structures, the administrator 
is undeniably interested in the pecuniary aspects of trades. While one can feel some sympathy for the
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harried block development official, the repercussions of his policy resource exchange strategies for the 
poor are severe. It matters little that the policy he is implementing is named a "development program," a 
"poverty alleviation program," or a "landless employment guarantee program;" what does matter is that it 
makes a quantum of more or less valued resources available, and that the predominant pattern of resource 
exchange in the policy bazaar keeps resources effectively out of the hands of the poor. However, as also 
highlighted by the resource exchange approach, there is some room for intermediaries who refuse to trade 
beneficiaries’ resources. At issue, then, is how to make this room larger.
The rich see the state’s poverty alleviation policy resources as another set of resources which they 
can control for their own profit, and the local officials see the policy as another set of targets they must 
meet. New Delhi’s or Madras’ poverty alleviation policy rhetoric which claims that the poor are being 
provided with productive, income-generating assets and additional employment, ignores the process and 
outcomes of implementation at the grassroots of the state. It ignores the dominance of distributive policy 
implementation by resource exchange.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Room for the Poor?
This study has demonstrated that local administrators allocate the resources of poverty alleviation 
policies through resource exchange strategies. I have discussed the Integrated Rural Development 
Program in terms of the block development administrators and their socio-economic and political 
environment, thus analysing the nexus between administrators, policy resources, and environment The 
picture of local officials presented in the development management literature comprising the 
administrator, the formal organisation, the policy rules and the "target group” has less explanatory power 
(of policy implementation) than the view of the local administrator responding to a large number of 
conflicting demands (relating to the resources under his control) which arise from his environment. His 
attempts to meet those demands ultimately have a greater determining effect on the flow of policy 
resources than its design. The state cannot be an effective agent of rural poverty alleviation when local 
administrators are so closely linked with wealthy and influential socio-economic and political actors to 
whom they trade policy resources.
I have used IRDP as a tool to explore larger issues of development policy implementation in India, 
and will address some of those issues in this chapter. I summarise my observations and analyses of the 
Integrated Rural Development Program’s implementation and impact in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks, 
discuss the "development" administration, and examine the possibilities for the poor to improve their 
position in the policy resource benefits equation. When analysing development policy in terms of 
resource exchange, we must ask: how and when can we skew the terms of trade so that the appropriate 
people really benefit from the policies that are apparently designed for them?
7.1. IRDP: Summary and Future
The Integrated Rural Development Program in the villages of Tiruchi District bears little 
resemblance to the Integrated Rural Development Program in New Delhi’s administrative guidelines. The 
block development officials of necessity virtually ignore IRDP’s intricate policy design, and have 
moulded IRDP’s rules to fit their political and socio-economic environment. This has, in effect, benefited 
the rich peasantry. My findings showed that the majority of poor beneficiaries were losing money as a 
result of taking IRDP loans for milch animals. (Small farmer milch animal beneficiaries and beneficiaries 
in other areas of the program tend to do better.)
A significant feature of IRDP and, I would argue, of other rural poverty alleviation policies 
(excepting those with a substantial contracting component) is that the demands for their implementation 
largely arise within the block, primarily at the village-level. ML As and other political people with 
effective connections and/or economic interests outside of the block, for example, do not generally try to 
exert influence over IRDP’s implementation directly, and the administrator’s disbursal of IRDP’s 
resources represents the outcome of demands and/or competition for them within the villages and the 
block.
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The concentration cf IRDP benefits (especially milch animals) in a few villages is the result of a 
limited number of rich peasants’ (the block administrators’ main trading partners) efforts to take control 
of them rather than the administrators disbursing the most benefits on a one-to-one basis to the poorest 
people of the block’s poorest villages. In some cases the administrators themselves sought out 
contractors (especially from the ruling party) to take charge of a number of IRDP loans. The selection of 
beneficiaries within the village depends largely on the rich peasant-contractor who acts as a loan broker, 
and completes administrative tasks for the development officials. Those people who wanted assets 
besides milch animals tended to approach the Rural Welfare Officer individually, and had to pay fairly 
substantial bribes in the process of getting the subsidy.
The "one-to-one" requirement of IRDP’s implementation is almost completely lost in the milch 
animal component, as block officials have allocated IRDP’s resources predominantly through brokers- 
whether private milk vendors, parish priests, or milk society presidents-and to a lesser extent, 
intermediaries. The actual beneficiaries have had little to do with the local administration, except for 
paying bribes to the Rural Welfare and Animal Husbandry Officers. Nonetheless, senior administrators 
continue to make recommendations for changes to IRDP which are predicated on the "one-to-one" 
relationship between local officials and beneficiaries. This is, perhaps, of more questionable rationality 
than the grassroots official’s refusal to adopt this time-consuming method of implementation.
Those who gain the most from IRDP do so through an accretion of policy resources, rather than 
through the use of a single policy resource (the subsidy). What this means, in effect, is that the milk 
society president is able to profit in various ways-from animal purchase to milk sales—at least until the 
beneficiaries have sold most of their animals (the one area where the milk society president has little 
control over the beneficiaries’ assets). The beneficiaries do get money for milk sold, but we did not 
interview any genuinely poor beneficiaries who made enough money from milk sales both to repay the 
loan and pay for required feeds during their animals’ first lactations. (This, along with long intercalving 
periods, encouraged the beneficiaries to sell the animals as soon as possible.) The cattle broker is able to 
make profits through sales and resales of IRDP milch animals. Rural Welfare and Animal Husbandry 
Officers make money through collecting bribes from beneficiaries. In short, IRDP offers far more 
opportunities to "middle men" than to poor beneficiaries to profit from the program’s resources.
In the Seventh Plan document the authors write that IRDP is flawed and that it would be better to 
focus on the food for work programs, NREP and RLEGP. The chances of ERDP continuing with the 
same scale of funding beyond the Seventh Plan are limited. It has been heavily criticised in many 
quarters in India with, as mentioned, even the central planners finding fault with i t  Because 
administrators are loath to cut existing policies, IRDP is likely to be incorporated with a new policy, 
perhaps following along the lines of the SFDA which was essentially incorporated with IRDP. Moreover, 
even were IRDP to be continued, the demands for its resources in the rural areas are likely to decrease as 
well.
Insofar as Tamil Nadu’s block officials have successfully spent IRDP funds to date, it is because of 
the milch animal component. There are two important limitations, however, to the continued disbursal of 
large numbers of subsidised loans for milch animals and there is no other component, or combination of 
components, which can replace it  First, the much lower ceiling on the number of milch animals per block 
per annum means that no new large IRDP societies can be established, thus drastically reducing the 
r.umber of "big men" (the administrators’ most frequent trading partner) interested in gaining IRDP’s 
resources beyond loans for their individual use. Second, most milk societies have a short lifespan. Many
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deteriorate by the end of their second year of operation because of cattle sales, and if not because of cattle 
sales then because of internal disputes over the handling of society funds. When potential milk society 
presidents realise this, they will be less likely to want milch animal loans in the village because they see 
their potential for profit-making in both political and socio-economic terms as too limited for the effort 
required to operate a milk society.
Despite its severe limitations and likely demise, I would not recommend the abolition of IRDP. 
Not every IRDP resource comes under the control of the dominant peasantry. The poor have gained some 
access to IRDP’s resources and occasionally made profits (although more often by selling the asset than 
by keeping it for the income it generates), especially when there is an intermediary in the village who 
does not try to exploit them. There are times when the poor do not gain control of policy resources and 
realise they are being denied their rights by the rich peasantry and/or the administrators. Importantly, one 
or two among their number may decide to take action, such as lodging protests with more senior officials. 
This may not necessarily result in senior administrators punishing the local officials, but the protest itself, 
however, is significant and may lead in future to a poor community’s refusal to pay bribes to officials for 
the resources they are entitled to. This was already happening in a few, scattered villages I visited, 
through the same poor intermediaries who were responsible for bringing IRDP and other resources into 
the village.
7.2. Local Officials and ‘Development’ Administration
Development management analysts and senior administrators have generally conceived of 
development policy implementation as the local administrator’s attempts to put a policy into effect as 
originally designed, and further that the differences from the design which inevitably occur during his 
implementation of it are the result of various failings in the local administrative office. Senior officials in 
India have tended to view "successful" implementation as the administrators’ achievement of quantitative 
program targets, and local administrators end their involvement with the policy where effective 
implementation should really begin. That is, when the targets have been met and the resources have 
finally reached the villagers. Therefore, just as the policy reaches its point of impact, those who have 
taken control of the policy resources in the villages determine what that impact will be. In other words, 
the state’s administrative machinery does not determine the shape of the program in the village, and the 
block officials have little interest in the beneficiaries’ fates once the policy resources have been disbursed
I chose to analyse the block officials’ behaviour in terms of their political and socio-economic 
environment, and found that their actions are much more rational than ad hoc or irrational. In terms of 
IRDP, for example, the local administrators’ implementation of it (and other policies) would be difficult 
to understand without knowing about the politicians’ behaviour towards the block officials. Most of the 
politicians’ demands do not relate directly to ERDP, but their demands on the administrator’s time and 
resources cause him to exchange as many policy resources as possible in order to gain resources valuable 
to him (especially in his dealings with the politicians). The political configurations of the local 
administrator’s environment will vary from block to block, but this is not problematic in using resource 
exchange, as it encourages the observer to take into account the particularities of the environment in 
his/her analyses.
Policy designers have not recognised (perhaps they do not wish to recognise) that if the 
implementing administrator is confronted with a policy such as IRDP, which has rules of implementation 
which "fit" poorly with his environment, he is most likely to adjust the rules to make them fit better. He is
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especially likely to do this-in the context of the current development administrative structure in Tamil 
Nadu-in a way which helps him meet the program’s most important, most easily checked, targets. My 
observations, which agree with many others’, reveal an overemphasis on targeting in the state. The issue 
of targeting is outside the purview of resource exchange at the block level, but it is clear that the senior 
administrators’ adherence to quantitative target achievement places no hindrance on the local 
administrators’ exchange activities with the resource-wealthy in the block.
It is equally clear that suggestions to change administrative practices, whether at lower or higher 
levels of the organisation, are easier to make than to put into practice. Nonetheless, the reliance on 
quantitative targets should be curtailed in Tamil Nadu. This calls for reliable qualitative checking on 
what the administrators are doing with policy resources in the block. The current administration of 
poverty alleviation programs specifically includes monitoring of "performance," but seems to have been 
largely ineffective to date. For some programs (IRDP among them) targets should be limited (although 
not abolished), as should the local officials’ ability to meet targets in large groups (as the latter 
encourages the entrance of "middle men" in the policy bazaar). More stringent verification should be 
made in the villages themselves as to the destination and use of resources. The problematic aspect of this 
is the actual checking in the villages, as it would have to be done by a non-partisan group independent of 
the development administration (perhaps non-governmental organisations or National Survey Volunteers 
could report to a special officer in the Collectorate). My research in Lalgudi and Thuraiyur Blocks 
showed that, even with the "full co-operation" of block officials in providing program records, it was 
difficult and time-consuming to attain and go through the appropriate records and then follow this up with 
visits to villages and enough interviews to make an accurate assessment of the actual state of the program. 
In other words, effective qualitative checking is labour-intensive and requires that the person/group doing 
the verifying not be "co-optable” by either local politicians or officials.
Two other aspects of the development administration require changing in order to encourage the 
emergence (including the poor as transactors) of alternative forms of resource exchange. The first of 
these is obvious, but probably next to impossible to effect-removal of the politicians’ influence over the 
transfer. As long as an MLA can have BDOs and RWOs transferred for any perceived transgression, the 
latter will have to respond to particularistic demands from MLAs and their supporters; the officials 
currently have little reason to respond to the poor. A second change would be to remove family planning 
from the block administration, giving it instead to a Health and/or Social Welfare Ministry which could 
provide some sort of counseling and follow-up for women (as opposed to the RWO desperately offering 
increasing amounts of money at the end of the financial year to reluctant takers). This would give the 
RWO more time to spend with the poverty alleviation programs. I would suggest additionally that with 
this extra time, the RWOs be forced to establish small "offices" (a centrally-located hut would suffice) in 
each panchayat village of their group (the "offices" could be constructed under NREP or RLEGP), and 
that they have regular (weekly), well-publicised, office hours during which any person of the village may 
see the RWO.
The concept of "implementation" has commonly been used in a way that conjures up images of 
normative administrative behaviour which neither do nor can hold true. In order to "implement" a 
distributive development policy so that its resources reach the "target group,” an administrator should be 
somewhat removed or "protected” from his political and socio-economic environment so that he can be an 
impartial adherent to policy rules.1 The local official should not be receptive to requests and demands
lrThis is, of course, an ideal, and even in Western bureaucracies, one finds officials who do not try to obey the rules of policy 
implementation. See Lipsky (1980) on "street-level bureaucracy."
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from political people and vested interests in the rural areas,2 although the official in charge of rural 
poverty alleviation policy should be receptive to demands made on him by "the poor." However, the 
opposite holds truer while senior administrators discuss "political interference" in policy implementation, 
the local administrator is closely involved with rural elites, from whose perspective, perhaps, the local 
administrator has too much "administrative interference."
"Development" administration, then, is a misnomer. The local "development" official, the Block 
Development Officer or the Rural Welfare Officer, is little more concerned with "development" than the 
revenue official who is directly concerned with "extraction" (in fact RWOs help in the collection of 
overdue land taxes). It is no surprise that rural people see the development bureaucracy as an extractive 
arm of the state as well, especially as RWOs try to raise money in the villages for items or events which 
are of little or no interest to the villagers, such as "smallsavings" and life insurance schemes, special 
ceremonies, etcetra. Many observers in Tamil Nadu also see the development administration as a 
"building and maintenance" administration and, according to most of my rural informants, a highly 
indifferent one at that
There is an irony in the state’s efforts to make the block development administration the centre of 
poverty alleviation. With the greater funds now available in the block, especially those for construction 
projects, the BDO is more the subject of political demands than when his office was primarily concerned 
with agricultural extension. In effect, he is even more inclined to exchange resources with rural elites to 
cope with the increased demands for the resources under his control, and the rural elites are more likely to 
make efforts to gain control of those resources. The irony, then, is that even those policy resources which 
are directly "targeted" at the poor, reach them primarily by "trickling through" the rural wealthy. 
Moreover, local political and economic institutions (panchayats and credit co-operatives, for example) 
which have the potential to give the poor a greater voice, are also dominated by the rich peasantry. The 
Panchayat President who, as a contractor, is able to take charge of projects, such as the construction of 
houses for Scheduled Castes or the digging of a well in a Scheduled Caste part of the village, is able to 
benefit both himself and some of the poor in his village. This, unfortunately, is about the best one can 
reasonably expect for the poor from the panchayats.
As long as the state relies on an administration whose local officials have close, mutually profitable 
relations with the landed elite, the state cannot, even if its leaders want to, be an effective agent of either 
rural poverty alleviation or equitable economic growth. The overt policy goals of the state are subverted 
by its own implementing arm, (although this is not to say a la Griffin that state leaders’ possible covert 
goals are not achieved.) Over time the monetisation of the administrative and political system has 
occurred in the rural areas, such that resources, most often money, are required by those interested in 
acquiring administratively-controlled resources. In a system where resources are needed to gain policy 
resources to which one is actually entitled, the poor are grossly disadvantaged.
^ u ra l banks are more effective than the development administration in ignoring politically based demands (overall, the bankers’ 
task is easier than the block officials’, as the former’s main clientele is rural vested interests). Moreover, the bankers’ job of 
increasing deposits and disbursing loans does not attract politicians’ attention and the latter seldom have enough interest in the 
former to try to transfer bank officials, even if  they ignore a supporter’s special loan request Additionally, bankers have better 
promotion chances which are not tied to political whim. All of these factors allow bank officials to adhere fairly closely to their 
narrowly defined banking norms (although banking corruption is considered a problem as well in India).
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7.3. Room for the Poor?
Edward Clay and the late Bernard Schaffer (1984) entitled their edited volume on development 
policy, Room for Manoeuvre, and in it they make a plea for a style of policy analysis which does not 
leave policy makers and analysts with "escape hatches" which allow them to avoid recognising the 
implications of their own "prescriptions and diagnoses." In other words, they ask that we turn away from 
"mainstream policy analysis." I have tried to do that by using "resource exchange" to explain local 
officials’ distribution of poverty alleviation policy resources.
It is clearly the responsibility of policy makers to design development policies which make it much 
more difficult than it is now for policy resources to be traded into the hands of the rich. However, with 
aggregate statistics which present rosy pictures of targets achieved, and the administrative policy makers’ 
ignorance or misunderstanding of the local officials’ political and socio-economic environment, policy 
designers are unlikely to make major changes to policies in such a way as to improve the poor’s chances 
of gaining from them. If the policy makers will not make room for the poor, who will? The community 
participation literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s suggested that the poor would "create room" for 
themselves by assisting the local administrator to plan policies which help satisfy their "felt needs" (the 
assumption being that the administration would be both sympathetic and specially trained to respond to 
the "community," and that the state would provide resources adequate for the task). The community 
participation scenario is as unlikely as policy makers devising massive changes to existing development 
policies.
The block political and socio-economic environment examined in this study leads to the conclusion 
that state-led attempts to make room for the poor are unlikely to be successful. We are confronted with a 
bleak scenario which suggests few possibilities for positive change in distributive policy implementation. 
If we return to resource exchange, however, and the brokers and intermediaries it uncovers, there is, 
perhaps, a narrow opening for change in the form of the intermediaries. The suggestion to promote 
intermediaries to help the poor takes more cues from the local administrator’s socio-economic and 
political environment than does community participation, and the poor intermediary is more likely to help 
his/her community than the panchayat council.
One cannot expect successful mass participation when that so directly opposes the very structure of 
administrator-dominant peasant relations. It poses a threat to the "well-adapted" administrator. 
Enhancing the role of the educated poor youth as an intermediary between his community (his own caste 
in the village) and the administration is a change which is more subtle and less likely to run into 
opposition than an attempt to organise community participation. Furthermore, if community participation 
is to be effective, it requires much more than an illiterate, almost wholly unorganised population 
differentiated by caste, and spatially farflung.
Development administrators could not be relied upon to seek out "potential intermediaries," and I 
would suggest that perhaps either existing voluntary action groups (keeping in mind that they are not 
ubiquitous in the rural areas) or a special ombudsman’s office at block level could encourage educated 
youth to lobby the development officials in the district for policy resources. A voluntary action group, for 
example, could itself be an intermediary at first for a village’s Scheduled Caste population, but in so 
doing should encourage a successor (or successors) in the form of an educated or committed poor youth 
(or woman) in the village. Moreover, the educated youth of one village may be able to contact, or even 
mobilise like-minded, similarly positioned people from neighbouring villages. As a group they could try
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to lobby the Block Development Officer for resources for the poor of their villages (just as contractors 
co-operate to share contracts), and perhaps like their broker counterparts, offer to help the block official 
with other policies, the resources of which are more difficult for him to disburse. The Block 
Development Officer is not averse to disbursing resources to genuine representatives of the poor as that 
helps him meet his targets and, at times, win commendations from his superior officers (which also helps 
his career prospects).
I do not, however, hold out "intermediaries" as a panacea to cure development policy woes. The 
good that they can do will be severely limited by a number of factors. One of these, besides their own 
credibility in their community and the opposition which might arise from the economically dominant 
castes in the village, is how valuable the policy resources are. If intermediaries have been successful in 
gaining IRDP’s resources, it is partly because the local administrators have had more demands from 
senior administrators to meet IRDP’s targets than from rural influentials for IRDP’s resources. In Lalgudi 
and Thuraiyur Blocks, I did not learn of any poor intermediaries, for example, who had taken charge of 
constructing National Rural Employment Program (NREP) projects because construction projects 
represent an important area of profit-making for the rich peasantry. Overall, the extent to which active 
intermediaries can become involved in resource exchange with administrators in a monetised political- 
administrative system is severely limited by their lack of monetary resources.
As the discussion in Chapter Six emphasised, two important resources the poor lack are education 
and information, especially about policies of which they are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries. 
While my impression was that greater education leads more people to seek employment in semi-urban 
and urban areas, and that they then have less interest in village affairs, there is still a "residue" of educated 
youth who do remain, perhaps forced to remain by unemployment, in the villages. The youth who has 
studied as far as the Secondary School Leaving Certificate (SSLC) has accomplished much, especially in 
light of the still widespread illiteracy in the villages of Tamil Nadu. As mentioned, 40% of Tiruchi 
District’s rural population is literate, while less than one-third of the Scheduled Caste population is 
literate. This means that a far lower percentage of people would have completed high school, especially 
as high schools are generally located only in the blocks’ largest towns. The educated Scheduled Caste 
youth will feel, quite rightly, that he has accomplished something of value, and will also feel capable of 
making demands of the development administration. Perhaps rather than further investments in subsidised 
credit, the government should make available more scholarships, especially for women, for the children 
of landless agricultural labourers (preferably for Scheduled Castes).
An important first step for the poor to gain policy resources on favourable terms is for them to have 
the appropriate policy information; one cannot even enter the policy bazaar if one does not know of its 
existence. As the development administration tends not to be a reliable source of information for the 
poor, I would suggest that policy information be provided in panchayat villages on posters (with details 
on policy eligibility criteria, availability, etcetra) to be placed at the very least in a public place frequented 
by Scheduled Caste people (perhaps near a well or temple they use). There are always enough people 
who can read who would be able to relate the information to others. When people have accurate 
information the less easy it is to cheat them, and the easier for an intermediary to take effective action on 
their behalf. The posters should be put up at the beginning of the financial year (as soon as funding 
availability is known in the block). If these posters were combined with RWO office hours in the village, 
the poor would have a greater chance to make demands of him for poverty alleviation policy resources. 
Perhaps college or high school students could be made to volunteer their services to put up the posters 
every year.
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One of the findings highlighted by the resource exchange approach is the prominence of negative 
exchange in the local administrator’s set of exchanges, and its effectiveness in eliciting desired actions 
from him (when the negative inducement is an unwanted transfer). Another suggestion I have, then, to 
increase the poor’s access to policy resources is to vest in them some say in transfers, if not of BDOs, 
then RWOs. This is something that would have to be done by a group of intermediaries (organised on an 
RWO panchayat group basis) acting to advise the Collector or an ombudsperson. It is, perhaps, a drastic 
measure, but in light of the current exchange network in the block it may be one of the few ways to 
encourage block officials to be more responsive to the poor. Unfortunately, it would have the effect of 
increasing the officials’ insecurity/vulnerability in the block, but insofar as the block officer has been a 
victim of negative exchanges, he too, has victimised those with fewer resources than himself. If the poor 
cannot use money to equalise the terms of trade, they must gain access to other resources.
The force of history is against the poor benefiting substantially from state-led attempts to effect 
rural development. Since the 1950s development administrators have traded policy resources into the 
hands of the rich peasantry in return for cash and/or future considerations. Over thirty years of 
administrative and political profit-making through policy resource exchange will not be easily changed. 
The central government’s shifting of policy directions from community development to Green Revolution 
strategies to integrated rural development does not alter the fact that additional resources which the rich 
can easily capture, indeed are often asked to take, are made available in the resource-scarce rural areas, 
nor does it alter the other aspects of the local administrator’s environment which lead him to disburse the 
resources to whomever can reciprocate with valuable resources.
I have argued that even if the poor do gain access to and control of policy resources, it does not 
necessarily mean that they will be able to profit by them. But if they can gain the resources it affords 
them the opportunity, even if small, to do something with them. If IRDP has given an agricultural 
labourer a chance to have Rs 1000 from selling his/her cow, it does not represent a profit, but at least s/he 
has gained access to cash s/he would not have otherwise had. Realistically, the odds are stacked against 
the poor making many socio-economic gains in India, but I have used a contextual analysis of the 
Integrated Rural Development Program to suggest how the poor, through intermediaries, might convince 
resource exchanging administrators to exchange more resources with them, thus giving them a larger 
share of available policy resources.
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Appendix A
Two Development Officials’ Job Charts1
The Rural Welfare Officer
The Rural Welfare Officers are the grassroot level workers in rural development They constitute 
the cutting edge of the Rural Development Department They have been provided with sufficient pre­
service training to work in rural areas. Hitherto the Rural Welfare Officers were being [.sic] attending to 
work connected with Development of Agriculture and allied activities. Recently Government have 
reorganised the Agricultural Extension set up under a new system known as "Training and Visit System" 
and agriculture extension work has been taken away from the purview of Block Administration and 
therefore Rural Welfare Officers are not attending to Agricultural Extension work now. In G.O.Ms. No. 
825, RD & LA Dept., dt. 7-6-82, Government have appointed the Rural Welfare Officers as Group 
Executive Officers of Village panchayats [in the absence of of elected village panchayat councils]. With 
this the Rural Welfare Officers become responsible for the proper maintenance of all assets in the villages 
like buildings, hand pumps, power pumps, etc. Many new schemes have been taken up by the 
Government recently and the Rural Welfare Officers are associated with the implementation of these new 
schemes such as ERDP, NREP, Massive Programme, Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme, 
one job for one family, Low-cost Sanitation, Bio-gas, Chulah [wood stove] Programme, etc. Hence there 
is a need to revise the job chart so as to cover all the duties now entrusted to the Rural Welfare Officers. 
In terms of priorities the first and foremost item entrusted to the Rural Welfare Officer is IRDP and his 
maximum effort should be on this programme.
1. The Rural Welfare Officers will be responsible for maintaining village-wise and habitation-wise basic 
statistics in the prescribed registers . . .
2i. Under IRDP he will be responsible for gathering baseline data required for implementation of the 
programme. He will be personally responsible for selecting the beneficiaries by undertaking household 
surveys. He will be personally accountable for any wrong selection. He will be responsible for taking 
follow-up action for a continuous period of at least three years so that the selected family crosses the 
poverty line.
ii. He will be responsible for collection of loan applications from the selected applicants under IRDP 
approved by the Block Development Officer. He is responsible for ensuring that these applications are sent 
to the Block Development Officer and forwarded by the Block Development Officer to banks.
iii. He will be responsible for 100% physical verification of the assets created under IRDP every month.
iv. He will also report death or loss of IRDP animals to the Block Development Officer and arrange for 
claiming of Insurance coverage and purchase of substitute animal with insurance amount.
v. He will assist the Bankers to realise the loan amount from the beneficiaries.
vi. He will intimate immediately any case of misutilisation to the Block Development Officer in writing.
He will also assist the Block Development Officer in setting right such cases.
^rom  a circular issued by the Director of Rural Development, no date but probablv 
1983.
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3. Under Massive Programme he will be responsible to collect the loan applications under Minor 
Irrigation and Land Development Programme, forward them through the Panchayat Union Commissioner 
(BDO) to the bank and follow up till the sanction and utilisation of the loan amount. His role will be 
similar to that under IRDP.
4. He will be responsible for preparing the details of works to be taken up at village level and send the 
same to the Block Development Officer for inclusion. He will monitor the programme of these works and 
also their maintenance. Wherever he is entrusted with execution of works he should maintain rice stock 
account and cash registers.
5. The Rural Welfare Officers will be responsible for the construction of Group Housing Scheme under 
Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme as in the case of NREP when directed by the Block 
Development Officer.
6. He will be responsible for promoting Small Savings in his jurisdiction.
7. He will be responsible for promoting Family Welfare Programme and motivate the cases as specified 
by the Block Development Officer.
8. The Rural Welfare Officers will be responsible for the implementation of the programme relating to 
prevention of starvation deaths.
9i. He will be responsible for the development of alternative source of energy under the National Bio-gas 
Programme. The Rural Welfare Officers will be responsible for canvassing applications from prospective 
beneficiaries and arranging for their [bio-gas plants’] construction and payment of subsidy loan. He will 
also be in charge of proper functioning of Bio-gas plants.
ii. He shall be in charge of implementation of Chulah programme.
10. He will be responsible for village conservancy and sanitation. He will be responsible for the 
implementation of the low-cost sanitation programme.
11. [Section 11-15 were in force until the panchayat elections were conducted at the end of February, 
1986.] The Rural Welfare Officers will work as Group Executive Officers in the Village Panchayats 
coming under his jurisdiction and attend to the following items of work enumerated in G.OJvls. No. 825, 
RD & LA., di. 7-6-82.
a. The Group Executive Officer shall have authority to supervise the work of village panchayat staff such 
as panchayat clerks, etc.
b. He will be responsible for proper assessment of taxes and other dues to the panchayats in his 
jurisdiction.
c. To attend to the works of augmenting the financial resources of panchayats with regard to various 
items of receipts as enumerated in Section 137 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958.
d. To assist the Presidents of Panchayats (now Special Officers) in maintaining proper accounts.
e. To have a quarterly verification of accounts and to submit reports to Extension Officer (Panchayats) 
who is the inspecting and supervising officer of village panchayats.
f. Assisting the President (now Special Officer) in conducting the panchayat meetings.
12. He will arrange to prepare and submit the panchayat budget on the due date.
13. He will ensure street lights of village are in good condition.
14. He will ensure drinking water facilities including maintenance of hand pumps as well as power 
pumps in his jurisdiction.
15. He will see that the sanitary conditions are kept satisfactorily.
16. He will attend to all items of work which are entrusted to him by his superior officers from time to 
time.
17. The Rural Welfare Officers will provide assistance to the Extension Officer (Adi Dravidar Welfare)
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in the implementation of Special Component Plan for Adi Dravidars and also attend to schemes relating to 
Adi Dravidar welfare.
18. He will be responsible for organising and strengthening co-operative institutions in his jurisdiction.
19. He will be assisting the Block Development Officer in running of the Chief Minister’s Nutritious 
Noon Meal Programme.
20. The Rural Welfare Officers will be responsible for proper maintenance of ponds in the Village 
panchayats. He will also be responsible for the proper upkeep of panchayat vested lands and also the trees 
in such lands.
21. He will maintain all registers as prescribed below and put up for check to Block Development Officer 
once in a month.
22. He will remain in his group headquarters on the mornings of Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and 
be available for the public, to hear their representations.
The Block Development Officer/Panchayat Union Commissioner
1. The BDO is primarily a development officer for the Block. At the same time functioning as an 
Executive Authority of the Panchayat Union Council.
2. He shall be the head of the Panchayat Union Office and in charge of the entire office administration.
3. He shall supervise the work of clerical as well as executive staff.
4. He shall be responsible for execution of all works programmes undertaken under different 
development schemes in the block, viz., Village Works Programme, NREP, RLEGP, TARRA, DANIDA 
Assisted Programmes etc.
5. He shall be responsible for proper maintenance of Panchayat Union roads, school buildings and all 
Panchayat Union assets.
6. He shall be responsible for proper maintenance of Minor Irrigation Tanks entrusted to the Panchayat 
Unions under five-year cycle system.
7. He shall motivate people to undertake Kudimaramath [co-operative maintenance work of irrigation 
channels feeding village lands] work in irrigation schemes.
8. He is the pivotal officer in propagating and publicising all of the state’s and centrally sponsored 
schemes.
9. He is primarily responsible for ensuring adequate drinking water supply in the block area.
10. He shall be responsible for maintenance of hand-pumps and power pumps.
11. He shall take suitable immediate remedial measures at times of natural calamities like drought, 
cyclone and floods.
12. He shall be responsible for proper burning of street lights in Panchayat areas.
13. He shall successfully implement the Chief Minister’s Nutritious Noon Meal Programme in the block.
14. Anti-poverty programmes, viz., IRDP and Massive Programmes will receive his personal attention.
15. He shall prepare annual plans, select beneficiaries, obtain and process loan applications for providing 
adequate package of schemes to the poorest among the poor for lifting them above the poverty line.
16. He shall be personally responsible for successful implementation of TRYSEM.
17. He shall select suitable candidates, arrange for their training and loan assistance and take adequate 
follow-up actions. [Uncertain as to which program this is.]
18. He shall be responsible for educating rural folk in Bio-gas and Chulahs and arrange for successful 
installation of plants in rural areas.
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19. All Social Welfare Programmes for the benefit of Adi Dravidas and Tribals will receive his personal 
attention.
20. He will work in liaison with THADCO for implementing various schemes undertaken by them.
21. Construction of public latrines, latrines under Low Cost Sanitation Scheme and all Public Health 
matters involving sanitary conditions will be one of his duties.
22. He shall be the officer in charge of giving assistance for funeral rights for Adi Dravidas.
23. He shall be in charge of prevention of starvation deaths.
24. Tree-planting and Social Forestry will be implemented by the BDO under his direct supervision.
25. He shall be in charge of prevention and control of epidemics.
26. He shall be the Chief Officer implementing Rural Housing Scheme benefiting the poor, especially the 
SCs and STs.
27. He shall motivate people to undertake family welfare measures and make them to undergo 
sterilisations and IUDs.
28. He shall take steps to make people small savings minded and take active steps to enroll them under 
various small savings schemes.
29. He shall be in charge of Social Education Schemes and shall be responsible in utilising social 
education grants.
30. He shall arrange for proper maintenance of Community Radio Sets and TV sets.
31. He shall be in charge of Fisheries Development in the block.
32. He shall help in organising cooperative Societies for the welfare of rural people.
33. He shall activise voluntary organisations in undertaking social and welfare activities.
34. He shall assist in propagation of Khadi and Village Industries.
35. He shall organise free medical camps, viz., Eye Camps, assistance for deaf and dumb people and 
mass immunisation, etc.
36. He shall assist in Bhoodan work.
37. He shall take active part in social welfare activities of Government like distribution of free books to 
widows’ children, orphans, re-marriage of widows, distribution of dhoties and saris to orphans and 
destitutes.
38. He shall help in starting of new small scale industries in his area.
39. He shall be responsible for provision of all basic amenities in villages.
40. As a Panchayat Union Commissioner he shall be the executive authority of the Panchayat Union 
Council.
41. He shall regulate Dangerous and Offensive Trades and be in charge of issue of licences in village 
panchayats.
42. He shall be responsible for the maintenance of all local fund accounts.
43. He shall start Remunerative Enterprises in villages so as to augment the resources of panchayats and 
panchayat unions.
44. In the absence of elected bodies in Village Panchayat he shall be the Special Officer for the Village 
Panchayats in his block area.
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45. He is primarily responsible for regulation cf buildings with reference to acts and rules issued from 
time to time.
46. He shall function as a member of all the committees of the panchayat union council.
47. He shall be responsible for implementing the resolutions of the Panchayat Union Councils.
48. He shall be responsible for proper monitoring of all schemes implemented in the block at frequent 
intervals.
49. He will act as Panchayat electoral registration officer in respect of the panchayat union area.
50. He shall arrange to celebrate National Days in his jurisdiction.
51. He shall be in liaison with all departments or district officers of various departments for the 
systematic development of his block.
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Appendix B
The Integrated Rural Development Program and
ram:
n  vuutiac uiai ui iriaipi atutcs
IRDP
By the Administration
1. Bribes to Rural Welfare Officers for ERDP application forms (Rs 5; only Rs 2 if forms 
procured from private press).
2. Bribe to RWO for his acceptance of completed application (at least Rs 25; much higher 
when loan is for expensive item such as tyre cart).
3. Bribe to Animal Husbandry Officer (Rs 25-50) for putting requisite tag on animal’s ear.
4. Bribe to Village Administrative Officer (village revenue official) for landholding 
certificates.
5. Village household economic surveys not done (supposed to be done to determine actual 
numbers below poverty line).
6. Lists of potential beneficiaries made up by potential milk society president and others in 
village rather than by RWO. Frequently, people whose names don’t appear on this list at all 
get loans.
7. Economic status of beneficiaries knowingly falsified for records.
8. Administrators’ relatives getting loans.
9. Administrators pay no attention to "Antyodaya" approach, so loans go to any village where 
there are brokers, rather than to poorest villages in block.
10. "Deals” made with bankers to have subsidies credited by end of financial year, but 
beneficiaries do not get assets until well into new financial year.
By the Milk Society President
1. No open society accounts kept. Beneficiaries remain ignorant of progress of loan 
repayment
2. Low price for milk given to beneficiaries.
3. Cheating of beneficiaries in milk measurement (ie., recording milk in beneficiaries’ account 
of 1 litre, but actual amount milked 1.1 litres).
4. Delays in loan repayments to banks (meaning beneficiaries have to pay higher interest).
5. At inception of society demands made for large amounts of money from beneficiaries. 
Some may be for bribes for officials. Some is a bribe to the milk society president for the 
"privilege" of being a member of his society.
6. President purchases cattle feeds/medicines at low prices. Sells at high price to beneficiaries.
7. President keeps some milk for lucrative private sales. Pockets money from these.
^ in s of Omission, Sins of Commission
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8. Watering of milk for both private sales and for co-operative sales, so get paid more money 
for milk than actually procured from members. (Co-operative milk federation tests fat 
content of milk, so there is a limit as to how much water may be added to milk which is 
going to the federation. However, buffalo milk has a much higher fat content than cow 
milk, thus allowing more water to be added.)
9. President does not pay money back to banks (outright fraud and theft).
10. President forces beneficiaries to purchase animals through certain cattle brokers or at certain 
markets (president may get commission for this).
11. President gets profits through sale of dung which has accumulated at milking yard.
12. President does not give beneficiaries adequate income from monthly milk sales (ie., he 
should give them at least two-thirds of the money from the sales of milk, but seldom does).
13. Uses society money to give loans to members. May keep interest payments for own profit
14. Scheduled Caste people’s animals always milked last
By Beneficiaries
1. Non-repayment of loan, especially if there has been sale of milch animal before loan is 
repaid.
2. Person gets subsidised loan, but either does not purchase asset at all, or gets one very much 
less than value of loan (but pretends otherwise, and/or gets receipts which state otherwise). 
Especially common for non-milch animal part of program.
3. Benami name loans. A.) A family gets a loan through using wife’s name (because little or 
no land in her name).
4. Benami name loans. B.) A landowner gets a loan by using an agricultural labourer’s name, 
and having that labourer go to the bank in his stead.
Collusive Corruption
1. Beneficiary pays full loan amount for milch animal, but the animal is worth significantly 
less than this. The difference between the animal’s actual value and the amount paid is 
shared among the cattle seller and broker, the Animal Husbandry Officer, and probably the 
milk society president The beneficiary is told that his "share” is the subsidy.
NREP: Common Wrongdoings
1. Administration gives projects to contractors to do.
2. Administration gives contractor less than required grain, less than required cement-these 
items sold on open market
3. Sub-contractors pay women less than men.
4. Sub-contractors falsify employee records, so it looks like far more people worked on 
project
5. Sub-contractors use regular construction gang coolies, rather than hiring needy, unemployed 
agricultural labourers.
6. Projects constructed at time to suit sub-contractor, rather than during agricultural lean 
season, when supposed to be constructed (to be of maximum help to unemployed 
agricultural labourers).
7. Administrators use inflated estimates of project worth, then share excess amount with sub­
contractors.
8. Sub-contractors use inadequate amounts of low quality materials, meaning that construction 
will not last long.
9. Sub-contractors hire skilled labour for some jobs, meaning that one person would get 
equivalent of three "man-days" worth of wages per day.
10. Sub-contractors pay people entirely in cash, sending inferior quality grain to mills for 
repolishing, then selling grain on open market.
11. Sub-contractors, in turn, sub-contract.
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12. Panchayat Presidents are allowed, under NREP rules, to do projects, but do sub-contracting.
13. Works do not get completed.
